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Psychologists and sociologists alike have contributed to our understanding of how 
individuals attribute the causes of—and responsibility for preventing—events both common and 
extraordinary. This dissertation envisioned responsibility and risk holistically by applying 
attribution theory on both an individual level (i.e., how individuals explain the causes of 
accidents and unintentional injury) and within a social context (i.e., how they perceive their 
responsibility to promote safety in public spaces). The research integrated risk perception 
concepts into attribution theory, examining how the perceived nature of risks (e.g., 
controllability, desirability) and the context in which they are encountered (i.e., the novel setting 
of a national park) may affect attribution of responsibility. Finally, the dissertation examined 
how sociocultural variables (e.g., past experiences in a setting, group memberships) and 
exposure to “official” (i.e., institutionally-scripted) and “unofficial” (i.e., unscripted) park-related 
communication relate to attribution of responsibility for causing and preventing visitor injury. 
The study pursued these goals in the context of three U.S. national park units, Mount Rainier 
National Park (Washington), Olympic National Park (Washington) and Delaware Water Gap 
National Recreation Area (Pennsylvania and New Jersey) using in-depth interviews with park 
employees and volunteers, and an online survey of employees, volunteers, and visitors.    
Results suggested differences between employees and visitors in attributing the cause of a 
hypothetical visitor accident, as well as between those with varying levels of experience in a park 
	  setting, and with varying perceptions of the “controllability” of park-related risk. The tendency 
among all respondents to interpret visitor accidents as “user errors” or “acts of God” also 
corresponded to certain attributional processes, such as “blaming the victim.” Among visitors, 
differences in attributing responsibility for preventing accidents were observed on the basis of 
individual characteristics, including activity choice and demographics (e.g., age, sex, 
race/ethnicity). Likewise, among employees, attributions of responsibility varied by occupational 
division, but the idea of a “shared” responsibility for preventing visitor accidents was commonly 
understood as temporal, distributed, and spatial. These and other results suggest various 
management implications, such as whether the NPS should consider co-orientation or attribution 
“re-training” in order to counteract “misalignment” of attributions of responsibility between park 
staff and visitors.    
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CHAPTER 1. 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
The classification of any event as “accidental” is certainly often provisional: misfortunes are only 
described as accidents until responsibility can be apportioned (Green, 1997, p. 3). 
 
Common parlance suggests that “accidents” are part and parcel of daily life, from stubbing 
one’s toe to spilling one’s coffee; we accept and even expect them to occur from time to time.  
But in less mundane situations, in which injury or even death are unfortunate outcomes, how do 
we allocate responsibility for what we perceive as “accidents”? Who (or what) is responsible for 
causing them, and for preventing them from occurring in the first place?  Consider, for example, 
the following accidents:  
• A 34 year-old mother of two is shot as she attempts to intercept a speeding car. The 
driver had failed to stop at a checkpoint intended to ensure that all vehicles install tire 
chains (necessary for driving in icy conditions). Waiting for backup from her co-workers, 
she succumbs to her wounds.     
• An Iraq veteran, the 24 year-old shooter abandons his car and runs into a wooded area of 
waist-high snow, wearing little more than a t-shirt and tennis shoes. He is found the next 
day submerged in a snowy creek, a victim of hypothermia and drowning.   
• Attempting to reach a 14, 410 ft. summit, two experienced mountaineers are caught by 
strong winds and snow. Hit by the same storm, another party of two fails to return from 
an overnight trip to a popular base camp (10, 200 ft). To date, none of the four 
individuals have been found.  
As I sat in my cloistered office, analyzing data collected over seven months in three national 
parks, the news of these accidents found their way in, plastered on CNN newsfeeds and 
assembled on Facebook pages. The stories were at once compelling and tragic. In some ways, I 
	   2	  
reacted to the news of January 2012 at Mount Rainier National Park (MORA) in Washington 
state—the death of a law enforcement ranger, her killer, and four climbers—much like my 
friends at the National Park Service (NPS) and the wider public: with a mixture of shock and 
grief. Yet, for me, the events took on an even greater academic significance. A brief biographical 
tangent is due in order to better explain the emergence of this dissertation research.  
I had spent the previous three years exploring the psychological and sociological 
underpinnings of safety, including the idea of “accidents,” in the context of the NPS. My inquiry 
had brought me to Mount Rainier, a literal landscape of fire and ice, where the active volcano 
reigns far above the Puget Sound metropolitan area. Following my interest in risk 
communication and love of the outdoors, I first found myself at the park in the summer of 2009, 
when I pursued an opportunity with the Student Conservation Association (SCA) to conduct 
public risk management research. Working with Dr. Sara Newman, director of the NPS Public 
Risk Management Program, I designed a research program to explore how MORA utilizes both 
formal and informal sources to convey safety-related messages to park visitors. Studying risk 
communication at MORA led me to consider perceptions of responsibility and risk management: 
when a visitor is hurt or killed in a park, who (or what) is perceived as responsible for the 
tragedy? Moreover, how might such attributions relate to perceptions of park-related risk, such 
as unpredictable weather or rough terrain? During my first visit to MORA, I posed these 
questions to visitors in an online survey. The results suggest that most visitors perceived 
themselves as responsible for their own safety, and their perceptions of the uncontrollability of 
park risks were positively related to these attributions; however, attribution of responsibility for 
safety to park management failed to predict support for preventative risk management as 
expected (Rickard, Scherer, & Newman, 2011). These survey results further piqued my interest 
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in the relationship between risk perception, communication, and attribution theory, an 
intersection that this dissertation research attends to in greater depth.  
Back in Ithaca, NY, thousands of miles removed from the Pacific Northwest, turning on the 
evening news now meant confronting the very questions driving my research.  Measuring how 
visitors perceive and evaluate park-related risks, as well as attribute responsibility for their own 
safety in a park can illuminate potential differences between visitor “types” and suggest 
strategies for targeting and tailoring park safety messages accordingly. If NPS staff and park 
visitors apportion responsibility for causing and preventing visitor accidents differently, for 
example, we can use such information as a baseline to design communication strategies that 
work toward aligning these attributions of responsibility with each other and with NPS visitor 
safety policy. In the rest of this chapter, I provide a brief orientation to the theoretical and 
applied contexts of this research, followed by an overview of each of the chapters that follow.    
Theoretical context 
 In its simplest form, attribution theory tells us how individuals come to attribute both the 
causes of and the responsibility for phenomena: whether to “internal” traits of individuals or to 
“external” characteristics of the environment (Heider, 1958; Shaver, 1985). One classic 
application of this theory has been to consider individuals’ attributions of the cause of accidents: 
whether to an individual’s characteristics (e.g., clumsiness, unsafe behavior), or to situational 
factors outside of her control (e.g., weather, terrain) (Harvey & Weary, 1984; Walster, 1966). To 
date, psychological studies linking attributions of responsibility for accident causation, risk 
perception, and safety have largely considered occupational settings, such as factories (e.g., 
Gyeke, 2003), and everyday routines, such as driving (e.g., Kouabenan, 1998, 2002). Instead of 
focusing on the cause of accidents, a second body of scholarship situates attribution of 
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responsibility in the larger context of risk management and thus seeks to explain how individuals 
attribute responsibility for preventing accidents (i.e., for ensuring safety) in cultural, moral, and 
ethical terms. (I refer to this broad literature, collectively, as describing “prevention attribution”). 
Taking a sociological perspective, this literature has examined issues such as the social 
construction of accidents (Green, 1997) and citizens’ perceptions of the role of government and 
other institutions in regulating risk and safety (e.g., Bickerstaff, Simmons, & Pidgeon, 2008). 
While the causal attribution and prevention attribution literatures share an attention to 
perceptions of risk, risk management, and risk-related behavior, no apparent research has 
attempted their integration.  
 Taking a step in this direction, this dissertation links these two previously segregated 
approaches to attribution theory, thus attempting to broaden our understanding of attribution 
theory on both an individual level (i.e., how individuals explain the causes of accidents and 
unintentional injury) and within a social context (i.e., how they perceive their role in the 
promotion of safety in public spaces). The research also works towards a more thorough 
integration of risk perception concepts into attribution theory, examining how the perceived 
nature of risks, such as controllability (Slovic, 1987) or desirability (Machlis & Rosa, 1990), and 
the context in which they are encountered (e.g., the novel settings of a national park) may affect 
attributions of responsibility. Finally, the research helps clarify how sociocultural variables often 
important to perceptions of risk (e.g., past experiences, institutional memberships) (e.g., Rayner, 
1986; Tansey & O’Riordan, 1999) and exposure to both “official” (i.e., NPS-scripted) and 
“unofficial” (i.e., unscripted, informal) park risk and safety-related communication (Rickard, 
2011) relate to causal attribution and attributions of responsibility. To date, few studies have 
examined how communication, such as exposure to certain information sources (e.g., 
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newspapers, family members), might influence the development of causal attributions (e.g., 
Doria, Abubakar, Syed, Hughes, & Hunter, 2006; Ford & Kaphingst, 2009; O’Neill, McBride, 
Hensley, Alford, & Kaphingst, 2010).   
Applied context 
According to data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), unintentional 
injury (including suicide and homicide) constitutes the leading cause of death for Americans 
under age 44 (CDC, 2010). From a public health perspective, these injuries result from a variety 
of contributory factors, including individual behavior (e.g., driving while intoxicated), 
organizational management and regulation (e.g., seatbelt laws), as well as environmental and 
infrastructural conditions (e.g., road conditions) (Waller, 1994).   Hosting hundreds of millions 
of visitors each year, U.S. national parks represent one context in which unintentional injuries 
are both recurrent and often fatal (NPS, 2009). Data reported by the NPS indicate that on average 
three visitors die in parks every week due to unintentional injuries and an average of 14 people 
are seriously injured daily (S. B. Newman, personal communication, May 2009). Given these 
unsettling statistics, this research broadly supports the NPS’ public health goal of limiting 
injuries and fatalities among park visitors. To do so, this study compares park employees,’ 
volunteers,’ and visitors’: (1) attributions of responsibility for maintaining safe park visits; (2) 
perceptions of the cause of unintentional injury; (3) understanding of the role of risk and risk 
management in national parks. Awareness of these groups’ attributional beliefs and opinions of 
safety, in turn, can help inform the content of future official and unofficial risk communication 
strategies in parks, especially in locations where engineering or enforcement strategies are 
inappropriate or impossible, and given racially and ethnically-diverse visitor populations.  
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Research overview 
 Methods. By using a mixed method design, including quantitative and qualitative methods, 
and by allowing for immersion into three national parks, the research attempted to provide richer, 
experiential accounts of participants, a perspective that has received only limited attention to date 
in the safety literature (Dorn & Brown, 2003). Three U.S. national parks, Mount Rainier 
National Park (MORA), Delaware Water Gap National Recreation Area (DEWA), and Olympic 
National Park (OLYM), provided the setting for data collection, which included (1) an online 
survey of park visitors (n = 773) and park staff, including employees (n = 251) and volunteers (n 
= 163) and (2) in-depth interviews with park staff (n = 57). This study adopted a “concurrent 
nested strategy” (Creswell, 2003, p. 218), as both qualitative and quantitative data were collected 
simultaneously during a single phase with an emphasis placed on the survey to visitors and 
employees (quantitative), and the interviews (qualitative) serving as the “nested” method. A 
“complementary” mixed method study, each method focused more directly on one of the main 
dependent variables to provide an “enriched, elaborated understanding” of the central 
“phenomenon” of attribution theory and risk management in an applied context (Greene, 
Caracelli, & Graham, 1989, p. 258).  
 Outline of chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter 2 provides an overview of the 
scholarly literature informing this research. First, I present the foundational social psychological 
literature explicating causal attribution theory, including the central concept of defensive 
attribution, and the application of attribution theory to studies of workplace safety. Next, I delve 
into the sociological literature, exploring how prevention attribution can include cultural beliefs, 
such as fatalism, as well as be connected to a given organization’s “safety culture” (e.g., Cooper, 
2000; Guldenmund, 2000). Following is an overview of the connection between attribution 
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theory and risk perception, including an attention to how one’s connection to, or understanding 
of, a physical place may influence perceptions of risk (e.g., Masuda & Garvin, 2006), and how 
risk may become desirable given certain circumstances, such as participating in outdoor 
recreation (Machlis & Rosa, 1990). A fourth section considers extant literature drawing 
connections between risk communication and attribution theory, while the final section 
introduces the context of a national park, highlighting its unique attributes by comparing them to 
those found in a theme (amusement) park or an occupational setting. The chapter concludes with 
an overview of previous relevant research in a national park context, and a presentation of 
research goals and hypotheses.  
 To clarify how the data for this study were collected, Chapter 3 presents an extensive review 
of the research methods. The chapter involves an explanation of how the research sites were 
selected, and permission was obtained to conduct the research, as well as a justification for using 
“mixed” methods. For the online survey, I present the sampling strategies employed to select 
employees, volunteers, and visitors, as well as an overview of the items included in the survey, 
and the logistics involved in conducting the survey. Likewise, for the in-depth interviews, I 
explain how interviewees were selected, and what general subject areas the interviews entailed. 
The chapter concludes with a discussion on data analysis, including how I integrated the 
qualitative and quantitative data, and implications for generalizability of study results.   
 The first of two chapters presenting results of the survey, Chapter 4 considers the hypotheses 
and research questions related to causal attribution theory. The chapter begins with a brief 
description of the sample, including demographic characteristics of employees, volunteers, and 
visitors who responded to the survey. Drawing upon results from survey respondents’ 
interpretations of a hypothetical scenario in which a visitor is injured (presented in the survey), 
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this chapter illustrates differences between visitors’ and employees’ causal attributions (H1), and 
the relationship between employees’ and visitors’ experience with the context and attributions of 
responsibility (H2 and H3, respectively). I also explore relationships between causal attribution 
(as an outcome variable) and several predictor variables, including sense of place (RQ1), 
perception of risk (RQ2), and exposure to park-related information (RQ3). Alongside 
quantitative results to the survey questions, I also present qualitative, free-response data in order 
to better illustrate the meaning of the findings.  
 Chapter 5 presents the second part of the survey data, this time with respect to prevention 
attribution (i.e., attribution of responsibility for preventing accidents/ensuring safety). First, I 
investigate the relationship between visitors’ voluntary risk-taking (operationalized as 
participation in certain “risky” recreational activities) and attributions of responsibility (H4). 
Shifting the focus to employees, I explore whether these individuals tend to attribute 
responsibility for preventing visitor injury to the visitor (i.e., internal responsibility), to the NPS 
(i.e., external responsibility), or to a combination of both (i.e., shared) (H5). The analysis next 
considers whether visitors’ attributions of responsibility for preventing injury vary by certain 
demographic characteristics, such as sex, age, and country of origin (H6). As in Chapter 4, 
Chapter 5 also includes a series of research questions that explore the relationships between 
attribution of responsibility (as an outcome variable) and various predictor variables, including 
sense of place (RQ4), causal attribution (RQ5), perception of risk (RQ6), and exposure to park-
related information (RQ7). Once again, the analysis relies on both quantitative and qualitative 
data, as free-response answers are used to further interpret statistically significant findings.   
 Switching gears, Chapter 6 considers the interviews with park employees and volunteers. 
Instead of considering each of the research questions articulated earlier in the dissertation 
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sequentially, as done in Chapters 4 and 5, in following the tradition of grounded theory analysis 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1969) I present my findings thematically. First, I explore the idea of risk as 
taking on value in certain contexts, such as national parks, where its presence may be desired and 
even sought. I next present employees’ and volunteers’ interpretations of their (and the National 
Park Service’s) responsibility to prevent visitor injury, which evokes the concept of the “three 
Es”—education, engineering, and enforcement—of risk management (Baker, 1973; Heberlein, 
1974), and how interviewees understood each of these realms. In addition to recognizing their 
own responsibility, interviewees also saw visitors as playing a role in their own safety, which 
seemed to translate into a “checklist” of things to do (and ways to act) both before and during a 
park visit. A subsequent section presents the ways in which employees and volunteers thought 
about visitor “accidents”—including issues of definition (what is an “accident”?), causality, and 
blame. Rounding out the chapter, the final section considers how interviewees spoke of the 
“culture” of safety more broadly in the NPS, including attention to employee safety, and the role 
of communication. 
 Considering each of the previous chapters, Chapter 7 reviews pertinent findings and presents 
avenues for future inquiry. As an overall conclusion, this chapter attempts to not just present the 
results, but also to answer the larger “so what?” question. To do so, I re-visit the literature 
presented in Chapter 2, and also re-cast my theoretical net even further to locate possible 
connections to empirical findings in other disciplines, such as safety science and cultural 
geography. These ideas provide interesting fodder for future studies, as I suggest throughout this 
chapter. At the same time, I revisit the present study to highlight potential limitations in 
methodology, such as challenges in achieving a random visitor sampling strategy, and 
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measurement, such as an inadequate distinction between “controllability” and “voluntariness” of 
park-related risk.     
What should the reader take away from the combination of these chapters? From a pragmatic 
perspective, this research sheds light upon how one institution, the National Park Service, 
manages risk for a varied amalgamation of employees and public users. Moreover, by integrating 
research in risk perception, tourism/leisure studies, and environmental psychology with existing 
work in attribution theory, the research provides new evidence of how previously unconsidered 
variables tend to predict differences in how individuals attribute the causes of, and responsibility 
for preventing, unintentional injury. As will be discussed in Chapter 7, anticipating how 
individuals attribute responsibility for safety can provide a platform for designing public 
communication, as well as influencing desired visitor behavior, both central to institutional risk 
management practices.  From a theoretical perspective, this research aims to link two different 
ontological and epistemological approaches to considering attribution of responsibility. 
Discussion in Chapter 7 suggests using Construal Level Theory (CLT) as one potential avenue 
for marrying the concepts of prevention and causal attribution; however, the broader question 
remains as to whether the operationalization of “prevention attribution” via standardized survey 
questions, such as were used in this dissertation, maintains loyalty to its original 
conceptualization.  
 In its inclusion of the qualitative and the quantitative, and attention to the psychological 
and the sociological, this dissertation, like the concept of risk management itself, is, at times, 
complex and cumbersome. By placing a widely known psychological concept in conversation 
with a broader field of ethical and moral inquiry, I intended to better represent what I see as a 
theoretical and applied concept resisting neat packaging. Unsurprisingly, integrating the concepts 
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of both literatures into a single predictive model, neither a small nor uncontroversial task, 
remains an unmet, but future goal of this line of research. It is my hope that the reader comes 
away assured of the breadth and depth of risk management practice, and aware of the role that 
social science, generally, and communication theory, more specifically, can play in keeping 
places and people safe.      
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CHAPTER 2. 
 
 LINKING THEORIES OF ATTRIBUTION, RISK PERCEPTION, AND RISK 
COMMUNICATION 
 
Causal Attribution 
 During the past fifty years, social scientists have amassed an impressive body of literature 
establishing and applying the principles of attribution theory. Sociologists and social 
psychologists alike have contributed to our understanding of how individuals come to attribute 
both the causes of and the responsibility for such wide-ranging phenomena as diseases, natural 
disasters, institutional failure, and academic success. An early leader in attribution research, 
social psychologist Howard Kelley (1973, p. 107) described attribution theory as:  
…About how people make causal explanations, about how they answer questions 
beginning with ‘why?’ It deals with the information they use in making causal inferences, 
and with what they do with this information to answer causal questions.   
 
From a more contemporary perspective, sociologist Kathleen Crittenden (1989) characterized 
attribution as, “A process that begins with social perception, progresses through causal judgment 
and social inference, and ends with behavioral consequences” (Crittenden, 1989, p. 2). In its 
simplest form, social psychological attribution research questions whether a given victory or 
calamity is perceived as caused by the “internal” (“dispositional”) traits of individuals, or by the 
“external” (“situational”) characteristics of their environment (Heider, 1958). For their part, 
sociologists have embraced attribution theory as a platform to explore various social processes 
such as impression management and labeling (e.g., Crittenden, 1983, 1989; Crittenden & Bae, 
1994; Howard & Levinson, 1985), as well as social roles and expectations (e.g., Hamilton, 1978; 
Hamilton & Sanders, 1981). Given the expansiveness of this multidisciplinary literature, for the 
purpose of this chapter I limit my review to the aspects and applications of attribution theory 
most relevant to understanding perceptions of risk, accidents, and unintentional injuries, the 
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substantive focus of this research. I begin this section by reviewing the concepts and variables 
central to social psychological attribution research, next introducing defensive attribution and its 
application to occupational contexts.        
Social psychological definition 
 Using mostly experimental methodologies, social psychologists have applied attribution 
theory to illustrate how individuals assign responsibility for a hypothetical event given a variety 
of conditions. Pioneering researchers in the 1950s and ‘60s characterized citizens as “naïve 
psychologists,” (Heider, 1958) motivated to decipher the complexities of daily life by seeking 
explanations for why events occur. Given adequate time and cognitive reasoning tools, Kelley 
(1972) explained that individuals tend to gather and analyze information about the world around 
them by way of an analysis of variance (ANOVA). By referencing the statistical procedure 
popular with social scientists, Kelley (1972) meant that most people weigh the contributions of 
various factors to the eventual “outcome” in question, whether a car accident or passed test, 
attending to the pattern with which such factors (i.e., independent variables) and effects (i.e., 
dependent variables) relate to one another. Individuals may consider, for example, the particular 
circumstances in which an event occurred, and whether any other events have occurred under 
similar circumstances in the past. Put simply, individuals’ informal observational data allow 
them to attribute effects to factors with which they covary (Kelley & Michaela, 1980). Two more 
specific principles, theorized by Kelley (1972) and empirically validated by various social 
psychologists, further describe the attribution process. First, the “discounting principle” (Kelley, 
1972) posits that, “the role of a given cause in producing a given effect is discounted if other 
plausible causes are also present” (Shaver, 1985, p. 55). A companion effect, the “augmentation 
principle,” describes the process by which “the perceiver will perceive [a cause] to be stronger 
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when the effect occurs in the presence of the obstacle…than when the effect occurs in the 
absence of the obstacle” (Shaver, 1985, p. 56). For example, if an individual succeeds in building 
a house despite considerable adversity (e.g., inclement weather, insufficient funding, etc.), 
observers are more likely to attribute the cause of the individual’s success to her own abilities 
(e.g., fortitude, work ethic, etc.), than if she had completed the task under more favorable 
circumstances. 
 When distinguishing a cause of an event from multiple causes, however, whether or not 
individuals are afforded one or multiple observations of the phenomenon matters in their 
eventual attributional judgments; given just one observation or “data point,” people tend to rely 
on cognitive schemata to “fill in the gaps” of a given scenario (Kelley, 1972, 1973; Shaver, 
1985).  While amassing multiple observations of a given scenario may be ideal, in situations of 
incomplete information, Kelley (1972) noted that individuals may rely on so-called “causal 
schemata”: general conceptions about how certain causes may interact to produce particular 
kinds of effects. As he explained:     
…The mature individual undoubtedly has acquired a repertoire of abstract ideas about the 
operation and interaction of causal factors. These conceptions afford him a solution to the 
need for economical and fast attributional analysis, by providing a framework within which 
bits and pieces of relevant information can be fitted in order to draw reasonably good 
causal inferences (Kelley, 1972, p. 152).  
 
Following the ANOVA approach, these causal schemata replace “actual” observations, providing 
the observer with “an assumed pattern of data” (Kelley, 1973, p. 115) on which to base 
attributional judgments. 
 As indicated above, much social psychological attribution research distinguishes the locus of 
causality of a given event as internal (“dispositional”), those presumably brought about by 
actions or characteristics of the individual, or external (“situational), forces outside of the person 
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(Shaver, 1985). A third category of the locus of causes, so-called “superphysical causality,” the 
explanation that “God has a reason,” may also exist. Research indicates that the religiosity of 
individuals and the nature of the event described may be important variables in determining 
whether superphysical explanations are generated (Shaver, 1985). In addition to the locus of the 
cause, Weiner (1996, 2006) proposes that individuals attribute the cause of a given event based 
on two additional properties: (1) its controllability: the extent to which the cause is perceived to 
be under personal or situational control), and (2) its stability: the extent to which the cause is 
perceived to vary over time. Building on Weiner’s work, Anderson (1983) focused on properties 
of the event to predict how individuals generate causal attributions. Using an experimental 
methodology, Anderson (1983) showed that varying the context by illustrating cases of 
interpersonal failure (i.e., failing to make friends), noninterpersonal failure (i.e., failing a test), 
interpersonal success (i.e., cheering up a friend), and noninterpersonal success (i.e., winning a 
board game) associated with hypothetical scenarios led respondents to generate causes that 
differed in causal dimensions (i.e., changeability, locus, stability, intentionality, globality, and 
controllability). Concluding that individuals “do not simply examine a standard list of possible 
causes” (Anderson, 1983, p. 192), Anderson explained that a causal explanation of a given event 
might become salient under particular circumstances and not others.      
  Just as the perceived characteristics of a cause or the context of the situation matter, how 
individuals understand the intentionality of an event may also affect resulting causal attributions.  
Importantly, Weiner (1996) suggests that controllability and intention are distinct concepts, with 
controllability a property of the cause itself, and intention related to a person’s motives or goals; 
both concepts, however, contribute to the larger, encompassing concept of individual 
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responsibility. Illustrating the distinction between these concepts, Weiner (1996, p. 204) 
explained:  
… A person failing because of a lack of effort is deemed to be personally responsible 
inasmuch as one can choose to expend effort or not. On the other hand, one does not make 
a decision about aptitude. For this reason, failure because of lack of aptitude does not result 
in a judgment of responsibility.  
 
According to Malle (1999), when individuals perceive a given behavior as intended, they utilize 
“reason explanations” that “cite the agent’s reasons for acting that way” (Malle, 1999, p. 24). 
The inverse is also true: when individuals encounter “reason explanations,” they are more likely 
to understand a given behavior or event as intended. When behaviors or events are unintentional, 
the author further explained, individuals develop “cause explanations”—explanations “without 
the mediating role of an intention” (Malle, 1999, p. 27). Based on his experimental work, Malle 
(1999) concluded that people’s explanations for intentional behaviors and events explode the 
dualistic categories of external or internal locus of causality, and rather should be understood as 
more complex “folk explanations” anchored by perceived intentionality.   
Defensive attribution 
 Among social psychologists studying perceptions of unintentional accidents, however, the 
internal-external causal duality remains a popular approach: whether an accident is perceived as 
having been caused by an individual’s characteristics (e.g., clumsiness, unsafe behavior), or by 
situational factors outside of her control (e.g., weather, uneven terrain) (Harvey & Weary, 1984; 
Walster, 1966). In a seminal study examining perceptions of hypothetical car accident scenarios, 
Walster (1966) found that judgments of causal responsibility were dependent upon the severity 
of accident consequences; as she explained, motivated by our need to think of unfortunate events 
as avoidable, as the magnitude of harm (e.g., bodily injury, property damage) increases, we are 
more likely to see the event as predictable or controllable, rather than the product of random 
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chance. Viewing the accident victim as culpable serves as a self-protective mechanism: a way to 
convince ourselves that, had the individual behaved differently, disaster may have been averted. 
Walster’s work provided a foundation for the exploration of “defensive attribution” in 
experimental settings by researchers interested in how individuals attribute responsibility for a 
range of unfavorable outcomes, from diseases to damages associated with natural disasters 
(Burger, 1981; Shaver, 1970).  
Like the concept of defensive attribution, the Just World Hypothesis (Lerner & Miller, 1978) 
describes situations in which people’s perceptions of causality tend to follow self-protective 
patterns (Burger, 1981). When unfortunate events befall individuals, as Lerner and Miller (1978) 
explained, we tend to believe that such individuals “deserve” what they get or, as a corollary, 
“get what they deserve.” The Just World Hypothesis describes attempts to preserve a systematic 
view of a fair world—one that punishes the guilty, for instance—as a way to navigate an 
increasingly complicated daily life. As the authors explain: 
Since the belief that the world is just serves such an important adaptive function for the 
individual, people are very reluctant to give up this belief, and they can be greatly 
troubled if they encounter evidence that suggests that the world is not really just or 
orderly after all (Lerner & Miller, 1978, pp. 1030-1031).  
 
According to the researchers, as circumstances of a particular fate approach the experiences or 
traits of an individual, she experiences empathy, a reaction that may motivate her to develop 
explanations for this possible injustice. Conversely, individuals may be drawn to “derogate” an 
innocent victim, i.e., to view the person as less attractive given his or her suffering of a 
particularly unsavory fate, and reacting in this way appears to function as a self-protective 
mechanism; for instance, she “deserved” this outcome because she’s a bad (mean, treacherous, 
etc.) person, but it won’t happen to me because I’m a good (kind, generous, etc.) person.  
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 Despite the attractiveness of the concept, in practice, defensive attribution (and the related 
Just World Hypothesis) research has produced mixed results, leading researchers to seek 
additional variables to better explain the psychological process. Eschewing the experimental 
approach most often used by attribution researchers, Bulman and Wortman (1977) conducted 
interviews with individuals who had experienced serious accidents, such as spinal cord injuries 
associated with falls, in order to better understand the predictors of “successful” coping. Though 
testing hypotheses related to defensive attribution did not constitute a central aim of the study, 
the authors found scant evidence that study participants were motivated to avoid blame for 
becoming accident victims; instead, “in general, the respondents appeared to attribute more 
blame to themselves than objective circumstances would warrant” (Bulman & Wortman, 1977, 
p. 361). After failing to replicate Walster’s (1966) experimental findings, Shaver (1970) 
concluded that the perceived similarity between the accident victim and the respondent, in terms 
of personal characteristics and situational circumstances, matter in determining whether 
defensive attribution occurs. In sum, respondents avoided concluding that a situationally relevant 
accident could have been by caused by a like individual through the following reasoning pattern:   
…Assign responsibility when personal similarity is low, secure in the knowledge that as a 
different kind of person, you are safe. When personality similarity is high, attribute the 
accident to unfortunate, but unavoidable, circumstances (Shaver, 1970, p. 108). 
 
 Following Shaver’s (1970) lead, in a meta-analysis of the defensive attribution hypothesis, 
Burger (1981) investigated whether Walster’s fundamental conclusion, that attribution of 
responsibility to the victim of the accident increases as consequences become more severe, holds 
across diverse experiments. Importantly, Burger’s (1981) review of the literature uncovered 
several variables largely unexplored in Walster’s work that may contribute to the process of 
attribution with respect to accident causation, including:  
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 Personal and situational similarity. Following Walster’s logic, the observer of an accident 
who sees himself as different from the victim may be motivated to blame this person for the 
event, and in so doing, rule out the possibility that the event may have happened due to chance. 
Alternatively, researchers such as Shaver (1970) noted (as described above) that if observers 
perceive themselves as similar to the accident victim, they may be motivated to attribute the 
accident to external factors, rather than to internal characteristics of the individual, a process 
known as “blame avoidance.”  
 Experimental realism. At the time of his writing, Burger (1981) observed that most 
psychological attribution research relied on the presentation of hypothetical scenarios. He and 
other researchers questioned whether bolstering the “realism” of the experiment, such as by 
presenting the scenario from the point-of-view of the victim, reading the scenario out loud 
(rather than presenting it to respondents in written form), and providing multiple perspectives on 
the victim (e.g., highlighting his or her personal relationships, career aspirations, and so forth) 
might affect respondents’ attributional judgments.   
 Level of responsibility attributed to the accident victim. Beginning with Heider (1958), 
many researchers have noted that the level of responsibility attributed to a (hypothetical) victim 
can vary considerably, from, for example, “holding a person responsible for anything associated 
with him or her to attributing responsibility only for intentional, uncoerced acts with foreseeable 
consequences” (Burger, 1981, p. 509). If respondents are unaware of the level of responsibility 
on which they are to base their attributional judgments of a given experimental scenario, each 
individual may choose a different level, thus introducing error. Fishbein and Ajzen (1973, p. 
150) summarized this potential dilemma as such:  
  A question such as, “Is the actor responsible for the accident?” can be interpreted in 
different ways: (1) Was the actor associated with the accident?, (2) Was he instrumental 
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in producing the accident, i.e., did he cause it?, (3) Is he responsible in the sense that he 
could have foreseen the accident?, (4) Did he intend to cause the accident?, and (5) To 
what extent was his behavior justified? Since subjects are usually not told at what level 
they are to respond, judgments of responsibility  may take on different meanings in 
different conditions of an experiment, in  different investigations, and for different 
subjects. 
 
Recognizing the need to parse out the contribution of these variables, Burger (1981) concluded 
his review by noting that future research “should not be whether the defensive attribution effect 
exists but rather under what conditions it can be found” (Burger, 1981, p. 509).   
 Counterfactual thinking. Elsewhere, researchers have suggested additional personal or 
situational attributes that may influence the course of defensive attribution. First, defensive 
attribution may be influenced by counterfactual thinking—that is, “the tendency to mentally 
undo negative outcomes by imagining how events might have been better or worse” (Williams & 
Lees-Haley, 1996, p. 2100). In an experimental study, Williams and Lees-Haley (1996) showed 
that the mutability, or ease with which individuals could imagine an alternative outcome, of a 
given car accident scenario led participants to view the accident as more avoidable, and thus they 
ascribed a greater causal role to the accident perpetrator. Other experimental studies of 
hypothetical accidents have measured participants’ own locus of control, the degree to which 
individuals judge themselves as in control of their own fate, finding that “internals” (i.e., 
individuals with a high internal locus of control) tend to assign the most responsibility to the 
victim for the accident, whereas “externals” (i.e., individuals with a high external locus of 
control) assign the least (e.g., Sosis, 1974; Steensma, den Hartigh, & Lucardie, 1994). In such 
experiments, participants appear to extend their personal philosophy of responsibility to judging 
the hypothetical accident victim’s fate. Moreover, internals and externals may construct 
dissimilar interpretations of the accident, such as “a case of negligent behavior” versus “a case of 
bad luck” (Sosis, 1974, p. 398).   
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 Level of experience. Causal attributions of accidents also appear to be affected by the level 
of experience of the perceiver in the hypothetical activity described. Surveying West African 
drivers of differing occupations (e.g., professional drivers, police officers, students) and 
experience levels (e.g., non-drivers, novices, professionals), Kouabenan (2002) explored the 
relationship between driving experience and causal attribution of car accidents. Findings 
indicated that one’s occupation and past exposure to road risks do affect causal attributions, in 
that greater driving experience tends to predict both internal and external attributions. That is, 
Kouabenan (2002) argues that the varying attributions made across the occupations studied 
represent a common pattern of defensive attribution by occupational group; all respondents “tend 
in their explanations to present themselves positively and decline causal responsibility for 
accidents, passing the blame onto others or pointing to factors beyond their control” (Kouabenan, 
2002, p. 65). In a different context, Kumagai, Daniels, Carroll, Bliss, and Edwards (2004) 
present similar results. In a community affected by wildfire in the Sierra Nevada region of 
California, respondents who had already experienced wildfires in the past were more likely to 
attribute responsibility for the fire to people other than themselves, such as government agencies. 
Moreover, Kumagai et al.’s (2004) interviews provided evidence that individuals who felt a loss 
of control over their situation tended to attribute fire damage to factors associated with others, 
including firefighters and bureaucrats (see also Kumagai, Bliss, Daniels, & Carroll, 2004; Winter 
& Fried, 2000).  
 A few studies have also investigated how one’s experience may also lead to the development 
of “optimistic bias” (e.g., Weinstein, 1980, 1987; McKenna, 1993): the propensity for 
individuals to see themselves as less susceptible to certain risks than those around them, or the 
sense that “it won’t happen to me” (Caponecchia, 2010). This perceptual bias, in turn, can affect 
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how one perceives the cause of accidents. In a questionnaire study of college students regarding 
perceptions of hypothetical driving-related accidents, DeJoy (1989) found that more experienced 
drivers, as well as those who viewed themselves as skilled drivers, tended to assign greater 
importance to “human factors” such as operator errors (i.e., internal attribution) in accident 
causation as opposed to external factors, such as technical problems or bad luck. Since this “risk 
optimism” appears “related to an exaggerated sense of control,” DeJoy (1989, p. 339) explained 
that more experienced drivers tend to perceive others as similarly “in control” of their safety on 
the road, and thus blameworthy in the case of an accident. Similarly, in a qualitative study 
examining police officers’ perceptions of their on-the-job driving accidents, Dorn and Brown 
(2003) found that officers tended to attribute the causes of these accidents to sources other than 
themselves, perceiving themselves as “invulnerable.” A qualitative study of residents’ reactions 
to wildfire in six Western U.S. communities provides additional evidence of the role of 
optimistic bias and perceptions of controllability in influencing attributional judgments (Cohn, 
Williams, & Carroll, 2008). Overall, residents were hesitant to attribute any responsibility for a 
fire to their own actions, preferring to “attribute the magnitude, damage, or cause of the fires to 
others, the acts of others, or natural processes” (Cohn et al., 2008, p. 38). Somewhat 
paradoxically, the authors describe these individuals as:  
  …Willing to accept the risk of living in the [fire-prone community] and the 
responsibility of undertaking firesafing measures, but they did not include themselves as 
responsible agents for damage to their homes and property (Cohn et al., 2008, p. 36).  
 
While the findings from these three studies provide a useful foundation for future analysis, the 
extent to which causal attribution may be linked to optimistic bias in other contexts remains 
uncertain.  
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Workplace safety 
 Outside of the laboratory, defensive attribution has been researched most extensively with 
regard to workers’ and managers’ interpretations of the causes of workplace accidents (e.g., 
Dejoy, 1985, 1994). Such studies focus primarily on occupational safety, such as preventing 
accidents on the factory floor, and consider both managers’ and workers’ perspectives (e.g., 
Dejoy, 1985, 1994; Goncalves, da Silva, Lima, & Melia, 2008; Gyekye, 2003; Hasle, Kines, & 
Andersen, 2009; Lehane & Stubbs, 2001). Much of this research argues that identifying causal 
attributions of both “expert” (e.g., managers) and “lay” (e.g., rank-and-file employees) 
individuals constitutes a central element of designing effective accident prevention strategies in 
occupational settings (e.g., Dejoy, 1985, 1994; Goncalves, da Silva, Lima, & Melia, 2008; 
Gyekye, 2003; Hasle, Kines, & Andersen, 2009; Kouabenan, 1998, 2002, 2009; Kouabenan & 
Cadet, 2005; Kouabenan, Gilbert, Medina, & Bouzon, 2001; Lehane & Stubbs, 2001; Torell & 
Bremberg, 1995). For instance, in a survey-based study of managers and workers who suffered 
slipping or tripping-related accidents in British worksites, Lehane and Stubbs (2001) argue that 
the misalignment between managers’ and workers’ perceptions of the cause of accidents, as 
attributed to the individual or to the work environment, may result in tension, mistrust, and 
misunderstanding. They describe how both managers and employees might be persuaded—
through training and targeted information—to adopt a more “balanced” view of causal 
responsibility, in order to “foster a better environment for the effective implementation of 
preventative [injury] strategies in a mutually supportive way” (Lehane & Stubbs, 2001, p. 125). 
As these and other studies show (e.g., Desai, Roberts, & Ciavarelli, 2006; Hofmann & Stetzer, 
1998; Salminen, 1992; Steensma et al., 1994), wide disparities often exist between perceived 
causal attributions of those in different hierarchical levels of organizations; these differences, in 
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turn, may impact the effectiveness or appropriateness of various risk communication or 
management strategies.    	  
Prevention Attribution  
 As reviewed above, applied studies linking attributions of responsibility for accident 
causation, risk perception, and safety have largely been conducted in occupational settings, such 
as factories (e.g., Gyeke, 2003), and in the course of everyday routines, such as driving (e.g., 
Kouabenan, 1998, 2002).1 Such studies have concentrated on applying attribution theory to 
highlight how particular individuals (e.g., managers and employees) perceive the causes of 
accidents. Scaling up from this micro-level perspective, relationships between attribution theory 
and risk perception have also been explored on a broader, societal level in terms of risk 
management and safety promotion.  
 Taking a sociological perspective, a small body of literature has focused more directly on the 
social construction of accidents and how audiences attribute the responsibility for accident 
prevention (i.e., safety promotion) in various social settings. Differing from the psychologically 
focused studies on causal attribution, this literature situates attribution of responsibility in the 
larger context of risk management and thus seeks to explain it in cultural, moral, and ethical 
terms. While this literature adopts the language of causal attribution, some clarification is 
necessary to understand the meaning of the terms employed. An internal attribution of 
responsibility denotes personal responsibility: the responsibility to the individual him/herself to 
prevent injury, and to maintain safety. An external attribution of responsibility, on the other 
hand, holds an external source accountable: the responsibility for keeping individuals safe is seen 
as falling on a third party, such as a manager, an organization, or a larger institution. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 To a much lesser extent, this research has considered the context of communities, such as residential 
neighborhoods (e.g., Butchart, Kruger, & Lekoba, 2000).  
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following section briefly reviews attribution theory and safety in the social constructionist 
tradition then examines this perspective in the context of occupational settings. Before delving 
into this specific literature, however, I take a step back to consider, more generally, how 
sociologists, geographers, and political scientists, among others, have considered the 
management of risk in terms of individual or institutional responsibility.      
Managing risk: Individual (internal) or institutional (external) responsibility?  
Beginning in the early 1990s, a multidisciplinary collection of social scientists drew 
increasing attention to how citizens understand both their own, as well as the government’s, role 
in regulating risk (e.g., Beck, 1992; Eden, 1993; Hinchliffe, 1997). Based largely, but not 
exclusively, in the European context, such research seems to question the larger implications of 
attributing responsibility for preventing the “ills” associated with an increasingly industrialized, 
technologically-based society, whether exposure to genetically modified organisms, or the 
effects of a changing climate. Rather than focusing more narrowly on processes of human 
cognition, for instance, as might be said of seminal work on causal attribution by social 
psychologists (see previous sections), therefore, this research asks more broadly what such 
attributions might tell us about the nature of contemporary society. Understanding the 
contribution of this diffuse collection of studies to our understanding of risk and attribution of 
responsibility may be best accomplished in describing four broad, underlying themes, which I 
discuss in turn. 
First, this research presupposes the existence of a “risk society” (Beck, 1992): one in which 
advancements in science, and the ever-increasing division of labor present opportunities for risks 
to emerge, yet does not (necessarily) allocate responsibility to manage such risk—so-called 
“organized irresponsibility” (see also Bickerstaff, Simmons, & Pidgeon, 2008). With this notion 
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comes the idea that institutional actors can “offload” responsibility for avoiding risk onto 
individual citizens, people who may be ill equipped to address such responsibility. At the same 
time, citizens themselves may hold certain expectations about who should be addressing risks, 
which can influence their perception of risk, including its acceptability (Freudenberg, 1993). 
Analyzing quantitative and qualitative data related to two risk-based case studies in the U.S., 
toxic waste exposure and the citing of a nuclear facility, Freudenberg (1993) used the term 
“recreancy” to describe how political institutions can fail to carry out their responsibility to 
manage risk to a level meriting public support and the cultivation of trust. As such, the 
expectation of responsibility becomes an important driver of perception of risk, as Freudenberg 
concludes (1993, p. 927):    
…The issue may still be risk, but it is at least in part the risk that socially consequential 
actors will fail to carry out their duties with the full degree of competence and 
responsibility that their fellow citizens need to expect.  
 
 The expectation that an outside (external) institution—government or otherwise—will 
address a risk issue drives the second theme of this research: the idea of transferring or “shifting” 
responsibility from the individual to an outside other (Bickerstaff & Walker, 2002; Eden, 1993; 
Hallman & Wandersman, 1992; Maestas, Atkeson, Croom, & Bryant, 2008).  In part, shifting 
responsibility can be contingent on the attributes of the individual actor, including one’s 
perception of response efficacy: the belief that his or her actions will contribute to the solving of 
a problem, such as the minimization of an environmental ill (Eden, 1993). In a qualitative study 
of citizens and environmental activists in Leeds, England, Eden (1993) introduced the concept of 
“actionable responsibility” to describe how some people experience an almost moral 
responsibility to engage in pro-environmental behavior; this sense of responsibility, Eden (1993) 
explained, may be supported by their understanding of the nature of the problem(s) as well as 
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their having the relative “privilege” necessary contribute to the process (e.g., being financially 
able to make a donation to an environmental group). Those who did not identify as 
environmental activists, however, tended to divert responsibility away from themselves, either to 
the aforementioned activists, or to generalized institutional “others.” In a U.S. context, Maestas, 
Atkeson, Croom, and Bryant (2008) described how news coverage of Hurricane Katrina 
showcases what they referred to as “transfer attributions”: the process of transferring blame for 
the consequences of the record-breaking storm from one level of government to another (see also 
Iyengar, 1989). The tendency to shift—or to share—responsibility can also be related to the 
history of governance in a particular place, including the (non)existence of a “social contract” 
between the nation state and its citizens (Harrison, Burgess, & Filius, 1996).  
 Part of the process of “shifting” responsibility, this research demonstrates, is also dependent 
on the social context of the risk. Most centrally, is a given risk, or social ill, perceived as a 
“collective” or an “individual” problem? (Bickerstaff et al., 2008; Bickerstaff & Walker, 2002; 
Petts, 2005). In her exploration of two risk-based case studies, the MMR vaccination and air 
pollution, Petts (2005) illustrated how focus groups of English citizens tended to view 
themselves as having individual (internal) responsibility for MMR (i.e., a mother’s responsibility 
to get her child vaccinated to avoid potential disease), but not for air pollution; instead: 
“…people either passively distanced responsibility to the rest of society or sought to transfer 
responsibility for action to government and industry” (p. 799). As a “collective,” rather than 
“individual” risk, air pollution thus, “challenges concepts of individualization because people do 
not conceive that either the cause of the problem, or its solution, lies with them personally and 
solely” (p. 801). Also employing focus groups in the UK, Bickerstaff et al. (2008) reached a 
similar conclusion: that different types of risks conjure different “representations of the problem” 
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(p. 1317), and thus expressions of responsibility. For instance, a mobile device was seen as an 
individual responsibility, “typically framed in terms of a consumer-choice model of action: the 
power of the sovereign consumer to reject a product or service that was considered to present an 
unacceptable risk” (p. 1317). In turn, respondents saw themselves as having agency, personal 
choice, and control over their exposure to the risk. Most generally, such research suggests the 
importance of knowing how individuals experience and understand risks in order to predict how 
they will see their responsibility to prevent and respond to them (e.g., Hinchliffe, 1997).  
 A final theme underlying this literature surrounds the idea of “ambivalence”: the lack of 
certainty about what one’s own, as well as others,’ responsibility is and ought to be (Bickerstaff 
et al., 2008; Hinchliffe, 1997). As Bickerstaff et al. (2008) illustrated, even as respondents in 
their study viewed themselves as responsible for their exposure to a risk, they also acknowledged 
their dependence upon institutional actors; as they conclude:  
…Attempts to position individuals as ‘responsible citizens’ in relation to various forms of 
risk are faced with citizen ambivalence, both ambivalence towards assuming 
responsibility themselves and ambivalence towards the exercise of responsibility by 
institutions (Bickerstaff et al., 2008, p. 1327).  
 
Part of this ambivalence may be a function of ignorance: a lack of knowledge about just who and 
what these “external” sources of institutional power are even in the midst of their reliance on 
them; as Hinchliffe (1997, p. 205) put it, “…the distance and obscurity of institutions that people 
felt should either be in their control or lobbied to enable control.” Finally, as this research shows, 
opinions about responsibility for managing risk are often dynamic, rather than set in stone.  
 Constructing accidents and safety 
 Despite its common usage, the term “accident” may conjure distinct meanings for individuals 
depending on their background and social context. Tracing the historical and etymological roots 
of the word, Loimer and Guarnieri (1996, p.106) situate the modern meaning of “accident” as 
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emerging in the 1400s, a word that “conveyed a mixture of ideas: injury, property loss, 
unexpected events, and unintended results,” and, eventually, “act of God.” Interestingly, these 
notions of unpredictability and randomness have led many contemporary public health 
professionals to reject the word entirely, judging it an “obstruction” to the modern study of injury 
prevention (e.g., Girasek, 1999; Loimer & Guarnieri, 1996). Using both sociological and 
historiographic data, Green (1997a) argued that, within an increasingly rationalized “risk 
society” (Beck, 1992), accidents have transformed from events we fail to predict to events for 
which we can assign blame. As accidents come to be understood as resulting from a clear set of 
identifiable risk factors, those who suffer them are seen as lacking in their ability to properly 
assess these risks; indeed, “accidents no longer demonstrate the proper limits of rational 
explanatory systems, but rather individual failure” (Green, 1997a, p. 143).  
 As preventability replaces notions of “luck” or “fatalism,” so, too, do blameworthiness and 
responsibility become attached to the accident victim. By holding people responsible for their 
choices, and resulting ill health anthropologist Mary Douglas (1990) suggested that we begin to 
view these individuals as “sinners,” rather than as victims, as our increasing exposure to risk in 
everyday life becomes intertwined with notions of accountability and blameworthiness. Arguing 
that the concept of risk has become appropriated as a “forensic resource,” Douglas (1990) argued 
that risk discourse perpetuates an individualistic culture: “[playing] the role equivalent to taboo 
or sin, but the slope is tilted in the reverse direction, away from protecting the community, and in 
favor of protecting the individual” (1990, p. 7).  Similarly, research conducted by Green (1997a) 
and others is founded on the idea that both “expert” and “lay” explanations of (and proposed 
solutions for) accidents reflect salient values and beliefs, as well as normative conceptions of 
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“proper” social identities and responsibilities (Green, 1997a, 1997b; Green & Hart, 1998; 
Roberts, Smith, & Bryce, 1993, 1995).  
 Like those studying attribution in occupational settings, these researchers see value in 
gauging the perspectives of multiple publics. For instance, suggesting that safety “experts” (e.g., 
policymakers, law enforcement officials) may lack insight on the particular risks facing 
populations in a disadvantaged British neighborhood, Roberts et al. (1995, p. 18) interviewed 
community members in an attempt to “[draw] on ordinary people’s knowledge built up during 
the day-to-day routines associated with life in an uncertain environment.” Further, such scholars 
view safety as not only as a state of physical wellbeing, but also as a “social value” experienced 
by individuals, groups, and communities (e.g., Roberts et al., 1995; Suchman, 1961). Similarly 
focused on the social context, Factor and colleagues (Factor, Mahalel, & Yair, 2007; Factor, 
Yair, & Mahalel, 2010) argue that, in the case of automobile collisions involving two or more 
drivers, the drivers’ decision-making is inextricably embedded in cultural norms and values. 
Referring to these car collisions as “social accidents,” Factor et al. (2007; 2010) argued that 
interactions between drivers matter more than the behavior or characteristics of a single driver, as 
different drivers may draw on distinct cultural “tool kits” to respond to a given situation. The 
authors conclude that road accidents are not random events, but rather, “manifest social 
predispositions that exogenously affect an individual’s tendency to become involved in an 
accident” (Factor et al., 2010, p. 1420).  
Safety culture   
 Perceptions of accidents, and safety in general, become increasingly salient among workers 
in particularly hazardous occupations, whether coal mining or construction work.  Considerable 
research has documented the extent to which the organizational decisions, communication 
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between managers and workers, and attributes of occupational settings (among other factors) 
both construct and perpetuate a unique “safety culture”: shared values, beliefs, and practices 
related to safety, defined at group level (e.g., Cooper, 2000; Guldenmund, 2000). Key to the 
current study, safety culture may also encompass perceptions of responsibility for ensuring on-
the-job safety. Importantly, these values may stem from organizational norms and rules for 
dealing with work-related risk, as well as members’ own attitudes towards occupational safety; 
such values may, in turn, influence on-the-job behavior (e.g., Didla, Mearns, & Flin, 2009; 
Guldenmund, 2000; Lund & Aaro, 2004; Pidgeon, 1991; Pidgeon, 1998; Wilson-Donnelly et al., 
2005), as organizational members are encouraged to learn from errors to minimize their personal 
risk and maximize safety (Silbey, 2009).  
 Despite over twenty years of research, one universally recognized definition of safety 
culture2 continues to evade researchers (Guldenmund, 2000); however, within the occupational 
safety literature, researchers have increasingly drawn a causal line between a “positive” safety 
culture and “safe practices” within an organization or workplace, often in industrial settings (e.g., 
Cooper & Phillips, 2004; Nielsen, Rasmussen, Glasscock, & Spangenberg, 2008; Wilson-
Donnelly et al., 2005). Occupational trainings and programs centered on risk and safety issues, 
for instance, have been increasingly viewed as means to solidify a favorable safety culture and, 
in following, ensure best practice in organizations (e.g., Leiter, Zanaletti, & Argentero, 2009; 
Lund & Aaro, 2004), as has effective communication between employees and management (e.g., 
DeJoy, Schaffer, Wilson, Vandenburg, & Butts, 2004). Safety culture may also influence the 
ways in which managers and employees develop causal attributions about occupational accidents 
(Hofmann & Stetzer, 1998). In a field experiment of utility workers, Hofmann and Stetzer (1998) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 This dissertation utilizes the concept of “safety culture” concept, but recognizes the related concept of “safety 
climate,” including the contentious academic discussion regarding the similarities and differences between these two 
terms (e.g., see Dov, 2008).  
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illustrated that individuals who openly discussed safety issues within their workplace were more 
likely to make internal attributions about an occupational accident scenario, given evidence that 
implicated the worker.  
 Approaches to studying safety culture also vary widely, ranging from descriptive, 
interpretivistic accounts of a workplace (see, e.g., Zoller, 2003), to more normative appeals for 
organizational change (Guldenmund, 2010). In an overview of the current use of safety culture in 
the academic and applied literature, Guldenmund (2010) described three main approaches to 
studying the concept: (1) the “academic approach,” using mostly qualitative field research to 
produce value-free assessments of an organization’s historical approach to safety; (2) the 
“analytical approach,” adopting mostly quantitative survey instruments to measure the current 
status of an organization’s safety culture; and (3) the “pragmatic approach,” relying on expert 
opinion to evaluate the structures and processes of an organization to make suggestions for future 
improvements. By classifying the studies as such, Guldenmund (2010) provides a useful 
distinction between scholarship using safety culture to describe, and research intended to 
evaluate, a difference not always acknowledged by researchers (see Silbey, 2009).   
Attribution Theory and Risk Perception 
 Despite its focus on determining beliefs about accident causation and prevention, the 
attribution literature has paid only limited attention to risk perception theory. Studied from a 
variety of ontological and epistemological perspectives, research in risk perception converges on 
the central premise that interpretations of, and responses to, risks (whether present or 
hypothetical) are rarely uniform among individuals, groups, or communities. While early 
experimental research focused heavily on the contrast between so-called “expert” and “lay” 
estimates of hypothetical risks, such as nuclear energy or blood transfusions (e.g., Slovic, 1987), 
	   33	  
subsequent scholarship has attended more to the ways in which an individual’s characteristics, 
community memberships, as well as lived experiences, may shape understandings of risks salient 
to his everyday life (e.g., Lupton & Tulloch, 2002; Masuda & Garvin, 2006; Scherer & Cho, 
2003). While references to risk-taking and risk perception do appear in several studies examining 
causal attributions, the unsystematic incorporation of risk perception theory across such studies 
create substantial gaps in the literature that merit further attention. In an attempt to locate these 
gaps, the following section establishes potential linkages between attribution theory and risk 
perception in the context of safety through several conceptual areas, including cultural theories 
of risk, sense of place, and the context in which the risk is encountered.    
Cultural theories of risk 
 A few noteworthy studies explore the connections between cultural beliefs, risk perceptions, 
and attributions of responsibility for accidents (Kouabenan, 1998, 2002, 2009; Peltzer & Renner, 
2003). Using a sample of West African respondents, Kouabenan (1998) investigated the 
relationship between fatalistic beliefs, causal attributions for car accidents, and risk-taking/risk 
perception with regard to driving. Survey results indicated that respondents’ beliefs and social 
practices did influence both risk perceptions and causal explanations of accidents. Fatalistic 
subjects were more likely to over- or under-estimate driving-related risks, and in either case were 
more likely to take bigger risks, as compared to other respondents. In terms of causal 
attributions, Kouabenan (1998) found that those with fatalistic beliefs were more likely to 
attribute accidents to external factors outside of the driver’s control, such as road infrastructure 
or fate, rather than to factors related to the driver (e.g., carelessness). While this pattern may be 
understood as a form of defensive attribution, the author suggests that the response is more likely 
a mechanism for fatalistic individuals to feel that they can exercise some control over their 
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environment; despite their worldview, such individuals, “…do not necessarily want to believe 
that the world in which they live is altogether unpredictable and that any kind of catastrophic 
event could happen to them at any moment” (1998, p. 250). Working in a different context, 
Kimhi, Canetti-Nisim, and Hirschberger (2009) draw upon cultural differences between Israeli 
Jews and Palestinians to explain their respondents’ differing causal perceptions of terrorism-
related violence in the Middle East. 
 While Kouabenan’s and colleagues’ research provides a window into the importance of 
cultural beliefs to developing causal attributions, attention is needed to explore these 
relationships more fully with regard to cultural theories of risk. As numerous scholars have 
articulated, such a perspective argues that the sociocultural experiences and background of 
individuals, as well as the social institutions to which they belong, or with which they interact 
(e.g., schools, churches, corporations, etc.) contribute to how they construct the meaning and 
judge the acceptability of risk (e.g., Kasperson, Kasperson, Pidgeon, & Slovic, 2003; Lupton, 
1999; Rayner, 1986, 1992, 1993; Rayner & Cantor, 1987; Tansey & O’Riordan, 1999; 
Wildavsky & Dake, 1993). For instance, whereas fatalism and superstition may represent salient 
belief systems for residents of the African Ivory Coast, such beliefs may not translate across 
nations or cultures in affecting understandings of risk. Perceptions of risk, as well as its 
“appropriate” management may also vary widely within an organization; for instance, Rayner 
(1986) documented how occupational role and hierarchical status within a hospital predicted a 
typology of judgments regarding institutional trust and acceptability of radiation risk. 
Importantly, cultural theories of risk consider the association between perceptions of—and 
exposure to—risk in everyday life and notions of accountability and blameworthiness of 
individuals and institutions (e.g., Douglas, 1990, 1992).   
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Sense of place  
 Like religious beliefs and group memberships, an individual’s understanding of, and 
attachment to, a physical setting may also influence how she perceives risk. Humanist 
geographers such as Tuan (1977) differentiate “place” from “space,” arguing that the former 
takes on value and meaning for people, whereas the latter remains abstract and undifferentiated. 
Neither is a place the same as a “landscape,” as these are the assemblages of visual attributes that 
we can readily describe; as Cresswell (2004, p. 11) explains, “We do not live in landscapes—we 
look at them.” Rather, places, according to Cresswell (2004), citing political geographer John 
Agnew (1987), are “meaningful” and fundamentally comprised of three components: (1) 
location; (2) locale; and, (3) sense of place (SOP). Whereas location implies a dot on a map, 
locale relates to the physical (or “material”) characteristics of the setting, and sense of place 
refers to the “subjective and emotional attachment people have to place” (Cresswell, 2004, p. 7): 
an understanding of being there and experiencing daily life. Accordingly, place entails a physical 
setting, our experiences in this setting, as well as our subjective interpretations of this setting 
(e.g., Cheng, Kruger, & Daniels, 2003; Farnum, Hall, & Kruger, 2005; Galliano & Loeffler, 
1999; Low & Altman, 1992). 
After an extensive review of the literature, Farnum et al. (2005) find no single definition of 
SOP, and arrive at the idea of SOP as a human relationship to a physical location, including 
related meanings, attachments, attitudes, emotions, and cognitions. In this same vein, suggesting 
that place is “multidimensional and multidisciplinary,” Stedman (2003a, p. 825) argues that 
understanding SOP means accounting for human (e.g., individual behaviors), social (e.g., group 
or community-level behaviors) and biophysical elements. Two elemental constructs in this 
literature include:    
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Place attachment. The affective responses an individual (or group) may experience towards 
a place, place attachment is often—but certainly not always—positive (e.g., Farnum et al., 2005; 
Low & Altman, 1992). Farnum et al. suggest that place attachment can be further divided into 
two separate constructs: (1) place identity, or, “how one views oneself in relation to the 
environment” (Farnum et al., 2005, p. 4), resembling the social psychological construct of 
identity or identity salience (Stedman, 2002) and (2) place dependence—for instance, 
“connections based specifically on activities that take place in an outdoor, recreational setting” 
(Farnum et al., 2005, p. 4). Based on their extensive review of the SOP literature, Farnum et al. 
suggest that no clear consensus exists as to a relationship between place identity and dependence: 
for instance, does one’s place identity precede the dependence she develops on this setting, or 
vice versa? Moreover, other researchers find that place identity and dependence actually measure 
the same underlying construct (e.g., Jorgensen & Stedman, 2001), while still others see place 
attachment as “[incorporating] several aspects of people-place bonding” (Low & Altman, 1992) 
that are not reducible to component parts. While researchers may disagree on the existence of 
and/or relationships between place attachment, identity, and dependence, all of these measures 
are fundamentally evaluative: they seek to define the degree to which “a setting is important…is 
useful for achieving goals… or reflects one’s sense of self” (Stedman, Beckley, Wallace, & 
Ambard, 2004, p. 581).  
Place meaning. SOP studies also measure what places mean to people, eliciting their 
cognitive responses to these settings (e.g., Farnum et al., 2005; Stedman, 2002). Scaling up from 
this individual perspective, Galliano and Loeffler (1999, p. 11) define place themes as “shared 
meanings that applied to broad areas,” such as “wilderness area” or “working landscape.” 
According to Stedman (2002, p. 564), place meanings can be understood as “descriptive 
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statements, rooted in symbols about ‘what kind of place is this’” (Stedman, 2002, p. 564). These 
meanings, in turn, can lead to the development of place-related attitudes (Stedman, 2002).  
 Research in SOP also integrates a number of additional variables. Due to the variety of 
theoretical and methodological perspectives underlying SOP studies (e.g., phenomenological vs. 
positivistic), the importance of these variables can be highly contested: 
Physical attributes of the place. Some SOP research identifies specific characteristics of the 
physical setting, such as the water quality of its lakes. While such attributes may not determine 
the place-related meanings attachments, or satisfaction people express, they nonetheless may 
come to influence the nature and development of these sentiments (e.g., Stedman, 2003a, 2003b). 
Experience in the place. Whereas some researchers emphasize the centrality of physical 
involvement in a place to developing SOP (e.g., Tuan, 1977; Stedman, 2002), others view SOP 
as existing even in the absence of in-person interaction in settings.  
Specificity and scale of the place. Does SOP develop from a particular corner of the forest, 
or a larger swath of wilderness? Moreover, does SOP differ with respect to a 1-mile trail, or a 
100,000 square-mile wilderness area? The degree to which researchers see the specificity of a 
place as important to measuring SOP relates to their theoretical approach; however, little 
conclusive empirical evidence suggests whether, or how, scale influences SOP (Farnum et al., 
2005; Low & Altman, 1992).  
Recreation-related variables. Focusing on the relationship between outdoor recreation and 
SOP, Farnum et al. (2005) uncover a number of potentially important variables, such as: activity 
type (e.g., mountain biking vs. hiking), level of involvement or specialization in this activity, type 
of user (e.g., local vs. tourist), level of visitation to a particular area (as well as expectations 
related to such visits), and potential for social conflict between different recreational user groups.    
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Place and perception of risk 
Working from the above definitions, researchers in a variety of disciplines have applied 
place-related concepts to further understand risk meanings and perceptions. As Masuda and 
Garvin (2006) note, risk perception may be a product of one’s place attachment and sense of 
community, or even the unique social context, such as the existence of other well-publicized 
risks “competing” for public attention (see also Lewis & Tyshenko, 2009). Exploring public 
reactions to a proposed industrial park in Alberta, Canada, Masuda and Garvin (2006, p. 447) 
described risk perceptions not as “isolated within the minds of individuals,” but rather, 
“manifested as threats to shared ‘ways of life’ that included people’s sense of belonging and 
well-being in the community at large” (see also Jardine, Boyd, & Furgal, 2009; Hugh Jones & 
Madill, 2009). Individuals’ occupations and historical relationships with the land, whether as 
farmers or subdivision residents, mattered in determining whether the proposed development 
represented a “risk” or an “opportunity”; in following, risk concern depended on whether 
residents “saw the region generally as a place to live, or as a place for economic progress” 
(Masuda & Garvin, 2006, p. 450). Likewise, a risk may be deemed more “acceptable” to 
individuals based on their relationship with and proximity to its source. For instance, Baxter and 
Lee (2004) found evidence of low concern among residents living adjacent to a hazardous waste 
facility in Alberta, Canada, a source of employment and economic support for the community, 
despite amplified concern among citizens elsewhere in Canada. Similarly, in a study of Israelis 
living in a tumultuous, violence-prone region of the West Bank, Billig (2006) suggested that 
strength of place attachment and religious ideology predicted respondents’ tendency to downplay 
the “riskiness” of their home.  
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 The risk perceptions stemming from a shared sense of place or place attachment may also 
serve to delineate “insiders” from “outsiders.” In a qualitative case study exploring reactions to 
the 2001 foot and mouth disease outbreak in the United Kingdom, Bickerstaff, Simmons, and 
Pidgeon (2006) found that the people’s recollections of the event produced and reproduced a 
cultural identity that separated the “local insiders” from “outsiders who do not share the 
knowledge and experience of living in rural communities” (p. 853). At the same time, these 
relationships to place mobilized particular responses to risk and “official” (i.e., government) risk 
management strategies. Describing the citing of a waste facility, Baxter (2009) explained how 
place meanings and attachments motivated both risk concern and the seeking of particular 
information sources, whether so-called information “insiders” (i.e., local media, local family and 
friends), or “outsiders” (i.e., national media or family and friends living outside of the 
geographical area).    
Characteristics and context of the risk   
  Like one’s individual biography, community ties, and relationship(s) to the physical place, 
the context in which an individual encounters a given risk, as well as the characteristics of the 
risk itself, also matter in the development of risk perceptions. Previous applications of attribution 
theory to explaining accidents have generally failed to account for the nature of the risk, as well 
as the context in which a given risk may be encountered. As pioneering experimental studies in 
the so-called “psychometric paradigm” of risk perception illustrated (e.g., Slovic, 1987; Slovic, 
Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1981), individuals’ judgments of a given risk depend on, among other 
attributes, perceived controllability  (i.e., the degree to which individuals believe they can control 
the level of risk to which they are exposed) and voluntariness (i.e., whether individuals believe 
they can choose to be exposed to the risk). Risks judged more controllable and more voluntary, 
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as well as more known (i.e., produce observable effects, are known to current science, etc.)—in 
Slovic’s (1987) experiments, riding motorcycles or downhill skiing, for instance —tend to be 
less “dreaded”; in turn, they tend not to generate inflated risk perceptions among non-“experts.”  
Though a handful of studies have considered individuals’ risk perceptions and their attributions 
of responsibility for events such as car accidents or occupational accidents (DeJoy, 1985; Dorn 
& Brown, 2003; Kouabenan, 1998, 2001, 2002), no known research has investigated the role of 
perceived controllability or voluntariness of risk in the assignment of attributions. In the context 
of social psychological causal attribution research, Weiner (1996, 2008) and others have 
highlighted the importance of the perceived controllability of a cause as predicting attributions of 
responsibility; however, the perceived ability to exert “control” over one’s study habits, for 
instance, may or may not be equivalent to the perceived control one feels over exposure to an 
avalanche in a national park. This dissertation attempts to determine this question empirically.  
 Moreover, while the aforementioned studies explore respondents’ risk perceptions and causal 
attributions with regard to everyday surroundings (e.g., job sites) or daily routines (e.g., driving 
cars), they make no mention of the meanings respondents may attach to such contexts, nor to 
how respondents’ beliefs might change given contexts that are unfamiliar, novel, or non-routine.  
 Previous research has also paid limited attention to circumstances in which individuals may 
perceive risk (and risk-taking) as a desirable (Machlis & Rosa, 1990), rather than detrimental, 
aspect of an experience, and thus consciously seek, rather than avoid its presence. Characterized 
as “sensation-seeking” by social psychologists (Zuckerman, 1979), most individuals who 
participate in activities such as rock climbing, for example, consciously choose to put themselves 
in high-risk environments and circumstances (e.g., Beedie & Hudson, 2003; Dimmock, 2009; 
Dunn & Gublis, 1976; Ewert, 1994; Ewert & Hollenhurst, 1989; Galloway & Lopez, 1999; 
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Pomfret, 2006). Researchers in recreation and leisure studies have pointed out that, as 
engagement in “adventure recreation” increases, so too does the expertise or skill-level of the 
recreationist, as well as her preferred level of risk, and preference for challenge, achievement, 
and control. As Ewert and Hollenhurst (1989, p. 135) maintain, adventure recreation may surpass 
the goal of physical fitness to encompass complex meanings for its participants. 
Sociologists, too, have looked toward recreational contexts, and even the more mundane 
events of everyday life, to understand the role and meaning of voluntary risk-taking. Coining the 
term “edgework,” Lyng (1990) proposed a sociological framework for how and why people 
voluntarily take risks, such as sky-diving, examining general social-psychological variables 
rather than “idiosyncratic motives or personality characteristics” (Lyng, 1990, p. 854). Lyng’s 
(1990) ethnographic analysis brings to light, among other findings, the dialectic between 
spontaneity and constraint, and feelings of self-actualization and “oneness” with the environment 
experienced by a group of skydivers (see also Lipscombe, 2005). In an ethnographic study of 
technical rock climbers, Csikszentmihalyi (1975) applied the concept of “flow” to explain the 
alignment of mind and body throughout the practice, from confronting challenge, to engaging in 
deep concentration, to experiencing competence and control. In less physically “risky” contexts, 
sociologists Tulloch and Lupton (2002) found instances of voluntary risk-taking, such as a 
painter taking a creative risk on a canvas, as eliciting similar feelings of self-improvement, as 
well as emotional engagement and control (see also Lupton & Tulloch, 2002a, 2002b; Parker & 
Stanworth, 2005). Importantly, the authors define these moments as instances of “deliberate” 
risk-taking as contrasting with: 
…Taking part in activities that to the dominant culture are coded as ‘risky’ but are not 
perceived as such by those involved, or in activities which are perceived by participants 
to be unacceptably risky but because of their circumstances have little choice of avoiding, 
or of which they are unaware at the time (Lupton & Tulloch, 2002a, pp. 114-115). 
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Through Lupton and Tulloch’s research, we are reminded that actions and situations become 
“risky”—or “safe”—in the eye of the beholder, and that the voluntariness of a given risk implies 
both awareness and choice.          
 Relationships between variables 
 As previously noted, few studies consider both risk perception and attribution theory, and 
even fewer in the context of unintentional injury or safety. Of the research that does link risk 
perception and attribution, considerable differences exist in the treatment of the relationship 
between these variables, as well as the object of the perceptions (i.e., the individual himself, or a 
third party). For instance, in a survey addressing Italian healthcare workers’ perceptions of AIDS 
patients, Mannetti and Pierro (1991) measured the healthcare workers’ own perceived 
susceptibility of contracting AIDS, along with their perception of how hypothetical AIDS 
patients described in a scenario, including homosexual or heterosexual, promiscuous or 
monogamous, contracted the disease (i.e., “third person” causal attributions); no relationship was 
drawn between risk perception and the type of causal attribution made. In another survey-based 
study, researchers measured both risk perceptions and causal attributions from the respondents 
themselves; questioning the general public about a recent waterborne disease outbreak in the 
Milwaukee, WI water supply, Kahlor, Dunwoody, and Griffin (2002) showed that the 
respondents’ personal risk estimates varied depending on their personal experience, and that 
these estimates influenced the nature of causal attributions. As the authors concluded:    
…Individuals who had avoided becoming ill from exposure to a waterborne pathogen 
were more likely to ‘explain’ their choice of risk estimate in terms of personal causal 
factors. In other words, when a past outcome (having become ill or not) was good, 
respondents were more likely to attribute their future likelihood to personal actions 
(Kahlor, Dunwoody, & Griffin, 2002, p. 253). 
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In yet another substantive context (and country), Sellstrom, Bremberg, Garling, and Hornquist 
(2000) conducted a survey exploring Swedish mothers’ causal attributions of hypothetical 
common accidents involving children (e.g., burns, bicycle injuries). The authors found a strong, 
positive correlation between the mothers’ perceived risk of injury to the child, and their 
attribution of responsibility for causing the accident to the child (i.e., third person risk perception 
and attribution of responsibility). When considered with other variables, such as mothers’ 
normative beliefs and sociodemographic characteristics, attributing responsibility to the child 
emerged as the most important predictor of elevated parental risk perceptions. Other studies 
(Kouabenan, 1998, 2002) have investigated how variables such as experience and cultural beliefs 
influence risk perceptions and causal attributions—as dependent variables—but do not establish 
a clear relationship between the latter two variables. More research is needed to clarify how (or 
whether) an individual’s perception of risk (to self or others) might influence how she attributes 
the cause of accidents (involving self or others).  
Attribution Theory and Risk Communication 
 Just as limited research has incorporated risk perception into attribution theory, few studies 
have examined whether (and how) risk communication influences judgments of responsibility. 
Because risk communication often emerges from multiple sources, it is helpful to distinguish 
between “types” of sources (e.g., disseminated by an “official” agency or among an “unofficial” 
group of friends) as well as the style of dissemination (e.g., a “formal” report or an “informal” 
conversation.  While references to risk communication appear in a handful of studies examining 
causal attributions, including those involving health information seeking, limited research 
precedents exist for basing future study.    
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Official/unofficial and formal/informal risk communication  
 Within public settings, risk information circulates through both official (i.e., affiliated with a 
publicly-recognized organization or institution, such as a government agency) and unofficial 
(i.e., not affiliated with a recognized organization) messages and messengers. Likewise, risk 
information may be formal (i.e., scripted, such as the text of a written press release) or informal 
(i.e., unscripted, such as an impromptu conversation). Limited scholarship in risk communication 
has focused on either the unofficial or the informal categories. Whereas posted signs and the 
enforcement of safety regulations convey an official view of risk, for example, safety 
information may also be passed on via water cooler gossip or non-verbal cues (e.g., a worker 
failing to wear appropriate personal protective equipment) (Rickard, 2011).  In their seminal 
Social Amplification of Risk Framework, Kasperson et al. (1988) allude to both official and 
unofficial sources of risk information, suggesting that the latter, such as interpersonal 
communication with friends or neighbors, may play a central role in the attenuation or 
amplification of risk perceptions. Along these lines, McComas, Lundell, Trumbo, and Besley 
(2010) illustrated that individuals attending public meetings about local cancer clusters explained 
their feelings of cancer concern by referencing their exposure to both “official” sources of 
information (e.g., scientific presentations) and “symbolic” risk messages (e.g., information from 
other citizens). The distinction between official and unofficial risk communication also holds in 
the workplace. For instance, a commercial pesticide applicator may engage in conversation with 
a homeowner about the potential human health risks of the product he is applying to the client’s 
lawn (Dantzker, Chandrasekaran, & Snedeker, in press; Rickard, 2011). Using commercial 
pesticide applicators as an example, Rickard (2011, p. 646) proposes that the defining 
characteristics of “informal risk communicators” (IRCs) may include his or her:   
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• Exposure to occupational risks (or potential risks).  
• Complex understanding of a given risk, founded on both cultural and technical meanings.  
• Exposure to training and/or other education in dealing with (potential) occupational risks.  
• Opportunity to interact directly with the public through both verbal and nonverbal 
communication. 
• (Perceived) similarity to an “average” member of the public, perhaps leading him/her to be 
more trusted than public officials.  
• Potential to deal with socially stigmatized risks on a daily basis.  
• Potential lack of recognition for providing information about health- or risk-related issues. 
 The present study is concerned less with identifying examples of IRCs than with 
distinguishing between forms of prevalent official/unofficial and formal/informal risk 
communication both inside and outside of an organizational setting. Combining “formal” and 
“official” in a 2 x 2 table thus creates a typology of risk information consisting of four main 
types: (1) official/formal; (2) official/informal; (3) unofficial/formal; (4) unofficial/informal (see 
Table 2.1). Given the substantive context of the research, which will be elaborated below, we can 
use the National Park Service as an example organizational setting to apply this typology of risk 
information potentially available to the public (i.e., national park visitors). Whereas the 
designation of official refers to information coming from the NPS, such as a park brochure 
distributed by the agency, unofficial would signify messages emerging from sources outside of 
the Park Service, such as private businesses located in towns adjacent to the park. Likewise, 
formal information would be available in a scripted, possibly non-editable form, such as road 
signs or visitor center exhibits, whereas informal information would be unscripted and possibly 
modifiable by members of the public (e.g., face-to-face conversations or interactive blogging 
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sites). (See Table 2.1 for an overview of a typology of risk information sources potentially 
available to a national park visitor).             
Table 2.1. Typology of Risk Information Available to National Park Visitors  
 Official (NPS) Unofficial (non-NPS) 
Formal (Scripted) • Interpretive programs 
• Junior Ranger Program 
• Permits  
• Brochures, handouts, maps 
• Website 
• Signs and exhibits 
• Park movies and podcasts 
• Traveler Information Systems 
(AM radio station) 
• Press releases 
• Pre-recorded phone messages 
• Guidebooks and maps/atlases 
• Highway road signs 
• GPS devices (i.e., directions to 
the park) 
• Print information in local 
chamber of commerce, private 
business, or visitor center 
outside of the park 
• Commercial websites (e.g., 
guide services) and other 
websites including park 
information. 
• AM or FM radio stations 
Informal (Unscripted) • Interacting face-to-face with 
NPS staff (e.g., rangers, fee 
collectors, maintenance 
workers) 
• Talking with an NPS 
employee (e.g., dispatcher) on 
the telephone  
• Hand-drawn maps, directions, 
etc. given by NPS staff or 
volunteers 
• Interacting with climbing 
guides, boating guides, or other 
recreational trip leaders 
• Interacting with staff at 
restaurants, gift shops, or 
hotels 
• Interacting with other park 
visitors, family members, or 
friends 
• Visitors’ blogs, personal 
websites, and podcasts 
• Visitors’ personal photographs, 
videos, audio recordings, etc 
 
Linking attribution of responsibility and risk communication 
 Few known studies have explored how individuals’ attributions of responsibility may be 
affected by the nature of the risk communication they receive. As described above, Kahlor et al. 
(2002) studied the relationship between personal estimates of risk susceptibility and individuals’ 
causal attributions for becoming ill from a waterborne pathogen. Though the authors did not 
measure exposure to risk communication explicitly, their finding that status (a measure of 
education and income) was positively related to external attributions led them to hypothesize that 
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such attributions may have been an artifact of heavier media use among high status individuals 
(see, e.g., Viswanath & Finnegan, 1996); because media outlets tend to interpret environmental 
risks as stemming from external sources, such as poor management and oversight by government 
agencies, (e.g., Griffin & Dunwoody, 1997), heavy media users may be inclined to adopt these 
attributional patterns in their own causal reasoning (Kahlor et al., 2002).3 A second study, 
focused on causal attributions related to cryptosporidiosis in the United Kingdom, linked 
individuals’ reported information sources about the pathogen to their perceptions of the cause of 
the outbreak (Doria, Abubakar, Syed, Hughes, & Hunter, 2006). Using quantitative and 
qualitative survey data, Doria and colleagues (2006) reported that information sources, such as 
medical documents (e.g., stool sample results), environmental health officers, and doctors or 
nurses, appeared to influence the causal attributions reported. By relating information sources 
and respondents’ attributional reasoning, Doria and colleagues concluded that, “Respondents 
who heard about the disease from a particular source were more likely to point out or to reject 
certain specific causes” (Doria et al., 2006, p. 749); for instance, individuals who relied on 
information from doctors and nurses tended to perceive contaminated water as the cause of the 
outbreak.  
 Two additional studies associate health information sources with causal attributions about the 
occurrence of disease. Using the 2005 Health Information National Trends dataset, Ford and 
Kaphingst (2009) investigated the relationship between causal beliefs about cancer and lay 
interpersonal sources of health information (i.e., community organizations, family members, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  A handful of studies link media coverage of “risky” events to the attributions of the general public about 
controllability (McClure, Allen, & Walkey, 2001; McClure, Walkey, & Allen, 1999; McClure, Sutton, & Wilson, 
2007). For instance, McClure et al. (1999) suggest that media coverage in New Zealand of natural hazards such as 
earthquakes tends to overemphasize the sheer magnitude of the event, leading the public to form attributions that 
damage is uncontrollable, and thus to downplay its preventability (i.e., leading to feelings of fatalism).   
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friends). Their results indicate that those individuals who never spoke with family or friends 
about health concerns, for instance, were more likely to view colon cancer risk as modifiable—
that is, able to be lessened by engaging in certain preventative behaviors. Because the survey 
relied on cross-sectional data, however, we can assume neither causality, nor directionality of the 
results; as Ford and Kaphingst (2009, p. 1980) stress, “…individuals’ beliefs about cancer 
causation may also influence what sources they choose to interact with to seek health 
information.” In a related survey-based study of the general public, O’Neill, McBride, Hensley 
Alford, and Kaphingst (2010) explored how behavioral risk factors and family history influence 
causal attributions for prevalent diseases such as hypertension, and how such attributions might 
influence health-related information-seeking preferences. Interestingly, their results suggest that 
certain attributional beliefs, such as linking the cause of a disease to genetic factors, may 
discourage individuals from seeking complementary information about health behaviors. As the 
authors conclude, “those with the greatest need for behavior change are at most risk for 
responding defensively and devaluing information for behavior change (O’Neill et al., 2010, p. 
135).  Despite the wide range of substantive contexts, the studies reviewed above converge on 
the conclusion that the nature of risk information matters in the development of causal 
attributions; however, less is known about the relative roles or importance of the risk 
communication “type” (i.e., official/unofficial) or “style” (i.e., formal/informal) (Rickard, 2011) 
in influencing these attributions.  
Attribution Theory, Risk Management, and National Parks 
 This research explores the linkages between attribution of responsibility, risk perception 
theory, and risk communication with regard to safety promotion in the context of three U.S. 
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national park units.4 Whether sightseeing or spelunking, camping or bird watching, hundreds of 
millions of people enjoy visits to national parks each year (NPS, 2009). Spurred in part by 
President Obama’s recent signature of the presidential memorandum “America’s Great Outdoors 
Initiative” (Office of the Press Secretary, 2010), as well as by the promotion of so-called “nature 
deficit disorder” in American children (Louv, 2005), increasing attention has focused on the 
value of open space and wilderness areas such as are maintained in these settings. Moreover, 
given continuing efforts to attract diverse and traditionally under-served populations to parks, as 
well as to document and support unique patterns of use in these spaces (e.g., Baas, Ewert, & 
Chavez, 1993; Floyd & Johnson, 2002), providing appropriate risk communication has become 
critical. While limited research has investigated issues of risk perception and responsibility for 
safety in national parks, I have located no published studies that have utilized such settings to 
formally investigate causal attribution of unintentional injury or accidents. Before reviewing 
prior research, I first further describe relevant characteristics of U.S. national park settings.  
Characteristics of the research context 
 To better understand the relevant features of the research setting, we can compare and 
contrast U.S. national parks with two other contexts: occupational settings such as factories (i.e., 
those used in previous research on attributions of accident causation and risk perceptions) and 
amusement theme parks (e.g., Disneyworld). By denoting the similarities and differences 
between these settings, I intend to illustrate the uniqueness of national parks as supporting 
inherently “risky” recreational opportunities (see Table 2.2). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The National Park Service uses the inclusive term “national park unit” to encompass several different categories of 
the 397 designated locations managed by the NPS (U.S. Department of the Interior), such as national parks, national 
monuments, and national seashores. The proposed study will consider issues relevant to two national parks and one 
national recreation area, with the understanding that each designated “unit” of the National Park System may entail 
a unique set of management issues, potential risks, and visiting publics.  
	   50	  
Table 2.2. Comparison of Occupational Settings, Theme Parks, and National Parks 
 Occupational Setting Theme Park National Park 
Primary audience Workers Visitors (tourists) Visitors (tourists) 
Type of risk • Familiar 
• Mostly controllable 
• Undesirable  
• Familiar  
• Mostly controllable 
• Undesirable 
• Novel, unfamiliar  
• Controllable and 
uncontrollable 
• Undesirable and desirable 
(e.g., “authentic” 
wilderness experience)  
Type of setting Ordinary/familiar Extraordinary/unfamiliar Extraordinary/unfamiliar 
Injuries/deaths  Regular injuries and 
deaths; rate varies 
greatly by occupation 
Small number of injuries 
and deaths 
Many injuries and deaths; 
often predictable by park 
location, time of the 
week/year, activity, 
characteristic(s) of the visitor 
involved, etc. 
Risk 
communication 
“Official” and 
“unofficial” (e.g., 
posted signs, 
rules/regulations, other 
workers)  
“Official” and 
“unofficial”  
“Official” and “unofficial”  
Institutional 
goals/ “mission” 
• Produce materials 
to secure profits 
• Prevent worker 
injury  
• Attract visitors to 
secure profits 
• Prevent visitor 
injury 
• Conserve natural and 
cultural resources 
• Attract diverse visitors 
• Prevent visitor injury 
**In most situations** 
Risk management • Risk managers 
known to workers 
(e.g., Safety 
Officers) 
• “Safety culture” 
known to workers 
• Risk managers 
unknown/unfamiliar 
to visitors  
• “Safety culture” 
unknown to visitors 
• Risk managers 
unknown/unfamiliar to 
visitors  
• “Safety culture” unknown 
to visitors 
 
 Primary audience. Whereas occupational settings house workers performing repeated daily 
routines, both theme parks and national parks cater to tourists engaging in recreational activities, 
usually for a limited time period. Within the recreation and tourism literature, researchers have 
suggested that tourists may not take appropriate safety-related precautions when traveling to new 
locations, may be more vulnerable to risks such as crime, and may not have access to the most 
appropriate and/or timely information about the locale (e.g., Tarlow & Muehsam, 1996). Other 
research has documented that tourists may tend to behave differently in unfamiliar contexts, 
taking more risks than they would in their day-to-day settings, and being unaware of (or 
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perceiving themselves as invulnerable to) potential risks to their safety (e.g., Page & Meyer, 
1997; Dann, 1996). Such behaviors, in turn, may be “compounded by the fact that many tourist 
destinations are located in natural hazard prone areas (Espiner, 2001, p. 109).  
 Type of setting. As opposed to spending time in an occupational setting, for most 
individuals, a trip to a theme park or a national park is an out-of-the-ordinary trip (such as part of 
a vacation) rather than a regular routine, such as a daily commute or a trip to a local town park.  
 Novel or unfamiliar risk. Both occupational settings and theme parks represent built 
environments in which most individuals are familiar with risks to their safety, such as 
malfunctioning machinery, or tripping on slippery or uneven surfaces. National parks, on the 
other hand, vary widely in environmental characteristics such as topography, elevation, and 
climate, creating a range of potential risks, from geohazards (e.g., volcanic eruptions) in the 
Pacific Northwest to encounters with bears in the Rocky Mountains, to Lyme disease-carrying 
ticks in the Northeast (Tuler, Golding, & Krueger, 2002). Some individuals may have never 
before visited a particular park and thus may not be aware of the associated risks, such as rapidly 
changing weather, narrow, winding roads, or the effects of elevation. While driving on an 
interstate highway might also entail encountering wildlife or navigating through inclement 
weather, individuals may perceive driving as a “known” (Slovic, 1987) part of their everyday 
experience and thus may have developed complacency towards the associated risks (e.g., 
Kouabenan, 1998, 2002). In both cases, one’s past experiences and perceptions of the particular 
environment (e.g., experience in the outdoors) may inform perceptions of risk.   
 Desirable/undesirable and controllable/uncontrollable risk. In settings such as factories 
and theme parks, many—though certainly not all—risks can be controlled through engineering, 
such as through the addition of safety controls to equipment, whether in manufacturing 
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machinery or roller coasters. Visiting a national park, however, entails both risks that one 
voluntarily chooses, such as participating in recreational activities, such as hiking in an 
undeveloped area, and also risks that one can neither “choose” nor “control,” such as inclement 
weather (Slovic, 1987). Due to the novelty of the location, however, some visitors may be 
unaware of the risks associated with certain park locations or activities, and thus fail to perceive 
them as voluntary (e.g., Whittlesey, 1995). At the same time, empirical research in leisure studies 
has demonstrated that tourists may tend to perceive less personal control over the outcome of 
their decisions, as compared to during non-vacation experiences (Jackson, White, & Schmierer, 
1996).  For other visitors, however, these risks may be perceived as desirable (Machlis & Rosa, 
1990), in that they contribute to an “authentic” experience of being in a wilderness setting. While 
riding certain attractions in theme parks may also entail voluntary thrill seeking, due to the safety 
controls mandated on these rides, such risk-taking does not carry with it an equivalent—however 
remote—potential for injury or death.   
 Risk managers. Both theme parks and national parks attract conglomerations of diverse 
individuals other than employees who do not necessarily have a commitment to the institution, 
nor to its employees. While protecting park visitors’ safety remains an institutional goal (see 
below), NPS employees are neither obligated—nor in most cases, able—to establish the sort of 
familiarity, camaraderie, or trust with visitors that might be expected to develop among 
managers and employees, or between co-workers in occupational settings.   
 Safety culture. For their part, national park or theme park employees may be familiar with a 
given park’s safety culture (e.g., Guldenmund, 2000), including knowing what constitutes “safe” 
and “appropriate” behaviors when encountering certain risks in order to prevent on-the-job 
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accidents. On the other hand, visitors may be unfamiliar with this culture, or even subscribe to 
their own, potentially conflicting accounts of acceptable behavior in such locations.      
 Risk management as one of many institutional goals.  Occupational settings, theme parks, 
and national parks all engage in risk management as part of a larger institutional mission. As for-
profit entities, both occupational settings, such as factories, and theme parks focus attention on 
the bottom line, whether through manufacturing products or increasing visitation. With a 
mandate to protect the country’s natural and cultural resources, as well as to engage a diverse 
public, NPS is also tasked with preventing unintentional injury among visitors. While the latter 
goal might be best met by developing engineering controls and enforcing rules (e.g., banning 
particular activities), such strategies might run counter to the first and second goals of sustaining 
landmarks and attracting visitors. As such, NPS must rely on educational programs and public 
communication (e.g., signs, brochures, employees) to relay preventative risk and safety messages 
to its visitors (U.S. Department of the Interior, 2010).   
 Protecting health and safety as institutional responsibility. Thanks to federal, state, and 
local regulations, the carefully engineered settings characterizing both occupational and theme 
park settings promise employees and tourists, respectively, a great deal of safety assurance. 
Whereas the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) regulates workplaces 
(including theme parks as occupational settings) and worker safety, the safety of theme park 
rides are regulated by state and local governments, with specific arrangements varying by state 
(Saferparks, 2009). Given lapses in the protection of health and safety, such settings can be liable 
to legal claims. While NPS commits to protecting the safety of its visitors in its internal 
regulatory code, individual parks can choose not to engage in any effort that may endanger the 
welfare of their employees, or the character of the natural environment, such as a complicated 
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search and rescue (SAR) operation (U.S. DOI, 2010). Therefore, the degree to which a given 
park may or may not offer assistance to visitors (whether to prevent or to respond to an accident) 
may vary on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, given the unpredictability and uncontrollability of 
many of the risks present in national parks, safety cannot always be unquestionably guaranteed. 
Above all, as stated in Director’s Order 50C, NPS sees its commitment to safety as shared with 
park partners (e.g., concessions services) and park visitors, and dependent upon the active 
cooperation and coordination of all three parties (U.S. DOI, 2010).  
 Risk communication. Within all three settings, risk communication circulates through 
official and unofficial messages and messengers, in both formal and informal styles (Rickard, 
2011; Rickard, McComas, & Newman, 2011). While visitors routinely encounter examples of 
NPS-scripted) risk communication in physical and virtual park spaces, they are also exposed to 
unofficial messages and messengers, such as through interactions with concessions workers (e.g., 
restaurant or hotel staff) or other visitors.   
 Injuries, accidents, and deaths. Occupational settings, theme parks, and national parks all 
report accidental injuries and deaths. In occupational settings, such injury/fatality rates vary 
tremendously by occupation, with farmers and miners experiencing more fatal accidents than 
those engaged in occupations such as retail trades (U.S. Department of Labor, 2010).5 Data 
released by the International Association of Amusement Parks and Attractions suggest that, per 
one million patron-rides in such locations in 2008, there were .05 serious injuries (National 
Safety Council, 2008). Pelletier and Gilchrist (2005) examined fatalities related to roller-coaster 
rides in the United States between 1994-2004, concluding that an average of 4 deaths annually 
could be attributed to such attractions (see also Braksiek & Roberts, 2002).   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 For example, OSHA (2008) reports the number of fatal occupational injuries per 100,00 full-time equivalent 
workers as the following: agriculture, 30.4; mining, 23.9; retail, 2.8. 
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 While available accident rates are not directly comparable across settings, data indicate that 
visitors in national park settings experience more frequent injuries and deaths than theme park 
tourists and many occupational workers. Data reported by NPS indicate that on average three 
visitors die in parks every week due to unintentional injuries and an average of 14 people are 
seriously injured daily (S. B. Newman, personal communication, May 2009). According to SAR 
data, many injuries, accidents, and deaths are predictable by location, time of the week/year, 
activity, and/or characteristic(s) of the visitor involved (Heggie & Amundson, 2009; Heggie & 
Heggie, 2004, 2009). For instance, in a comprehensive review of NPS SAR records collected 
between 2003-2006, Heggie and Heggie (2009) found that rescues disproportionately occurred 
on Saturdays and Sundays, were initiated by activities such as day hiking, boating, or technical 
climbing, and involved visitors aged 20-29. (See Appendix A for an overview of 10 years of 
visitor injury/fatality data for Mount Rainier National Park).  
National parks management in the popular press 
 The preponderance of natural hazards and associated visitor injuries in national parks has not 
escaped the attention of the popular press, with many authors themselves former NPS 
employees. Several recent volumes document in voyeuristic detail visitor deaths in the nation’s 
most iconic parks, such as Yellowstone (Madgic, 2005; Whittlesey, 1995), Yosemite (Ghiglieri 
& Farabee, 2007), and Grand Canyon (Ghiglieri & Myers, 2001). Other accounts (e.g., Blehm, 
2006; Lankford, 2010; Loewen, 2009) depict the experience of working in these environments, 
in so doing providing ample commentary on visitor and employee tragedies. In describing these 
instances in which various men, women and children met their demise, these authors present 
clear opinions of an individual’s responsibility to prevent such accidents from occurring. A 
former Yellowstone National Park ranger and tour bus driver turned lawyer, Whittlesey (1995), 
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for example, chronicles the documented deaths of visitors and employees in the park from the 
1870s to the early 1990s. Much of his account portrays park visitors as ignorant and irrational: 
unaware of (and often unperturbed by) the dangers inherent in national park settings, and of their 
responsibility to protect themselves from harm. Throughout the narrative, Whittlesey (1995) 
interjects commentary on the responsibility to ensure safety in national parks, whether through 
the preparedness of park visitors or the crafting of safety warnings by park staff. At the same 
time, he describes the barriers to doing so, such as the unfamiliarity of many contemporary 
visitors with the appropriate norms and practices—in some sense, the culture—of recreating in 
such “wild” areas. As he writes:  
Many visitors to Yellowstone and other national parks enter the gates with a false sense 
of security. These persons wrongly believe that the animals are tame, and that the place 
surely is a lot like a city park, with swings, horseshoe pits, golf courses, swimming pools, 
and total safety—a place where lawns are watered and mowed regularly and fallen tree 
branches are picked up and carted away, all nicely managed, nicely sanitized. But 
national parks are not like that; they are places where nature and history are preserved 
intact. And intact nature includes dangers (Whittlesey, 1995, p. xii).  
 
 Visitor perceptions notwithstanding, whether national parks should resemble country clubs or 
wilderness sanctuaries, including the risk management implications implied by each, is an issue 
raised by legal scholar Joseph Sax. In Mountains without Handrails, Sax (1980) integrates the 
environmental philosophy underlying the founding of the National Park Service with 
contemporary development and management issues; he questions whether parks are (or should 
be) “recreational commodities” or “temples of nature worship” and whether a modern-day 
“preservationist” ethic can be sustained in these places. Like scholars interested in sense of place 
(see above), Sax (1980) points out that national parks carry symbolic meanings and can play a 
role in perpetuating and teaching visitors values such as self-reliance. For Sax, the “intensity” of 
experiences available to park visitors, such as encountered when backpacking in remote terrain, 
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contrasts with other more predictable, pre-packaged tourist activities. Importantly, in these more 
developed tourist settings, such as amusement parks or seaside resorts, Sax suggests that 
maintaining personal safety (or the corollary, preventing unintentional injury) is not necessarily 
linked to an individual’s preparation, knowledge, or skills; therefore, “Nothing distinctive about 
us as individuals is crucial. The margin of error permitted is great enough to neutralize the 
importance of what we know” (1980, p. 31).  
 While visitor safety does not constitute a central focus of his book, Sax’s “prescription” for 
the national parks as providing for “reflective recreation” that is “challenging and demanding” 
(Sax, 1980, p. 61) certainly alludes to the role of voluntary risk-taking in these places (see 
above). As Sax points out, however, encouraging all park visitors to seek “challenge” may be not 
only an inappropriate, but also a paradoxical management scheme. Since the most inexperienced 
park visitors are likely ill-equipped to tackle untrammeled backcountry areas, as we set aside 
larger tracts of these areas for use, most people will be inevitably drawn to the smaller, more 
crowded, urbanized areas in national parks—those equipped with general stores, restaurants, and 
so forth. Noting the importance of providing opportunities for visitors to “set their own agendas” 
rather than “be entertained” by the NPS, Sax  (1980, p. 80) concludes: 
Management committed to contemplative recreation should be just that, whether for the 
young and hardy or the old and infirm. One does not provide such an opportunity for 
older people or inexperienced visitors by building a highway to the top of the mountain. 
Rather we can assure that places that are accessible to them are not so deprived of their 
natural qualities as to put such an experience beyond their reach.   
 
Sax’s (1980, p. 108) ideal management scheme, in sum, recognizes the differences between 
national park and theme park—including the safety concerns entailed—by “[encouraging] the 
visitor to adapt to the setting of the place visited.”   
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Social science contributions 
From a social science perspective, a handful of studies have considered attributions of 
responsibility for safety in the context of outdoor recreational settings. Three studies conducted 
in New Zealand explored visitors’ and park managers’ hazard awareness, perceptions of risk and 
safety, as well as attributions of responsibility for safety within the context of a national park 
(Espiner, 1999, 2001) and during guided adventure recreation tours (Smith & Espiner, 2007). 
Triangulating interview, observation, and survey data, Espiner (1999, 2001) found that park 
visitors demonstrated only “rudimentary” awareness of the hazards to which they may be 
exposed in such settings; despite the rugged, glaciated terrain, visitors perceived such settings as 
“managed, consumable, and safe” (2001, p. 245), and for some foreign visitors, even safer than 
their home countries. As opposed to visitors, park managers tended to perceive park-related risks 
much differently and as more dangerous; such perceptions varied by occupational and 
hierarchical position and reflected their own experiences as park managers, as well as the moral 
and legal culture in which the New Zealand Department of Conservation operates. While the 
majority of park visitors and recreation tour participants acknowledged a modest degree of 
individual (internal) responsibility for their own safety, many also viewed park managers (or tour 
guides) as jointly responsible for shouldering some of the burden of safety. Moreover, findings 
from all three studies suggest that these judgments of responsibility varied by characteristics of 
the visitor, such as gender and nationality, and recreational activity choice. Importantly, 
Espiner’s findings pose a critical question that invites empirical inquiry: given visitors’ reported 
low perceptions of risk and high perceptions of safety, is willingness to assume personal 
responsibility based, at least in part, on a failure to fully recognize existing safety risks?  
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 Within the U.S. context, three unpublished studies investigated the perspectives of managers 
and visitors with regard to safety within national parks. First, a groundbreaking survey of visitor 
safety and risk communication in 30 national parks commissioned by the NPS in 2000 found that 
visitor opinions regarding the attribution of responsibility for preventing visitor injury varied 
from park to park (Tuler & Golding, 2002). In general, the majority of visitors to “backcountry 
parks” (i.e., parks where popular activities include off-trail pursuits such as backpacking) 
believed the visitor to be responsible for his safety. On the other hand, the majority of visitors to 
“frontcountry parks” (i.e., parks that offer limited or no backcountry activities) placed the burden 
of responsibility on both the visitor and the park staff. Finally, very few visitors at any of the 
parks surveyed felt that park employees should be held entirely responsible for guaranteeing 
visitor safety. In explaining the differing attributions of responsibility reported by those visiting 
backcountry and frontcountry parks, Tuler and Golding (2002, p. 60) noted that this distinction 
may reflect the perception that risks in frontcountry parks can be more easily “controlled” “since 
visitor activities tend to be less physically rigorous and the venues tend to be more ‘benign,’ with 
many paved walkways, regular stairs, and buildings.” On the other hand, as the authors note, 
such deviating attributions may reflect the perceptions, characteristics, and expectations of the 
visitors who frequent each park “type.”   
 A second survey considered the perspective of NPS park employees in attributing 
responsibility for visitor accidents (Newman & Chanlongbutra, 2008). Results from the park 
managers (e.g., Superintendents, Chief Rangers) of 51 national park units in the Pacific West 
Region surveyed revealed that participants tended to attribute responsibility for visitor injury to 
the visitor himself, while viewing park facilities and infrastructure as appropriate for ensuring 
safe visits. For instance, the majority of participants agreed or strongly agreed that visitors’ 
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inattention to their surroundings, physical health, risk-taking, and lack of preparedness 
contributed to injuries and fatalities within parks. On the other hand, the majority of participants 
disagreed or strongly disagreed that cultural and/or natural park protection requirements, 
inadequate park maintenance, and insufficient law enforcement activity were contributory factors 
leading to unintentional visitor injury and death.  
 Finally, research conducted in 2009 with both employees and visitors at Mount Rainier 
National Park investigated the relationship between risk perceptions, attributions of 
responsibility for ensuring safety, and support for risk management policy. First, a survey of park 
visitors (Rickard, Scherer, & Newman, 2011) found that over 93% of those surveyed perceived 
themselves as responsible for their own safety. Contrary to previous findings (Weiner, 2006), 
internal attributions of responsibility for safety failed to predict support for risk-preventative 
policy; however, as evidenced by free-responses to the survey, this measure may have been 
compromised by its inability to account for the contingent nature of visitors’ perceptions of 
responsibility (e.g., dependent on the activity in which the individual was participating, or the 
area of the park he was visiting) as well as a the belief that such responsibility might be shared 
between visitors and park managers. Perceptions of risk, participation in high-risk recreational 
activities (e.g., skiing, mountaineering), and visiting the park with family and friends were all 
negatively related to support for risk-preventative policy; without data on the ages and 
relationships existing in these groups, however, we cannot fully interpret the latter result.  
 A second arm of this research explored park employees’ roles in official and unofficial risk- 
and safety-related communication with park visitors (Rickard et al., 2011). Using interview and 
observational data, this study examined how park staff rely on heuristic cues to evaluate visitors 
during face-to-face interactions, so-called “proficiency profiling,” using these assessments as a 
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basis for either encouraging or discouraging visitors from participating in inherently risky 
recreational activities. While many employees described visitors as responsible for their own 
safety, they also routinely told stories in which visitors appeared as deficient: lacking the 
clothing, skills, or common sense to act appropriately in a national park. Despite serious ethical 
implications, such as the potential for proficiency profiling to lead to inaccurate judgments or to 
perpetuate visitor stereotypes, the authors conclude that it:  
…Represents a beneficial risk management tool, especially when considering the high- 
risk scenarios and potentially tragic outcomes associated with some park settings. 
Relying on intuition developed through experience to pinpoint ‘red flags’ allows staff to 
intercept visitors with unreasonable itineraries or inappropriate preparation, thus 
potentially preventing injury (Rickard et al., 2011, p. 77).  
 
Directions for future research 
 	   While the above studies represent critical first steps in studying attribution theory in a 
national park context, several limitations highlight the need for additional research. First, while 
Espiner (1999, 2001) considers the role of park signage in affecting visitors’ behavior and risk 
awareness, and Rickard et al. (2011) show how informal, face-to-face interactions between staff 
and visitors function as a form of risk management, more research is needed to understand how 
both official and unofficial, formal and informal communication may influence attributions of 
responsibility for causing and preventing visitor injury. Second, differences in the institutional 
and legal contexts of park management in New Zealand and the United States raise questions 
about the generalizability of studies conducted in international locations. Third, while previous 
research in U.S. parks more closely reflects the proposed research, a limited survey instrument 
(Rickard et al., 2011) and the reporting of mostly descriptive data (Newman & Chanlongbutra, 
2008; Tuler & Golding, 2002) restricts the applicability of these findings. Finally, and perhaps 
most centrally, none of the studies reviewed consider how both visitors and employees perceive 
	   62	  
the causes of accidents and unintentional injuries in park settings and how such perceptions 
might be related to perceptions of risk and attributions of responsibility for preventing 
injury/ensuring safety.      
Hypotheses and Research Questions 
 This study combines psychological concepts utilized to explain causal attribution of 
accidents with sociological concepts applied to understanding the attribution of responsibility for 
preventing accidents/ensuring safety to create a mixed-method, multiple case study approach. By 
using both quantitative and qualitative methods, and through extended visits at three national 
parks, the approach accounts for both the sociocultural and psychological factors that may 
predict attributions of responsibility, as well as the contextual nature of these judgments (see 
Marris, Langford, & O’Riordan, 1998). In so doing, the intent is to provide richer participant 
accounts, a perspective that has received only limited attention to date in the safety-related 
literature (Dorn & Brown, 2003). I have divided the attribution-related hypotheses into two 
sections with respect to the two dependent variables denoted above. 
Attribution of responsibility for causing accidents/unintentional injuries 
 While previous safety science research highlights differences in managers’ (tasked with 
managing risk) versus employees’ (tasked with acknowledging management rules while 
completing a job) perspectives (e.g., Lehane & Stubbs, 2001), I hypothesize that parallel 
differences may exist between NPS employees (tasked with managing risk) and park visitors 
(tasked with acknowledging rules while enjoying recreational activities). Formally stated:   
H1: Employees’ causal attributions of visitor accidents will differ from visitors’ causal 
attributions of accidents.   
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 The second hypothesis builds on the findings of Kouabenan (2002) and DeJoy (1989), in that 
it poses a relationship between the degree of experience one has in the given activity, such as 
driving a car, and how one attributes the cause of a hypothetical accident. The rationale is that 
employees with more experience working in national parks will tend to attribute the cause of 
visitor accidents in a matter that reflects positively on their occupational position in the park. For 
instance, those with positions most closely related to visitor protection (e.g., law enforcement 
rangers), or highly involved in SAR operations will be more likely to attribute the cause of 
visitor accidents to characteristics of the visitor (i.e., internal attributions), rather than place 
blame on themselves or on aspects of the park environment or infrastructure (i.e., external 
attributions). I hypothesize:  
 H2: Employees’ experience with the context will relate positively to self-defensive 
 attributions of responsibility for causing accidents.  
 Third, following research on defensive attribution and optimistic bias (e.g., DeJoy, 1989; 
Shaver, 1970; Walster, 1966), I hypothesize that visitors who report having more experience in 
outdoor settings will be more likely to attribute the cause of a “third person” visitor accident to 
internal factors (e.g., inadequate preparation, clumsiness) rather than to external factors (e.g., 
weather, park infrastructure). Formally, I state this hypothesis as: 
 H3: Visitors’ experience with the context will relate positively to internal attributions of 
 responsibility for causing accidents.  
 Next, given limited existing research considering the relationship between causal attribution 
and (1) sense of place and place attachment; (2) the nature and context of risks encountered in a 
location; and (3) exposure to different forms of risk- and safety-related communication, I pose 
the following research questions:   
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RQ1: How do sense of place and place attachment relate to attributions about the cause of 
accidents?   
RQ2: How do perceptions of controllability, voluntariness, and desirability of park risks 
relate to attributions of responsibility for the cause of accidents?  
 RQ3: How does exposure to formal/informal and official/unofficial risk communication 
 relate to attributions of responsibility for the cause of accidents? 
Attribution of responsibility for preventing accidents/unintentional injuries 
 The findings of Tuler and Golding (2002) suggest that visitors who spend the majority of 
their park visit engaging in frontcountry activities (e.g., visiting indoor exhibits, walking to 
outdoor attractions) will be more likely to attribute responsibility for preventing accidents to both 
managers and visitors (i.e., a “shared” responsibility) than to just themselves or to park 
managers. On the other hand, visitors who spend the majority of their park visit engaging in 
backcountry activities (e.g., hiking, camping) will be more likely to attribute responsibility for 
preventing accidents to themselves than to managers or to visitors and managers (see also 
Rickard et al., 2011). Because participating in these activities entails voluntary exposure to 
different levels of objective risk, I therefore hypothesize:    
 H4: Visitors’ voluntary risk-taking will relate positively to internal attributions of 
 responsibility for ensuring safety.   
 The fifth hypothesis is based broadly on the idea that institutional actors may “offload” 
responsibility for risk management onto individual citizens (Bickerstaff et al., 2008), and that 
safety, in the context of the National Park Service, may be conceived of as an “individual,” 
rather than a “collective,” responsibility (Bickerstaff et al., 2008; Bickerstaff & Walker, 2002; 
Petts, 2005). More specifically, I draw on the findings of Newman and Chanlongbutra (2008), 
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whose data suggest that NPS managers tend to attribute responsibility for ensuring visitor safety 
to the park visitor himself, rather than to park officials or elements of the park environment. 
Formally stated:  
H5: Employees will be more likely to report internal attributions of responsibility for 
ensuring safety than external or shared attributions of responsibility.  
 Next, I draw from cultural theories of risk, which suggest that perceptions of the 
“appropriateness” of risk management strategies, as well as notions of accountability and 
blameworthiness in the event of accidents, can vary widely among individuals and members of 
organizations (e.g., Douglas, 1990, 1992; Rayner, 1986). More specifically, I also refer to the 
research of Espiner (1999, 2001), who found attributions of responsibility among park visitors 
and employees to vary by both individual characteristics and larger group memberships. I 
hypothesize:   
H6: Visitors’ attributions of responsibility for ensuring safety will vary by: (1) age; (2) 
gender; and (3) country of origin. 
H7: Employees’ attributions of responsibility for ensuring safety will vary by occupational 
position and level in the agency.   
 Due to the limitations in previous research linking risk perception and attribution theory 
(described above), I explore the relationships between attribution of responsibility for preventing 
injury/ensuring safety and: (1) sense of place and place attachment; (2) the nature and context of 
the risk; (3) exposure to park risk communication, and; (4) perceived causal attribution with the 
following research questions:  
RQ4: How do sense of place and place attachment relate to attributions of responsibility for 
preventing accidents?  
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RQ5: How do attributions of responsibility for safety relate to attributions about the cause of 
accidents?   
RQ6: How do perceptions of controllability, voluntariness, and desirability of  park risks 
relate to attributions of responsibility for preventing accidents?  
RQ7: How does exposure to formal/informal and official/unofficial risk communication 
relate to attributions of responsibility for preventing accidents? 
Risk management and cultural theories of risk 
 To explore cultural theories of risk and perceptions of risk management, I draw upon the 
work of scholars interested in social construction of risk and accidents (e.g., Green 1997a; 
Roberts et al., 1995), and research exploring how individuals interpret risk within the context of 
organizations and institutions (e.g., Bickerstaff et al., 2008; Rayner, 1986; 1993). Because much 
of this research has been qualitative in nature, employing interviews, participant observation, and 
ethnomethodological approaches, research questions are more appropriate than hypotheses. I 
pose the following research questions, with the understanding that respondents will draw upon 
their values, beliefs, experiences, and so forth in crafting their responses:  
RQ8: How do employees understand risk management in relation to the “mission” of the 
National Park Service?  
 RQ8a: How do formal/informal and official/unofficial communication fit into 
risk management? 
 RQ8b: What comprises a given park’s “safety culture”?  
RQ9: According to employees, what are “acceptable” vs. “unacceptable” risks or levels of 
risk in park settings? 
 RQ9a: How does risk fit into the “experience” of being in a national park? 
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 RQ9b: In the context of a national park, what do employees classify as 
“accidents”?  
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CHAPTER 3. 
 
METHODS 
 
Description of Cases 
 
Case study approach 
 Having interacted with the National Park Service (NPS) in various capacities over the past 
15 years as a volunteer trail crew member, intern, and backcountry ranger, in following Lofland, 
Snow, Anderson, and Lofland (2006, p. 9), I decided upon this research by “[starting] where I 
was.” With the assistance of Dr. Sara Newman of the NPS Public Risk Management Program 
and with funding from the Student Conservation Association (SCA), in 2009 I designed a 
research program to better understand how both “official” (i.e., from the NPS) and “unofficial” 
(i.e., non-NPS), as well as “formal” (e.g., scripted) and “informal” (e.g., unscripted) risk and 
safety information is conveyed to the visiting public at Mount Rainier National Park (MORA). 
Based on the recommendations I made to the park in 2009, MORA Chief Ranger Chuck Young 
invited me to return in 2011 to assist park management in learning about the nature of visitor 
injuries in the last ten years. By compiling and analyzing these data, the management team hoped 
to better design and implement the park’s emergency services programs, as well as to determine 
how to allocate park resources to enhance prevention efforts in the park. While the quantitative 
analysis of this data did not constitute the present research, returning to MORA for several 
months (during January-May 2011) did allow me access to the employees and visitors who 
became my study participants. (See Appendix A for an abridged version of the MORA visitor 
injury analysis).  
Following a case study approach, in addition to MORA, I selected two other national park 
units to serve as research sites, Olympic National Park (OLYM) and Delaware Water Gap 
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National Recreation Area (DEWA). According to Yin (1994) case study approaches garner 
strength in their ability to use multiple sources of evidence to “[converge] on the same set of 
facts or findings” (Yin, 1994, p. 78), a positive attribute that is likewise mentioned with regard to 
mixed method research approaches, as will be described below. Extensive consultation with Dr. 
Newman and the Chief Rangers from all three sites helped inform the site selection, logistics, 
and research timeline. Before the start of the research, officials from all three parks had 
demonstrated an ongoing commitment to NPS safety prevention and risk communication efforts, 
as well as expressed interest and enthusiasm in participating in research. The study adopted a 
multiple case, embedded design, meaning that it included multiple cases (i.e., national parks), 
and within each case, multiple units of investigation (i.e., both park employees and park visitors). 
To allow for theoretical development, I selected cases that would allow for both literal 
replication (i.e., case(s) predicted to produce similar results to a comparison case) and theoretical 
replication (i.e., case(s) predicted to produce contrasting results for predictable reasons) (Yin, 
1994). More specifically, the three park units I selected are characterized by known similarities 
and differences with regard to: (1) visitation patterns and levels of visitation, (2) seasonal 
recreational activities, (3) region of the U.S., climate, and natural hazards; (4) prevalent visitor 
injuries and causes of injury, and, (5) potential risks (see Table 3.1). For instance, while all three 
park units are within driving distance of major U.S. metropolitan areas, two are located in the 
Pacific Northwest region (MORA and OLYM), and a third is in the Northeast/Mid-Atlantic 
region (DEWA). All three parks employ between 100 and 200 full-time employees, yet the 
physical size of the park (i.e., acreage) varies. And while all the parks report annual visitor 
accidents, the types of injuries/mortalities (e.g., drowning, falling), as well as the activities 
associated with them (e.g., swimming, mountaineering) differ considerably. Due to scheduling 
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constraints, data collection occurred during Winter and Spring 2011 at MORA and OLYM and 
during Summer 2011 at DEWA (see Table 3.2). (Potential limitations of this approach are 
discussed below and in Chapter 7).  
Research settings 
Between January and August 2011, I conducted on-site data collection in MORA, OLYM, 
and DEWA. The descriptions below characterize each site and provide the reader with a brief 
history of the park unit (see also Table 3.1). Of note, my research period at MORA and OLYM 
overlapped with the period in which lawmakers debated, and eventually avoided, the potential 
closure of the U.S. federal government (April 2011), a decision that would have closed all 
national parks and furloughed all but “essential” NPS employees. Though far from Washington, 
D.C., MORA employees reacted to the unfolding political discussion with understandable 
anxiety and apprehension. As an SCA intern, I sat in on park-wide meetings involving discussion 
of operating plans under a potential federal closure, and was privy to employees’ reactions; for 
me, a government shutdown would have meant an end to visitor recruitment, as well as my paid 
internship. Fortunately, the averting of the closure “crisis” in the final hours allowed life and 
work to proceed as usual for me and for most NPS employees.      
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Table 3.1. Summary Characteristics of Study Sites  
 Mount Rainier 
National Park 
Olympic National Park Delaware Water Gap 
National Recreation 
Area 
NPS abbreviation MORA OLYM DEWA 
Location Western Cascade 
Range, WA [~50 
miles from Seattle-
Tacoma] 
Olympic Peninsula, 
WA [~100 miles from 
Seattle-Tacoma] 
PA/NJ [~100 miles from 
New York City and 
Philadelphia] 
Park size (2010)1 236,381 acres 922,650 acres 66,741 acres  
Full-time employees 
(2006)2 
184 180 116 
Recreational visitors per 
year (2010)1 
1,191,754  2,844,563  5,285,761 
Popular recreational 
activities 
Summer: Day hiking, 
backpacking, 
mountaineering 
Winter: Skiing, 
snowshoeing, “snow 
play”  
Summer: Day hiking, 
backpacking, 
mountaineering 
Winter: Skiing, 
snowshoeing, day 
hiking 
Summer: Swimming, 
canoeing/kayaking, day 
hiking, fishing, 
backpacking 
Winter: Skiing, hunting 
Activities commonly 
associated with visitor 
injuries and fatalities 
Driving; 
mountaineering, day 
hiking, backpacking 
Driving; 
mountaineering, day 
hiking, backpacking 
Driving; swimming 
Fatalities per 100,000 
visitors3 
.10 .10 .04 
Injuries & illnesses per 
100,000 visitors3 
6.30 3.53 1.91 
1NPS Public Use Statistics Office (http://www.nature.nps.gov/stats/index.cfm)  
2S. B. Newman, personal communication, July 2010  
3Tuler and Golding (2002)  
 
Table 3.2. Overview of Data Collection, 2011 
 January-February 
(Washington) 
March-May 
(Washington) 
June-August 
(Pennsylvania/ 
New Jersey) 
Interviews 
(employees & volunteers) 
MORA MORA, OLYM DEWA 
Survey recruitment 
(employees) 
MORA, OLYM ------ DEWA 
Survey recruitment 
(visitors) 
MORA MORA, OLYM DEWA 
 
Mount Rainier National Park. America’s fifth national park (established in 1899), located 
about 50 miles southeast of the Seattle-Tacoma, Washington metropolitan area, MORA is a 236, 
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381 acre park on the west side of the Cascade Mountains. The mountain itself is a well-known 
presence in the Pacific Northwest: a majestic backdrop against the Seattle skyline and an iconic 
image on the state vehicle license plate. A volcanic mountain, Mount Rainier boasts the most 
extensive single-peak glacial system in the U.S. Ringed by the Tatoosh Mountains, the park is 
also heavily forested and dotted with alpine streams, lakes, and waterfalls. Whether attempting 
the summit (elevation 14, 410 ft), camping in the backcountry, or sledding, MORA offers year-
round recreational opportunities.  
 Like most national parks, MORA houses a constellation of natural hazards, unique 
environmental conditions, and concentrated human activity (Tuler et al., 2002). Since the 
mountain is an active volcano, the park and surrounding areas are subject to mud flows (lahars), 
flooding, and earthquakes. Climbing the mountain requires glacier travel and poses high-altitude 
hazards such as altitude sickness, hypothermia, and fast-changing weather. At lower elevations, 
visitors may encounter wildlife (e.g., bears, foxes, deer), poisonous plants, and river crossings. 
Accessing many of the trails and interpretive centers requires driving on narrow, winding roads 
providing only limited shoulders and distance from obstacles such as large trees. Designated as 
historic, these roads were designed by landscape architects at the turn of the 20th century to 
provide spectacular views of the mountain, as Mount Rainier became one of the first national 
parks allowing visitors a scenic experience without leaving their cars (Louter, 2006). While 
several entrances around the park perimeter provide visitors road access to MORA, much of the 
park’s interior is accessible only by foot, skis, or snowshoes. From late fall (e.g., November) to 
early summer (e.g., June), depending on snowfall and road conditions, access to the park is often 
limited to one road in the southwestern corner of the park, the Nisqually entrance road, 
approximately five miles from the town of Ashford, WA. Moreover, throughout the winter, park 
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officials often close this road, which leads to the base of the mountain (Paradise, located at 5,400 
ft), due to inclement weather and/or avalanche concern.        
Olympic National Park. About 100 miles northwest of Seattle, Washington, OLYM is an 
expansive (922, 650 acre) park situated in the Olympic Peninsula in the northwest corner of the 
state, bordered by the Pacific Ocean (to the west), the Strait of Juan de Fuca (to the north), and 
the Puget Sound (to the east). Declared a national park in 1938, OLYM has since earned the 
distinction of an International Biosphere Reserve and a World Heritage Site. Despite its 
proximity to urban centers of the state, 95% of OLYM has been designated by Congress as 
wilderness, bordering only sparsely populated towns and Native American reservations, with few 
maintained roads running through the park interior.  
 The park is characterized by a variety of diverse ecosystems: the glaciated sub-alpine 
environments of the Olympic Mountains, temperate rain forests, hot springs, placid mountain 
lakes, and rugged coastline. Due to unique patterns of geological and climatic conditions, the 
park hosts a variety of plants, mammals, amphibians, fish, insects, and mollusks found nowhere 
else in the world (McNulty, 2009). While winter park visitors are most often found at Hurricane 
Ridge (elevation 5, 200 ft.) skiing or sledding, others find year-round recreational opportunities 
camping on the park’s remote Pacific coast beaches, or venturing into the dense greenery of the 
temperate rainforest. Within all of OLYM’s ecosystems, visitors may encounter rough terrain, 
inclement weather, and wildlife, such as deer, bears, or cougars.6 Like MORA, many park roads 
close throughout the winter and early spring, and winter access to Hurricane Ridge is limited to a 
single road from the Heart O’ the Hills entrance (approximately 5 miles from Port Angeles, WA) 
which is often closed due to snow and avalanche concern. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Of note, in 2010, an OLYM visitor died on a popular hiking trail from injuries sustained in an attack by a 
particularly aggressive mountain goat.	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Delaware Water Gap National Recreation Area. A much newer addition to the National 
Park System, DEWA is a smaller park unit (nearly 70,000 acres) straddling the states of New 
Jersey (NJ) and Pennsylvania (PA) on a roughly 40-mile section of the Middle Delaware River. 
Following the dissolving of a controversial plan in the 1960s to build a dam on Tocks Island in 
the Delaware River for flood control and hydroelectric power, the federal government transferred 
authority over the present DEWA to the NPS in 1978 (Albert, 1987).  The “gap” itself is a 
portion of ridgeline carved out by the eroding action of the river over thousands of years. In close 
proximity to New York City, Philadelphia, as well as the popular vacation area of the Pocono 
Mountains (PA), the park borders heavily populated, developed areas, ranging from golfing 
resorts to farms to single-family homes. As such, one can access the park from a multitude of 
county roads and semi-maintained rural lanes; unlike at MORA and OLYM, visitors are not 
shuttled through a centralized park entrance, and accessing most areas of the park is possible by 
car.  
As a “national recreation area,” DEWA requires that visitors pay entrance fees only in certain 
“expanded amenity” areas of the park (e.g., lifeguarded swimming areas), and also permits a 
wider range of recreational activities, such as hunting and motorized boating, which are often 
banned in national parks. While day hiking, canoeing, and kayaking are popular activities, a 
substantial portion of DEWA visitors use the park for picnics, family reunions, or even as a 
scenic and convenient driving route to New York City. Occupying a landscape in transition, 
ecosystems in DEWA range from fallow farmland to rural villages, and the historic Appalachian 
Trail follows about 25 miles of the park’s eastern boundary. With its strong currents, slippery 
rocks, and underwater obstructions, the Delaware River poses the most obvious potential risk to 
visitors; however, the park also hosts a substantial population of black bears, poisonous snakes, 
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and Lyme disease-carrying ticks. Large mosquito populations also pose the risk of West Nile 
Virus.  
Study Logistics 
Study approval 
 The current study received funding from a Dissertation Improvement Grant from the 
National Science Foundation (NSF) (Grant No. 1060433). Prior to data collection, I secured 
approval of the study from multiple entities. All research conducted in national parks requires a 
research permit, which involves an application process coordinated by each park’s division of 
research. Before applying for permits in MORA, DEWA, and OLYM, I consulted with each of 
the Chief Rangers to determine acceptable times and locations to carry out date collection. I took 
this information into account when proposing my research plan, and ultimately received three 
research permits during Fall 2010. At the same time, I obtained human subjects approval from 
the Cornell University Institutional Review Board (IRB) (protocol ID #1011001776).  
 While my internship with the SCA in 2011 allowed me to live and work on-site at MORA for 
several months, this affiliation with the NPS also led to somewhat challenging circumstances for 
gaining approval for the visitor research portion of the study. Importantly, I received “support” 
from the NPS through the use of its resources, such as an apartment to live in, and the research 
involved posing the same questions to more than seven visitors; therefore, due to the guidelines 
of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the federal office tasked with upholding the 
Paperwork Reduction Act, my study required additional approval. After extensive consultation 
with NPS Chief Social Scientist Dr. Bruce Peacock as well as Dr. Newman, however, it was 
determined that I could collect visitor data (i.e., recruit visitors to take an online survey; see 
below) during designated “time off” from my SCA internship, such as on weekends. In these 
	   76	  
instances, as a Cornell University affiliate, I was to receive no support (e.g., help with recruiting 
visitors) from park staff. When contacting park visitors, for instance, I wore a nametag 
identifying myself as a “Cornell University graduate student” and a Cornell hat or jacket; further, 
I refrained from wearing or using any paraphernalia with the NPS or SCA logos. All three Chief 
Rangers were informed of this situation, and I drafted a memorandum of agreement for Chief 
Ranger Chuck Young to ensure proper documentation.  
 Though the situation described above represented an acceptable solution, in late 2010 Dr. 
Newman and I nonetheless decided to pursue OMB approval for the final phase of visitor data 
collection in DEWA. By securing OMB support, we hoped to afford the study more flexibility 
and additional resources—namely, the permission to allow NPS-affiliated personnel to contact 
visitors, and to publicly endorse the research.  In June 2011, we received OMB approval, 
allowing two individuals associated with the volunteer program at DEWA to assist with visitor 
recruitment during the following two months.   
 Role of the researcher and “gaining access”  
While collecting data, I lived and worked on-site, interacting with Park Service employees in 
the office, on the trail, and sometimes in the local bar. Through these extended field visits, I not 
only gathered information specific to this study, but also gained a richer understanding of the 
general culture of each of the park units. Though MORA, OLYM, and DEWA each belong to the 
National Park System, individual parks tend to operate idiosyncratically with minor—and 
sometimes major—differences in structure and management philosophies. Informally, those 
familiar with the System tend to refer to each park as its own “fiefdom,” operating as a discrete 
unit separate from its NPS neighbors. While some of the differences between parks are made 
explicit in each park’s “enabling legislation”—for instance, the recreational and management 
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distinctions between a “national park” and a “national recreation area”—others are less obvious.  
To “gain access” (Lofland, Snow, Anderson, & Lofland, 2006) to the employees at each park, I 
began by asking each Chief Ranger to circulate an introductory email explaining my work to all 
park staff, and how they might be asked to participate. At all three parks, the Chief Rangers also 
discussed my research in management meetings and with less senior employees, allowing 
individuals to ask questions, and to discuss any potential problems or concerns. The Chief 
Rangers then reported back to me on the content of these meetings, allowing me to answer any 
questions, and to modify my plans as necessary. Throughout the research period, this continual 
communication was instrumental in ensuring successful implementation of the study.          
At MORA, data collection involved living at the park for a four-month period. My stays at 
OLYM and DEWA, though less extensive (i.e., several week-long stays at each park), similarly 
introduced me to both park employees and to the characteristics—codified and noncodified, —of 
the work setting. Arguably, my knowledge of the Park Service, gleaned from field research 
conducted for the present study, as well as past summers spent working for the NPS, offered me 
a valuable “insider status” (Lofland et al., 2006) perhaps allowing for a more nuanced 
understanding of the sites and people with whom I interacted. Nonetheless, insider or not, my 
construal of the parks, employees, and visitors I contacted throughout the course of my research 
remains uniquely my own. As Becker (1996, p. 58) paraphrases Herbert Blumer, “all social 
scientists, implicitly or explicitly, attribute a point of view and interpretations to the people 
whose actions we analyze.”           
Mixed Method Research 
The present study utilized both qualitative interviews and quantitative and qualitative survey 
questions to explore a series of research questions and hypotheses. While various researchers 
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have taken this approach since the 1950s, in the past decade, interest has grown in applying 
“mixed methods” within a variety of disciplinary contexts.7 The following sections define mixed 
method research in general and explain how it is applied to this study, in particular.      
Explanation and justification 
Most simply, mixed method research involves one or more of the following three 
characteristics: (1) the use of two or more “types” of data, often, but not always, classified as 
“qualitative” and “quantitative”; (2) the use of two or more data collection methods (e.g., a 
controlled experiment and interviews); (3) the use of data analysis methods not usually 
associated with a particular type of data (Small, 2011). These “crossover analyses” refer to 
instances in which “qualitative data are analyzed primarily through formal, mathematical, or 
statistical techniques or those in which quantitative data are analyzed primarily through narrative 
techniques” (Small, 2011, p. 72), sometimes called “qualitizing” or “quantitizing” the data. Other 
mixed method analyses integrate multiple techniques at the same time, such as combining 
network analysis and conversation analysis to examine interview transcripts. Mixed method 
studies can vary in sequencing, whether different types of data are collected at the same time or 
sequentially, for various reasons; a popular example involves using one method, such as 
qualitative interviews, to generate hypotheses, and a second, such as a survey, to test emergent 
hypotheses. Studies can also be nested, in that multiple types of data can be collected from the 
same actors (e.g., individuals, organizations) (Small, 2011).  
By using a mixed method approach, researchers gain a variety of benefits, including 
comparing or confirming findings, more fully understanding the data, and balancing the 
weaknesses of different epistemological paradigms (Creswell, 2003; Greene, Caracelli, & 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 While this methodology has received varied labels (e.g., multimethod, mixed methodology), the term mixed 
method has increasingly gained universal recognition and will be used in this dissertation (Creswell, 2003). 
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Graham, 1989; Sieber, 1973). According to Small (2011), the most common motivations for 
conducting a mixed method study fall into two main categories. First, researchers often seek 
confirmation of their data, and so utilize a triangulation or “convergence” approach to uncover 
the same information from multiple research methods. Second, other researchers see mixed 
method approaches as allowing for complementarity: the ability of one method to compensate 
for the weakness of the other, and vice versa, thus allowing for an interpretive “richness” that 
would be otherwise unavailable (see also Morgan, 2006). Whether seeking confirmation or 
complementarity, others have praised mixed method approaches as suited to applied research 
questions. In so doing, they note that mixed methods research are underlined by a “pragmatist” 
epistemological foundation (e.g., Cherryholmes, 1992; Creswell, 2003; Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004), one that,  “[prioritizes] the act of discovery over the justifications for 
knowledge” (Small, 2011, p. 62). 
Mixed method approaches, however, are not without drawbacks. Employing these 
approaches may also involve more time and resources than single method studies, as well as the 
challenge of gaining competence in at least two research methods (Creswell, 2003). As the social 
sciences continue to specialize, including in particular methodologies utilized in different fields 
and sub-fields, the mixed method researcher may also run the risk of “falling behind” on 
emerging techniques (Small, 2011). Less obviously, methodologists have pointed out that the 
commensurability of multiple research methods may be problematic; that is, the epistemological 
foundations of two methods, views on the nature of knowledge and how it is generated, may 
actually contradict one another (e.g., Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Morgan, 2006; Small, 2011). For 
some, the incommensurability of epistemological foundations renders mixed method approaches 
impracticable; others, however, note simply that mixed method researchers must be able to, 
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“write and think across not only methodological techniques but also epistemological 
perspectives” (Small, 2011, p. 79).    
Application to this study 
This study adopted a “concurrent nested strategy” (Creswell, 2003, p. 218), as both 
qualitative and quantitative data were collected simultaneously during a single phase with an 
emphasis placed on the survey to visitors and employees (quantitative), and with the interviews 
(qualitative) serving as the “nested” method. A “complementary” mixed method study, each 
method focused more directly on one of the main dependent variables to provide an “enriched, 
elaborated understanding” of the central “phenomenon” of attribution theory and risk 
management in an applied context (Greene, Caracelli, & Graham, 1989, p. 258). The survey 
primarily informed hypotheses and research questions related to causal attribution—that is, 
attributions of responsibility for causing accidents/unintentional injuries among park visitors. In-
depth interviews, on the other hand, addressed prevention attribution (or, attribution of 
responsibility for ensuring safety), integrating more sociological and cultural theories of risk. 
Opportunity for triangulation (i.e., confirmation) also existed, as both methods addressed the 
study’s central independent variables, such as the types of risk communication (i.e., 
official/unofficial, formal/informal) available to park visitors, and the perceived nature/context of 
park-related risk. Moreover, as discussed below, survey questions addressed both dependent 
variables, and interviews often included respondents’ reflections on their survey responses. By 
using the concurrent nested strategy, I hoped to increase my breadth of perspective on a complex 
issue, as I combined the data from both methods. Unfortunately, little guidance exists in the 
literature on just how to transform the data, or resolve potential discrepancies between the two 
data types (Creswell, 2003), a potential limitation that will be discussed below.   
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Survey 
The goal of the survey, which was distributed to both visitors and park employees/volunteers, 
was to test hypotheses 1-7 by examining the statistical relationships using two main dependent 
variables, (1) causal attribution, and (2) prevention attribution, and several independent 
variables, such as: experience in a park context, perceptions of park-related risk, and exposure to 
park communication. The survey also provided insight into research questions 1-7. Below, I 
describe the survey, including its format, items, and implementation.8  
Measurement 
Consisting of both closed and open-ended items, the survey was conducted online and 
existed in two forms: (1) for employees and volunteers, and (2) for visitors. Throughout the 
research period (February-August 2011), Cornell University Survey Research Institute (SRI) 
provided technical support in the form of programming the online survey, providing web 
hosting, and coordinating the logistics of the survey process (e.g., sending email invitations and 
follow-up reminders to survey respondents, compiling survey responses, etc.).    
 I gathered data in the following broad areas: (1) exposure to/reliance on communication 
related to the park; (2) demographic characteristics, including traveling companions; (3) 
recreational activity involvement in the park; (4) experience at the park and in other park 
settings; (5) perceptions of park-related risk (and/or safety); (6) causal attribution (i.e., attribution 
of responsibility for causing accidents); (7) perceptions of risk management and prevention 
attribution (i.e., attribution of responsibility for preventing visitor accidents/ ensuring safety). In 
the descriptions of the measures for the key variables that follow, I distinguish between question 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 It deserves mention that some respondents, after taking the online survey, emailed additional comments. While not 
formally analyzed, such comments were taken into consideration when interpreting survey results, including both 
closed and open-ended questions.   
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sets delivered to just one or both of the groups. (See Appendix B for a copy of the specific 
survey instrument).    
 Exposure to/reliance on risk communication (visitors only). Based on Rickard et al. 
(2011)’s conception of potential risk communication sources and the idea of “information 
channel reliance” (Griffin, Dunwoody, & Zabala, 1998), visitors were asked to indicate the 
extent to which they received information related to the park from particular sources, including 
official/unofficial and formal/informal: not at all, very little, some, a lot, or not applicable (see 
Table 3.3). Using the same response categories (excluding the “not applicable” category), an 
additional item asked visitors to indicate which topics they received information about: (1) park 
hazards (e.g., wildlife, drowning); (2) park regulations (e.g., swimming or boating restrictions); 
(3) weather conditions; and (4) road conditions/closures.   
Table 3.3 Typology of Visitor Information Sources Presented in Survey 
 Official (NPS) Unofficial (non-NPS) 
Formal (Scripted) • NPS Interpretive program 
• NPS brochures 
• NPS website 
• Signs, exhibits, movies 
• Traveler Information Systems 
(AM radio station) 
• Guidebooks (e.g., hiking 
guide) 
• Printed information in local 
chamber of commerce, private 
business, or visitor center 
outside of the park. 
Informal (Unscripted) • Interacting with NPS staff 
(e.g., rangers) 
• Interacting with climbing 
guides, boating guides, or other 
recreational trip leaders. 
• Interacting with staff at 
restaurants, gift shops, or 
hotels in the park. 
• Interacting with other park 
visitors, family members, or 
friends. 
 
 Visit companions (visitors only). Based on Tuler and Golding (2002) and Rickard et al. 
(2011), one question asked respondents to describe their group as one of the following: (1) 
family members; (2) friends; (3) organized tour group, or; (4) “other.” A second question asked 
respondents to record the amount of people in their group falling into particular age groups, 
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including: (1) number of children 5 or under; (2) number of children ages 6-12; (3) number of 
children ages 13-17; (3) number of adults 18-65; (4) number of adults older than 65.   
 Recreational activities (visitors only). With the help of the Chief Rangers and by reviewing 
each park unit’s website and relevant brochures, I compiled a list of 16 common recreational 
activities that visitors engage in at each park unit throughout the year. I first analyzed how the 
activities grouped via an exploratory factor analysis (varimax rotation). Results of the factor 
analysis indicated that mountaineering, rock climbing, skiing/snowboarding, and backpacking in 
the backcountry loaded onto a single factor, and this loading also aligned with the “high risk” 
classification of recreational activities used by Rickard et al. (2011); participation in “high risk” 
recreational activities was thus used as a predictor variable throughout the analysis.  
 In addition to measuring the “riskiness” of the recreational activities, I also gauged the 
visitors’ self-reported preparedness for participating in the activity in which they spend the most 
time; using a five-point Likert scale, a single item asked visitors to indicate how prepared they 
felt for participating in this activity, from “not at all prepared” to “completely prepared.” A 
second, open-ended item asked respondents to explain why they had described their 
preparedness as such.     
 Experience at park(s). To gauge experience, I measured three related items: frequency (i.e., 
number of visits to the park and to all national parks), impact (i.e., the extent to which the 
experience of being in a national park impacted the participant’s life), and outcome (i.e., whether 
the experience was positive or negative) (Barnett & Breakwell, 2001). To measure impact and 
outcome, I used a five-point semantic differential scale and asked respondents to describe their 
experiences at the park with three sets of antonyms: (1) unremarkable/remarkable; (2) 
negative/positive, and; (3) easy to forget/unforgettable. Additionally, for visitors who reported 
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participating in more than one recreational activity, one survey item asked them to indicate 
which activity was the most memorable.   
Park experience also included measures of sense of place. Items pertaining to place meaning 
were informed by Davenport et al. (2000), as well as by an informal review of the messages 
contained in official/formal park communication in each of the three parks; eight items were 
measured on a 5-point Likert scale, from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The items 
comprising place attachment were adapted from Stedman (2002), and included 7 items also 
measured on the same 5-point Likert scale. All of the items described above were modified to fit 
the park that the respondent had visited; for example, a DEWA visitor received an item stating 
“Delaware Water Gap National Recreation Area means a lot to me” whereas an OLYM visitor 
would have seen “Olympic National Park means a lot to me.”  
 Perception of park-related risk. To measure perception of park-related risk, items covered 
the following sub-areas:  
• Desirability of park-related risk (Machlis & Rosa, 1998): Using a 5-point Likert scale 
ranging from “not at all important” to “extremely important,” respondents indicated the 
importance of five different reasons for being in the park, including: (1) to take risks; (2) to 
experience thrills; (3) to have an adventure; (4) to be challenged; (5) to experience 
excitement.  
• Perceived controllability and voluntariness of park-related risk (Slovic, 1987): Visitors chose 
a number along a 5-point semantic differential scale best reflecting their opinion of six 
opposing statements (e.g., “People cannot control whether or not they are harmed by the 
hazards they face in Mount Rainier National Park/People can control whether or not they are 
harmed by the hazards they face in Mount Rainier National Park).      
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 Causal attribution. To explore attributions of responsibility for causing accidents, I 
presented participants with a brief narrative, formatted as a newspaper press release, describing a 
hypothetical visitor accident. After reviewing accounts of actual park visitor accidents,9 I wrote 
two separate scenarios adapting information from these incidents, while withholding any 
personally identifiable information (see Appendix B for the wording of these scenarios). In order 
to increase the degree of perceived personal and situational similarity with the hypothetical 
victim (Burger, 1981), respondents received the narrative based on which recreational activities 
they had participated in at the park. Specifically, all park employees and volunteers and visitors 
who reported participating in at least one “non-guided” activity (i.e., biking, mountaineering, 
technical rock-climbing/bouldering, horseback riding, day hiking, backpacking, skiing or 
snowboarding) received the narrative in which a visitor embarks on a solo backpacking trip. A 
second “group” of visitor survey respondents were those who reported participating in at least 
one of the following activities, many of which are “guided” and/or more highly 
regulated/overseen in each of the park units:  
• Visiting a visitor center, permitting office, or museum 
• Attending a ranger-led program or hike 
• Camping in a designated campground 
• Playing in the snow, sledding, or snowshoeing 
• Riding a snowmobile 
• Hunting or fishing 
• Swimming 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Dr. Newman provided a selection of brief narratives describing visitor injuries/mortalities that had taken place in a 
variety of NPS park units over the past 10 years. I also consulted the NPS Morning Report 
(http://www.morningreport.nps.gov), which provides, among other information, a daily review of reported visitor 
accidents submitted by Chief Rangers and Information Officers throughout the Park System.    
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• Motorized or non-motorized boating 
These individuals received a narrative in which the visitor falls while taking part in a guided 
interpretive hike. After reading the narrative, respondents were asked to indicate whether a 
similar incident had ever happened to them or to a person they know. Both narratives described 
activities common in a national park setting (e.g., hiking, taking photographs), and did not 
include recreational pastimes pursue by a smaller, more selective group of visitors (e.g., ice 
climbing, mountaineering). Across both scenarios, several variables were held constant, 
including: (1) Name, sex, age, and place of residence of the hypothetical victim (i.e., Roger 
Ellison, 35, of Bozeman, MT), (2) Date, time, and location of the incident (i.e., the afternoon of 
October 17 in Yellowstone National Park) and; (2) degree of physical consequences of the 
accident (Burger, 1981) (i.e., the victim’s described injuries, which included a concussion, 
bruised ribs, and a wrist fracture).  
 Both narratives were also written to be purposefully “ambiguous” in that they were intended 
to elicit a variety of potential internal and external causes for the visitor accident (see Menon, 
Morris, Chiu, & Hong, 1999); this was verified through pre-testing (see below). After reading the 
narrative, the respondent was asked to describe what caused the accident by: (1) responding to a 
free-response question (i.e., “What do you think caused this incident?”) and (2) indicating the 
importance of several potential causal factors (e.g., “Mr. Ellison’s excessive risk-taking”) using a 
5-point Likert scale ranging from “not at all important” to “extremely important.”  
 Perceptions of risk management. To explore prevention attribution, I adapted five items 
from Espiner’s (1999; 2001) “individual responsibility for safety” scale (e.g., “While visitors are 
at the park, their safety is the responsibility of those who manage the area.”) Two items about 
NPS (external) and visitor (internal) responsibility drew from Tuler and Golding (2002) (e.g., 
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“Besides providing appropriate safety information and warnings, the National Park Service 
should not limit or prohibit activities that may pose serious risks to the participants.”) All items 
were measured on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.”  
 Demographics. I measured the following demographic variables across all respondents:  
• Sex 
• Education (i.e., highest level of formal education completed) 
• U.S. residence (including state and/or country of residence) 
• Race/ethnicity 
• Native language  
• Age 
In addition, employees received questions measuring the following:  
• Status (seasonal or permanent) 
• Park division (e.g., Maintenance, Natural and Cultural Resources, etc.) 
• Length of time employed by park 
• Length of time employed by the NPS 
Volunteers were asked to provide a description of their volunteer work at the park.  
 
Pre-testing 
 Prior to distributing the survey to NPS employees/volunteers and visitors, I conducted 
several types of pre-tests to ensure the validity of the research instrument. First, during Fall 2010, 
I gathered a group of undergraduate students familiar with risk communication research to 
comment on a set of proposed visitor accident scenarios. Each student read the narratives, 
answered the corresponding questions as if she were taking the survey, and then reacted to a 
number of additional questions meant to clarify potential issues of misinterpretation, such as, 
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“Please describe anything confusing about this question.” Based on each student’s written 
feedback, as well as group discussion, I chose the narratives that elicited the widest range of 
interpretations and causal attributions (i.e., both internal and external). In addition, in order to 
determine how long the survey would take, as well as the types of answers elicited, I 
administered the survey to a Cornell undergraduate risk communication class. By doing so, I 
uncovered several instances of unclear wording, and also decided to shorten the survey length. 
Finally, prior to releasing the final version of the survey, the questions were reviewed once more 
by a group of Cornell University professors and graduate students. These individuals responded 
to the survey in its online format, thus allowing them to make additional comments about the 
visual layout of the questions on the screen, as well as other “mechanical” concerns.   
Survey sampling 
For NPS employees, the sampling frame included all employees working at the park during 
the study timeframe (approximately 100-150 employees at each site; see Table 3.1). All NPS 
employees receive an email address and are able to access this account at home and from their 
job sites. I obtained the complete list of current employees at each park from the NPS website 
(http://www.nps.gov) and also checked this list with each park’s Chief Ranger to ensure that 
entries were up-to-date. It is important to note that seasonal employees are sometimes furloughed 
during slower visiting seasons, such as in the winter; in these periods, they often cannot access 
their NPS email accounts. Therefore, by default, the sampling frame represented individuals who 
were both currently employed by the park and also actively working during the research period. 
Unlike employees, NPS volunteers do not uniformly receive government email addresses. Thus, 
due to the limited availability of volunteer contact information in OLYM and DEWA, the 
volunteer sample was limited to individuals associated with MORA. With the help of the park’s 
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Volunteer Coordinator,10 I obtained a spreadsheet that listed individuals who had recently 
volunteered at MORA. Due to the large number of individuals in this population, I limited my 
sampling frame to those who had volunteered in the last two fiscal years. (See Appendices C, D, 
and E for the letters describing the study disseminated to employees at all three park units).      
  Sampling park visitors presented a unique set of challenges. Like most park volunteers, park 
visitors do not share “standardized” contact information that is publicly available, such as an 
NPS-issued email addresses, and thus cannot be sampled systematically from a particular 
“frame.” Following the precedent of NPS visitor use studies conducted in the past several 
decades (see Dillman, Dolsen, & Machlis, 1995; Dillman, Smyth, & Christian, 2009), I chose to 
contact visitors face-to-face at park locations such as fee collection stations and outside of visitor 
centers (see Table 3.4), selected after consultation with each park’s Chief Ranger to represent a 
popular visitation area in the current season. At each of these locations, I had hoped to randomly 
select days of the week and times of day (e.g., 2-4 pm) to recruit visitors; however, as I soon 
found out, various logistical challenges made a truly random sampling pattern both inefficient 
and ultimately untenable for the study period. My sampling strategy, thus, proceeded as follows: 
In order to capture the most visitors, at all three parks, recruitment took place almost exclusively 
on Fridays, Saturdays, and Sundays, with the exception of two Monday holidays, President’s 
Day and the 4th of July. When possible, I also chose days with favorable weather (e.g., no rain or 
heavy snow), as I learned from my discussions with park staff and personal experience that 
visitation patterns vary broadly depending on the forecast.11 Moreover, since the majority of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 It is worth noting that MORA’s Volunteer Coordinator, a Cornell University alumnus, enthusiastically endorsed 
this study, going so far as to post an entry on the MORA Volunteer Program blog, a news and information resource 
read by many of the park’s dedicated volunteers, describing the research and encouraging individuals to participate. 
This situation may help explain, in part, the relatively high survey response rate among the volunteers.     
11 For instance, employees at MORA routinely “predicted” the day’s visitation by the status of the sky—more 
specifically, whether Mount Rainier was visible from the Seattle/Tacoma metropolitan areas. As one backcountry 
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recruitment sites offered limited indoor shelter, I also planned my exposure to the elements—
bitter cold and rain in OLYM and MORA, heat and humidity at DEWA—as strategically as 
possible. Unfortunately, at MORA and OLYM in particular, my efforts to contact visitors at 
particular locations and certain times of day were often hampered by road closures, often due to 
snowfall and avalanche hazard.     
 When visitor recruitment was possible, I contacted one person out of each visitor group 
passing by a pre-determined landmark (e.g., a sign or set of stairs). When at a park entrance or 
area with a fee station attendant, I attempted to contact each incoming car within a pre-
determined time period (e.g., 11 am to 2 pm) before the visitors stopped to pay the park fee. A 
few exceptions included:   	   
• If a visitor group consisted of multiple cars (i.e., a caravan); in these cases, I recorded 
information from the first car only. (When unsure, I asked the driver of the second car 
whether s/he was part of the group in the first car). 
• If the vehicle had a government license plate, or the driver identified him/herself as an 
NPS employee or concessions employee (e.g., river guide, lifeguard). 
• If the vehicle was an NPS visitor bus or another commercial bus transporting visitors 
(e.g., for river or mountaineering trips).  
Upon contacting a visitor group, I used the following introduction or close variant:  
Good Morning/Good Afternoon! 
I am a student surveying park visitors. I am gathering information to help improve your 
experience at [Park name]. I’m asking that you [addressing car driver or, if group is on foot, 
first member of group that approaches] fill out an online survey when you get home. What I 
would need is a first name and email address. This information will only be used to email you a 
link to a survey. If you complete the survey, you’ll have a chance to win [incentive—REI gift 
card or gas card]. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
ranger told me, the mountain acts “like a billboard” to attract city dwellers to the nearby park (where, ironically, 
skies are often cloudier).   
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• May I have your first name and email address? [Record information; if refuses, record 
reason given].  
• Where is your group from? [Record information; in case of refusal, record license plate 
state.] 
 
Thank you for your time! Have a great day! 
 
I then handed the individual a postcard with photographs of park scenery, a brief advertisement 
of the study, and my contact information, similar to what has been done in other visitor surveys 
conducted by the NPS (Dillman et al., 2009), and might be considered a “foot-in-the-door” 
technique. In other words, I asked potential respondents to comply with a relatively small request 
(i.e., to share their email address as well as basic demographic information) under the 
assumption that they would be more likely to comply with a larger request (i.e., to fill out an 
online survey) in the future (Dillman et al., 2009). (See Appendix F for a sample recruitment 
postcard).  As I spoke with each group, I also recorded the number of people, including adults 
and children under age 18. In the case of a refusal to participate in the study (i.e., not agreeing to 
provide an email address), I recorded the instance, as well as any reason given.  While not all 
individuals who refused to participate shared a reason for their decision, some of the most 
common reasons mentioned included:  
• No email access: This category of response included not having an email address, not 
having access to a computer, not “liking” to use email, having email/computer access 
only at work (where, presumably, filling out an online survey would have been 
impossible and/or inappropriate), and not being able to remember one’s email address. 
While I did not ask visitors to disclose their ages, informal observation suggests that 
many—though certainly not all—of these individuals were among the older individuals 
in the sample (e.g., 65 and above) (See below for a discussion of the benefits and 
drawbacks of Internet surveys).      
	   92	  
• Prefer not to share email address: Respondents in this category expressed concern 
about providing their email addresses; despite my explanation otherwise, some stated 
concern about being on “mailing lists” or being required to share personal information.  
• In a hurry: Respondents in this category expressed that they were in a rush to meet 
someone, join up with a recreational tour group, etc. and did not have time to give out 
their information. For example, many guided canoe, kayak, and rafting trips departed 
from Smithfield Beach (DEWA), where I was stopping vehicles, and participating 
individuals needed to meet the trip leader at a pre-established time.  
• Not interested: These respondents shared a variety of explanations for why they 
preferred not to participate in the study, including that they felt it would be too much 
trouble, that they “weren’t interested” in the subject, or that they “never fill out surveys.” 
Many provided a nondescript statement such as “I’ll pass” or “No thanks.” 
•  Language barrier: These respondents either expressed directly that they did not feel 
comfortable speaking in English, or indicated in some other fashion that they could not 
participate. Notably, some sites at DEWA, such as Smithfield Beach and Kittatinny Point 
Visitor Center, attract a considerable Hispanic/Latino visitor population. In most cases, at 
least one individual in such visitor groups (often younger in age) was comfortable 
conversing in English and could help translate for the rest of the group. In a few 
situations, I interjected words or a short explanation in Spanish to help facilitate 
understanding.  
• Just driving through: At some of the park entrance sites, I encountered visitors who did 
not plan to spend time in the park, but rather were just driving through, or hoping to turn 
around. While some of them appeared to be lost (i.e., the park was not their intended 
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destination), others seemed to be disappointed that they would need to pay an entrance 
fee and decided to turn around.    
Across all three sites, rates of compliance (i.e., agreeing to give one’s email address) ranged 
from a low of 80% at Smithfield Beach (DEWA) to a high of 100% at Hurricane Ridge 
(OLYM), with an average of 89% across sites (see Table 3.5). 
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Table 3.4. Overview of Visitor Recruitment Sites by Park  
Study Site Location of 
Site 
Description of Site Dates (2011) 
Paradise  MORA Located at 5,400 ft, the highest point in 
the park accessible by road in the winter. 
Access to skiing, “snow play,” 
snowshoeing, and hiking. Visitor center 
open on weekends; guided snowshoe 
walks available.  
February 12 
Nisqually 
entrance 
MORA Park entrance located in the southwestern 
corner of the park near the town of 
Ashford, WA; only accessible park 
entrance during the winter (entrance fee 
required).  
• Feb. 18 
• Feb.19 
• Feb. 20 
• March 7 
• March 19 
• April 8 
• April 17 
Hurricane 
Ridge 
OLYM Located at 5,200 ft, the highest point in 
the park accessible by road in the winter. 
Access to skiing, snow play (children 8 
and under only), snowshoeing, and 
hiking. Visitor center open 7 days/week. 
March 24 
Heart o’ the 
Hills entrance 
OLYM Park entrance located in the northeastern 
corner of the park near the town of Port 
Angeles, WA (entrance fee required).  
• March 25 
• March 26 
• March 27 
• April 3 
• April 23 
Smithfield 
Beach 
DEWA Lifeguarded beach in PA; popular picnic 
and swimming site, as well as boat launch 
(entrance fee required). 
• July 2 
• July 3 
• July 4 
Turtle Beach DEWA Lifeguarded beach in NJ; new swimming 
area established in 2010 (entrance fee 
required). 
August 7 
Milford Beach DEWA Lifeguarded beach in PA; popular picnic 
and swimming site, as well as boat launch 
(entrance fee required). 
• July 16 
• July 17 
• August 6 
Dingmans 
Falls visitor 
center 
DEWA Visitor center in PA, adjacent to 
boardwalk access to Dingmans Falls; 
guided interpretive walks offered in 
Summer and Fall. 
• July 16 
• July 17 
• August 6 
Kittatinny Point 
visitor center 
DEWA Visitor center in PA, located just off of 
Interstate 80. Popular picnic and boat 
launch area; no swimming allowed due to 
hazardous river conditions. 
August 7 
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Table 3.5. Compliance Rates Across Visitor Recruitment Sites 
Study Site Park Average 
Compliance Rate1 
Paradise  MORA 94% 
Nisqually 
entrance 
MORA 91% 
MORA OVERALL 93% 
Hurricane Ridge OLYM 100% 
Heart o’ the Hills 
entrance 
OLYM 90% 
OLYM OVERALL 95% 
Smithfield Beach DEWA 80% 
Turtle Beach DEWA 87% 
Milford Beach DEWA 87% 
Dingmans Falls 
Visitor Center 
DEWA 90% 
Kittatinny Point 
Visitor Center 
DEWA 87% 
DEWA OVERALL 86% 
AVERAGE OF ALL SITES  
(MORA, OLYM, and DEWA) 
89% 
1 Number of acceptances (i.e., individuals who give an email address)/total number of contacts made during a given 
recruitment interval (e.g., Saturday, 2-4 pm at the Nisqually Entrance). Note that a “contact” corresponds to a visitor 
group, which could range in size from one to several individuals; only one email address was obtained per group.   
 
Survey logistics 
 SRI contacted all potential survey respondents (i.e., visitors and employees/volunteers) by 
email with an introductory message that included a link to the survey and a unique ID number. 
Throughout the study period, those who did not respond to the survey received up to two email 
reminders, sent at two-week intervals (see Appendices G and H). Upon completing the survey, 
respondents were offered the chance to enter a random drawing for an incentive. After 
consultation with the Chief Rangers, these incentives included a gift card to REI, a popular 
	   96	  
outdoor clothing and gear outfitter in the Pacific Northwest, for OLYM and MORA respondents, 
and a gas card for DEWA respondents.  In an attempt to boost the DEWA visitor response rate, 
in late August 2011, I offered an additional incentive—a $10 Amazon.com gift card to the first 
50 individuals to complete the survey in a one-week timeframe (see Appendix I). Survey data 
collection ended on September 13, 2011, after which point the survey was no longer available to 
potential respondents.  
Response rate and non-response bias 
In total, 1,106 respondents (visitor, employees, and volunteers) completed the survey out of a 
possible 2, 262 with valid email addresses, yielding a response rate of 48.89% (see Tables 3.6 
and 3.7). Additionally, 81 participants started the survey, answered at least one question, but did 
not complete it.  These partially completed cases are also included as part of the final dataset. In 
the case of visitors, comparisons between several characteristics of respondents and non-
respondents at each of the three parks allowed for a measure of non-response bias (see Table 
3.6). Specifically, results indicated that, within each of the three parks, non-respondents were no 
more likely than respondents to reside in the U.S. (versus a foreign country) or to be from one of 
the states closest to the park (i.e., Washington or Oregon for MORA and OLYM and New York, 
New Jersey, or Pennsylvania for DEWA); however, in all three of the parks, non-respondents did 
seem, on average, to have a smaller group size than respondents. While this difference may, in 
fact, exist, it is also important to note that, due to a shortage of time, in some cases I relied on an 
estimate of a party’s group size, such as by glancing in a vehicle window. It is possible that this 
method may have introduced error (e.g., consider tinted windows) and that I may have under-
estimated actual group sizes for non-respondents. Because of this, and due to the challenges to 
establishing a random sampling method for park visitors (see above), it is important to exercise 
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caution when generalizing the results of the survey to populations beyond those sampled, such as 
other visitors to MORA, OLYM, or DEWA, or to other national park units. Chapter 4 provides 
an overview of visitor demographics (e.g., age, sex, level of formal education achieved, etc.) and 
compares these characteristics to those observed in other studies of NPS visitors.      
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Table 3.6. Visitor Respondents vs. Non-Respondents: Sample Characteristics 
 Reside 
in U.S.  
Group 
Size 
% From 
local 
states 
% Surveyed at park location Response 
Rate1 
DEWA 
Respondents 
(n = 191) 
98% 
(n = 
188) 
M = 
4.82, SD 
= 5.07 
83%  
(n = 
128) 
NY, NJ, 
PA 
Dingman 
39% 
(n = 74) 
Kittatinny 
3% 
(n = 6) 
Milford 
23% 
(n = 
44) 
Smithfield 
24% 
(n = 46) 
Turtle 
.5% 
(n 
=1) 
39% 
DEWA  
Non-
respondents 
(n = 298) 
99% 
(n = 
294) 
M = 
3.09, SD 
= 1.71 
82%  
(n = 
243)  
NY, NJ, 
PA 
Dingman 
15% 
(n =44) 
Kittatinny 
4% 
(n =11) 
Milford 
23% 
(n = 
68) 
Smithfield 
57% 
(n = 170) 
Turtle 
2% 
(n = 
5) 
------- 
Sample 
Differences 
χ2 (489, 
1) = 
.04, p = 
.84, ns 
t(193.69) 
= -5.39, 
p = .000 
χ2 (489, 
1) = 
.11, p = 
.74, ns 
 
          
OLYM  
Respondents 
(n = 171) 
96% 
(n = 
164) 
M = 
3.70,  
SD = 
4.60 
84%  
(n = 
143) 
WA, 
OR 
Heart o’ the Hills 
96% 
(n = 165) 
Hurricane Ridge 
4% 
(n = 6) 
61% 
OLYM  
Non-
respondents 
(n =111) 
96% 
(n 
=105) 
M = 
2.40, SD 
= 1.55 
88%  
(n = 97) 
WA, 
OR 
Heart o’ the Hills 
96% 
(n= 106) 
Hurricane Ridge 
5% 
(n = 5) 
------- 
Sample 
Differences 
χ2 (281, 
1) = 
.03, p = 
.86, ns 
t(218.18) 
= -3.28, 
p = .001 
χ2 (281, 
1) = 
1.11, p 
= .29, 
ns 
 
       
MORA 
Respondents 
(n = 411) 
99% 
(n = 
405) 
M= 4.46, 
SD = 
4.98 
88%  
(n = 
361) 
WA, 
OR 
Nisqually Entrance 
84% 
(n= 345) 
Paradise 
16% 
(n = 66) 
58% 
MORA  
Non-
respondents 
(n = 292) 
99.7% 
(n = 
291) 
M = 
3.15, 
SD= 
2.36 
89% (n 
= 259) 
WA, 
OR 
Nisqually Entrance 
94% 
(n = 274) 
Paradise 
6% 
(n = 18) 
------- 
Sample 
Differences 
χ2 (702, 
1) = 
1.55, p 
= .21, 
ns 
t(590.1) 
= -4.58, 
p = .000 
χ2 (702, 
1) = 
.07, p = 
.79, ns 
 
1Survey respondents/ Total number of visitors contacted at the park. 
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Table 3.7. Employee Response Rate 
 Employee 
Respondents 
Employee Non-
respondents1 
Response Rate 
DEWA n = 66 n = 60 52% 
OLYM n =85 n = 130 40% 
MORA2 n = 100 n = 163 38% 
1In some cases, employees were not able to receive the email such as in the following scenarios: (1) having moved 
to a different park; (2) no email access due to seasonal status; (3) no longer affiliated with the NPS. 
2Volunteer response rate for MORA= 163/238= 68% 
 
 
Benefits and drawbacks of Internet surveys 
Choosing to disseminate the survey on the Internet, rather than through a more traditional 
mail, telephone, or face-to-face channel, offered several benefits. Most simply, Internet surveys 
are efficient, in that once respondents provide information, the data is stored in electronic form, 
thus eliminating the need to digitize spoken or hand-written responses. The flexibility of the 
online interface also allows for complex question “branching patterns,” user interactivity, 
experimental conditions, and graphical design that would be difficult to implement in paper-and-
pencil formats (Couper & Miller, 2008; Sexton, Miller, & Dietsch, 2011). With postage and 
paper eliminated, the online format usually provides significant savings for researchers, as costs 
are reduced to programming and web hosting (Kaplowitz, Hadlock, & Levine, 2004); 
implementation is also simplified, as the researcher can send survey invitations and reminders 
quickly via email (Vaske, 2011). Similarly, with the proliferation of Internet-equipped smart 
phones, laptops, and tablets, online surveys can be expedient for many respondents, allowing 
them to complete the survey at their convenience, and saving them the trouble of visiting a post 
office.  
Despite these benefits, scholars have been quick to point to potential drawbacks of Internet-
based surveys. A primary argument against using Internet surveys centers on the concept of 
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sample validity, or the representativeness of the sample elicited to the general population studied 
(e.g., Baxter & Babbie, 2003; Couper & Miller, 2008; Duda & Nobile, 2010). As Duda and 
Nobile (2010) note, the equivalent of random-digit dialing, a method of ensuring a representative 
sample of the general public, does not exist for email addresses. For those without access to 
computers or broadband Internet—or for individuals less comfortable with using this 
technology—completing an Internet survey can be challenging, or even impossible. As 
populations without Internet access and/or technological proficiency tend to fall into particular 
demographic groups (e.g., older, lower SES, rural residents) some researchers warn that Internet 
surveys can pose possible threats to validity by eliciting non-representative samples (e.g., Graefe, 
Mowen, Covelli, & Trauntvein, 2011; Smyth, Dillman, Christian, & O’Neill, 2010; Vaske, 
2011). Unfortunately, “weighting” the sample to counteract these deficiencies has not proven 
successful in empirical studies (e.g., Duda & Nobile, 2010; Vaske, Jacobs, Sijtsma, & Beaman, 
2011). Similarly, online surveys posted without security controls, and/or on “public” websites 
introduce self-selection bias, as individuals with a vested interest in a topic may be compelled to 
complete the survey, or even to complete the survey multiple times (i.e., “poll-crashing”); 
without an identifying mechanism, such as a unique ID number assigned to each survey 
respondent, researchers will be unable to determine whether a given individual may have 
“posed” as another, and thus skewed the results (Duda & Nobile, 2010).  
Other arguments against the use of Internet surveys point to the quantity and quality of the 
elicited results. Many researchers have reported that Internet surveys tend to produce poorer 
response rates than mailed surveys (e.g., Baxter & Babbie, 2003; Lesser, Yang, & Newton, 2011; 
Petchenik & Watermolen, 2011), especially if not paired with an additional contact, such as a 
pre-survey mailed invitation (Kaplowitz et al., 2004). When compared to a face-to-face survey 
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format, others suggest that the online format may increase the degree of “satisficing” apparent in 
the data, such as an upsurge in non-response items and “don’t know” responses, and less 
differentiation on scaled items (Heerwegh & Loosveldt, 2008).    
With these drawbacks in mind, I designed the Internet survey methodology to counteract as 
many potential weaknesses as possible. These design characteristics included the following:  
Secure survey and unique ID number. Hosted by SRI on a secure website, the survey was 
accessible only to individuals who had been contacted. In his or her email invitation to take the 
survey, each respondent received a unique number (e.g., see Sexton, Miller, & Dietsch, 2011). 
This number was then used to “track” the respondent, and could be linked to demographic 
variables recorded at the time of recruitment, such as the size of the individual’s group, and 
where s/he was from; subsequently, I used this information to measure non-response bias (see 
Duda & Nobile, 2010) (see above).   
Tracking refusals. When recruiting visitors, I recorded the number of individuals who 
refused to provide an email address; at the same time, I kept track of reasons provided, such as 
that the individual did not possess a computer and/or have Internet access. This information was 
then used to measure non-response bias, as well as to gauge the validity of the sample (see 
above).   
Complete employee sampling frame. As explained above, the sampling frame used for 
employees represented individuals who were both currently employed by the park and also 
actively working during the research period.  
Pre-survey notification. Both visitors and employees received some form of notification 
about the study prior to receiving the survey invitation. While I spoke with many park employees 
throughout the study period, all individuals received an email introducing the nature of my 
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survey and other activities I would be involved in at the park. Upon contacting each park visitor 
at the recruitment locations, I handed each individual an attractive postcard with my contact 
information and a brief description of the study. While impossible to verify, it is possible that 
this face-to-face contact or “in person appeal” (Dillman et al., 2009), as well as the visible 
affiliation with Cornell University, bolstered the study’s credibility, encouraging visitors to 
respond to the survey, as well as decreasing “satisficing” in the data (Heerwegh & Loosveldt, 
2008).  
Completion incentive. While Dillman et al. (2010) suggest that a token cash incentive, 
delivered with a pre-survey mail contact, can encourage subsequent online survey completion, 
my study offered an incentive upon completion of the survey (i.e., entry into a lottery to win a 
gift certificate).12 I used my experience in each park, as well as input from the Chief Rangers, to 
select incentives most likely to appeal to the majority of visitors at each park.       
Survey data analysis 
The survey data were analyzed in SPSS Statistics (version 19.0) using both descriptive and 
inferential statistical approaches, such as t-tests, bivariate correlations, comparison of means, 
Chi-square analysis, and OLS regression.  
In addition, several survey free-response questions were used in the analysis of the study 
hypotheses and research questions: 
• [In response to respondent’s self-reported level of preparedness for participating in an 
activity] Why did you answer this way? 
• [In response to the visitor accident narrative] What do you think caused this incident?  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Based on anecdotal feedback received from park visitors, for some, the postcard served as an incentive as well. 
Several individuals commented on the attractiveness of the photographs, and some even asked for multiple copies 
(conceivably to use as souvenirs of their trip).  
	   103	  
• [At the end of the survey] Is there anything else you’d like us to know? Use this space 
for comments, feedback, etc.   
I chose to analyze these data based on a qualitative, grounded theory-based approach (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967), which I explain in more depth with respect to coding interview data, below.  
Interviews 
To explore cultural theories of risk and perceptions of risk management, which relate to 
research questions 8 and 9, I conducted qualitative, in-depth interviews with NPS employees and 
volunteers. Rather than repeat the questions posed in the survey, these sessions provided an 
avenue to understanding additional dimensions of the interplay between attribution and risk 
perception theory, as it pertains to risk management in national parks. Moreover, providing 
participants the chance to respond to open-ended questions allowed for deeper understanding of 
topics that may otherwise have been overlooked in the survey. 
Interview format 
Between February and July 2011, I conducted in-depth interviews with a total of 57 
employees and volunteers at MORA, OLYM, and DEWA. Interviews ranged from 14 to 85 
minutes, with an average of 39 minutes. Most interviews took place at the respondent’s place of 
work (e.g., an office or public meeting space within the park headquarters building) or private 
residence, though a small number (n =3) were conducted via telephone due to travel and 
scheduling constraints. While most individuals were interviewed one-on-one, a few respondents 
elected to be interviewed with another individual present. In these instances, the second 
individual represented a colleague (or in one case, a spouse) with a similar job description, and 
both individuals contributed equally to the conversation.  
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As Fontana and Frey (2000) point out, referring to a method simply as “interviewing” can be 
misleading, as interviews can exist in an array of formats, lengths, and even epistemological 
bases. For instance, the researcher may abide strictly by a prescribed set of questions, or may 
choose to follow an interviewee’s comment that, from a more “objectivist” perspective, might 
appear tangential. My interviews followed a semi-structured form, as I wished to shape the 
discussion towards my research interests (as outlined broadly in the interview guide), but remain 
flexible enough to adequately respond to respondents’ interpretations of ideas and events. Each 
interview explored several topical areas in similar depth (Rubin & Rubin, 1995), including (but 
not limited to): (1) biographical information about the respondent (e.g., his/her job description, 
tenure with NPS, etc.); (2) opinions on how to attribute responsibility for visitor safety (e.g., 
perception of the park’s role in keeping visitors safe, perception of the word “accident” with 
respect to park settings); (3) the nature and role of risk in national parks (e.g., the acceptability of 
certain risks in parks; the types of risks identified in their park); (4) communication in the park 
(e.g., ways in which visitors receive information, including risk information, and how 
information sources or channels might be changed/improved, etc); and (5) sense of place (e.g., 
the role of “wilderness” in park settings). I obtained voluntary informed consent to record each 
interview to ensure accurate data collection.  
Depending on the interviewee’s job and background, certain topical areas became more or 
less relevant; therefore, I modified the questions and probes to best complement the participant’s 
biography. In the words of Rubin and Rubin (1995), the interview format often followed a “river 
and channel” approach; I followed alternative directions or “channels” as appropriate, based on 
“markers” (Weiss, 1994) I perceived as referring to “important events or feeling states” (Weiss, 
1994, p. 77). While the interview topics tended to follow a particular pattern, since I attempted to 
follow the arc of the conversation, not all interviewees received questions in the same order. At 
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the beginning of an interview, whenever appropriate, I referred to my past experiences 
volunteering, visiting, and working in national parks, so as to indicate my familiarity with the 
context. Likewise, my attempts at “small talk” often involved references to current events in the 
park, such as a road closure, a search and rescue event, or a bout of particularly inclement 
weather, so as to “ground” our conversation on mutually-recognized terms (see Weiss, 1994). 
(See Appendices J and K for the interview protocol and interview informed consent form).     
 Following each interview, a debriefing discussion allowed respondents to react to the 
experience, which often included asking questions about the study and my research interests 
more generally (Sieber, 1998). On my own, I also followed Lofland et al.’s (2006) advice to 
record my reaction to each interview, including how I felt psychologically after the experience, 
and my overall perception of the interaction. I revisited these “journal entries” when analyzing 
the interviews in order to paint a more complete picture of the data in the context of the social 
interaction.  
 Interview sampling 
In addition to interviewing the individuals in management positions (e.g., Superintendent, 
Chief Ranger, Division Chief) at each park, I also consulted with each park’s Chief Ranger for 
their recommendations of individuals whose job descriptions and/or history with the park (or 
NPS more generally) would allow them to comment on issues of visitor safety, communication, 
and risk management. In so doing, I encouraged each Chief Ranger to suggest individuals across 
park divisions and levels of tenure with the agency. In this regard, individuals were purposively 
(rather than randomly) selected based on their attributes and job experiences. I contacted 
potential respondents by email, phone, or face-to-face, and invited them to take part in an 
interview. In some cases, after being interviewed, respondents recommended additional 
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individuals to contact, comprising a “snowball sampling” approach (Lofland et al., 2006). The 
resulting set of interview respondents represented an assortment of job descriptions and levels of 
experience with Park Service, ranging from approximately 1 year at NPS to over 40 years in the 
agency, with a mean and mode of 17 years.   
In general, most researchers (qualitative or otherwise) are encouraged to study the largest 
samples possible (e.g., Mayring, 2007); in determining the number of interviews to conduct, 
however, I relied on principles of grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). First, in each park, I 
conducted interviews until certain themes were repeated across multiple interviews, so-called 
“theoretical saturation” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Second, in order to ensure that these emergent 
themes were not simply a product of a certain “type” of NPS employee (e.g., holding a particular 
job position or tenure at the agency), I attempted to search for “disconfirming cases”—in 
particular, individuals who might have reason to express different opinions on the subject of the 
interview. A central tenet of the grounded theory approach, the search for disconfirming cases 
(as well as “maximized differences”) (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) strengthens the validity of a 
qualitative study by allowing the researcher to “assess whether it is more plausible to retain or 
modify the conclusion, being aware of all of the pressures to ignore data that do not fit [the] 
conclusions” (Maxwell, 1996, p. 93). As Maxwell (1996) further explains, while quantitative 
researchers can employ tactics before the research begins to ensure the validity of the data (e.g., 
control groups, randomized sampling, etc.), qualitative researchers “must try to rule out most 
validity threats after the research has begun, using evidence collected during the research itself to 
make these alternative hypotheses implausible” (1996, p. 88). 
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Table 3.8. Generalized Job Descriptions of Interviewees by Park1 
 MORA OLYM DEWA TOTAL  
Interpretation 
• Interpretive ranger  
• Exhibit/information 
design 
• Fee collection 
n = 5 n = 3 n = 3 n = 11 
Maintenance 
• Road maintenance 
• Grounds maintenance 
n = 1 --- n = 1 n = 2 
Natural & Cultural 
Resources 
• Geologist 
• Wildlife biologist 
• Research coordinator 
• Natural resources 
program manager 
n = 3 n = 2 n =2 n = 7 
Occupational Health & 
Safety 
• Safety Officer 
• Water safety/lifeguard 
program 
n = 1 n = 1 n = 2 n = 4 
Park Management 
• Chief Ranger 
• Superintendent/Deputy 
Superintendent  
• Division Chief 
n = 4 n = 2 n = 4 n = 10 
Protection 
• Law enforcement ranger 
• Dispatch 
n = 6 n = 3 n = 5 n = 14 
Public Affairs 
• Public Affairs Officer 
• Volunteer Coordinator 
--- n = 1 n = 1 n = 2 
Trails and Wilderness 
• Backcountry ranger 
• Wildland fire coordinator 
• Wilderness planner 
--- n = 2 n = 1 n = 3 
Volunteer 
• Volunteer backcountry 
ranger 
• Volunteer park 
photographer 
n = 4 ---- ---- n = 4 
TOTAL n = 24 n = 14 n = 19 n = 57 
1Job description categories are mutually exclusive; each individual was assigned to only one category, 
even in instances of potential overlap.  
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Interview data analysis 
 I analyzed interview transcripts broadly following Glaser and Strauss’ (1967) grounded 
theory approach, in that I began the interview portion of the project with general research 
questions, yet allowed the most salient themes to emerge throughout the data collection and 
analysis process. I attempted to follow the “constant comparative method” by analyzing my data 
as I conducted the research, and refined my interview guide to follow emerging areas of interest. 
I coded transcripts “line-by-line” Charmaz (2002) and, whenever possible, applied “in-vivo” 
codes (i.e., in the words of the interviewees) rather than codes pre-defined by my terminology, or 
supplied by the academic literature. After first coding by hand, I subsequently used Atlas.ti, one 
of several software packages used by qualitative researchers to analyze interview data. Using this 
program, I imported typed transcripts of the interviews, as well as the typed survey free-
responses and coded each electronically. In the process, I re-assessed (in some cases, changing) 
the codes I had previously developed and recorded by hand. Using the software functions, I then 
merged and compiled quotations applying to each code, later exporting the created document 
into word processing software.   
One minor deviation from line-by-line coding in the analysis process deserves mention. 
When coding interviewees’ responses to the question “What is an accident?” I referred to 
Kouabenan (1998), who categorized his respondents’ “naïve” definitions of an accident 
according to whether the emphasis was placed on one or more of the following: 
• Causes or elements of the accident. 
• Consequences of the accident. 
• Circumstances of the accident. 
• The nature of the accident or an example of an accident. 
• Characterization of the accident. 
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• A fatalistic definition. 
• A simplistic or off-hand judgment.  
Since Kouabenan’s (1998) sample, predominantly male citizens of the African Ivory Coast, 
many of whom held fatalistic beliefs, differed considerably from mine, I did not assume that 
such categories would necessarily be salient in the context of this study; therefore, rather than 
adopt them outright for use in this research, I instead relied on them as organizational 
“heuristics,” useful for clarifying my interpretations of the data.   
Validity and generalizability 
Both Maxwell (1996) and Lofland et al. (2006) advise that researchers conduct “member 
checks” to increase the validity of qualitative findings. Although I did not formally check the full 
extent of my findings with all interview respondents, some elements were discussed informally 
and elaborated upon with NPS employees following the interviews. Moreover, while in the 
office, or during social events, my findings sometimes became the topic of informal conversation 
with park employees and volunteers. Whenever possible, I took this feedback into consideration 
as I approached my analysis. Such instances align with Trochim’s (2006) suggestion that 
qualitative research should strive for “credibility”—the idea that findings should be viewed as 
credible in the eyes of the informants.  
In considering the generalizability of the qualitative results, two additional concepts proposed 
by Trochim (2006) deserve mention. First, in order for qualitative research to be “transferable”—
a concept loosely comparable to the quantitative concept of replicability—Trochim suggests that 
researchers keep readers abreast of the assumptions they have made, as well as the characteristics 
of the research context; this information, in turn, lets readers decide whether or not the results 
might be generalized to other settings and populations. More specifically, for qualitative research 
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to be “dependable,” another one of Trochim’s terms, the researcher must account for (rather than 
ignore or suppress) attributes of the context in which it occurs—characteristics that may be 
dynamic rather than stable.  In terms of this dissertation, several characteristics of the research 
context deserve mention, as they may influence efforts to generalize the findings more broadly, 
such as to other national park units. As will be discussed more in Chapter 7, the timing of the 
research, i.e., that it took place in winter/spring at two of the parks (MORA and OLYM), and 
during the summer at another (DEWA), may have influenced the types of visitors included in the 
survey sample, as well as the employees (e.g., number of seasonal employees vs. year-round 
employees on site). While I attempted to sample employees and volunteers broadly, it is possible 
that the research window at each park limited my access to a more diverse group of those willing 
and available to talk. Another aspect of the research context included the ambient political 
atmosphere, which can be critical to the functioning of a federal agency like the NPS. With the 
threat of a government shutdown looming, March and April 2011 represented particularly 
volatile months in the two national parks in which I worked (MORA and OLYM); it is possible 
that the anxiety and concern felt by many—for the future of their jobs, as well as that of the 
agency overall—may have influenced how employees in my sample responded to the interview 
questions.    
Interpreting qualitative and quantitative data 
The combination of qualitative and quantitative data took place in the final, interpretive 
phase of the research, and this combining took multiple forms. First, after analyzing the closed-
ended (i.e., quantitative) questions, survey free-response (i.e., qualitative) questions were 
analyzed and compared to the quantitative results in order to shed more light upon the research 
questions and hypotheses. For instance, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, I explain the 
	   111	  
unexpected factor loadings of place meaning items on the survey with respondents’ references to 
(and explanations of) sense of place in their free responses. The comparison of loadings from 
exploratory factor analysis with emergent interview themes follows Creswell’s (2003) 
conception of “data transformation.”  In this sense, the qualitative survey data served to clarify 
and to suggest a potential meaning of the quantitative data. Second, during the interpretive phase 
I also compared the qualitative interview data with the quantitative and qualitative survey data. I 
purposively selected interview topics to overlap with the material presented on the survey, 
providing opportunity for triangulation. Interviewees’ descriptions of the definition of an 
accident, as well as how they conceived of assigning causal responsibility, were compared to the 
causal attributions for the hypothetical accident (reported in the survey) as well as free-response 
explanations of the event. Moreover, interviewees often referred to the survey, including the 
hypothetical visitor accident scenario, in responding to interview questions; in these cases, I 
encouraged them to explain how they interpreted the scenario, including what made them answer 
the way they did. While Chapters 4, 5, and 6 each report on survey or interview data, in the final 
chapter (Chapter 7), I attempt to weave together findings from both of the methods in order to 
suggest larger themes and implications. Finally, the “nested” structure of this dissertation 
allowed for the examination of central phenomena (e.g., attribution of responsibility, perception 
of risk, etc.) at multiple levels (Creswell, 2003); the interviews with employees and volunteers 
provided opportunities to examine specific instances of more generalized concepts presented in 
the survey (e.g., visitor injuries/accidents), and among a distinct population.  
As discussed earlier in this chapter, one potential drawback of mixed method research is the 
possibility that results gleaned from one “phase” or method will contradict those emerging from 
another. While this dissertation allowed ample opportunities for triangulation, it also relied on a 
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primary method to answer questions related to a main dependent variable—that is, the survey 
emphasized causal attribution (i.e., attribution of responsibility for causing accidents), while the 
interviews emphasized prevention attribution (i.e., attribution of responsibility for preventing 
accidents/ensuring safety).  Therefore, in many cases, answering research questions and 
hypotheses posed meant drawing most directly from one method. In the case that an 
“inconsistency” occurred, I attempted to explain the potential reasons for incompatible results, 
similar to what Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998, p. 70) refer to as an “inferential consistency 
audit.” As Chapter 7 explains, for example, survey data would seem to suggest that employees 
see visitors as predominantly responsible for their own safety when in national parks; however, 
when interviewed, many employees emphasized the important role that they and their colleagues 
play in ensuring visitor safety. As I explain, in this case, the interview may have allowed and 
encouraged employees to express a more nuanced opinion; while many do tend to view visitors 
as more responsible than themselves and other NPS employees, they nonetheless recognize and 
respect the joint role that they play in preventing visitor injuries and accidents. Moreover, these 
opinions may have also reflected the specific job title and responsibilities of the respondents, 
which the survey data suggests may predict differences in attributions of responsibility.  
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CHAPTER 4. 
 
 ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR CAUSING ACCIDENTS  
 
Description of the Sample 
Visitors 
  Of the visitors to the three park units (DEWA, n = 191; MORA; n = 411; OLYM, n = 171; 
total n = 773) who completed the survey, the majority were male (64%), U.S. residents (98%), 
White/Caucasian (88%) and highly educated; roughly one third of the sample (31%) reported 
completing a four-year college degree as the highest formal education level achieved, whereas 
almost forty percent (37%) reported completing post-graduate work (see Tables 4.1 and 4.2). 
Visitors’ ages ranged from 19 to 87 (M = 46.56, SD = 13.42) and they hailed from 31 of the 50 
U.S. states, with the five most-represented states reflecting the geographical location of the three 
park units: Washington (60%), New Jersey (8%), Pennsylvania (6%), New York (4%), and 
Oregon (2%). Though a substantial majority of visitors reported speaking English as a native 
language (92%), in addition to Spanish (2%), 19 additional first languages were reported, 
including Bengali, Punjabi, Turkish, and Korean. Because the NPS does not collect information 
on the demographic characteristics of its general visiting public, including age, sex, or 
race/ethnicity, the extent to which the survey sample is representative of the larger national park-
visiting public remains somewhat unclear. In a recent random-digit dial phone survey of the 
American public (i.e., national park visitors and non-park visitors) gauging support for national 
park entrance fees, however, Ostergren, Solop, and Hagen (2005) found that, of the individuals 
reporting that they had visited an NPS park unit in the previous 24 months, 89% described 
themselves as White (including Hispanic), 53% were between the ages of 35-59, and 31% had 
completed a college degree. The clear similarities between the demographic characteristics of 
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Ostergren et al.’s (2005) sample and the present sample provide some evidence that the visitors 
who completed the online survey can be considered representative of the larger visiting public.  
 When asked about their traveling companions, visitors described their group sizes as ranging 
from one to 50 individuals (including themselves) (M = 4.37, SD = 4.92). Of these groups:  
• 13% (n = 99) included at least one child age 5 or under. 
• 20% (n = 149) included at least one child between the ages of 6-12. 
• 15% (n = 112) included at least one child between the ages of 13-17. 
The majority of visitors described their groups as comprised of family members (60%), but 
another third of the sample (30%) also reported having friends in their traveling group. A small 
minority of visitors (2%) reported being part of an organized tour group. Almost half of the 
visitors (48%) reported spending more than 4 hours in the park on their most recent visit, and 
43% had been to the park between two and five times (including the most recent visit) in the last 
year. When asked how many other national parks they had visited (besides the surveyed park), 
visitors gave answers ranging from zero to 200 (M = 15.26, SD = 21.14).   
 During their most recent visit to the surveyed park, visitors reported engaging in a range of 
activities, including (in decreasing order of prevalence):  
• Going to a visitor center, permitting office, or museum (60% of respondents, n = 456) 
• Playing in the snow, sledding, or snowshoeing (57%, n = 432) 
• Day hiking (43%, n = 322) 
• Skiing or snowboarding (14%, n = 109) 
• Swimming (11%, n = 82) 
• Camping in an NPS campground (9%, n = 67) 
• Mountaineering (9%, n = 67) 
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• Non-motorized boating (9%, n = 65) 
• Attending a ranger-led program or hike (8%, n = 63) 
• Backpacking in the backcountry (8%, n = 60) 
• Biking (5%, n = 35) 
• Fishing or hunting (4%, n = 32) 
• Rock climbing (2%, n = 13) 
• Motorized boating (2%, n = 11) 
• Horseback riding (1%, n = 10) 
• Snowmobiling (.1%, n = 1) 
When asked to indicate the single activity that they spent the most time engaged in at the park, 
the most visitors reported playing in the snow (including sledding or snowshoeing) (34% of all 
respondents, n = 189), followed by day hiking (23%, n = 127), and skiing or snowboarding (9%, 
n = 48). Likewise, about a third of all visitors (31%, n = 118) described day hiking as their most 
memorable activity at the park, with about a quarter (24%, n = 94) choosing playing in the snow, 
and ten percent (n = 38) reporting skiing or snowboarding. Because visitors in two out of the 
three park units (i.e., MORA and OLYM) were surveyed during the winter or early spring, the 
overall prevalence of snow-related recreational activities, as well as the salience of these 
activities to visitors in this sample, is unsurprising. Upon rating their level of preparedness on a 
scale of 1-5 for their most memorable activity, the majority of respondents ranked themselves as 
“completely prepared” (53%, n = 395), compared to a very small minority who perceived 
themselves as “not at all prepared” (.7%, n = 5); mean preparedness was 4.33 (SD = .84). (See 
below for further discussion on visitor preparedness).  
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Table 4.1. Formal Education Level of Survey Respondents 
 N (%) ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
(n = 251) 
N (%) ALL 
VOLUNTEERS 
(n = 163) 
N (%) 
ALL 
VISITORS 
(n = 773) 
Less than high school 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 3 (.4%) 
High school graduate 14 (6%) 2 (1%) 34 (5%) 
Trade or technical school 8 (3%) 6 (4%) 31 (4%) 
Some college 36 (15%) 14 (9%) 84 (12%) 
2 year college graduate 22 (9%) 13 (8%) 80 (11%) 
4 year college graduate 94 (38%) 40 (26%) 215 (31%) 
Post-graduate work 71 (29%) 79 (51%) 257 (37%) 
Mean education1 M= 5.58 (SD= 
1.42) 
M= 6.08, SD= 
1.23) 
M= 5.67, SD= 
1.46) 
1Measured on a 7-point scale, where 1= “less than high school”; 2=  “high school graduate”; 3= “trade or technical 
school”; 4= “some college”; 5= “2-year college graduate”; 6= “4-year college graduate; and 7= “post graduate 
work.” 
 
Table 4.2. Race/Ethnicity of Survey Respondents 
  N (%)  
ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
(n = 251) 
N (%)  
ALL 
VOLUNTEERS 
(n = 163) 
N (%) 
ALL 
VISITORS 
(n = 773) 
White/Caucasian 222 (92%) 137 (91%) 615 (88%) 
Black/African American 1 (.4%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Asian 2 (.8%) 6 (4.0%) 40 (6%) 
American Indian or Alaska native 4 (2%) 2 (1%) 3 (.4%) 
Native Hawaiian or other Pacific 
Islander  
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (.1%) 
Hispanic or Latino 3 (1%) 2 (1%) 26 (4%) 
Other (including multi-ethnic and/or 
multi-racial) 
10 (4%) 4 (3%) 15 (2%) 
 
Employees 
  The NPS employee survey respondents (n = 251) were predominantly male (58%), 
White/Caucasian (92%), and 4-year college graduates (38%). The vast majority spoke English as 
a first language (99%), and age ranged from 22 to 70 years old (M = 47.02, SD = 11.29). While 
most respondents (86%) worked at the park year-round, as opposed to on a seasonal basis, the 
division in which individuals were employed varied. For the purposes of this analysis, I coded 
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respondents’ self-reported park division affiliations into five general categories (presented in 
decreasing order of prevalence):  
• Visitor and Resource Protection: positions involving law enforcement, 
communications/dispatch, and fee collection inside the park (29%, n = 67). 
• Administration: positions in, for instance, the Superintendent’s Office, human resources 
technology support, and planning and program management (22%, n = 49).  
• Maintenance and Trails: positions that might include utility work, management of 
sewage/septic systems, building maintenance, and road/trail construction and 
maintenance (20%, n = 46).   
• Natural and Cultural Resources: positions in, for instance, biological and geological 
research, wildlife management, archaeology, and fire management (18%, n = 40).  
• Interpretation and Education: positions related to interpretive programming in the 
park, and/or community outreach and the volunteer program (11%, n = 26). 
(See Table 4.3 for example position titles). Employees reported having worked in the park 
between less than a year and 44 years (M = 11.19, SD = 9.65), and in the NPS more broadly 
between less than a year and 52 years (M = 15.86, SD =10.58).  
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Table 4.3. Example Park Employee Position Titles by Category  
 Example park staff position 
Visitor and Resource Protection • Law enforcement ranger 
• Backcountry ranger 
• Dispatcher 
• Entrance fee collector 
Administration • Budget Officer 
• Superintendent 
• Concessions Management 
Maintenance and Trails • Trail crew 
• Snow removal crew 
• Electrician 
Natural and Cultural Resources • Geologist 
• Plant re-vegetation team  
• Landscape architect 
Interpretation and Education • Interpretive Ranger 
• Volunteer Coordinator 
• Public Information Officer 
 
 Volunteers 
 As described in Chapter 3, volunteer respondents were recruited only from MORA. Of these 
individuals (n = 163), the majority were male (53%), White/Caucasian (91%), and had 
completed post-graduate work (51%). Almost all reported English as a first language (98%). Age 
ranged widely, from 20 to 87 years old (M = 55.91, SD = 15.11). Similar to the categorization 
process described above, I coded volunteers’ self-reported work descriptions into three broad 
categories (presented in order of prevalence; note that not all individuals provided a description 
of their duties):  
• Visitor and Resource Protection: positions involving assisting park staff with visitor 
safety efforts (e.g., search and rescue) and/or in enforcing park regulations (64%, n = 87). 
• Interpretation and Education: positions related to interpretive programming in the 
park, and/or working with school children (21%, n = 30). 
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• Natural and Cultural Resources: positions involving assisting park staff with biological 
or cultural research in the park, such as citizen science efforts to catalogue flora and 
fauna (14%, n = 21). 
(See Table 4.4 for example volunteer tasks in each of these categories). Volunteers reported 
having volunteered for an average of about five years in the surveyed park (M = 4.68, SD = 5.59) 
and five years with the NPS more generally (M = 5.09, SD = 6.02).  
Table 4.4. Example Volunteer Tasks by Category 
 Example volunteer task 
Natural and Cultural Resources • Participant in a citizen science project (e.g., 
amphibian survey) 
• Seed collection; re-vegetation 
• Historical re-enactment 
• Photography, videography 
Interpretation and Education • Participates in the NPS “Teacher-Ranger-
Teacher” program 
• Leads interpretive walks/hikes or other 
programs 
• Staffs the Wilderness Information Center 
Visitor and Resource Protection • Meadow Rover 
• Nordic ski patrol/snowshoe patrol 
• Campground host 
• Search and rescue participant 
• Offers roadside assistance for visitor vehicles 
 
Hypothesis 1: Causal Attributions of Employees vs. Visitors 
Measurement 
H1 stated that employees’ causal attributions of visitor accidents would differ from those of 
visitors. Addressing this hypothesis involved analyzing respondents’ causal attributions related 
to a hypothetical scenario in which a visitor is injured while recreating in a national park. As 
explained in Chapter 3, all employees and volunteers received one version of the scenario 
(Hellroaring Creek); visitors, on the other hand, received either the Hellroaring Creek or the 
Mammoth Hot Springs scenario, depending on which activity (or activities) they reported 
participating in during their most recent park visit. Because of this design, the majority of 
respondents, including visitors, employees, and volunteers, read and responded to the 
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Hellroaring Creek scenario (n = 856), as compared to those who read the Mammoth Hot Springs 
scenario (n = 289, visitors only). Though respondents answered the same set of survey questions 
across both scenarios, as explained in Chapter 3, the scenarios varied in their description of the 
circumstances leading to the hypothetical victim’s injury; whereas “Roger Ellison” was taking 
part in a solo, three-day backpacking trip in the Hellroaring Creek scenario, he was a member of 
a NPS ranger-led one-mile nature walk in the Mammoth Hot Springs scenario. Despite these 
distinctions, for two identified causal factors presented to survey respondents, I found no 
differences in mean response by scenario with regard to: (1) challenging environmental 
conditions at the park (e.g., uneven terrain) (q17a); and (2) lack of park rules, or lack of 
enforcement of existing park rules (q17c). For the six additional causal factors presented as 
potentially contributing to Ellison’s injury, however, differences existed in responses between 
individuals who read one or the other scenario. These factors included: (1) lack of safety 
infrastructure (t(1097) = -3.01, p = .003); (2) poor decisions or actions of park employees 
(t(396.38) = -3.57, p= .000); (3) Mr. Ellison’s excessive risk-taking (t(387.40) = 19.35, p = .000); 
(4) Mr. Ellison’s unpreparedness for the activity (t(1094) = 3.85, p= .000); (5) Mr. Ellison’s 
overestimation of his abilities (t( 381.27) = 8.86, p = .000) and; (6) Bad luck, fate, chance, etc. 
(t(478.39) = -8.4, p = .000).  
As shown in Table 4.5, a comparison in means between those who read the Hellroaring 
Creek scenario and those who read the Mammoth Hot Springs scenario sheds some light on all 
survey respondents’ interpretation of the hypothetical circumstances provided. First, comparing 
visitors, employees, and volunteers who read the Hellroaring Creek scenario, a significant post-
hoc comparison of means (utilizing Hochberg’s GT2 test to account for unequal sample sizes) 
revealed significant differences in means among these three groups on two items: (1) seeing the 
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accident as the result of challenging environmental conditions, and (2) seeing the accident as the 
result of bad luck. More specifically, employees were significantly more likely than volunteers 
(p = .035) or visitors (p = .000) to rate challenging conditions as an important cause of the 
accident. On the other hand, visitors were more likely than employees (p = .003) and volunteers 
were more likely than employees (p = .035) to rate bad luck as an important causal factor.   
Comparing all survey respondents, those who read about Mr. Ellison as a member of a 
guided hike in the Mammoth Hot Springs scenario were more likely than those who read the 
Hellroaring Creek scenario to view lack of safety infrastructure, NPS employee actions, and bad 
luck as contributing to Mr. Ellison’s incident.  On the other hand, compared to the Mammoth 
Hot Springs readers, those who read about Mr. Ellison as a solo backpacker engaged in nature 
photography in the Hellroaring Creek scenario were more likely to view the visitor’s incident as 
precipitated by his excessive risk taking, unpreparedness, and overestimation of his abilities. As 
will be discussed further in the sections below, respondents’ comments on a free-response 
question further clarified these distinctions between the scenarios, with Hellroaring Creek 
recipients tending to view Mr. Ellison as irresponsible, and risking his safety by hiking alone. 
Interestingly, although the scenario did not specify whether or not Mr. Ellison had left the 
established park trail, many respondents inferred that the visitor had, in fact, gone off-trail to 
photograph a plant. In turn, these respondents tended to see Ellison as consciously ignoring 
established rules in order to achieve a desired end. Free-response comments from Mammoth Hot 
Springs readers were more likely to characterize Roger Ellison as the victim of bad luck, or to 
question the responsibility of the park ranger to warn visitors about potential hazards on the hike.  
Based on these observed differences in interpretation, in order to best compare employees’ and 
visitors’ causal attributions, in the analyses that follow, I exclude visitors who had received the 
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Mammoth scenario. Cases in which Mammoth Hot Springs readers are included, however, will 
be indicated in the text.    
Table 4.5. Comparison of Means for Causal Attribution Variables: Employees, Volunteers, 
and Visitors 
 Challenging 
conditions 
Safety 
Infrastruct. 
Park 
Rules 
Employee 
Actions 
Visitor 
Risk-
Taking 
Unprepared Overest.
Abilities 
Bad 
Luck 
3.87 1.86 1.70 1.41 4.06 3.56 4.12 2.55 
246 243 244 241 243 242 244 240 
Employees Mean 
N 
Std. 
Dev. 1.13 1.02 .96 .84 1.07 1.19 1.01 1.37 
3.55 1.85 1.66 1.31 4.07 3.27 3.95 2.91 
159 159 158 159 160 157 159 159 
Volunteers 
 
Mean 
N 
Std. 
Dev. 1.23 1.05 .96 .63 1.09 1.26 1.11 1.32 
3.36 1.81 1.71 1.35 4.03 3.39 3.99 2.92 
440 437 437 434 440 437 438 438 
Visitors 
(HellroaringC
reek)  
Mean 
N 
Std. 
Dev. 1.26 1.08 1.06 .78 1.42 1.32 1.18 1.42 
3.67 2.05 1.63 1.58 2.37 3.07 3.22 3.58 
260 260 259 260 260 260 259 259 
Visitors 
(Mammoth 
Hot Springs) 
Mean 
N 
Std. 
Dev. 1.09 1.05 .89 .86 1.26 1.35 1.31 1.23 
 
A factor analysis (varimax rotation) of the eight causal attribution variables linked to the 
scenario (i.e., q17a- q17h) suggested that the items loaded on three distinct factors. The first 
factor related to characteristics of the hypothetical victim, Roger Ellison, including his: (1) 
overestimation of ability, (2) unpreparedness, and (3) excessive risk-taking; together, these factor 
loadings created an Internal (Park Visitor) Causal Attribution Scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .83).  
The second factor, by comparison, appeared to describe external causes that were, more 
specifically, characteristics of park management, and items loading highly on this factor 
included: (1) lack of park rules, (2) lack of safety infrastructure, and (3) poor decisions/actions of 
park employees. Together, the factor loadings of these three items became the External (NPS) 
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Causal Attribution Scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .84) (see Table 4.6). Similar to the second factor, a 
third factor appeared to describe external or situational characteristics, including challenging 
environmental conditions (q17a) and bad luck (q17h); however, the low alpha obtained by 
combining these items (α = .16) indicated that they measured different constructs, and so, in the 
analyses that follow, they are analyzed as separate outcome variables.  
Table 4.6. Internal Causal Attribution and External Causal Attribution Scales 
Scale Cronbach’s alpha 
Internal (Park Visitor) Causal Attribution 
Mr. Ellison’s over-estimation of his 
abilities  
Mr. Ellison’s unpreparedness for the 
activity  
Mr. Ellison’s excessive risk-taking  
.83 
External (NPS) Causal Attribution 
Lack of park rules, or lack of enforcement 
of existing park rules  
Lack of park safety infrastructure (e.g., 
guard rails) 
Poor decisions or actions of park 
employees  
.84 
 
 External causal factors 
 
Park management. On average, visitors and park employees rated external causes related to 
park management (i.e., lack of park rules, lack of safety infrastructure, poor decisions/actions of 
park employees) at about the same level of importance in contributing to Mr. Ellison’s injury 
(employees: M = 4.93, SD = 2.37; visitors: M = 4.84, SD = 2.61); this difference was not 
significant: t(921)= -.73, p >.05.  
Based on the analysis of the open-ended question following the scenario, some individuals 
who mentioned park management qualified their answers by explaining that they needed 
additional information about whether the visitor had strayed from a park-maintained trail. In 
these circumstances, causal responsibility appeared dependent on the location of Ellison: on or 
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off-trail. For instance: 
• I need more information about the trail. I'm not sure if Roger was off-trail or not when 
snapping the photos. If the trail was, indeed, that close to the waterfall, I would hope 
there were guard rails or hazard signs posted (Employee, OLYM).13 
 
• What is unclear is if he was off the established trail boundaries, if there were any warning 
signs regarding the danger of being that close to the waterfall and if there were any 
guardrails, etc. If none of these elements were present, the part has neglected their 
responsibility to educate and warn park visitors of hazards. If there elements were present 
and Ellison proceeded anyway, the responsibility is solely his own (Volunteer, MORA). 
 
• The responsibility may or may not be shared between the park and the hiker depending 
on the specifics of the situation. Was the hiker ON the trail when he fell? If so, was this a 
frontcountry trail where a person would have an expectation of wide, smooth surfaces 
and guardrails next to steep drop offs? Or was this a primitive way trail, where one 
should expect less trail refinement, and greater skills needed by the hiker? Or did the 
hiker leave the trail? What information was provided by park employees? What 
information was available in park literature and bulletin boards? Was the trail maintained 
to standard for that particular type of trail? Was there ice on the trail?... Etc, etc, etc 
(Employee, OLYM). 
 
Other respondents expressed ambivalence about the appropriateness of safety interventions in 
national park settings. Though recognizing the importance of routing trails away from known 
hazards, such as cliffs, or installing guard rails, some respondents also expressed wanting to limit 
infrastructure in order to preserve the undeveloped “wildness” of park settings. Quotations 
exemplifying this apparent tension between recognizing safety risks and appreciating wilderness 
included: 
• …If it seems that this is some kind of ‘turn out’ that hikers are likely to step out on, it 
might be worth putting up a sign. However, such signs destroy the naturalness of the area. 
It's often a trade-off. It's hard to tell from this whether a guard rail would have been 
appropriate there or not (Employee, DEWA). 
 
• Were signs posted? (Generally signs bother me as they detract from the natural beauty 
and people should be able to use common sense) (Visitor, OLYM). 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Unless otherwise noted, this and all other quotations are from individuals who responded to the Hellroaring Creek 
scenario.  
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Challenging environmental conditions. On average, employees viewed challenging 
environmental conditions at the park (an external causal attribution) as a more important factor in 
causing Mr. Ellison’s injury (M = 3.87, SD = 1.13) than did visitors (M = 3.36, SD = 1.26). This 
difference was significant (t(556.08) = 5.27, p = .000). 	   Based on the qualitative analysis of open-ended survey responses, those who mentioned 
environmental conditions as causal factors appeared to fixate on the details provided in the 
narrative, such as the slippery rock surface, the trail topography, and the (assumed, but not 
specified in the scenario wording) wet weather. For example:  
• Hazardous unpredictable conditions in a natural environment. Even if you are on 
established hiking trail, conditions such as rain/snow can make it hazardous (Visitor, 
MORA). 
 
• Something as natural as moss or a wet rock can be perilous (Visitor, DEWA). 
 
• Unstable (in this case, wet, slippery rock) area (Employee, MORA). 
 
• Obviously the terrain itself (wet conditions, cliff face) and gravity is a factor (Employee, 
DEWA). 
 
• The combination of slippery footing and water is UNFORGIVING (Volunteer, MORA). 
 
As these quotations suggest, respondents pointed out that such physical conditions—irrespective 
of the behavior of Mr. Ellison or the NPS—could alone contribute to the incident.  
Bad luck. On average, visitors saw “bad luck”  (including “chance” or “fate”) as a more 
important causal factor (M = 2.92, SD = 1.42) than did employees (M = 2.55 SD = 1.37). This 
difference was significant (t(676) = -3.30, p = .001).   
Analyzing respondents’ open-ended survey responses allows for insight into how both 
visitors and employees conceptualized bad luck as a causal factor. While some respondents 
referred directly to bad luck in their responses, others invoked the general view that “accidents 
happen,” suggesting that events like the one described can—and will continue—to occur, 
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regardless of any party’s best intentions and preventative efforts. Moreover, in many of these 
responses, individuals seemed to indicate that accidents will happen irrespective of the 
surrounding environment—whether a paved road or a backcountry trail.  Representative 
quotations include the following: 
• Accidents happen. That's why they're called accidents! When you are in the backcountry 
there is no way to prevent every situation. Slips, falls, etc. cannot all be avoided (Visitor, 
MORA). 
 
• This just sounds like an unfortunate accident where nothing (i.e. signs, railings, etc.) 
could have prevented it. Mr. Ellison was not out of bounds and appears to have not been 
doing anything wrong (Visitor, MORA). 
 
• There are just times when accidents happen. When trails are built no one can anticipate 
every contortion a hiker will go through to get the perfect picture. I think the hiker leaned 
forward too far and when he slipped on the rock, there was no way to stop his forward 
momentum (Volunteer, MORA).  
 
In addition, for some, perceiving this scenario as nothing more than an unfortunate “accident” 
meant the inability to assign responsibility for its cause. As one MORA volunteer summed up, 
“To me, this was just an accident and no one factor was to blame.”  
Internal causal factors 
On average, employees saw internal causes (i.e., overestimation of ability, unpreparedness, 
and excessive risk-taking) as more important (M = 11.73, SD = 2.79) than visitors did (M = 
11.40, SD = 3.11) in contributing to Mr. Ellison’s injury; this difference was significant: 
t(509.39) = 6.08, p < .05.  
An analysis of responses to the open-ended survey question provides further illustration of 
how respondents characterized internal causes. After coding all responses for examples that 
could be classified as internal causal factors, I further divided these factors into ten additional 
themes (see Table 4.7). In general, these ten themes fell into two main groups. Group one, which 
I refer to as “visitor attributes,” included reasoning that related causes of the incident to 
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characteristics of Roger Ellison. More specifically, respondents referred to the scenario 
protagonist as:  
• Being “stupid” or being “ignorant” of park conditions. 
 
• Lacking common sense about how to behave, given the physical surroundings. 
 
• Being unprepared for the outdoor recreational activity in which he was participating. 
 
• Lacking experience in similar settings, such as other national parks. 
 
Though related to group one, the themes in group two, which I term “visitor decision-
making,” focused more directly on Ellison’s frame of mind and behavioral decisions while in the 
park as contributing to his unfortunate fate. These themes included Ellison’s:  
• Lack of “situational awareness” (i.e., attention to physical surroundings), possibly 
secondary to a photo opportunity.  
• Poor judgment or (inappropriate) risk-taking (e.g., stepping on slippery rocks, choosing 
to hike alone). 
• Decision to leave the established trail, and/or break park rules. 
 
• Overconfidence in his abilities. 
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Table 4.7. Internal Causal Factors: Survey Free Responses 
Theme Representative Quotation 
Visitor Attributes 
Being stupid or 
“ignorant” of park 
conditions 
• If you are stupid enough to stand on the edge of a wet rock ledge and fall you 
got what you deserve. Hopefully he had to reimburse the park for the rescue 
effort (Visitor, DEWA).  
 
• Not being educated about park rules and safety and not being serious about 
safety (Visitor, DEWA).  
Lacking common sense 
about how to behave, 
given the physical 
surroundings 
• He lost his footing on a wet rock—this type of environment is expected in 
these areas and it requires that the visitor use common sense. No one needs to 
rope off the area and put up a sign that says slippery when wet, it is self-
evident (Visitor, DEWA). 
 
• Visitor's lack of common sense. Rocks plus water equals SLIPPERY. Should 
have used a telephoto lens (Employee, DEWA). 
Being unprepared for the 
outdoor recreational 
activity in which he was 
participating 
• Hopefully he was wearing shoes that were appropriate for the conditions 
(Employee, OLYM). 
 
• The visitor could probably have taken more caution, use of a rope to secure 
himself may have prevented the fall (Visitor, OLYM).  
Lacking experience in 
similar settings, such as 
other national parks  
• He might have been new to the outdoor scene and just assumed if you had the 
right gear you'll be fine. It's hard to say because they don't mention how much 
experience he has in the outdoors. Some people believe what they see in 
pictures, that it's not hard or that it can be dangerous at times (Visitor, 
MORA).  
 
• I believe his inexperience to recognize the hazards of being on a cliff face 
without…technical equipment to be a primary cause of this accident 
(Employee, DEWA).    
Visitor Decision-making 
Lack of “situational 
awareness”  
 
• He obviously fell as a result of not paying close enough attention to his 
immediate surroundings. Had his awareness of his circumstances been more 
attentive, he probably would not have been injured or too close to disaster 
(Employee, DEWA).  
 
• Hiker focused on picture-taking not paying attention to his overall position 
and situation within the environment (Employee, OLYM).  
 
• I would think the cause was that the man was focused on his camera and not 
his surroundings (Visitor, MORA).  
Poor judgment or 
(inappropriate) risk-
taking 
• An experienced backpacker should know walking on wet rocks so close to the 
edge of a waterfall is dangerous (Visitor, DEWA).  
 
• …I think Roger's better judgment may not have put him so close to the edge 
where a slip on wet rock would cause him to plummet 15 feet or more 
(Employee, OLYM).  
 
• Mr. Ellison's decision to take the risk of walking on wet slippery rocks 
upstream of a waterfall in order to take photographs (Employee, DEWA).  
 
• Negligent recklessness on the part of the park visitor— specifically, in 
climbing out into such a precarious location for a photograph, and in taking 
such risks while traveling solo (Employee, MORA).  
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Decision to leave the 
established trail, and/or 
break park rules 
 
• It's his own fault for leaving the trail. Even thought it doesn’t state that, you 
can be sure he was too close to the edge (Employee, OLYM).  
 
• Maybe he was off the trail, outside of the barriers, or failed to observe posted 
warnings (Volunteer, MORA).  
 
Overconfidence in his 
abilities 
 
• I think that the average park visitor has a little too much confidence in their 
own ability and most times think that this is a once in a lifetime opportunity 
and worth the extra risk (Volunteer, MORA).  
 
• Possibly, over-confidence. ‘I've done this before, and I never got hurt.’ I'll bet 
that plant was not the only one of its kind in the park or any other place for 
that matter. Bad decision making and no risk assessment. Not aware of his 
surroundings and how dangerous they are (Visitor, MORA).  
 
Summary 
 
 To review, on the basis of both quantitative and qualitative survey data, there was partial 
support for Hypothesis 1. Although no statistically significant difference was evident between 
employees’ and visitors’ rating of external factors related to park management as causes of the 
hypothetical visitor accident, significant differences did occur for three other factors. First, 
employees rated challenging environmental conditions at the park (e.g., weather, terrain) as more 
important causal factors than did visitors. Second, visitors rated bad luck as more important than 
employees in causing the accident. Finally, employees rated internal causes related to the 
hypothetical victim (e.g., unpreparedness) as more important than did visitors. In spite of these 
quantitative differences between the two respondent groups, themes emerging from survey free 
responses suggest that employees and visitors explain their causal reasoning in similar ways. For 
instance, when making internal causal attributions, both employees and visitors referred to the 
hypothetical visitor victim as “lacking common sense” and being “ignorant” of park conditions. 
Moreover, both employees’ and visitors’ comments included the idea that sometimes “accidents 
happen” regardless of all preventive measures taken.       
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Hypothesis 2: Employees, Experience, and Self-Defensive Causal Attributions 
 
 The second hypothesis stated that employees’ experience with the context would relate 
positively to self-defensive attributions of responsibility for causing accidents. To investigate 
H2, I conceptualized employees’ experience with the context in several ways. First, experience 
included employees’ tenure with the NPS, in terms of years worked in the current park unit and 
in other park units. Second, experience included employees’ involvement in visitor safety 
incidents, such as assisting with a search and rescue effort, or administering first aid. Finally, I 
considered a third aspect of experience to be the salience of the incident described in the 
scenario—that is, whether or not the employee, or someone they knew, had been involved in a 
similar situation. I explain each of these three related concepts below.   
Tenure with the NPS 
 I examined two-tailed Pearson correlations between the following variables: (1) years spent 
working in the park unit, (2) years spent working for the NPS, (3) score on the Internal (Park 
Visitor) Causal Attribution Scale, and (4) score on the External (NPS) Causal Attribution Scale. 
According to H2, individuals with more experience in the particular park and with the agency 
overall should tend to make more internal causal judgments—that is, reasoning that places causal 
responsibility with the visitor, rather than with employees or other external circumstances in the 
park, such as rules or safety infrastructure. No significant correlations were found. Contrary to 
expectation, there was a negative—though non-significant—correlation between years employed 
by NPS and viewing internal causes as important factors in a hypothetical visitor incident (r = -
.03, p = .68, ns), and no correlation between years employed by NPS and seeing external causes 
as important. Additionally, a very small, positive, non-significant correlation existed between 
years employed by the park and seeing external causes as important (r = .07, p = .31, ns).   
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In order to simplify measurement in the regression models (discussed later in this chapter), I 
created an additional variable summing employees’ years spent working in the park unit and 
years spent working for the NPS (“employee park experience”). No significant correlations were 
observed between this variable and the Internal and External Causal Attribution Scales.  
Involvement in visitor safety incidents 
 The majority of employees (60%) reported having been involved in a visitor safety incident 
in the past year. Of these individuals, almost half (45%, n =184) reported involvement in less 
than ten incidents, while a smaller percentage (15%, n =59) described assisting in 10 or more 
incidents. Thus, to examine whether involvement in a visitor safety incident was related to 
attributional judgments, I classified employees in three groups: (1) those who reported no 
involvement in visitor safety incidents, (2) those who were involved in less than 10 incidents, and 
(3) those who were involved in 10 or more visitor safety incidents. I then created dichotomized 
versions of the Internal Causal Attribution Scale and the External Causal Attribution Scale by 
dividing each via a median split. That is, individuals whose responses to the Internal Causal 
Attribution Scale items summed to .13914 (the mean) or lower were categorized into one group, 
and those reporting scores above .139 comprised a second group. Similarly, individuals whose 
responses to the External Causal Attribution Scale items summed to -.36 (the mean) or lower 
were considered together, and those scoring above -.36 comprised a second group.  Results of 
chi-square analyses suggest that there is a significant relationship between involvement in a 
visitor safety incident and reporting internal causes above the median level. More specifically, of 
those employees who reported not being involved in any visitor safety incidents, 71% (n = 59) 
reported above median internal causal attributional judgments, compared to 59% of employees 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Note that this value reflects the score on the scale comprised of factor loadings, rather than simply summing the 
items. 
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who had been involved in less than 10 incidents, and 49% of employees who reported being 
involved in 10 or more incidents; this association was significant: χ2 (2) = 6.67, p = .036. In the 
case of external (NPS) causal attributional judgments, however, no differences were apparent 
based on involvement in visitor safety incidents (χ2 (2) = 2.44, p = .295). 
Incident salience 
 When asked if an incident such as the one described in the hypothetical scenario had 
happened to them or someone they knew, half (50%, n = 123) of the employee sample reported 
affirmatively. A small percentage of employees (6%, n = 15) were unsure about their own, or a 
close other’s, involvement in a similar incident. Another 44% (n =108) reported not having had a 
similar experience happen to them or a close other. To simplify measurement, I created a new 
dichotomous variable in which respondents who had experienced a similar incident or who were 
not sure of their (or a close other’s) experience were considered as a single group, and those who 
reported no involvement as a second group. Using the dichotomized Internal and External Causal 
Attribution Scales (see above), I performed a chi-square analysis examining the relationship 
between one’s past experience with an accident and attributional judgment. Of those employees 
reporting that a scenario like the one described had never before happened to them or someone 
they knew  (n = 105), 69% reported median or higher judgments of internal causes of the 
hypothetical accident. In contrast, for those who reported that an incident had happened to them 
or someone they knew, or were unsure, (n = 130), responses were more divided, with 55% (n = 
72) describing median or higher internal causal factors and 45% (n = 58) expressing median or 
lower internal causal factors. This relationship was significant: χ2(1)= 4.26, p= .039. There was 
no association between experience with a similar scenario and external (NPS) causal attributional 
judgments χ2(1) = .69, p = .405. 
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Summary 
 Based on the three measures of experience used—tenure with the NPS, involvement in 
visitor safety incidents at the park, and incident salience—H2 was not supported. First, no 
relationship was found between tenure with the NPS (or the particular park) and self-defensive 
attributions of responsibility. Second, opposite of my prediction, a significant association was 
found between no involvement in visitor safety incidents and reporting of above median internal 
causal attributional judgments. Finally, also contrary to my prediction, a significant association 
was found between those who had never experienced a similar incident and reporting of above 
median internal causal attributions. Based on these findings, it appears as though making internal 
causal attributions in the case of a visitor accident may be the “default” response for most 
employees. An employee’s involvement in park visitor safety efforts, or the salience of a 
particular incident (based on personal experience), however, may serve to reduce or limit these 
internal attributional judgments.   
 Hypothesis Three: Visitors and Context 
 
Positivity of park visit 
The third hypothesis stated that visitors’ experience with the context would relate positively 
to internal attributions of responsibility for causing accidents. Overall, the majority of visitors 
reported positive reactions to their most recent park visit. Using a 5-point semantic differential 
scale, most visitors agreed that their experiences in the park in which they were surveyed were: 
remarkable (rather than unremarkable) (55%; M = 4.43, SD = .74), positive (rather than 
negative) (65%; M = 4.53, SD = .75), and unforgettable (as opposed to “easy to forget”) (54%; M 
= 4.42, SD = .74). Results of a factor analysis (varimax rotation) indicated that all three variables 
loaded onto a single factor, conceivably representing the “positivity” of one’s park visit; the 
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factor loadings were used to create a scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .84).  
 No significant correlations were found between the reported positivity of the visitor’s park 
experience and: (1) judging external (NPS) causes of accidents as important (2) judging internal 
(park visitor) causes of accidents as important; (3) judging bad luck as an important causal factor 
(4) judging challenging conditions as an important factor in causing a hypothetical incident.  
Familiarity with national park unit 
 I conceptualized visitors’ familiarity with the park unit in which they were surveyed as a 
second aspect of “experience.” More specifically, I measured familiarity in two ways: (1) the 
number of visits to the park in the past year (i.e., once, 2-5 visits, 6-10 visits, more than 10 
visits), and (2) the length of the park visit (i.e., half a day or less, more than half a day to one full 
day, more than one day). When considering all visitors together, there was a small, significant, 
negative correlation between reporting external (NPS) causes of the hypothetical visitor incident 
as important and the number of park visits the respondents had taken in the past year (r = -.18, p 
= .000). That is, the more times a visitor had been to the park, the less likely he or she was to 
view external (i.e., park-related) causes of the accident as important. The direction and relative 
size of this correlation held after considering respondents in different groups by scenario 
received (see Table 4.8). Conversely, among all visitors, a very small, significant, positive 
correlation existed between reporting internal causes of the visitor incident as important and the 
number of park visits in the past year (r = .08, p = .032). Though the directionality of this 
correlation remained consistent across both scenario groups, the correlation was not significant 
for those who read the Hellroaring Creek scenario (see Table 4.8).  
 In regard to the length of the most recent park visit, among all visitors, I observed a small, 
significant, negative correlation between reporting external (NPS) causes of the hypothetical 
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visitor incident as important and the length of the visit (r = -.13, p = .001). That is, the longer 
visitors reported staying at the park during the most recent visit, the less likely they were to 
report external (NPS) causes as important factors in the visitor scenario. Though the 
directionality of this correlation remained the same across visitor groups, the correlation was not 
significant for those who read the Hellroaring Creek scenario. Finally, among all visitors, I 
observed a very small, significant correlation between reporting internal causes as important 
factors in the scenario and the length of the park visit (r = .07, p = .052); however, this 
correlation was not significant among the individual scenario groups (see Table 4.8).  
Table 4.8. Correlations between Familiarity with Park and Causal Attribution 
Visitor Group  Number of Park 
Visits and 
External Causal 
Attribution 
Number of Park 
Visits and 
Internal Causal 
Attribution 
Length of Park 
Visit and 
External 
Causal 
Attribution   
Length of 
Park Visit 
and Internal 
Causal 
Attribution 
All Visitors r = -.18*** r = .08* r = -.13** r = .07* 
Read Hellroaring Creek 
scenario 
r = -.16** 
 (n = 425) 
 
 
r = .02, ns  
(n = 425) 
 
r = -.09, ns  
(n = 425) 
r = .02, ns 
(n = 425) 
 
Read Mammoth Hot Springs 
scenario 
r = -.19** 
(n = 254) 
 
r = .12*  
(n = 254) 
r = -.15*  
(n = 255) 
 
r = -.06, ns  
(n = 255) 
 
Note. Two-tailed Pearson’s correlations. 
*p< .05;**p<.01; ***p<.001 
 Experience in other national park units 
 A final measure of “experience” involved asking respondents to approximate the total 
number of other national park units that he or she had ever visited to date. When considering all 
visitors together, I observed a small, significant negative correlation between reporting external 
(NPS) causes of the hypothetical visitor incident as important and the number of other national 
parks visited (besides the present park) (r = -.15, p = .000). That is, the more national parks 
respondents had visited, the less likely they were to report external (NPS) causes as important in 
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explaining how the hypothetical incident occurred. The directionality of this correlation held 
across both scenario groups, and its size strengthened, especially among those visitors in the 
Mammoth Hot Springs group (see Table 4.9). Among all visitors, there appeared to be no 
correlation between reporting internal causes of the hypothetical scenario as important, and the 
number of other national parks visited. As explained above, the pattern of these correlations lend 
support to the idea that experience in national parks may provide visitors a perceived sense of 
control over their environment, making them less likely to see aspects of the managed 
environment, such as (lack of) rules or safety infrastructure, as contributors to an accident. 
Supporting this idea, a positive, significant correlation existed between the number of national 
parks visited and perceiving park-related risks as controllable (r = .12, p = .002). (Controllability 
of risk will be discussed further below). Perhaps running counter to this finding, however, among 
the Mammoth Hot Springs scenario readers, I found a positive correlation between the number of 
parks visited and viewing accidents as caused by bad luck (r = .17, p= .009). Since the 
individuals chosen to receive this scenario had participated in less “risky” recreational pursuits, it 
is conceivable that their patterns of activities also held in these other parks, and taking fewer 
recreational risks oneself may cause visitors to view bad luck as a more salient causal factor; 
however, further empirical study is necessary to test this speculation. .  
 In order to simplify measurement in the regression models (discussed later in the chapter), I 
created a new variable that summed the three measures of visitors’ experience in a national park 
setting: (1) the length of time spent in the surveyed park, (2) the number of times the individual 
had been to the park in the past year, and (3) the number of other national parks the individual 
had visited.  Since this variable was highly skewed (skewness = 3.77, kurtosis = 23.71), I 
	   137	  
performed a natural log transformation. The resulting variable had acceptable skewness and 
kurtosis levels (.21 and .46, respectively) and appeared to be normally distributed.  
Table 4.9. Correlations between Experience in Other Parks and Causal Attribution 
Visitor Group Number of Other 
National Parks and 
External Causal 
Attribution 
Number of Other 
National Parks and 
Internal Causal 
Attribution 
Number of 
Other National 
Parks and Bad 
Luck 
All Visitors r = -.15*** r = .00, ns r = .02, ns 
Read Hellroaring Creek scenario r = -.11* 
(n = 381) 
r = -.01, ns  
(n = 381) 
 
r = .00, ns 
(n = 388) 
Read Mammoth Hot Springs 
scenario 
r = -.24***  
(n = 229) 
r =  -.09, ns  
(n = 229) 
 
r = .17** 
(n = 230) 
Note. Two-tailed Pearson’s correlations. 
*p< .05;**p<.01; ***p<.001 
 
Incident salience 
 When asked if an incident such as the one described in the hypothetical scenario had 
happened to them or someone they knew, one quarter (25%, n = 177) of the visitor sample 
reported affirmatively. A small percentage of visitors (6%, n = 45) were unsure about their own, 
or a close other’s, involvement in a similar incident. Another 70% (n = 490) reported not having 
had a similar experience happen to them or a close other. Using the dichotomized Internal and 
External Causal Attribution Scales, I performed a chi-square analysis examining the relationship 
between one’s past experience with an accident and attributional judgment. Of those visitors 
reporting that a scenario like the one described had never before happened to them or someone 
they knew (n = 465), about half (52%, n = 241) reported median or lower internal causes of the 
hypothetical accident. In contrast, for those who reported that an incident had happened to them 
or someone they knew, or were unsure if one had happened (n =218), over half (60%, n = 131) 
reported median or lower judgments of internal causal attribution. This relationship was 
significant: χ2(1) = 4.09, p = .043. 
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  As described earlier in this chapter, employee perceptions illustrated the opposite effect, as 
individuals involved in similar incidents as well as those not involved reported median or higher 
internal causal attributions. While an optimistic bias may still be operating, as opposed to 
employees, visitors appear less willing to attribute responsibility to individuals who may, in 
some respects, resemble them. Thus, visitors’ causal reasoning appears align Shaver’s (1970) 
concept of “blame avoidance” based on the perceived similarity of the accident victim. It may 
also follow Crohn et al.’s (2008) analysis of residents of Western U.S. communities who 
hesitated to attribute any causal responsibility for a wildfire to their own actions, tending instead 
to see the acts of others (e.g., public agencies), or natural processes as more important factors. 
Summary 
 Overall, partial support was found for H3. While no relationship was found between the 
positivity of the respondent’s park visit and internal causal attribution, significant relationships 
were found for several other variables. First, for length of park visit, I found a small, significant 
negative correlation between reporting external causes of the hypothetical visitor incident as 
important and the length of the respondent’s most recent visit. Second, a medium-sized, 
significant, negative correlation existed between reporting external causes of the hypothetical 
visitor incident as important and the number of park visits the visitors had taken in the past year. 
Finally, I found a small, significant negative correlation between reporting external causes of the 
hypothetical visitor incident as important and the number of other national parks visited (besides 
the present park). In terms of the salience of the hypothetical incident, visitors’ causal 
attributional judgments appeared opposite those of employees (described in the previous 
section). Those who reported that an incident had happened to them or someone they knew, or 
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were unsure if one had happened were more likely to report median or lower internal causal 
attributions, as opposed to those who had not been involved in an incident.  
Research Question One: Sense of Place and Causal Attribution 
 
Place meaning: Closed-ended responses 
The first research question asked how place meaning and place attachment relate to 
attributions about the cause of accidents. Results of a factor analysis (varimax rotation) 
suggested that five of the eight place meaning-related survey items loaded highly on a single 
factor. These items appeared to describe both natural and cultural-based place meanings, 
including seeing the park as a wildlife habitat, a historical place, somewhere to be preserved for 
future enjoyment, a community of visitors and staff, and an unpredictable landscape (see Table 
4.10); together, these loadings created the Place Meaning Scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .70). While 
I had expected items related to Place Meaning to load onto two separate factors, one representing 
more “nature-based” place meanings, and a second to represent more “human-based” place 
meanings, I instead found a single-factor solution.  
Table 4.10. Place Meaning and Place Attachment Scales 
Scale Cronbach’s alpha 
Place Meaning 
This park is a wildlife habitat. 
This park is a place with historical value. 
This park is a place to be preserved for 
future generations. 
This park is a community of visitors, 
employees, and volunteers. 
This park is an unpredictable landscape. 
.70 
Place Attachment 
This park means a lot to me. 
I identify strongly with this park. 
I feel that I can really be myself at this 
park. 
.77 
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That both nature-based and human-based place meanings load jointly on a single factor may 
reflect how omnipresent information available to visitors in both physical (e.g., signs, pamphlets, 
NPS rangers) and virtual (e.g., NPS website) spaces characterizes national parks; from a 
communication-as-constitutive perspective (Carey, 1989), we can understand these meanings as 
created and re-created through information-sharing and dissemination. The central NPS website 
(http://www.nps.gov), from which websites for individual park units can be accessed, provides a 
useful illustration. Text and images on the website construct a view of nature as valuable, 
something contributing both to a biological and cultural legacy. According to the website, while 
we can interpret some of this value as emerging through the scenic, “untouched” elements of 
national park landscapes, nature also accrues and retains value through our participation in it, 
such as through scientific study. Paradoxically, the website also appears to construct nature as 
dangerous, with risk emerging as both human-caused, and also an inherent characteristic of a 
setting. Following the conclusions of Cox (2010) and others, the NPS website therefore provides 
contradictory images of the “meaning” of nature in national parks: desirable and dangerous, an 
entity to preserve away from humans, and a resource to provide reflection and recreation. 
Comparing levels of place meaning by each park’s visitor population provides interesting 
contrasts; DEWA visitors, as a group, reported the lowest level of agreement with the place 
meaning scale (M = 20.68, SD = 2.68), whereas MORA visitors reported the highest (M = 22.02, 
SD = 2.67) (see Table 4.11). Anecdotal evidence supports this finding, as the majority of the 
MORA visitors contacted described themselves as residents of the Seattle-Tacoma metropolitan 
area, and spending a great deal of their free time in the park; such familiarity with the local 
context likely influenced their understanding of the park in terms of its natural and cultural 
meaning. Indeed, visitors to both OLYM and MORA were, more often than not, residents of 
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surrounding communities, as tends to be a defining characteristic of winter park visitors.  
For all respondents who received the Hellroaring Creek scenario (i.e., visitors, volunteers, 
and employees), results of bivariate Pearson correlations indicated small, significant, positive 
correlations between place meaning and: (1) judging internal causes of the hypothetical visitor 
incident as important (r = .12, p = .001); (2) viewing challenging environmental conditions as 
important causal factors in a hypothetical visitor accident (r = .11, p = .002) (see Table 4.11). In 
sum, the more an individual viewed the park as having natural and cultural meaning, the more he 
or she tended to view internal causes as important to a visitor accident; we might interpret this 
relationship to mean that supporting “preferred” (Hall, 2001) meanings of national parks, such as 
those established through park-related information, made an individual more likely to view 
visitors—rather than park managers—as responsible for causing a negative incident. Moreover, 
as individuals understood national parks as places with natural and cultural meaning, they also 
tended to view environmental conditions as contributing to the cause of a visitor accident. As 
illustrated by the factor analysis, natural and cultural park meanings encompassed the notion of 
parks as “unpredictable landscapes”; in following, viewing the park’s environmental conditions, 
such as uneven terrain, as contributing to a visitor accident would appear to make logical sense. 
(See Table 4.11 for correlations between these variables for other sub-groups of the survey 
sample). 
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Table 4.11. Comparison of Mean Place Attachment and Place Meaning by Park: Visitors 
only  
Group Place Attachment Place Meaning  
DEWA visitors 
 
M = 11.42, SD = 2.15 
(n = 178) 
M = 20.68, SD = 2.68 
(n = 182 ) 
 
MORA visitors  M = 12.44, SD = 2.00  
(n = 405) 
 
 
M = 22.02, SD = 2.67 
(n = 405) 
 
OLYM visitors M = 12.18, SD = 2.25 
(n = 170) 
 
M = 21.74, SD = 2.48  
(n = 168) 
All visitors M = 12.14, SD = 2.13 
(n = 753) 
 
M = 21.63 , SD = 2.69 
(n = 755) 
 
 
Table 4.12. Correlations between Place Meaning and Causal Attribution Variables 
Group Place Meaning and 
Internal Causal 
Attribution 
Place Meaning and 
Environmental 
Conditions 
All respondents: Hellroaring Creek  r = .12** 
(n = 810) 
r = .11** 
(n = 833) 
Visitors: Hellroaring Creek   
r = .14** 
(n = 425) 
 
r = .14** 
(n = 435) 
Visitors: Mammoth Hot Springs  r = .07, ns 
(n = 256) 
r = .12* 
(n = 258) 
All Volunteers r = .06, ns 
(n = 152) 
r = .12, ns 
(n = 157) 
 
 
All Employees r = .11, ns 
(n = 233) 
r = -.02, ns 
(n = 241) 
Note. Two-tailed Pearson’s correlations. 
*p< .05;**p<.01; ***p<.001 
 
Place meaning: Free responses 
Comments provided in response to an open question at the end of the survey provided 
additional evidence of how survey respondents understood the meaning of the three parks. While 
respondents were not prompted to comment on the significance of, or their relationship to, the 
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park, many chose to do so. To some degree, these comments can help: (1) parse out the 
definition of “natural and cultural place meaning”; (2) investigate potential overlaps between 
visitors’ and “preferred” (i.e., NPS-intended) understandings of natural and cultural place 
meanings; and (3) illustrate how the place meaning may function with respect to the other 
variables of interest, including risk perception, causal attribution, and prevention attribution 
(attribution of responsibility for preventing accidents/ensuring safety). In particular, three 
emergent themes deserve attention, two related broadly to nature-based meanings, and one to 
culture-based meanings. 
Park as wilderness. For many respondents, the park stood for “wilderness,” and thus 
represented the expression of many of the characteristics they attributed to such places, including 
physical challenge and inherent sources of risk. In this sense, comments echoed a broad theme of 
the NPS website which suggests environmental risk as intrinsic to many (if not most) park 
settings. Unlike the text of the NPS website, however, many survey respondents characterized 
the “riskiness” of park wilderness as serving distinct, often positive, functions. (More discussion 
of risk perception, including the desirability of risk, is provided below). For instance, one visitor 
used the concept of wilderness to describe the value of OLYM, noting, “We… need wilderness 
and wild places to recreate in, to test and challenge our spirits and keep us strong.” Noting the 
presence of this risk, other respondents stressed the importance of self-reliance, equating 
wilderness—and by extension, national parks—as places where preparation and self-preservation 
are necessary. As a different OLYM visitor suggested:  
Many of our parks include wilderness areas; the very word encompasses the word ‘wild.’ 
People should prepare themselves by studying the area and the risks, and then take 
actions to mitigate or reduce the risks before venturing out into the wilderness.  
 
Just as some respondents defined the concept of wilderness, others pointed out how national park 
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visitors can be unaware of what such characteristics may be, or what they may imply for 
ensuring one’s safety.  While one MORA volunteer described many visitors as “ignorant about 
nature” another noted that:  
Our ancestors were used to a wilderness experience. For our generation Rainier and other 
similar areas are strange territory.  
 
Though these and other respondents appeared to equate wilderness experiences with taking 
personal responsibility for one’s wellbeing, it is important to note that unfamiliarity with the 
context may render such actions difficult, or even impossible.   
Nature & spirituality. Similar to the idea of wilderness, respondents also appeared to 
understand national parks as representations of “nature” writ large. Reminiscent of the NPS 
agency directive, the 1916 Organic Act, some respondents’ comments characterized parks as 
sanctuaries, islands of flora and fauna purposefully set aside to exemplify a “natural” state. In the 
words of one MORA visitor:  
I can only hope that for many YEARS Mt. Rainier National Park and all its land stays 
kept safe and protected. For as we humans slowly destroy most of our world’s wonders, 
let there be some place that hopefully will remind people of what we did have and inspire 
others. 
 
This visitor’s words echo the NPS website’s indication of nature as scenic and untouched, as 
existing in the “pristine” landscapes of many parks (Oravec, 1996). Parks were also seen as 
places to visit non-human populations, as described by one OLYM visitor:   
Parks are not just for visitors. By the very word, we are guests. The park is a place for 
nature to continue its normal development as undisturbed as possible by humans… I am a 
visitor and not a resident of the park and should treat it with respect and reverence. 
 
These and other survey respondents juxtaposed national parks with other more “controlled” 
nature experiences, such as those available at zoos or amusement parks. For them, much of the 
value of parks and other wilderness areas emerged from their “wildness,” including the 
unpredictability of the physical landscape, the inevitability of risk, and the authenticity of a 
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“real” nature experience. A MORA volunteer expressed this sentiment quite adamantly when 
commenting:  
National park wilderness areas are not Disneyland. They are as real as we can preserve 
them. Having spent a lifetime in the wilderness as a hunter, hiker, and backpacker, I’ve 
learned that Mother Nature doesn’t give a rip about you and will as soon kill you as let 
you pass.  
 
 For some respondents, experiencing nature in a national park visit also meant creating a 
space for reflection, an idea that also garners some attention on the NPS website. In addition to 
the “awe” or “beauty” many described as experiencing in these places, some respondents 
emphasized that parks serve a spiritual role in their lives. One MORA visitor noted that, “Each 
time I visit the park I come away with my spirit lifted,” while a MORA volunteer viewed parks 
as “a place for peace of mind and unique beauty.” Reminiscent of transcendental philosophy, 
many of these comments seemed to convey a religious undercurrent, as exemplified by the words 
of a MORA visitor:  
I appreciate the Universe for the beautiful creation and feel lucky to visit [MORA]. It is 
like meditating in nature while walking and appreciating the beauty with the people I 
love.  
 
Natural & cultural heritage. In addition to wilderness-related meanings, survey 
respondents also understood the parks in terms of cultural meanings. Most centrally, many 
respondents referred to parks as “national treasures,” suggesting that these places occupy a 
central role in America’s cultural heritage, a view central to NPS, and thus articulated in its 
official descriptions of many of its national park units. In describing the parks as such, several 
respondents praised the federal system in place to conserve these places, such as is reflected in 
one DEWA visitor’s comment:   
USA is gifted with the most unique wonders of nature and the forefathers of this nation 
did very wisely to take good care to preserve this gift. It is an unenviable task of the 
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National Park Service to preserve and protect the natural beauty so that future generations 
can continue to enjoy them. 
 
In this same vein, many respondents lamented the limited funding available to the National Park 
Service, and expressed their support of the continued efforts of the NPS. In the words of one 
OLYM visitor:  
Do everything possible to add to and preserve our national parks, forests, and park lands. 
They are invaluable and irreplaceable resources that most purely and strongly represent 
our nation’s character and nurture and sustain its collective psyche and soul. 
 
As this quotation suggests, for some respondents, the importance of these physical spaces was 
not limited to facilitating ecological processes, but rather extended to supporting democratic 
ideals; national parks, in this sense, define not only what a “natural” area can (or should) be, but 
also what the United States can (or should) stand for. Because parks can, quite literally, “ground” 
such lofty principles, many respondents noted the importance of protecting and preserving them 
as a legacy for future generations, places that, as one MORA visitor expressed, “[I] hope my 
children and grandchildren will be able to [visit] as well.”        
Place attachment: Closed-ended responses  
Results of a factor analysis (varimax rotation) suggested that the seven items pertaining to 
place attachment loaded onto two separate factors. The first factor appeared to describe strong 
place attachment, or the idea that the respondent felt a substantial connection to the park. A 
reliability analysis indicated that the Cronbach’s alpha would be improved by omitting one item 
(“Few people know [park name] like I do.”). The remaining three item factor-loadings created a 
place attachment scale (Cronbach’s alpha= .77) (see Table 4.10). Of visitors to the three parks, 
those at MORA reported the strongest attachment to the park (M = 12.44, SD = 2.00), followed 
by OLYM (M = 12.18, SD = 2.25) (see Table 4.11). As explained above, MORA and OLYM 
visitors tended to be Seattle or Tacoma-area residents who visited the park on a regular basis, 
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and who, anecdotally, often emphasized the centrality of the park to their recreational activities 
and their larger support for the preservation of the environment and open space. 
When considering all respondents who read the Hellroaring Creek scenario, there was a very 
small, significant positive correlation between place attachment and (1) judging internal causal 
factors as important to a hypothetical visitor accident scenario (r = .09, p = .015); and (2) judging 
challenging environmental conditions as important causal factors (r = .09, p = .011). 
Unsurprisingly, place attachment was also positively correlated with visitors’ experience with the 
park context (i.e., the sum of: (1) length of last visit, (2) number of park visits in the past year, 
and (3) number of other national parks visited) (r = .13, p= .001). As visitors become more 
familiar with—and attached to—the park setting, they appeared more likely to both hold the 
visitor responsible for causing an accident, and also to recognize the potential contribution of 
environmental conditions to such a fate. As seen in Table 4.13, the correlation between place 
attachment and internal causal attribution was most pronounced among visitors who read the 
Hellroaring Creek scenario (r = .13, p = .006), and not significant for visitors who read the 
Mammoth Hot Springs scenario, volunteers, or employees. Likewise, the strongest correlation 
between place attachment and judging environmental conditions as important causal factors 
existed among volunteers (r = .16, p = .046), followed by visitors who read the Hellroaring 
Creek scenario (r = .11, p = .021); for employees and visitors who read the Mammoth Hot 
Springs scenario, correlations were not significant.  
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Table 4.13 Correlations between Place Attachment and Causal Attribution Variables 
Group Place Attachment and 
Internal Causal 
Attribution 
Place Attachment and 
Environmental 
Conditions 
All respondents: Hellroaring Creek  r = .09* 
(n = 826) 
r = .09* 
(n = 836) 
Visitors: Hellroaring Creek  r = .13** 
(n = 435) 
r = .11* 
(n = 438) 
Visitors: Mammoth Hot Springs  r = .08, ns 
(n = 258) 
r = .09, ns 
(n = 260) 
All Volunteers r= .15, ns 
(n = 154) 
r= .16* 
(n = 156) 
All Employees r = -.01, ns 
(n = 237) 
r = .01, ns 
(n = 242) 
 
Note. Two-tailed Pearson’s correlations. 
*p< .05;**p<.01; ***p<.001 
 
In a regression model predicting internal causal attribution (R2 = .18, F(16, 925) = 9.30, p < 
.001), place attachment was positively related to the outcome variable (β = .09, p < .05). Place 
meaning emerged as a significant, negative predictor (β = -.07, p < .05) of seeing bad luck as an 
important causal factor in a regression model (R2 = .12, F(16, 934) = 7.59, p < .001). In two 
additional regression models, one predicting seeing external (NPS-related) factors as important 
causal factors and the other predicting seeing challenging environmental conditions as an 
important causal factor, neither place meaning nor place attachment emerged as a significant 
predictor (see Tables 4.14 and 4.15).  
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Table 4.14. Regression Predicting Internal Causal Attribution: Sense of Place Variables  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Block 1: Demographics 
Age .11** .09** .10** .08* 
Education -.11** -.10** -.10** -.09** 
Gender  
(Female=1) 
-.01 .00 -.00 -.02 
Native English 
(Native English 
speaker = 1)  
-.03 -.00 -.00 -.02 
Asian -.00 .02 .02 .02 
Hispanic/Latino .02 .03 .03 .03 
Other .04 .02 .02 .02 
Inc. R2 (%)     
Block 2: Respondent Type 
Volunteer  -.02 -.01 -.03 
Employee  .02 .04 .03 
Scenario 
(Mammoth Hot 
Springs = 1) 
 -.35*** -.34*** -.33*** 
DEWA  .05 .04 .07* 
OLYM  .02 .03 .03 
Inc. R2 (%)     
Block 3: Incident 
Salience 
(Experienced 
similar 
incident/Unsure = 
1) 
  -.11*** -.11** 
Number of 
national parks 
visited 
  .02 .01 
Inc. R2 (%)     
Block 4: Sense of 
Place 
 
Place Meaning .06 
Place Attachment 
   
.09* 
Inc. R2 (%)     
Total R2    .18 
ANOVA    F16, 925= 
12.30*** 
Notes. *p< .05;**p<.01; ***p<.001 
n = 942. 
Cell entries for all models are standardized regression coefficients. 
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Table 4.15. Comparison of β  values for Significant Predictors in Sense of Place Regression 
Models 
Dependent Variable: Causal Attribution Independent 
Variable 
(β) Internal Causal 
Attribution 
(Park Visitor) 
External Causal 
Attribution 
(Park 
Management) 
Challenging 
Conditions 
(Park 
Environment) 
Bad Luck 
Age .08* ns ns -.14*** 
Education -.09** -.11** -.11* ns 
Female ns .13*** -.13** ns 
Native English 
Speaker 
ns -.13** -.12** ns 
Asian ns .16*** .16*** ns 
Volunteer ns .07* ns ns 
Employee ns .10** .10** -.12** 
Mammoth Hot 
Springs scenario 
-.33*** .14*** .14*** .20*** 
DEWA .07* .10** .10** -.08* 
Incident Salience -.11* ns .07* .11*** 
Place Meaning ns ns ns -.07* 
Place Attachment .09* ns ns ns 
Total R2 .18 .13 .06 .12 
ANOVA F 16, 925 = 12.30*** F 16, 925 = 8.84*** F 16, 941= 3.44*** F 16, 934= 7.59*** 
Note. *p< .05;**p<.01; ***p<.001 
Cell entries for all models are standardized regression coefficients. 
 
Place attachment: Free responses   
As was true for the concept of place meaning, open-ended comments on the survey revealed 
more about how respondents expressed place attachment. Many respondents described their 
connection to the park in terms of their own, or their family’s, history with the geographical area. 
As one DEWA visitor described:  
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I grew up farming the fields along the Delaware River within the park. It is a beautiful 
place, and I am thankful that the Park Service is dedicated to caring for the land and at 
the same time making it accessible to the people who appreciate it. 
 
The ability to identify with the park—to define oneself by interactions with the very features of 
the landscape—also appeared to affect the way in which respondents chose to support the park, 
such as through volunteering or working for the NPS. For example, a MORA volunteer 
explained:  
I have spent a lifetime hiking and climbing in the Cascade and Olympic mountains. 
These areas, including [MORA], are very precious to me. It is right to try and give back 
something to an area/environment that has been a major part of my life. 
 
For some, identifying with the park led to suspicion of those whose connection with the area was 
less established. An OLYM employee described frustration with a park management comprised 
largely of “outsiders”:   
I was born here and I love this place that I grew up in. The people we have managing it 
now are not from here and they just don’t have the love of the park like those who have 
gone before them. I don’t know what the answer is but I do know that Olympic National 
Park is not the same place it used to be. 
 
 Similarly, for many respondents, especially those living close to a park, place attachment 
seemed to manifest in the perception of the park as “theirs”: an ownership based jointly on 
knowledge, appreciation, and familiarity. According to one OLYM visitor:  
This park is probably the most special place to me and my family. I have travelled the 
world and nothing compares to its challenges and its beauty and its diversity.  
 
Likewise, a MORA volunteer described herself as “proud to take visitors to Mt. Rainier.” For 
these and other individuals, sense of place seemed to develop out of habit and routine. As a 
MORA visitor commented:  
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I visit 1-2 national parks in a year that are outside WA state. Within WA state, I just love 
Mt. Rainier too much to visit many others and so I’ve been there about 10 times in the 
past 2 years!!  
 
Similarly, one DEWA respondent described an annual father/son canoe trip in the park over 
Father’s Day weekend that he had taken for the past 12 years, and another noted that she and her 
husband “camped [in DEWA] for many years when our children were younger”—experiences 
that motivated the family to purchase a home nearby.  
Summary 
 Using both quantitative and qualitative data, this section explored the relationship between 
sense of place variables, place meaning and place attachment, and causal attributional judgments. 
Evidence from a factor analysis and survey free responses suggest that respondents envisioned 
the national parks studied as blending “nature” and “human”-based meanings. Moreover, I found 
significant, positive correlations between agreement with this “blended” place meaning and: (1) 
judging internal causes of the hypothetical visitor incident as important, and (2) viewing 
challenging environmental conditions as important causal factors. For many respondents, place 
attachment seemed to signify a sense of history and ownership with the place. Significant, 
positive correlations existed between place attachment and judging internal causal factors as 
important to a hypothetical visitor accident scenario and (2) judging challenging environmental 
conditions as important causal factors. 
Research Question Two: Perception of Risk and Causal Attribution 
Controllability and voluntariness of park risk 
Research question two asked how perceptions of controllability, voluntariness, and 
desirability of park risks relate to attributions of responsibility for the cause of park accidents. I 
performed a factor analysis (varimax rotation) of six survey items (q21a- q21f), expecting these 
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items to load onto two factors: one to represent voluntariness and the other, controllability of 
park-related risk. While the items, indeed, appeared to load onto two distinct factors, rather than 
representing voluntariness and controllability, they seemed instead to represent (1) visitors’ 
perceived personal control over park risk; and (2) perceptions of the National Park Service’s 
control over these risks. Because voluntariness and controllability appeared indistinguishable, I 
instead used the factor scores of the four items relating to visitors’ perceived personal 
control/voluntariness to create a new scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .67) (see Table 4.16).   
Table 4.16. Controllability and Desirability of Risk Scales 
 
 
 When considering all respondents who received the Hellroaring Creek scenario together, 
there was a small-medium sized, significant, negative correlation between perceived 
controllability of risk and seeing external causes of a hypothetical accident as important (r = -.22, 
p < .001). As respondents believed park-related risks to be controllable, they tended to view 
external causes of an incident as less relevant. Predictably, as respondents perceived risks as 
controllable, they also tended to see internal causes of a hypothetical accident (i.e., 
characteristics of the victim) as important (r = .11, p < .01). Also somewhat logically, 
Scale Cronbach’s alpha 
Controllability of Risk 
People cannot control whether or not they 
are harmed by the hazards they face in the 
park.  
Whether or not a person is exposed to park 
hazards is not his or her choice. 
In the park, people cannot choose whether 
or not they are exposed to most hazards.  
If they are exposed to hazards in the park, 
people cannot prevent harm to themselves 
and others.  
.67 
Desirability of Risk 
Experience thrills.  
Have an adventure.  
Be challenged.  
Experience excitement.  
.85 
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respondents who viewed park risks as controllable were less likely to: (1) perceive challenging 
environmental conditions as important contributors to a visitor accident (r = -.08, p < .05); and 
(2) see bad luck as a causal factor (r = -.07, p < .05). (See Table 4.17 for these correlations 
classified by respondent group and scenario received).  
Table 4.17. Correlations between Controllability of Risk and Causal Attribution Variables 
Group Controllability 
of Risk and 
Internal 
Causal 
Attribution 
Controllability 
of Risk and 
External 
Causal 
Attribution 
Controllability 
of Risk and 
Challenging 
Conditions 
Controllability of 
Risk and  
Bad Luck 
All respondents: 
Hellroaring   
r = .11** 
(n = 805) 
r = -.22*** 
(n = 805) 
r = -.08* 
(n = 830) 
r = -.07* 
(n = 822) 
Visitors: Hellroaring  r = .11* 
(n = 423) 
r = -.29*** 
(n = 423) 
r = -.10* 
(n = 434) 
r = -.10* 
(n = 432) 
Visitors: Mammoth  r = .20** 
(n = 254) 
r = -.18** 
(n = 255) 
r = -.04, ns 
(n = 256) 
r = -.07, ns 
(n = 255) 
All Volunteers r = .11, ns 
(n = 147) 
r = -.07, ns 
(n = 147) 
r = -.04, ns 
(n = 152) 
r = -.12, ns 
(n = 152) 
All Employees r = .13* 
(n = 235) 
 
r = -.13* 
(n = 235) 
r = -.03, ns 
(n = 244) 
r = -.00, ns 
(n = 238) 
 
Note. Two-tailed Pearson’s correlations. 
*p< .05;**p<.01; ***p<.001 
 
Desirability of park risk 
I next performed a factor analysis (varimax rotation) of five survey items (q20a- q20e) 
related to the desirability of park-related risk. The solution indicated that all of the variables 
loaded onto a single factor, lending confidence to the assumption that these items measured the 
same concept. Based on a reliability analysis, I deleted one of the items (“to take risks”; q20a), as 
it reduced the overall alpha of the items; the factor loadings of the resulting items presented a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .85 (see Table 4.16).   
 When all respondents who read the Hellroaring Creek scenario were considered together, 
there was a small, positive correlation between desirability of risk and: (1) seeing challenging 
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environmental conditions as contributing to a hypothetical visitor incident (r = .13, p < .001); (2) 
viewing bad luck as a causal factor in the incident (r = .12, p < .001). In other words, individuals 
who described being in a national park as a means to take risks were more likely to attribute the 
accident causes to both environmental conditions at the park and bad luck. (See Table 4.18 for 
these correlations classified by respondent group and scenario received).  
Table 4.18. Correlations between Desirability of Risk and Causal Attribution Variables 
Group Desirability of Risk 
and Challenging 
Conditions 
Desirability of Risk and  
Bad Luck 
All respondents: Hellroaring Creek  r = .13*** 
(n = 834) 
r = .12*** 
(n = 827) 
Visitors: Hellroaring Creek  r = .16** 
(n = 438) 
r = .16** 
(n = 436) 
Visitors: Mammoth Hot Springs  r = -.05, ns 
(n = 258) 
r = .11, ns 
(n = 257) 
All Volunteers r = .14, ns 
(n = 154) 
r  = .14, ns 
(n = 155) 
All Employees r = .08, ns 
(n = 242) 
r = .04, ns 
(n = 236) 
Note. Two-tailed Pearson’s correlations 
*p< .05;**p<.01; ***p<.001 
 
Danger/risk avoidance 
 A final, single item measured respondents’ perception of danger, or degree of risk avoidance 
in the context of the national park: “If I thought I would be putting myself in danger, I would not 
visit [the park]” (q22a). Due to its kurtosis (-1.12), this variable was log transformed, resulting in 
more favorable skewness and kurtosis levels (-.57 and -.49, respectively).  
When all respondents who read the Hellroaring Creek scenario were considered together, 
there were small, positive correlations between perception of danger/risk avoidance and: (1) 
internal causal attribution (r = .08, p < .05); and (2) external (NPS) causal attribution (r = .18, p 
< .001). Moreover, negative correlations existed between perception of danger/risk avoidance 
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and: (1) seeing bad luck as a cause of a hypothetical accident (r = -.13, p < .001) and; (2) 
viewing risk as desirable in a national park (r = -.26, p < .001). For the most part, these 
correlations follow the same direction in the other sub-groups of respondents (see Table 4.19), 
though sizes vary. Interestingly, correlations between perception of danger and seeing 
challenging conditions as causal factors in a hypothetical accident varied widely, with significant 
correlations occurring among visitors who read the Hellroaring Creek scenario (r = .15, p < .001) 
and volunteers (r = -.19, p < .05).  
Table 4.19. Correlations between Danger/Risk Avoidance and Causal Attribution 
Variables 
Group Danger1 
and 
Internal 
Causal 
Attribution 
Danger and 
External 
Causal 
Attribution 
Danger and 
Challenging 
Conditions 
Danger and 
Bad Luck 
Danger and 
Desirability of 
Risk 
All 
respondents: 
Hellroaring  
r = .07* 
(n = 
809) 
r = .18*** 
(n = 809) 
r = .03, ns 
(n = 833) 
r = -.13*** 
(n = 825) 
r = -.26*** 
(n = 833) 
Visitors: 
Hellroaring 
r = .12* 
(n = 
424) 
r = .17*** 
(n = 424) 
r = .15** 
(n = 435) 
r = -.11* 
(n = 433) 
r = -.32*** 
(n = 437) 
Visitors: 
Mammoth 
r = .10, 
ns 
(n = 
254) 
r = .21** 
(n = 254) 
r = .05, ns 
(n = 256) 
r = -.04, ns 
(n = 255) 
r = -.29*** 
(n = 260) 
All 
Volunteers 
r = -.04, 
ns 
(n = 
150) 
r = .19* 
(n = 150) 
r = -.19* 
(n = 155) 
r = -.20* 
(n = 155) 
r = -.24** 
(n = 155) 
All 
Employees 
r = .01, 
ns 
(n = 
235) 
r = .18** 
(n = 235) 
r = -.05, ns 
(n = 243) 
r = -.16* 
(n = 237) 
r = -.14 
(n = 241) 
Note. Two-tailed Pearson’s correlations 
*p< .05;**p<.01; ***p<.001 
1Survcy wording: “If I thought I would be putting myself into danger, I would not visit [the park].” 
 
In a regression model predicting internal causal attribution (R2 = .18, F(17, 927) = 12.24 p < 
.001), controllability of risk reached significance (β = .15, p < .001); other significant predictors 
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included the respondent’s age (β= .08, p < .05), education level (β= -.08, p < .01), receiving the 
Mammoth Hot Springs accident scenario (β = -.33, p < .001), and the salience of the described 
hypothetical incident (β = -.10, p < .01) (see Table 4.20). The risk perception-related variables 
also emerged as significant in three additional regression models (see Table 4.21). First, in a 
regression model predicting external (NPS) causal attribution (R2 = .17, F(17, 927) = 11.06 p < 
.001), significant predictors included controllability of risk (β = -.14, p < .001) and perceived 
danger/risk avoidance (β = .14, p < .001). Second, in a regression model predicting seeing 
challenging environmental conditions as important causal factors (R2 = .06, F(17, 941) = 3.50 p 
< .001), perceived desirability of risk was a significant predictor (β = .11, p < .01). Finally, in a 
third regression model predicting seeing bad luck as an important causal factor (R2 = .12, F(17, 
935) = 7.62 p < .001), all three risk perception-related variables measured were significant: 
controllability (β = -.06, p < .05), desirability (β = .06, p < .05) and perceived danger (β = -.07, p 
< .05).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   158	  
Table 4.20. Regression Predicting Internal Causal Attribution: Risk Perception Variables  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Block 1: Demographics 
Age .10** .09** .09** .08* 
Education -.10** -.09** -.09** -.08** 
Gender  
(Female=1) 
-.01 -.00 -.01 .00 
Native English 
(Native English 
speaker= 1)  
-.02 .01 .01 -.00 
Asian .00 .03 .03 .03 
Hispanic/Latino .03 .03 .03 .03 
Other .04 .01 .02 .03 
Inc. R2 (%) 2.1    
Block 2: Respondent Type 
Volunteer  -.02 -.01 -.00 
Employee  .01 .04 .05 
Scenario 
(Mammoth Hot 
Springs= 1) 
 -.35*** -.34*** -.33*** 
DEWA  .05 .04 .05 
OLYM  .02 .02 .02 
Inc. R2 (%)  12.7   
Block 3: Incident 
Salience 
(Experienced 
similar 
incident/Unsure= 
1) 
  -.11*** -.10** 
Number of 
national parks 
visited 
  .01 .01 
Inc. R2 (%)   1.0  
Block 4: Risk 
Perception 
 
Controllability .15*** 
Desirability 
   
.05 
Danger    .05 
Inc. R2 (%)    2.5 
Total R2    .18 
ANOVA    F17, 927= 
12.24*** 
Notes. *p< .05;**p<.01; ***p<.001 
n = 945. 
Cell entries for all models are standardized regression coefficients. 
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Table 4.21. Comparison of β  values for Significant Predictors in Risk Perception 
Regression Models 
Dependent Variable: Causal Attribution Independent 
Variable 
(β) Internal Causal 
Attribution 
(Park Visitor) 
External Causal 
Attribution 
(Park 
Management) 
Challenging 
Conditions 
(Park 
Environment) 
Bad Luck 
Age .08* ns .08* -.10** 
Education -.08** -.09* ns ns 
Female ns .10** ns ns 
Native English 
Speaker 
ns -.09* ns ns 
Asian ns .15** ns ns 
Hispanic/Latino ns .07* ns ns 
Employee ns .10* .19*** -.12** 
Mammoth Hot 
Springs scenario 
-.33*** .10** .09* .20*** 
DEWA ns .09** .07* ns 
Incident Salience -.10** ns ns .11** 
Controllability of 
Risk 
.15*** -.14*** ns -.06* 
Desirability of Risk ns ns .11** .06* 
Danger Avoidance ns .14*** ns -.07* 
Total R2 .18 .17 .06 .12 
ANOVA F 17,927 = 12.24*** F 17,927 = 11.06*** F 17,941=  
3.50*** 
F 17,935= 
7.62*** 
Note. *p< .05;**p<.01; ***p<.001 
Cell entries for all models are standardized regression coefficients. 
 
Risk as inherent to park settings 
 While the quantitative measures described above provided one lens through which we can 
understand respondents’ perceptions of risk within the park setting, responses to the open-ended 
survey item about the hypothetical incident provided additional insight.  In commenting about 
the Hellroaring Creek incident, many respondents noted that hazards, such as steep cliffs or 
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slippery surfaces, are both inherent to national park settings, and also important traits that 
distinguish these places from other locales, such as amusement or city parks. For some 
respondents, such inherent “dangers” made personal vigilance an unquestionable necessity in 
national parks, even when developed safety infrastructure exists. As respondents wrote:    
•  It is my humble opinion that many people do not truly appreciate the dangers of a natural 
setting because so much of their life is removed from these settings. Our ‘civilized’ lives 
have many ‘built in’ safety features not often found in the natural world. Also in most of 
our daily lives we are not the far from emergency services. Much of this changes in a 
natural setting and is not often considered. Many people assume that a National Park is as 
safe as an amusement park or city park (Employee, MORA).  
 
• …Hiking in wilderness areas is inherently dangerous, even with a well marked, well 
signed, well maintained trail people, even well trained rangers, can lose their footing 
(Employee, OLYM).  
 
• People need to remember where they are, the wilderness. It's life and death out there 
(Volunteer, MORA).  
 
• I think that many now grow up in a built environment where many hazards have been 
removed (schools, malls, and public spaces). As a result people are not learning to watch 
out for hazardous situations. In addition people are not being trained to take responsibility 
for their own safety. We have built a culture of seat belts, air bags, bike helmets and 
reflective clothes that make one think that equipment will keep them safe. I think that 
Ellison had not developed a sufficient personal awareness of dangers (Employee, 
OLYM).  
 
(The idea of inherent risk will be explored further in the analysis of employee and volunteer in-
depth interviews in Chapter 6). Furthermore, some respondents argued that these inherent 
hazards are not necessarily negative, or to be avoided, but rather unique characteristics that 
render national parks worth visiting and preserving for future generations. Representative 
quotations included:  
• …Putting oneself at risk is part of the attraction of wilderness areas (Visitor, OLYM).  
 
• Please leave national parks wild, if some people are too stupid not to fall down waterfalls 
let them fall and don't ruin the waterfall for everyone else by putting a fence around it. It 
is wilderness not a museum (Visitor, OLYM).  
 
• The park can't put guardrails everywhere. It takes away from the experience (Employee, 
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MORA).  
 
• To paraphrase a quote in the spirit of Ed Abbey – ‘we should all have the freedom to get 
lost and risk death in the wilderness if we want to’ (Employee, DEWA).  
 
(I return to the idea of risk as a desirable attribute of national parks, including wilderness areas, 
in the analysis of in-depth interviews of employees and volunteers; see Chapter 6).  
Summary 
 Qualitative and quantitative survey data helped to illuminate the relationships between the 
nature and context of park-related risk and causal attribution about a hypothetical visitor 
accident.  According to an exploratory factor analysis, items related controllability and 
voluntariness of risk loaded on a single factor; therefore, the present analysis considered only 
controllability. Findings indicated a significant negative correlation between perceived 
controllability of risk and: (1) judging external (NPS-related) causes of a hypothetical accident as 
important, (2) judging challenging environmental conditions as important, and, (3) judging bad 
luck as an important causal factor. Moreover, a significant positive correlation existed between 
perceived controllability of risk and seeing internal causes of a hypothetical accident as 
important. 
Significant positive correlations were found between perceived desirability of risk and: (1) 
judging challenging environmental conditions as causal factors contributing to a hypothetical 
visitor incident, and (2) viewing bad luck as a causal factor in the incident. Respondents’ free 
responses indicated that, while they saw risk as inherent to many national park settings, such risk 
was not necessarily a negative characteristic, but rather could be a draw to such locations.  
Finally, I found significant positive correlations between intending to avoid the park due to 
perceived danger (q22a) and: (1) attributing the cause of the hypothetical accident to internal 
factors, and (2) attributing the cause of the accident to external (NPS-related) factors. On the 
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other hand, negative correlations were found between perception of danger/park avoidance and: 
(1) attributing the cause of the accident to bad luck, and (2) viewing risk as desirable in national 
parks.   
Research Question Three: Risk Communication and Causal Attribution 
 
 Reliance on information sources 
 Research question three asked how exposure to formal/informal and official/unofficial risk 
communication relates to attributions of responsibility for the cause of accidents. In order to 
compare visitors’ reliance on NPS versus non-NPS sources of information, I divided the list of 
information sources into official and unofficial. Official information included the following six 
listed sources: (1) NPS interpretive programs; (2) NPS brochures; (3) NPS website; (4) signs, 
exhibits, or movies; (5) the National Park Service’s Traveler Information System (TIS) AM radio 
station; (6) interactions with NPS staff.  Unofficial information included: (1) Guidebooks (e.g., 
hiking guide); (2) Visiting a local chamber of commerce, private business, or visitor center 
outside of the park; (3) Interacting with climbing guides, boating guides, or other recreational 
trip leaders; (4) Interacting with staff at restaurants, gift shops, or hotels in the park; and (5) 
Interacting with other park visitors, family members, or friends. The following sources, 
presenting in descending order from most to least, represent those that visitors reported relying 
on for park-related information, using a scale of 1-4, where 1 is “not at all,” 2 is “very little,” 3 is 
“some” and 4 is “a lot”:  
• NPS website (M = 3.18, SD = 1.0).  
• NPS brochures (M = 2.99, SD = .93). 
• Interacting with NPS staff (M = 2.80, SD = .96).  
• Signs, exhibits, movies (M = 2.76, SD = .97). 
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• Guidebooks (e.g., hiking guide) (M = 2.72, SD = 1.09).  
• Interacting with other park visitors, family members, or friends (M = 2.64, SD = 
.10).  
• Interacting with staff at restaurants, gift shops, or hotels in the park (M = 1.93, SD = 
.98).  
• NPS interpretive programs (M = 1.79, SD = 1.0).  
• Interacting with climbing guides, boating guides, or other recreational trip leaders 
(M = 1.77, SD = 1.02).  
• TIS (NPS in-park AM radio station) (M = 1.64, SD = .93).  
• Visiting local chamber of commerce, private business, or visitor center outside of the 
park (M = 1.52, SD = .84).  
By summing all of the information source variables in each category, official and unofficial, I 
created two new variables, the first reflecting the visitor’s reliance on official information 
sources, and the second on unofficial information sources. Next, the sum of all 11 official and 
unofficial information variables was used to create a new variable that captured the total reported 
reliance on all park-related information. 
 Among visitors who received the Hellroaring Creek scenario, there were several small, 
positive, significant correlations between information reliance and attributional judgment. First, a 
significant positive correlation existed between the degree of reliance on official information 
sources and tendency to make internal causal attributional judgments (r = .13, p < .01). Second, I 
observed a significant positive correlation between the total reliance on all information sources 
listed (official and unofficial) and internal causal attributional judgments (r = .15, p < .01); 
however, in a regression model predicting reporting of challenging environmental conditions as 
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important causal factors in a hypothetical visitor incident, reliance on official information failed 
to reach significance in the model (see Table 4.22). Since NPS information emphasizes both the 
local hazards of the park environment (e.g., geohazards in MORA, Lyme disease at DEWA) and 
the behaviors one can take to avoid such hazards, exposure to official information may increase 
the visitor’s tendency to see himself as responsible for causing an accident.  
Type of safety information received  
When asked how much information they received about the a list of safety-related topics (on 
a scale of 1-4, where 1 is “none,” 2 is “very little,” 3 is “some,” and 4 is “a lot),” visitors reported 
receiving the most information about weather conditions (M = 3.03, SD = 1.0), followed by road 
conditions/closures (M = 2.94, SD = 1.04), park hazards, such as wildlife, drowning, earthquakes 
or rockslides (M = 2.58, SD = 1.01), and finally, park regulations, such as boating or swimming 
restrictions (M = 2.52, SD = .99). By summing these four variables, a new variable was created 
to capture the total reported amount of safety information visitors received. Among visitors who 
read the Mammoth Hot Springs scenario, there was a small, positive, significant correlation 
between the total amount of safety information received, and the tendency to see challenging 
conditions as causal factors in a hypothetical visitor incident (r = .13, p < .05) (see Table 4.22). 
As mentioned above, this correlation makes intuitive sense, as park information tends to 
emphasize environmental hazards that can compromise visitor safety.  
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Table 4.22 Correlations between Information Reliance/Exposure and Causal Attribution 
Variables 
Group Official Info 
and Internal 
Causal 
Attribution 
Official Info 
and 
Challenging 
Conditions 
All Info 
Sources1 
and Internal 
Causal 
Attribution 
All Info 
Sources 
and 
Challenging 
Conditions 
All Safety 
Info2 and 
Challenging 
Conditions 
All Visitors r = .13** 
(n = 505) 
r = .05, ns 
(n = 514) 
r = .15** 
(n = 483) 
r = .06, ns 
(n = 490) 
r = .06, ns 
(n = 490) 
Visitors: 
Hellroaring  
r = .11* 
(n = 323) 
r = .12* 
(n = 331) 
r = .13* 
(n = 311) 
r = .12* 
(n = 317) 
r = .04, ns 
(n = 427) 
Visitors: 
Mammoth  
r = .10, ns 
(n = 182) 
r = -.04, 
ns 
(n = 183) 
r = .10, ns 
(n = 172) 
r = -.02, 
ns 
(n = 173) 
r = .13* 
(n = 254) 
Notes.  
*p< .05;**p<.01; ***p<.001 
1All info sources= Sum of all information sources listed, i.e.,: NPS Interpretive program; NPS brochures; NPS 
website; signs, exhibits, movies; Traveler Information Systems (AM radio station); interacting with NPS staff (e.g., 
rangers); guidebooks (e.g., hiking guide); visiting local chamber of commerce, private business, or visitor center 
outside of the park; interacting with climbing guides, boating guides, or other recreational trip leaders; interacting 
with staff at restaurants, gift shops, or hotels in the park; and interacting with other park visitors, family members, or 
friends.    
2 All safety info= Sum of the amount of information received about four safety topics listed, i.e., park hazards, park 
regulations, weather conditions, and road conditions/closures.  
 
In a regression model predicting viewing challenging environmental conditions as important 
causal factors in a hypothetical visitor incident (R2 = .11, F(15, 398) = 3.12, p < .001), amount of 
safety information emerged as a significant predictor (β = .23, p < .001); other significant 
predictors included: being female (β = .10, p < .05), being Asian (β = .14, p < .05), reading the 
Mammoth Hot Springs scenario (β = .10, p < .05), being affiliated with Delaware Water Gap 
(i.e., visitor or employee) (β = .23, p < .001), and incident salience (β= .12, p < .05) (see Table 
4.23). As shown in Table 4.24, variables related to information failed to reach significance in any 
of the other regression models.  
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Table 4.23. Regression Predicting Challenging Conditions as Important Causal Attribution 
Factor: Visitors only  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Block 1: Demographics 
Age .03 .02 .03 .00 
Education .10* .10* .09 .10* 
Gender  
(Female=1) 
.09 .08 .09 .09 
Native English 
(Native English 
speaker= 1)  
.12 .11 .11 .12* 
Asian .13* .12* .13* .14* 
Hispanic/Latino .11* .09 .10 .07 
Other .01 .02 .01 .01 
Inc. R2 (%) 3.1    
Block 2: Respondent Type 
Scenario 
(Mammoth Hot 
Springs= 1) 
 .10* .08 .10* 
DEWA  .10* .10* .23*** 
OLYM  .05 .05 .06 
Inc. R2 (%)  1.8   
Block 3: Incident 
Salience 
(Experienced 
similar 
incident/Unsure= 
1) 
  .12* .12* 
Experience in  
park context 
  -.04 -.07 
Inc. R2 (%)   1.6  
Block 4: 
Information 
 
Official Info 
Reliance 
.01 
All Info Reliance 
   
.01 
Amount Safety 
Info 
   .23*** 
Inc. R2 (%)    4.0 
Total R2    .11 
ANOVA    F15, 395= 
5.19*** 
Notes. *p< .05;**p<.01; ***p<.001 
n =  411. 
Cell entries for all models are standardized regression coefficients. 
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Table 4.24. Comparison of Significant β  values for Significant Predictors in Information 
Regression Models 
Dependent Variable: Causal Attribution Independent 
Variable 
(β) Internal Causal 
Attribution 
(Park Visitor) 
External Causal 
Attribution 
(Park 
Management) 
Challenging 
Conditions 
(Park 
Environment) 
Bad Luck 
Female ns .19*** .10* -.12* 
Asian ns .25*** .14* ns 
Native English 
Speaker 
ns ns .12* ns 
Hispanic/Latino ns .12* ns ns 
Mammoth Hot 
Springs scenario 
-.34*** .15** .10* .29*** 
Experience in park 
context 
ns -.12* ns ns 
DEWA ns ns .23*** ns 
Incident Salience -.10* ns .12* ns 
Total Safety Info ns ns .23*** ns 
Total R2 .16 .23 .11 .13 
ANOVA F 15,395 = 5.19*** F 15, 395= 7.66*** F 15, 398 = 
3.12*** 
F 15, 398 = 4.01***  
Note. *p< .05;**p<.01; ***p<.001 
Cell entries for all models are standardized regression coefficients. 
 
Summary 
 Using quantitative survey data, this section explored the relationships between reliance on, 
and exposure to, park-related information and causal attribution. Results indicated a significant, 
positive correlation between reliance on official information sources (e.g., park brochures, park 
staff, signs, etc.) and tendency to make internal causal attributional judgments with respect to a 
hypothetical visitor incident. Moreover, a significant positive correlation existed between total 
reliance on all information sources (formal and informal) and internal causal attributional 
judgments. Among visitors who read the Hellroaring Creek scenario, there was an additional 
positive correlation between total reliance on all information sources and judging challenging 
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environmental conditions as important causal factors in the hypothetical incident. Finally, among 
visitors who read the Mammoth Hot Springs scenario, there was a significant positive correlation 
between the total amount of safety information received (i.e., in regard to topics including park 
hazards, regulations, weather conditions, and road conditions/closures), and the tendency to 
judge challenging conditions as important causal factors in a hypothetical visitor incident. 
Chapter Summary 
Using a hypothetical visitor accident scenario as a prompt, Chapter 4 explored the 
relationships between causal attribution, sense of place, perception of risk, and reliance on park-
related information. Table 4.25 summarizes the results of the hypotheses and research questions 
investigated in this chapter, which I elaborate briefly in turn.  
H1 was supported in that employees’ causal attributions of the visitor accident described in 
the scenario did, in fact, differ from those of visitors. Whereas employees tended to view internal 
causal factors (i.e., related to characteristics of the victim, Roger Ellison) and environmental 
conditions (e.g., uneven terrain) as more important than did visitors, visitors tended to rate bad 
luck as a more important causal factor than did employees. Overall, employees tended to make 
self-defensive attributions, in that they held the visitor more responsible for causing the accident 
than other NPS-related external factors, such as park rules or infrastructure; however, these 
judgments were not related to their degree of experience (1) with the NPS; (2) with visitor safety 
incidents in general; or (3) with an incident like the one described. Therefore, H2 was not 
supported. With regard to H3, visitors’ experience with the park context did, in fact relate 
positively to internal attributions of responsibility for accident causation. For instance, I observed 
a medium-sized, significant, negative correlation between reporting external causes of the visitor 
accident as important and the number of park visits the visitors had made in the past year. 
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Answers to the three research questions posed in this chapter provide further elaboration of 
the relationships between the causal attribution variables and other variables of interest. First, 
with regard to RQ1, there appears to be a positive relationship between perceiving natural and 
cultural-based place meanings related to the national park and: (1) internal causal attribution; and 
(2) viewing challenging environmental conditions as important causal factors. Likewise, I found 
positive correlations between feeling attached to the park and (1) internal causal attribution; and 
(2) judging challenging environmental conditions as important causal factors.  
RQ2 investigated the relationships between three risk perception-related variables and causal 
attribution. There appears to be a negative relationship between perceiving park-based risk to be 
controllable and: (1) external (NPS-related) causal attribution; (2) internal causal attribution; (3) 
seeing challenging environmental conditions as important; and (4) seeing bad luck as an 
important causal factor. With regard to the desirability of risk, I found positive correlations with: 
(1) seeing challenging environmental conditions as important causal factors, and; (2) viewing 
bad luck as a causal factor. A third risk-related variable, avoiding visiting park due to perceived 
danger, was positively correlated with internal causal attribution and external causal attribution, 
as well as negatively correlated with seeing bad luck as a causal factor.  
Finally, RQ3 examined the relationship between causal attribution and visitors’ reliance on 
and exposure to park-related information. Significant correlations suggest a positive relationship 
between reliance on official (i.e., NPS) information sources and internal causal attribution. 
Moreover, among some visitor groups, there was a positive correlation between the total amount 
of safety information received, and the tendency to see challenging conditions as important 
causal factors. 
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Table 4.25. Summary of Hypotheses and Research Questions: Chapter 4 
Hypothesis/Research Question Findings 
H1: Employees’ causal attributions 
of visitor accidents will differ from 
visitors’ causal attributions of 
accidents.   
Partially supported:  
• No difference was found between employees’ and visitors’ judgments of 
external causal factors related to park management.  
• Employees saw internal causal factors related to the hypothetical visitor as 
more important than did visitors.  
• Employees saw challenging environmental conditions as a more important 
causal factor than did visitors.  
• Visitors saw bad luck as a more important causal factor than did employees.  
H2: Employees’ experience with the 
context will relate positively to self-
defensive attributions of 
responsibility for causing accidents. 
Not supported:  
• No relationship was found between tenure with the NPS (or the particular 
park) and self-defensive attributions of responsibility.  
• A significant association was found between no involvement in visitor safety 
incidents and reporting of above median internal causal attributional 
judgments.   
• A significant association was found between those who had never experienced 
a similar incident and reporting of above median internal causal attributions.  
H3: Visitors’ experience with the 
context will relate positively to 
internal attributions of responsibility 
for causing accidents. 
Partially supported:  
• No relationship found between positivity of park visit and attributional 
judgment. 
• Medium-sized, significant, negative correlation between reporting external 
causes of the hypothetical visitor incident as important and the number of park 
visits the visitors had taken in the past year. 
• Small, significant negative correlation between reporting external causes of 
the hypothetical visitor incident as important and the length of the 
respondent’s most recent visit. 
• Small, significant negative correlation between reporting external causes of 
the hypothetical visitor incident as important and the number of other national 
parks visited (besides the present park). 
• Those who reported that an incident had happened to them or someone they 
knew, or were unsure if one had happened, were more likely to report median 
or lower judgments of internal causal attribution than those who had not been 
involved in an incident. 
RQ1: How do sense of place and 
place attachment relate to 
attributions about the cause of 
accidents?   
Place meaning:  
• Small, significant, positive correlations between place meaning and: (1) 
judging internal causes of the hypothetical visitor incident as important; and 
(2) viewing challenging environmental conditions as important causal factors.  
Place attachment:  
• Small, significant, positive correlation between place attachment and judging 
internal causal factors as important to a hypothetical visitor accident scenario; 
and (2) judging challenging environmental conditions as important causal 
factors. 
RQ2: How do perceptions of 
controllability, voluntariness, and 
desirability of park risks relate to 
attributions of responsibility for the 
cause of accidents?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Controllability  
• Small-medium sized, significant, negative correlation between perceived 
controllability of risk and seeing external causes of a hypothetical accident as 
important  
• Small, significant, positive correlation between perceived controllability of 
risk and seeing internal causes of a hypothetical accident as important. 
• Very small, significant, negative correlation between perceived controllability 
of risk and seeing challenging environmental conditions as important 
contributors to a visitor accident. 
• Very small, significant, negative correlation between perceived controllability 
of risk and seeing see bad luck as an important causal factor. 
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RQ2: How do perceptions of 
controllability, voluntariness, and 
desirability of park risks relate to 
attributions of responsibility for the 
cause of accidents? (continued) 
Desirability  
• Small, significant, positive correlation between desirability of risk and seeing 
challenging environmental conditions as causal factors contributing to a 
hypothetical visitor incident. 
• Small, significant, positive correlation between desirability of risk and viewing 
bad luck as a causal factor in the incident. 
 
Danger/risk avoidance 
• Small, significant, positive correlation between perception of danger and 
internal causal attribution. 
• Small, significant, positive correlation between perception of danger and 
external causal attribution. 
• Small, significant, negative correlations between perception of danger and 
seeing bad luck as a cause of a hypothetical accident.  
• Medium-sized, significant, negative correlation between perception of danger 
and viewing risk as desirable in a national park. 
RQ3: How does exposure to 
formal/informal and 
official/unofficial risk 
communication relate to attributions 
of responsibility for the cause of 
accidents? 
Official information 
• Small, significant, positive correlation between reliance on official 
information sources and tendency to make internal causal attributional 
judgments with respect to a hypothetical visitor incident. 
 
All information  
• Small, significant, positive correlation between total reliance on all 
information sources listed and internal causal attributional judgments 
• (Among some groups) Small, significant, positive correlation between total 
reliance on all information sources listed and judging challenging 
environmental conditions as important causal factors. 
 
Amount of Safety Information 
• (Among some groups) Small, significant, positive correlation between the total 
amount of safety information received, and the tendency to see challenging 
conditions as causal factors in a hypothetical visitor incident. 
 
 In addition to these correlational analyses, OLS regression analyses predicting causal 
attribution also demonstrated these relationships between variables, as well as the role of several 
significant covariates. When considering all of the variables of interest examined in this chapter 
(i.e., sense of place, risk perception, and information-related), based on standardized Beta 
coefficients, two of the risk perception variables, controllability and perceived danger/risk 
avoidance, appeared to contribute most to predicting causal attribution-related outcome variables 
(see Tables 4.26 and 4.27). Within the regression models presented in this chapter, several 
covariates emerged as significant, including: age, sex, race/ethnicity (specifically, identifying as 
Asian or Hispanic/Latino), being a native English speaker, park (specifically, DEWA), education 
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level, participant type (i.e., visitor, volunteer, or employee), experience in the park context, 
salience of the hypothetical incident, and which scenario the respondent read. 
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Table 4.26. Overall Regression Predicting External Causal Attribution: Visitors only  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Block 1: Demographics 
Age .00 -.01 .00 .00 .01 .02 
Education -.06 -.06 -.05 -.05 -.05 -.04 
Gender  
(Female=1) 
.22*** .20*** .18*** .18*** .13** .13** 
Native English 
(Native English 
speaker= 1)  
-.07 -.09 -.08 -.09 -.06 -.04 
Asian .27*** .26*** .24*** .24*** .21*** .21*** 
Hispanic/Latino .13** .11* .09 .09 .09 .09 
Other -.05 -.04 -.05 -.05 -.05 -.05 
Inc. R2 (%) 15.8      
Block 2: 
Respondent Type 
(Mammoth Hot 
Springs= 1) 
 .18*** .17*** .16** .14** .15** 
DEWA .08 .07 .06 .04 .03 
OLYM 
 
-.06 -.06 -.06 -.05 -.06 
Inc. R2 (%)  4.4     
Block 3: Incident 
Salience 
(Experienced 
similar 
incident/Unsure= 
1) 
  -.02 -.02 -.02 -.02 
Experience with 
context 
  -.13** -.13** -.10* -.10* 
Inc. R2 (%)   1.5    
Block 4: Park 
Information  
Official Info 
.12 .12 .14 
All Info 
   
-.07 -.09 -.11 
Total Safety Info    -.03 -.03 -.02 
Inc. R2 (%)    .3   
Block 5: Risk Perception 
Controllability     -.16** -.16** 
Desirability     .03 .04 
Danger     .13* .14** 
Inc. R2 (%)     3.5  
Block 6: Sense of 
Place 
 
Place Meaning -.08 
Place Attachment 
     
-.00 
Inc. R2 (%)      .6 
Total R2 (%)      .26 
ANOVA      F 20, 385= 6.79 
Notes. *p< .05;**p<.01; ***p<.001 
n=  406 
Cell entries for all models are standardized regression coefficients 
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Table 4.27. Comparison of β  values for Significant Predictors in Regression Models 
Incorporating All Predictor Variables 
Dependent Variable: Causal Attribution Independent 
Variable 
(β) Internal Causal 
Attribution 
(Park Visitor) 
External Causal 
Attribution 
(Park 
Management) 
Challenging 
Conditions 
(Park 
Environment) 
Bad Luck 
Female ns .13** ns ns 
Asian ns .21*** .13* ns 
Education ns ns .10* ns 
Mammoth Hot 
Springs scenario 
-.33*** .15** ns .28*** 
DEWA ns ns .22*** ns 
Incident Salience ns ns .12* ns 
Experience in park 
context 
ns -.10* ns ns 
Total Safety Info ns ns .22*** ns 
Desirability of Risk ns ns ns ns 
Controllability of 
Risk 
.13** -.16** ns ns 
Danger Avoidance .17** .14** .19*** ns 
Total R2 .21 .26 .15 .15 
ANOVA F 20, 385= 
5.18*** 
F 20, 385 = 6.79*** F 20, 388= 3.46*** F 20, 388 =3.54***  
Note. *p< .05;**p<.01; ***p<.001 
Cell entries for all models are standardized regression coefficients 
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CHAPTER 5. 
 
 ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREVENTING ACCIDENTS 
 
 Using quantitative and qualitative survey data, this chapter reports on the results of 
hypotheses and research questions related to what I refer to as prevention attribution: the 
attribution of responsibility for preventing visitor accidents, or, alternatively, for ensuring visitor 
safety in the park. Like Chapter 4, this chapter explores a dependent variable, prevention 
attribution, with respect to several independent variables of interest, including place meaning and 
attachment, perception of risk, and reliance on/exposure to park communication. In so doing, 
differences between the three respondent types, visitors, volunteers, and employees, are also 
explored.  
Measurement and Descriptive Statistics 
 
 This section details measurement of the chapter’s main dependent variable, prevention 
attribution, as well as compares employees,’ volunteers,’ and visitors’ perceived appropriateness 
of the NPS response in the hypothetical scenario presented in the survey.     
External responsibility: Perceived responsibility of NPS  
Seven survey items (q22a- q22g) related to the perceived responsibility of the NPS to prevent 
visitor injury in park settings. The solution of a factor analysis (varimax rotation) of these items 
indicated that five of the variables loaded together, and appeared to describe external 
responsibility (i.e., responsibility of NPS); factor loadings created an External Responsibility 
Scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .63)(see Table 5.1). Since the combination of these items was 
exploratory—i.e., they were adapted from measures used by Espiner (2000) and Tuler and 
Golding (2002)—the low observed alpha, though not ideal, may be somewhat expected. In 
addition, in order to create a dichotomous measure of external responsibility, I used a median 
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split to divide the variable into two groups: (1) median or lower level of expressed support for 
NPS’ responsibility to prevent visitor injury; and (2) higher than median expressed support for 
the NPS’ responsibility. (This variable will be discussed further below).  
Table 5.1. External Responsibility Scale 
Survey Item Cronbach’s alpha 
It is the responsibility of the NPS to 
prevent visitors from undertaking 
activities that may pose a serious risk to 
them, no matter how popular the activities 
are.  
Besides providing appropriate safety 
information and warnings, the NPS should 
not limit or prohibit activities that may 
pose serious risks to the participants. 
(reverse coded) 
NPS management should not prevent 
access to areas that might be dangerous.   
(reverse coded) 
While visitors are at the park, their safety 
is the responsibility of those who manage 
the area. 
Those who manage the park have an 
obligation to inform visitors about all 
things that might affect their safety. 
.63 
 
Appropriateness of NPS response  
 The majority of survey respondents viewed the park’s response to the hypothetical visitor 
accident scenario as appropriate, with 57% of all respondents reporting that the park’s actions, as 
described in the news brief, were “extremely appropriate,” i.e., a 5 on a 5-point scale, where 1 is 
“not at all appropriate” and 5 is “extremely appropriate.” Of those who read the Hellroaring 
Creek scenario, volunteers found the park’s response most appropriate (M = 4.62, SD = .55), 
followed by employees (M = 4.51, SD = .65) and visitors (M = 4.47, SD = .67). Indeed, 
according to a post-hoc test (Hochberg’s T2) comparing all individuals who received the 
Hellroaring Creek scenario (i.e., employees, volunteers, and visitors), there was a significant 
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difference between the mean level of perceived appropriateness between visitors and volunteers 
(p = .037), with volunteers perceiving the park’s response as more appropriate than did visitors. 
Mean differences between employees and visitors (p = .856), and employees and volunteers (p = 
.238), however, were not significant.  
 Mean levels of perceived appropriateness of park actions also appeared to vary according to 
which scenario respondents received. Results of an independent samples t-test indicated that, on 
average, those who read the Mammoth Hot Springs accident scenario perceived the park’s 
response as less appropriate (M = 4.38, SD = .69) than those who read the Hellroaring Creek 
scenario (M = 4.51, SD = .64); this difference was significant (t(1101) = 2.81, p =.005).   
Hypothesis Four: Voluntary Risk-Taking and Prevention Attribution 
 
High-risk activities and prevention attribution 
Hypothesis four stated that visitors’ voluntary risk-taking would relate positively to internal 
attributions of responsibility for preventing injury. Results of a factor analysis (varimax rotation) 
indicated that mountaineering, rock climbing, skiing/snowboarding, and backpacking in the 
backcountry loaded onto a single factor, and this loading also aligned with the “high risk” 
classification of recreational activities used by Rickard, Scherer, and Newman (2011). Measuring 
level of objective risk associated with a recreational activity is somewhat problematic, as 
activities appearing “safer” may, in fact, contribute to more injuries and deaths than activities 
that are seemingly “riskier.” Interestingly, the specialized equipment and know-how needed to 
engage in the activities listed above tends to inhibit a wider base of visitor participation. 
Activities like swimming or walking on trails, on the other hand, tend to be more accessible to a 
broader range of the visiting public, thus paradoxically leading to more injuries and deaths 
simply due to increased participation. Recognizing this problematic (and perhaps artificial) 
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distinction between “risky” and “safe” activities, I nonetheless see value in grouping 
mountaineering, rock climbing, skiing/snowboarding, and backpacking together, in that these 
activities likely attract a certain type of park visitor—for instance, an individual interested in 
recreating in less developed, more remote areas of the park.  
  Of the visitors who participated in at least one “risky” (by this definition) recreational 
activity (see Table 5.2), about two-thirds (68%; n = 111) expressed median or lower support for 
external (i.e., NPS) responsibility for visitor safety, as compared to less than half  (44%; n = 224) 
of visitors who had not participated in any of these activities; this relationship was significant (χ2 
(1, N = 679) = 29.12, p = .000). That is, visitors who participated in high-risk recreation 
appeared to assign the NPS less responsibility for preventing their injury/ensuring their safety, 
and instead, we can surmise, accepted this responsibility themselves, thus supporting H4. 
Moreover, I observed a medium-sized, negative, significant correlation between the number of 
high-risk activities that the visitor reported participating in (i.e., backpacking, mountaineering, 
rock climbing, and skiing or snowboarding) and support for external (i.e., NPS) responsibility for 
ensuring safety (r = -.23, p = .000), providing further support for this hypothesis. This pattern of 
attributing less responsibility given participation in certain recreational pursuits follows the 
conclusions of Rickard et al. (2011) in their sample of MORA park visitors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   179	  
Table 5.2. Visitor Participation in “High Risk” Recreational Activities by Park Unit 
 DEWA MORA OLYM TOTAL 
Number visitors  5 42 13 60 Backpacking 
% in-park 
respondents 
3% 10% 8% 8%  
(all visitors) 
Number visitors  8 46 13 67 Mountaineering 
% in-park 
respondents 
4% 11% 8% 9% 
(all visitors) 
Number visitors  3 5 5 13 Rock climbing 
% in-park 
respondents 
2% 1% 3% 2% 
(all visitors) 
Number visitors  7 52 50 109 Skiing/Snowboarding 
% in-park 
respondents 
4% 13% 29% 14% 
(all visitors) 
 
Preparedness 
Though visitors were not asked to rate the risk they may have perceived as associated with 
their recreational pursuits, self-reported levels of preparedness for the main activity appear to tell 
part of the story. (Recall from Chapter 4 that about half of the visitor sample, 53%, rated 
themselves as “completely prepared” for their main activity). For instance, of those visitors who 
took part in mountaineering, 65% reported being “completely prepared,” as opposed to 52% of 
visitors who did not participate in mountaineering; this difference was statistically significant (χ2 
(1, N = 746) = 4.33, p = .038). Likewise, of the visitors who reported skiing or snowboarding, 
65% perceived themselves as “completely prepared,” compared to 51% of those who did not ski 
or snowboard, also a significant association (χ2 (1, N = 746) = 7.14, p = .008). To some extent, 
these results are not surprising. As opposed to driving through a park or touring a visitor center, 
taking part in mountaineering or skiing/snowboarding require that an individual have specialized 
clothing and equipment (e.g., skis, crampons, ice axes, plastic boots) just in order to perform the 
activity itself. To a certain extent, these activities, by their very nature, require a higher degree of 
visitor preparedness from the start.  
While visitors’ judgments of their preparedness are illuminating, the self-report nature of the 
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measure does not allow us to judge whether, for instance, individuals may have exaggerated their 
readiness to participate in an activity, just as they may have underestimated their personal risk 
(i.e., optimistic bias). Nonetheless, one avenue to better understanding visitors’ perceptions is 
through analyzing their responses to an open-ended survey item asking for an explanation of 
their reported preparedness. Considering only those respondents who viewed themselves as 
“completely prepared” for their chosen activity (i.e., reported “5” on the 1-5 Likert scale), 
explanations for being prepared seemed to follow four major lines of reasoning. First, visitors 
explained their preparedness as having the equipment and supplies they deemed appropriate for 
the circumstances, such as the “ten essentials”—a list of common items, such as extra clothing 
and water, that the NPS promotes as necessary for a safe hike. As one MORA visitor explained:  
 I felt we had everything we needed in case things went wrong: extra food, extra clothes, 
flashlights, knives, first aid kit, matches, as well as good synthetic/waterproof/breathable 
clothing, sunglasses, sunscreen, and sufficient water.  
 
Also “prepared” for a park activity, though in a very different context, a DEWA visitor noted: 
“Just had to jump in the river—no preparation except a bathing suit…” A second, common 
explanation for seeing oneself as prepared was having the (perceived) necessary knowledge of or 
experience in the national park and its environs. An OLYM visitor described that s/he “[lives] 
near the park and [has] been skiing at Hurricane Ridge for 30 years” and a DEWA visitor 
commented that s/he “[has] been canoeing dozens of times through this area.” Similarly, a third 
explanation for judging oneself prepared surrounded having already participated in the activity in 
question, including having been through pertinent trainings. An OLYM visitor explained that 
s/he and her group “have done this for years and my son is certified with Kitsap Search and 
Rescue,” while a MORA visitor justified his/her preparedness as such:  
We have backcountry skied at Mount Rainier many times (as well as other places) and 
have all the safety and other gear we need, we are with a trusted group of experienced 
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friends, we know where we are going and we have backup plans if that doesn’t work out 
because of the weather or avalanche danger. We have taken an avalanche class. 
 
Finally, some respondents explained their “complete” preparedness as emanating from their 
trip planning and preparation, including both prior to and during their park visit. Such 
preparation often involved gathering information central to their recreational pursuits from 
sources both outside of the park (e.g., websites, park phone lines, etc.) and within the park (e.g., 
park staff, brochures, signs, etc.). As one MORA visitor described, “Prior to going backcountry 
skiing I consult the weather telemetry, forecast, avalanche conditions and maps to decide on my 
touring route.” And in the words of a less experienced MORA visitor: 	  
I have called the park to ask questions and have gone online to check weather, and road 
conditions and for general information about the trails, etc. We are fairly new at hiking 
and don’t want to make rookie mistakes that could cause us to be in danger or trouble... 	  
Of the visitors who perceived themselves as less than “completely prepared” for their activity 
(i.e., answered 1-4 on the Likert scale), explanations of preparedness tended to feature different 
elements. First, some respondents explained that they had taken a spontaneous trip to the park 
that involved no pre-planning, such as the DEWA visitor who described being “in the area for a 
wedding and decided to do this as an extra activity on a whim.” Unfortunately, such spur-of-the-
moment trips can sometimes leave visitors lacking the equipment necessary for the climate and 
environment, as one OLYM visitor’s explanation illustrates:   
We came to the park on short notice, because of the weather. We didn’t even stop to 
think that there would be snow. But, it was nice enough out that the snow wasn’t a real 
issue. However, we weren’t really prepared for it.   
 
Other visitors described needing more experience with the activity or knowledge of the park 
environment in general; for instance, a MORA visitor commented that, “As a beginner 
showshoer, I am still learning what to bring/carry in order to be better prepared” and a DEWA 
visitor described him/herself as “new to the Gap and did not know where to retrieve much of the 
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information for hiking.” Likewise, other respondents explained their lack of preparedness as due 
to their failure to account for the conditions at the park, whether the difficulty of trails, or the 
availability of amenities. According to an OLYM visitor, “We were unaware that the food shop 
was closed when we left to go to Hurricane Ridge, thus bringing no food, “ while a MORA 
visitor noted, “ We didn’t realize the trail would be so snowy and not everyone in our party was 
dressed appropriately, or had the right kind of shoes.” As the previous comment (and others 
before it) suggest, several respondents described lacking what they perceived as equipment and 
supplies necessary for their activity, whether snowshoes or snacks. As a MORA visitor put it: 
“Needed eye protection goggles from bright white snow and sun.” 
While the explanations presented thus far have, to a great extent, emphasized characteristics 
of the individual, such as lacking sufficient information or equipment, other reasons for not 
feeling “completely prepared” referenced the larger visitor group. Respondents described group 
members not physically prepared for engaging in the activity, such as a MORA visitor’s 
comment that, “Most of the people I was with were too out of shape to go very far.” Others 
explained that obligations to care for children or elderly members of their groups constrained 
their park experiences, and often in unanticipated ways. For instance, a DEWA visitor suggested 
that the “kids did not help rowing and we had to tow their raft with our canoe,” while another 
DEWA visitor described taking her 93 year-old mother to see the falls and not expecting the 
extended walk. A MORA visitor’s comment illustrates the difficulties of traveling with small 
children, compounded by the challenging terrain and environmental conditions of the park:    
We went on a two-mile hike in February, with six kids, two were three years old, one was 
six years old, the others were eight and eleven, with eight adults. We hiked down hill to a 
waterfall and took nothing with us. The walk back was bad. The kids had played on the 
way down and were cold and wet. The wind came up and it was a very steep hike back up 
that took a long time to do. We rotated on carrying the little ones who cried most of the 
way back up… Two miles didn’t seem far at the time, but boy o boy, when it’s all uphill 
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with snow, it’s hard.  
 
Summary 
 To review, analysis of quantitative survey data suggested support for H4, in that visitors who 
participated in certain “risky” recreational activities (e.g., mountaineering, skiing/snowboarding) 
were less likely to view the NPS as responsible for preventing their potential injury or ensuring 
their safety while at the park. Of the visitors who participated in at least one “risky” recreational 
activity, about two-thirds expressed median or lower support for external responsibility for 
visitor safety, as compared to less than half of visitors who had not participated in any of these 
activities. Moreover, a significant negative correlation existed between the number of risky 
activities that the visitor reported participating in and support for external responsibility. 
Examining respondents’ self-reports of preparedness for their recreational activities at the park 
revealed that those participating in risky activities (e.g., mountaineering) viewed themselves as 
more prepared than those who did not. Qualitative, free-response data provided a window into 
understanding these perceptions of preparedness, and many visitors seemed to equate being 
prepared with having the necessary equipment, experience, information, preparation, and know-
to perform the activity in the unique park environment.  
Hypothesis Five: Employees and Prevention Attribution 
 
Internal attribution: Individual responsibility for preventing the hypothetical scenario 
 Hypothesis five stated that employees will be more likely to report internal attributions of 
responsibility for ensuring safety (i.e., individual responsibility) than external (i.e., NPS) or 
shared attributions of responsibility. After reading the Hellroaring Creek scenario, roughly half 
of the employees surveyed (54%; n = 133) reported that responsibility for preventing the incident 
rested entirely with Mr. Ellison, the injured visitor. By comparison, only 5% of the sample (n = 
	   184	  
13) viewed Mr. Ellison and the NPS as equally responsible for injury prevention. Interestingly, 
an additional 6% of employees (n = 15) either did not assign responsibility to one party, or did 
not view the incident as preventable. These frequencies illustrate that employees in the sample 
were more likely to report internal attributions of responsibility for the hypothetical visitor injury 
incident than external or shared attributions of responsibility; thus, H5 is supported.  
 Like employees, volunteers and visitors, for the most part, also expressed more support for 
internal attributions of responsibility for preventing the accident than external or shared 
attributions. Of the visitors who read the Hellroaring Creek scenario, the majority (60%, n = 264) 
saw Mr. Ellison as entirely responsible for the prevention of his injury (57% of volunteers, n = 
91). As was true for the employee sample, only 6% of visitors (n = 24) and 7% of volunteers (n = 
11) reported Ellison and the NPS as equally responsible. In addition, 12% (n = 53) of visitors 
(5%, n = 8 of volunteers) either did not assign responsibility or did not view the incident as 
preventable (see Figure 5.1). While these percentages appear quite similar across the three 
groups, results of a chi-square test suggest that the slight differences are, in fact, significant (χ2 
(10, N = 844) = 23.96, p = .008). For instance, examining the proportions of respondents across 
categories in each of the three groups, visitors were most likely to: (1) see Mr. Ellison as entirely 
responsible for causing the accident, (2) view the accident as neither Mr. Ellison nor the park’s 
responsibility, or (3) to view the incident as unpreventable (see Table 5.3).      
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Figure 5.1. Perception of Responsibility to Prevent a Hypothetical Visitor Accident by 
Respondent Type  
 
 
Table 5.3. Prevention Attribution for a Hypothetical Visitor Accident 
 Employees 
(n, % within 
participant group) 
Volunteers 
(n, % within 
participant group) 
Visitors 
(n, % within 
participant group) 
Total 
(n, % all survey 
respondents receiving 
Hellroaring Creek 
scenario) 
Entirely Mr. Ellison’s 
responsibility 133 (54%)  91 (57%) 264 (60%) 488 (58%) 
2 83 (34%) 48 (30%) 92 (21%) 233 (26%) 
Both equally responsible 13 (5%) 11 (7%) 24 (6%) 48 (6%) 
4 2 (.8%) 1 (.6%) 6 (1%) 9 (1%) 
Neither Mr. Ellison’s nor 
the park’s responsibility 8 (3%) 2 (1%) 26 (6%) 36 (4%) 
This incident was not 
preventable 7 (3%) 6 (4%) 27 (6%) 40 (5%) 
Total 246 (100%) 159 (100%) 439 (100%) 844 (100%) 
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Internal attribution: Visitors should accept responsibility  
 A second survey item measured respondents’ perceptions of internal prevention attribution, 
and can also be used to test H5. When asked to report their level of agreement with the 
statement, “If visitors will not accept responsibility for their own safety, they should not visit 
[park name]” (q22e), about one third of employees (32%, n = 80) strongly agreed (i.e., “5” on a 
1-5 Likert scale), while nearly half (46%) agreed. An additional 14% (n = 34) expressed a neutral 
stance, 5% disagreed (n = 13) and a scant 2% (n = 4) strongly disagreed. Based on these 
frequencies, nearly 80% of the employee sample expressed some level of agreement with the 
idea that visitors should accept responsibility for their own safety, lending even more support to 
H5.  
 It is worth noting that, as indicated by the frequencies reported above for employee 
respondents, item q22e elicited skewed responses, with the majority falling into the “agree” or 
“strongly agree” categories; when considering all survey respondents, for instance, 43% (n = 
511) strongly agreed, while an additional 36% (n = 428) agreed. To account for this skewness, I 
dichotomized variable q22e, creating a new variable with two response categories: (1) those who 
“strongly agreed” that “if visitors will not accept responsibility for their own safety, they should 
not visit [park name]”; and (2) those who chose any other response category (i.e., agree, neutral, 
disagree, strongly disagree). While 52% of visitors expressed strong agreement (n = 365), only 
42% of volunteers (n = 66) and 33% of employees (n = 80) fell into the same category. 
According to the results of a chi-square analysis, there appears to be a significant association 
between survey participant type and expressing strong support for internal prevention attribution 
(χ2 (2, N = 1104) = 29.32, p = .000).   
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 Moreover, as illustrated in the previous section, comparing employees’ responses to item 
q22e to those of volunteers and visitors can illuminate potential differences in perceived internal 
attribution of responsibility for preventing injury/ensuring visitor safety. Based on an 
independent samples t-test, a significant difference in means existed between visitors (M = 4.37, 
SD = .79) and employees  (M= 4.03, SD = .91) on the degree to which they agreed that visitors 
need to accept responsibility for their safety in a park (t(945)= -5.55, p= .000). Though visitors, 
considered as a group, were more likely to see visitors as responsible for their own safety than 
were employees, comparing visitors by park provides evidence of differences within the visitor 
population. While OLYM visitors expressed the most support for internal prevention attribution 
(M = 4.40, SD = .76), DEWA visitors expressed the least (M = 4.30, SD = .83), with MORA 
visitors falling in the middle (M = 4.39, SD = .78); a post-hoc comparison of means (Hochberg 
T2), however, suggested that these mean differences were not statistically significant. With 
OLYM and MORA both classified as “backcountry” parks, and DEWA, with its preponderance 
of frontcountry picnic areas and lifeguarded beaches, less so, this pattern of responses appears to 
follow Tuler and Golding’s (2002) finding that attributions of responsibility may vary by park 
“type.”  
Summary  
 To review, the majority of employees surveyed reported that responsibility for preventing the 
hypothetical visitor accident described in the survey scenario rested entirely with the injured 
visitor himself, with only a very small minority (i.e., 5% of the sample) viewing the NPS and the 
visitor as equally responsible for preventing the accident; thus, H5 is supported. On a second 
survey item, nearly 80% of the employee sample expressed some level of agreement with the 
	   188	  
idea that visitors should accept responsibility for their own safety (or else not visit a national 
park), lending even more support to H5.  
Hypothesis Six: Visitors and Prevention Attribution 
 
 As described below, I found partial support for Hypothesis 6, which stated that visitors’ 
attributions of responsibility for ensuring safety (i.e., preventing injury) will vary by: (1) age; (2) 
sex; and (3) country of origin.  
Age 
No significant correlation existed between visitors’ age and their support for external 
responsibility or for internal responsibility. As will be demonstrated later in this chapter, 
however, in several regression models predicting support for external (i.e., NPS) responsibility, 
however, age did emerge as a positive, significant predictor variable. 
 Sex 
Whereas 54% of male visitors (n = 236) expressed median or lower levels of support for 
external (i.e., NPS) responsibility for preventing visitor injuries, 41% of female visitors (n = 99) 
fell into the same category. Results of a chi-square analysis suggested a significant association 
between gender and expressed support for external responsibility (χ2 (1, N = 678) = 10.88, p = 
.001). In other words, women visitors in the sample appeared more likely to express median or 
higher levels of support for NPS responsibility. (Respondents’ sex also emerges as a significant 
predictor variable in several regression models presented later in this chapter).  
Country of origin and native language 
Support for external responsibility did not vary by U.S. residency (i.e., whether or not the 
individual reported being a current U.S. resident) (χ2 (1, N = 676) = 1.87, p = .171). (It is 
important to note that a large majority of the visitor sample, i.e., 98%, resided in the U.S.). 
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Interestingly, however, support for external responsibility did vary by native language. Those 
who reported being non-native English speakers were more likely to express more support for 
external (i.e., NPS) responsibility. Whereas 79% of non-native speakers (n = 41) expressed 
median or higher levels of support for external responsibility, only 48% of native speakers (n = 
301) fell into the same category; this association was statistically significant (χ2 (1, N = 677) = 
18.08, p = .000). (Native language also emerges as a significant predictor variable in several 
regression models presented later in this chapter).  
Summary 
 This section provided evidence of partial support for H6. No significant correlations existed 
between age and support for external or internal prevention attribution.  Whereas over half (54%) 
of male visitors expressed median or lower levels of support for external responsibility, only 
41% of females were in the same category; this relationship was significant. Moreover, as 
evidenced in several regression models predicting external responsibility, women expressed 
more support for external responsibility than did men. Prevention attribution did not vary by 
country of origin; however, though not hypothesized, those who reported being non-native 
English speakers were more likely to express more support for external responsibility. 
Hypothesis Seven: Occupational Position and Prevention Attribution 
 
 Hypothesis 7 stated that employees’ attributions of responsibility for ensuring safety would 
vary by occupational position and level in the agency. Table 5.4 provides a comparison of mean 
scores on the External Responsibility Scale by employee division in the park. When considered 
as a group, employees in the Visitor & Resource Protection division expressed the most 
agreement with the park’s responsibility to prevent visitor injury than any of the other park 
divisions (M = 16.03, SD = 2.83), and employees in the Natural & Cultural Resources Division 
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(NCR) expressed the least (M = 14.85, SD = 2.47).  According to the results of a post-hoc 
comparison of means (Dunnett’s C), there were significant mean differences (p < .05) in 
attributing external (i.e., NPS) responsibility between NCR employees and two other employee 
groups: (1) Interpretation and Education, and (2) Maintenance & Trails. Whether or not the 
individual was employed on a year-round or seasonal basis did not affect support for external 
responsibility (χ2 (1, N = 236) = .000, p = 1.00).  
Table 5.4. Employees’ Mean Scores on External Responsibility Scale by Park Division 
Park Division Mean N Std. Deviation 
Administration 15.81 48 3.01 
Natural & Cultural Resources 14.85 40 2.47 
Maintenance & Trails 15.96 46 2.84 
Visitor & Resource Protection 16.03 67 2.83 
Interpretation & Education 15.64 25 2.16 
Total 15.72 226 2.75 
 
 When considered in a regression model predicting support for external responsibility (R2 = 
.36, F(20, 154) = 3.54, p < .001), occupational position also appeared to be a significant 
contributing variable, providing partial support for H7. More specifically, employees who 
worked in Administration (β = -.24, p < .01) and in NCR (β = -.22, p < .05) expressed less 
support, as compared to employees in Visitor and Resource Protection (the reference group), for 
the responsibility of the NPS to prevent visitor injury/ensure safety (see Table 5.5). A regression 
model predicting internal (visitor) responsibility for ensuring safety was not significant: (F(24, 
154) = 1.28, p = .188).  
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Table 5.5. Regression Predicting Support for External (NPS) Responsibility: Employees  
 Model 
1 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Block 1: Demographics 
Age .06 .16 .13 .14 .14 
Education -.04 -.01 -.06 -.07 -.03 
Sex (Female =1) .11 .15 .11 .12 .10 
Native English (Nat. 
speaker = 1)  
-.07 -.09 .01 .00 .01 
Asian .03 .03 .07 .05 .01 
Hispanic/Latino -.09 -.03 -.01 -.01 .01 
Other .08 .08 .02 .02 .01 
Inc. R2 (%) 3.4     
Block 2: Park 
Experience 
    
DEWA .11 .08 .05 .05 
OLYM 
 
-.07 -.05 -.07 -.05 
Experience in park   -.15 -.15 -.18* -.17 
Park division: (Admin= 
1) 
 -.21* -.20* -.21* -.24** 
Park Division:  
(N&C Resources =1) 
 -.25** -.21* -.21* -.22* 
Park Division: 
(Maint. & Trails= 1) 
 .01 -.00 -.01 -.03 
Park Division:  
(Interp= 1) 
 -.01 -.02 -.02 -.01 
Seasonal   .04 .04 .06 .05 
Inc. R2 (%)  11.6    
Block 3: Risk 
Perception 
   
Controllability -.36*** -.36*** -.34*** 
Desirability  
  
-.01 -.01 .01 
Danger would deter 
visit 
  .26*** .27*** .25*** 
Inc. R2 (%)   16.4   
Block 4: Sense of Place   
Place Meaning -.09 -.05 
Place Attachment 
   
.11 .10 
Inc. R2 (%)    .9  
Block 5: Causal 
Attribution 
 
External (NPS) .18* 
Internal (Visitor) .01 
Bad luck .00 
Challenging conditions 
    
.09 
Inc. R2 (%)     3.2 
Total R2 (%)     .36 
ANOVA     F 24, 154= 
3.54*** 
Notes. *p< .05;**p<.01; ***p<.001 
n =  181 
Cell entries for all models are standardized regression coefficients. 
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  How might we explain these differences in prevention attribution by park division? An 
explanation perhaps requires some knowledge of the nature of these occupational positions. That 
employees in NCR appeared to differ from employees in the other park divisions may be 
attributable to their relatively short tenure with the park and with the NPS more generally, as 
compared other employees. As shown in Table 5.6, employees in NCR reported the lowest mean 
years spent working for the NPS (M = 11.57, SD = 8.78) as compared to the four other divisions. 
Likewise, those in NCR reported the second lowest mean years spent in the current park (M = 
8.87, SD = 6.56); although employees in Interpretation and Education reported a lower average 
of years spent in the current park (M = 6.40, SD = 6.40), these positions are often seasonal and 
interpretive rangers will routinely move between parks on a yearly basis. Because NCR 
employees have spent less time in their current park and in other national parks than most other 
employees, it is possible that these individuals are less familiar with the culture of the Park 
Service with respect to visitor risk management—an area in which most of them are not directly 
involved. As scientists and researchers, these individuals may have had additional or even more 
experience in settings other than parks, such as other government agencies (e.g., U.S. Fish & 
Wildlife Service) or universities: places in which public risk management may be a less visible 
(or salient) institutional concern. While individuals in Administration had, on average, spent the 
most time working for the NPS, like the employees in Natural and Cultural Resources, most 
participate very little—if at all—in visitor safety-related activities. In charge of hiring, budgets, 
and other critical operational tasks, many of these individuals spend limited (or no) time 
interacting with park visitors.  
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Table 5.6. Tenure with NPS by Park Division 
 Years Worked for NPS 
Park Division Mean N Std. Deviation 
Administration 20.96 45 11.72 
Natural & Cultural Resources 11.57 40 8.77 
Maintenance & Trails 18.95 40 11.27 
Visitor & Resource Protection 13.89 64 9.75 
Interpretation & Education 14.25 24 8.95 
Total 
 
15.94 213 10.73 
 
Summary 
 
 To review, this section provided evidence of partial support for H7. Results of a post-hoc 
comparison of means as well as a regression model indicated significant differences between 
employees in some, although not all, of the different park divisions; however, whether or not the 
individual was employed on a year-round or seasonal basis did not affect support for external 
responsibility. In explaining these differences between park divisions, we may consider the 
typical responsibilities associated with jobs in each division (e.g., whether or not they include 
visitor contacts), the typical background of an employee (e.g., whether or not s/he has had 
considerable experience in other institutions, such as universities or other government agencies), 
and the typical employee’s overall tenure with the park and the agency.    
Research Question Four: Sense of Place and Prevention Attribution 
 
 Research Question 4 asked how place meaning and attachment relate to attributions of 
responsibility for preventing visitor accidents. I observed a small, significant, negative 
correlation between place attachment and support for external responsibility (r = -.11, p = .000); 
no significant correlations existed between agreement with the Place Meaning Scale and any of 
the prevention attribution variables (see Chapter 4). Results of a regression model predicting 
external responsibility (R2 = .12, F(15, 944) = 8.57, p < .001), further clarify these relationships. 
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Agreement with “blended” place meaning was significantly, positively related to support for 
external responsibility (β = .10, p < .01), whereas place attachment was significantly, negatively 
related (β = -.13, p < .001). Other significant predictors included the respondent’s age (β = .08, p 
< .05), education level (β = -.09, p < .01), being female (β = .11, p < .001), being a Native 
English speaker (β = -.15, p <.001), being Asian (β = .13, p < .001), and being affiliated with 
DEWA (β = .11, p < .01) (see Table 5.7). In a regression model predicting internal responsibility 
(R2 = .05, F(15, 951) = 3.64, p < .001), neither of the sense of place variables reached 
significance (see Table 5.8).  
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Table 5.7. Regression Predicting External Responsibility: Sense of Place Variables  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Block 1: Demographics 
Age .08** .08* .08* .08* 
Education -.10** -.10** -.09** -.09** 
Gender  
(Female=1) 
.13*** .12*** .12*** .11*** 
Native English 
(Native English 
speaker= 1)  
-.15*** -.15*** -.15*** -.15*** 
Asian .13*** .14*** .14*** .13*** 
Hispanic/Latino .01 -.00 -.00 -.00 
Other .01 .01 .01 .01 
Inc. R2 (%) 8.2    
Block 2: Respondent Type 
Volunteer  .11** .02 .04 
Visitor  -.05 .06 .06 
DEWA  .02 .11** .11** 
OLYM  .03 -.05 -.05 
Inc. R2 (%)  1.8   
Block 3: Incident 
Salience 
(Experienced 
similar 
incident/Unsure = 
1) 
  -.05 -.05 
Number of 
national parks 
visited 
  -.04 -.04 
Inc. R2 (%)   .4  
Block 4: Sense of 
Place 
 
Place Attachment -.10** 
Place Meaning 
   
-.13*** 
Inc. R2 (%)    1.5 
Total R2 (%)    .12 
ANOVA    F 15, 944= 
8.57*** 
Notes. *p< .05;**p<.01; ***p<.001 
n = 960 
Cell entries for all models are standardized regression coefficients. 
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Table 5.8. Comparison of β  values for Significant Predictors in Sense of Place Regression 
Models 
Dependent Variable: Causal Attribution Independent 
Variable 
(β) 
External  
(NPS) 
Responsibility 
Internal (Visitor) 
Responsibility  
Age .08* ns 
Education -.09** ns 
Female .11*** ns 
Native English 
Speaker 
-.15*** ns 
Asian .13*** ns 
Hispanic/Latino ns -.09** 
DEWA .11** ns 
Volunteer ns -.10*** 
Employee ns -.21*** 
Place Attachment -.13*** ns 
Place Meaning .10** ns 
Total R2 .12 .05 
ANOVA F 15, 944 = 8.57*** F 15, 951 = 3.64*** 
Note. *p< .05;**p<.01; ***p<.001 
Cell entries for all models are standardized regression coefficients. 
 
Summary 
 To review, no significant correlations were observed between agreement with “blended” 
place meaning and prevention attribution; in a regression model, however, there was a 
significant, positive relationship between agreement with place meaning and support for external 
responsibility. I observed a significant, negative correlation between place attachment and 
support for external responsibility; this relationship also held in a regression model.  
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Research Question Five: Relationship between Prevention and Causal Attribution 
 
 Research question five asked how attributions of responsibility for preventing accidents 
relate to causal attributions about a hypothetical visitor accident.  In order to answer this 
question, I first investigated two-tailed Pearson’s correlations using four variables related to 
causal attribution: (1) the Internal (i.e., park visitor) Causal Attribution Scale, (2) the External 
(i.e., NPS) Causal Attribution Scale, (3) seeing the hypothetical visitor incident as the result of 
bad luck, and (4) seeing the visitor incident as the result of challenging environmental conditions 
(see Chapter 4). These variables were compared to two variables related to attribution of 
responsibility for preventing visitor injury/ensuring safety: (1) the External Responsibility Scale, 
and, (2) viewing the visitor as responsible for ensuring his/her safety (q22e). (Only visitors who 
had received the Hellroaring Creek scenario were considered in this analysis). As shown in Table 
5.9, several significant correlations existed, including between external responsibility and:  
• Seeing the visitor as responsible for his/her safety (r = -.13, p < .001) 
• Attributing the cause of a hypothetical accident to external (i.e., NPS-related) factors (r = 
.44, p < .001) 
• Attributing the cause of a hypothetical accident to challenging park conditions (r = .12, p 
< .01).  
In addition, significant correlations were observed between viewing the visitor as responsible for 
preventing injury/ensuring his/her own safety and:  
• Attributing the cause of an accident to internal factors (r = .11, p < .01) 
• Attributing the cause of an accident to external (i.e., NPS-related) factors (r = -.13, p < 
.001) 
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Table 5.9. Correlations Between Prevention Attribution and Causal Attribution: All survey 
respondents who read the Hellroaring Creek scenario 
 Ex Resp Vis Resp Internal 
Causal 
External 
Causal 
Challenging 
Conditions 
External 
Responsibility 
Scale  
1 -.13*** 
(n = 833) 
.01, ns 
(n = 804) 
.44*** 
(n = 811) 
.12** 
(n = 826) 
Visitor 
responsible for 
own safety1 
(q22e) 
 1 .11** 
(n = 808) 
-.13** 
(n = 833) 
-.02, ns 
(n = 833) 
Note. Significant Pearson correlations are in bold.  
 ***Correlation is significant at the .001 level (2-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).  
1Survey item wording: “If visitors will not accept responsibility for their own safety, they should not visit the park.” 
 
 Results from a regression model predicting external responsibility (R2 = .20, F(16, 711) = 
11.25, p < .001)  further clarify these relationships. External causal attribution was significantly, 
positively related to support for external (i.e., NPS) responsibility (β = .33, p < .001); however, 
internal causal attribution and viewing challenging environmental conditions as factors 
contributing to a hypothetical visitor incident did not significantly predict external responsibility 
(see Table 5.10). In a second regression model, in this case predicting internal responsibility (i.e., 
seeing visitors as responsible for their own safety) (R2 = .08, F(16, 713) = 3.71, p < .001), 
relationships between causal attribution variables and prevention attribution variables followed 
suit; external causal attribution was a negatively related to support for internal (i.e., visitor) 
responsibility (β = -.12, p < .01) and internal causal attribution was positively related to the 
outcome variable (β = .12, p < .001) (see Table 5.11).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   199	  
Table 5.10. Regression Predicting Support for External Responsibility: Hellroaring Creek 
scenario only  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Block 1: Demographics 
Age .06 .03 .04 .05 
Education -.07* -.07* -.07 -.04 
Gender  
(Female=1) 
.09* .06 .06 .03 
Native English 
(Native English 
speaker= 1)  
-.15*** -.16*** -.16*** -.12** 
Asian .12** .12** .12** .06 
Hispanic/Latino .02 .01 .01 -.01 
Other .02 .02 .02 .02 
Inc. R2 (%) 6.6    
Block 2: Respondent Type 
Volunteer  .07 .07 .04 
Employee  .08* .10* .05 
DEWA  .14** .13** .09* 
OLYM  -.06 -.06 -.04 
Inc. R2 (%)  3.1   
Block 3: Incident 
Salience 
(Experienced 
similar 
incident/Unsure = 
1) 
  -.04 -.03 
Number of 
national parks 
visited 
  -.03 -.02 
Inc. R2 (%)   .2  
Block 4: Causal 
Attribution 
 
Internal Causal -.01 
External Causal 
   
.33*** 
Challenging 
Conditions 
   .06 
Inc. R2 (%)    10.3 
Total R2 (%)    .20 
ANOVA    F 16, 711= 
11.25*** 
Notes. *p< .05;**p<.01; ***p<.001 
n = 728 
Cell entries for all models are standardized regression coefficients. 
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Table 5.11. Comparison of β  values for Significant Predictors in Causal Attribution 
Regression Models 
Dependent Variable: Causal Attribution Independent 
Variable 
(β) 
External  
(NPS) 
Responsibility 
Internal (Visitor) 
Responsibility  
Native English 
Speaker 
-.12** ns 
Hispanic/Latino ns -.07* 
Volunteer ns -.10* 
Employee ns -.21*** 
DEWA .09* ns 
External Causal 
Attribution 
.33*** -.12** 
Internal Causal 
Attribution 
ns .12** 
Total R2 .20 .08 
ANOVA F 16,711 = 11.25*** F 16, 713= 
 3.71*** 
Note. *p< .05;**p<.01; ***p<.001 
Cell entries for all models are standardized regression coefficients. 
 
Summary 
 This section explored relationships between causal and prevention attribution variables using 
both Pearson’s correlations and regression. These correlations and β values followed expected 
patterns; for instance, support for external (i.e., NPS) responsibility was positively correlated 
with attributing the cause of the hypothetical visitor accident to external (i.e., NPS) factors and 
seeing the visitor as responsible for his/her own safety was positively correlated with attributing 
the cause of the accident to internal (i.e., visitor-related) factors. While these relationships follow 
the expected directions, it is important to note that the small to moderate size of the correlations 
indicate that prevention and causal attribution, while related, are, in fact, separate constructs. 
(Further discussion on the implications of the relationship between causal and prevention 
attribution is provided in Chapter 7).  
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Research Question Six: Risk Perception and Prevention Attribution 
 
 Research Question 6 asked how perceptions of controllability, voluntariness, and desirability 
of park risks relate to attributions of responsibility for preventing injury/ensuring safety. In order 
to answer this question, I first investigated two-tailed Pearson’s correlations using three variables 
related to risk perception: (1) Risk Desirability Scale (see Chapter 4); (2) Risk Controllability 
Scale (see Chapter 4) and; (3) survey item q22a: “If I thought I would be putting myself in 
danger, I would not visit [the park].” These variables were compared to two variables related to 
prevention attribution: (1) the External Responsibility Scale, and; (2) viewing the visitor as 
responsible for ensuring his/her safety (q22e) (see Table 5.12). First, results indicated a small, 
significant negative correlation between desirability of risk and support for external 
responsibility (r = -.15, p = .000). Perhaps unsurprisingly, as risk seeking becomes a goal of park 
visits, support for park management (i.e., possible limiting) of potential hazards decreases. 
Second, perceived controllability of park risk was significantly, negatively correlated with 
perceived external responsibility (r = -.40, p = .000), suggesting that the more one perceives park 
risk as controllable, the less responsibility he places with the NPS to manage it. Next, I found a 
medium-sized, positive correlation between perceived danger and external responsibility (r = .29, 
p= .000); that is, the more individuals agreed that they would not visit a park if their safety were 
in danger, the more likely they were to hold the park responsible for keeping them safe. Finally, I 
found small, significant, positive correlations between agreeing that, “If visitors will not accept 
responsibility for their own safety, they should not visit the park” (q22e) and: (1) desirability of 
risk (r = .10, p= .000); and (2) controllability of risk (r = .14, p= .000). We can interpret these 
correlations to mean that as one concedes personal responsibility as necessary for visiting a 
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national park, he or she also may, to some extent, find park-related risk as both desirable and 
under his or her control.  
Table 5.12. Correlations Between Prevention Attribution and Risk Perception Variables 
 Ex Resp Vis Resp Desire Risk Control Risk Danger  
 
External 
Responsibility 
Scale  
1 r = -.12*** 
(n = 1093) 
r = -.15** 
(n = 1085) 
 
r = -.40*** 
(n = 1090) 
 
r = .29*** 
(n = 1092) 
Visitor 
responsible for 
own safety1 
(q22e) 
 1 r = .10** 
(n = 1094) 
 
r = .14*** 
(n = 1096) 
r = .03, ns 
(n = 1103) 
 
Note. Significant Pearson correlations are in bold.  
 **Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).  
1Survey item wording: “If visitors will not accept responsibility for their own safety, they should not visit [the 
park].” 
2Survey item wording: “If I thought I would be putting myself in danger, I would not visit [the park].” 
 
 Results from a regression model predicting support for external (i.e., NPS) responsibility 
support these trends (R2 = .27, F(16, 943) = 21.53 p < .001). Contrary to expectations, 
desirability of risk was not a significant predictor in the regression model; however, perception 
of danger as a park deterrent (q22a) was strongly, positively related to support for external 
responsibility (β = .22, p < .001), and perceived controllability of risk was strongly, negatively 
related to the outcome variable (β = -.36, p < .001) (see Table 5.13). In a second regression 
model, in this case measuring internal responsibility for ensuring safety (R2 = .08, F(16, 950) = 
4.98, p < .001), however, perceived danger failed to reach significance while perceived 
controllability of risk (β = .14, p < .05) and desirability of risk (β = .10, p < .001) did (see Table 
5.14).  
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Table 5.13. Regression Predicting Support for External Responsibility: Risk Perception 
Variables 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Block 1: Demographics 
Age .08* .07* .08* .06 
Education -.10** -.10** -.09** -.09** 
Gender  
(Female=1) 
.13*** .11*** .11*** .05 
Native English 
(Native English 
speaker= 1)  
-.15*** -.15*** -.15*** -.07* 
Asian .14*** .14*** .14*** .11** 
Hispanic/Latino .01 -.00 -.00 .01 
Other .01 .00 .00 -.02 
Inc. R2 (%) 8.1    
Block 2: Respondent Type 
Volunteer  .01 .02 .05 
Employee  .03 .06 .06 
DEWA  .11** .11* .06* 
OLYM  .03 -.04 -.03 
Inc. R2 (%)  1.7   
Block 3: Incident 
Salience 
(Experienced 
similar 
incident/Unsure = 
1) 
  -.05 -.05 
Number of 
national parks 
visited 
  -.05 -.00 
Inc. R2 (%)   .5  
Block 4: Risk 
Perception 
 
Controllability -.36*** 
Desirability 
   
-.00 
Danger    .22*** 
Inc. R2 (%)    10.4 
Total R2 (%)    .27 
ANOVA    F 16, 948= 
21.53*** 
Notes. *p< .05;**p<.01; ***p<.001 
n = 965 
Cell entries for all models are standardized regression coefficients. 
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Table 5.14. Comparison of β  values for Significant Predictors in Risk Perception 
Regression Models 
Dependent Variable: Causal Attribution Independent 
Variable 
(β) 
External  
(NPS) 
Responsibility 
Internal (Visitor) 
Responsibility  
Education -.09** ns 
Native English 
Speaker 
-.07* ns 
Asian .11** ns 
Volunteer ns -.08* 
Employee ns -.18*** 
Hispanic/Latino ns -.08* 
DEWA .06* ns 
Controllability of 
Risk 
-.36*** .14*** 
Desirability of Risk ns .10** 
Danger/Risk 
Avoidance 
.22*** ns 
Total R2 .27 .08 
ANOVA F 16, 948 = 21.53*** F 16, 950= 
 4.98*** 
Note. p < .05;*p <.01; ***p <.001 
Cell entries for all models are standardized regression coefficients. 
 
Summary  
 This section explored relationships between three risk perception-related variables, 
controllability, desirability, and perceived danger, and the prevention attribution variables. 
Results indicated a significant negative correlation between perceived controllability of risk and 
support for external responsibility, as well as between perceived desirability of risk and support 
for external responsibility. On the other hand, a significant positive correlation existed between 
perceiving danger as a deterrent to visiting a national park and support for external 
responsibility. These relationships begin to explain how one’s perception and valuation of risk in 
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a setting may influence how s/he perceives the responsibility for its management, a theme that 
will be explored in more depth in Chapters 6 and 7.    
Research Question Seven: Risk Communication and Prevention Attribution 
 
Research Question 7 asked how exposure to and reliance on formal/informal and 
official/unofficial risk communication relates to attributions of responsibility for preventing 
accidents. In order to answer this question, I first investigated two-tailed Pearson’s correlations 
using five variables related to risk communication (see Chapter 4): (1) Reliance on Official 
Information, (2) Reliance on Official, Formal Information, (3) Reliance on Unofficial 
Information, (4) Reliance on Unofficial, Formal Information, and (5) Amount of Safety 
Information Received. These variables were compared to two variables related to attribution of 
responsibility for preventing injury: (1) the External Responsibility Scale, and; (2) viewing the 
visitor as responsible for ensuring his/her safety (q22e). Significant correlations existed between 
support for external responsibility and:  
• Reliance on official (i.e., NPS) information sources  (r =. 09, p = .045).  
• Reliance on official, formal (i.e., NPS and “scripted”) information sources (r = .11,  
p = .014).  
• Amount of safety information received (r = -.08, p = .037) 
That is, the more visitors reported relying on official information sources about the park, the 
more they viewed the Park Service as responsible for ensuring visitor safety; yet, at the same 
time, the more safety information visitors received, the less likely they were to hold the NPS 
responsible.  Additionally, I found a small, significant, positive correlation between agreeing that 
the visitor is responsible for his own safety and the amount of safety information received (r = 
.09, p= .022). Stated differently, the more information about park hazards, park regulations, 
	   206	  
weather conditions, and road conditions visitors reported receiving, the more they viewed 
themselves as responsible for ensuring their own safety. None of these variables reached 
significance in regression models (see Tables 5.15 and 5.16).  
Table 5.15. Correlations Between Prevention Attribution and Park Information Variables 
 Ex 
Resp 
Vis Resp Official 
Info 
Official 
Formal 
Info 
Amount 
Safety 
Info 
External 
Responsibility 
Scale  
1 r = -
.15*** 
(n = 694) 
r = .09* 
(n = 510) 
r = .11* 
(n = 512) 
 
r = -.08* 
(n = 673) 
Visitor 
responsible 
for own 
safety1 
 1 r = .00, ns 
(n = 514) 
r = .02, ns 
(n = 516) 
r = .09* 
(n = 679) 
Note. Significant Pearson correlations are in bold.  
 **Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).  
1Survey item wording: “If visitors will not accept responsibility for their own safety, they should not visit [the 
park].” 
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Table 5.16. Regression Predicting Support for External Responsibility: Visitors only 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Block 1: Demographics 
Age .13** .14** .13** 
Education -.12** -.09* -.09* 
Gender  
(Female=1) 
.18*** .15* .15** 
Native English 
(Native English 
speaker= 1)  
-.17** -.17** -.17** 
Asian .15* .13* .12* 
Hispanic/Latino .05 .01 .00 
Other .01 .00 -.00 
Inc. R2 (%) 12.4   
Block 2: 
Respondent Type 
  
DEWA .05 .05 
OLYM 
 
-.07 -.07 
Experience w/ 
context 
 -.15** -.16** 
Incident Salience  -.07  
Inc. R2 (%)  3.6  
Block 3: 
Information 
Official Formal 
Info 
  .08 
Safety info 
Amount 
  .00 
Inc. R2 (%)   .6 
Total R2 (%)   .17 
ANOVA   F 13, 421= 
6.44*** 
Notes. *p< .05;**p<.01; ***p<.001 
n = 435 
Cell entries for all models are standardized regression coefficients. 
	  
Summary 
 In sum, I found some, although limited, evidence of the relationship between exposure to 
(and reliance on) park communication and prevention attribution. Positive correlations existed 
between reliance on official information sources and support for external responsibility. At the 
same time, the amount of safety information a respondent received was positively correlated with 
agreeing that a visitor is responsible for his/her safety when in the park, and negatively correlated 
with attributing responsibility for ensuring safety to the NPS. Though modest, these relationships 
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provide some indication that the type of information one receives may be related to how one 
envisions responsibility in park settings, a topic I return to in Chapter 7.    
Chapter Summary  
 To better understand how employees, volunteers, and visitors attribute responsibility for 
preventing visitor injury/ensuring safety, Chapter 5 examined relationships between prevention 
attribution and several variables of interest, including those related to sense of place, perception 
of risk, and reliance on park-related information. Table 5.17 summarizes the results of the 
research questions and hypotheses investigated in this chapter, which I describe below.  
 H4 was supported, as visitors who participated in “risky” recreational activities (e.g., 
mountaineering, skiing/snowboarding) were less likely to express support for external (i.e., NPS) 
responsibility for preventing injury/ensuring safety. Because most employees in the sample 
expressed support for internal attributions of responsibility—both in general, and with regard to 
the hypothetical visitor accident scenario—rather than shared or external responsibility, I also 
found support for H5. H6 hypothesized that attributions of responsibility would vary by age, sex, 
and country of origin, a hypothesis that received partial support. Whereas age and sex 
(specifically, being female) emerged as significantly related to support for external responsibility 
in several regression models, country of origin did not; however, being a non-native English 
speaker did appear to predict support for external responsibility in several models. Though not 
hypothesized, respondents’ amount of formal education, and race/ethnicity (specifically, 
identifying as Asian or as Hispanic/Latino) also emerged as significant predictors of prevention 
attribution. Finally, H7 received partial support, as a post-hoc analysis of means and regression 
models demonstrated that employees working in certain park divisions (e.g., Natural & Cultural 
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Resources) appeared to be less supportive of external attribution of responsibility, when 
compared to those who worked in other divisions (e.g., Interpretation & Education).   
 A series of research questions also provided additional understanding of the relationships 
between prevention attribution, other variables of interest, and a series of covariates. With regard 
to RQ4, I observed negative relationships between both place meaning and place attachment and 
support for external attribution of responsibility for preventing injury/ensuring safety. RQ5 
considered the relationship between prevention attribution and the causal attribution variables. In 
addition to a number of significant correlations between the causal attribution and prevention 
attribution variables, in a regression model, external causal attribution was significantly, 
positively related to support for external responsibility; however, internal causal attribution, and 
viewing challenging environmental conditions as contributing to a hypothetical visitor incident 
did not significantly predict support for external responsibility.  
 With regard to risk perception, the focus of RQ6, positive correlations existed between 
perceived controllability of risk and internal attribution of responsibility, as well as between 
desirability of risk and internal attribution of responsibility. In contrast, I observed negative 
correlations between external attribution of responsibility, and (1) perceived desirability of risk, 
and (2) perceived controllability of risk. In addition, a positive correlation existed between 
perceiving danger as a deterrent to visiting the park and external attribution of responsibility. For 
the most part, these relationships held in two regression models. Finally, RQ7 examined 
relationships between park-related information and prevention attribution, revealing positive 
correlations between support for external responsibility and (1) reliance on official information 
sources; and (2) reliance on official, formal information sources. In addition, there was a positive 
correlation between the amount of safety information the visitor received and internal attribution 
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of responsibility, as well as a negative correlation with external attribution of responsibility. 
Unfortunately, none of the information-related variables reached significance in the regression 
models. 
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Table 5.17. Summary of Hypotheses and Research Questions: Chapter 5 
Hypothesis/RQ Findings 
H4: Visitors’ voluntary 
risk-taking will relate 
positively to internal 
attributions of 
responsibility for 
ensuring safety.   
 
Supported 
• Of the visitors who participated in at least one “risky” recreational activity, about two-thirds 
expressed median or lower support for external responsibility for visitor safety, as compared to 
less than half of visitors who had not participated in any of these activities; this relationship 
was significant. 
• A medium-sized, negative, significant correlation between the number of high-risk activities 
that the visitor reported participating in and support for external responsibility for ensuring 
safety. 
H5: Employees will be 
more likely to report 
internal attributions of 
responsibility for 
ensuring safety than 
external or shared 
attributions of 
responsibility.  
Supported 
• After reading the scenario, the majority of employees surveyed (54%) reported that 
responsibility for preventing the incident rested entirely with the injured visitor. Only 5% of 
the sample viewed the visitor and the NPS as equally responsible for injury prevention. 
• When asked to report their level of agreement with the statement, “If visitors will not accept 
responsibility for their own safety, they should not visit [park name]”, about one third of 
employees (32%) strongly agreed, while nearly half (46%) agreed. An additional 14% 
expressed a neutral stance, 5% disagreed and 2% strongly disagreed.  
H6: Visitors’ 
attributions of 
responsibility for 
ensuring safety will 
vary by: (1) age; (2) 
sex; and (3) country of 
origin. 
Partial support 
• As evidenced in several regression models predicting support for external (NPS) 
responsibility, age was positively related to support for external responsibility; however, no 
significant correlation existed between age and support for external (or internal) responsibility. 
• Whereas over half (54%) of male visitors expressed median or lower levels of support for 
external responsibility, only 41% of females were in the same category; this relationship was 
significant. Moreover, as evidenced in several regression models predicting external 
responsibility, women expressed more support for external responsibility than did men.  
• Though not hypothesized, respondents’ amount of formal education also emerged as a 
significant, negative predictor of support for external responsibility.  
• Though not hypothesized, respondents’ race/ethnicity also emerged as a significant predictor 
of external responsibility in several of the regression models. As compared to 
White/Caucasian respondents, Asian respondents expressed more support for external 
responsibility. Additionally, in regression models predicting support for visitor responsibility, 
reporting oneself as Hispanic/Latino was a significant negative predictor.  
• Though not hypothesized, those who reported being non-native English speakers were more 
likely to express more support for external responsibility; this association was statistically 
significant by chi-square test and also found in several regression models. 
• Attributions of responsibility did not appear to vary by country of origin. 
H7: Employees’ 
attributions of 
responsibility for 
ensuring safety will 
vary by occupational 
position and level in the 
agency.   
 
Partial support 
• When considered as a group, employees in the Visitor & Resource Protection division 
expressed the most agreement with the park’s responsibility to prevent visitor injury than any 
of the other park and employees in the Natural & Cultural Resources Division (NCR) 
expressed the least. 
• A post-hoc comparison of means indicated significant differences between employees in NCR 
and: (1) Interpretation and Education, and (2) Maintenance and Trails.  
• When considered in regression models, employees who worked in Administration and in NCR 
were less supportive of external responsibility, compared to those who worked in Visitor and 
Resource Protection (as a reference group).  
 RQ4: How do place 
meaning and place 
attachment relate to 
attributions of 
responsibility for 
preventing accidents?  
 
Place Meaning 
• No significant correlations were observed between place meaning and prevention attribution; 
in a regression model, however, there was a significant, positive relationship. 
 
Place Attachment 
• Small, significant, negative correlation between place attachment and support for external 
responsibility; this relationship also held in a regression model.  
	   212	  
RQ5: How do 
attributions of 
responsibility for safety 
relate to attributions 
about the cause of 
accidents?   
• A small, significant, negative correlation existed between external responsibility and seeing 
the visitor as responsible for his/her safety. 
• A medium-size, significant, positive correlation existed between external responsibility and 
attributing the cause of a hypothetical accident to external factors. 
• A small, significant, positive correlation existed between external responsibility and attributing 
the cause of a hypothetical accident to challenging park conditions.  
• A small, significant, positive correlation existed between viewing the visitor as responsible for 
his/her own safety and attributing the cause of an accident to internal factors. 
• A small, significant, negative correlation existed between viewing the visitor as responsible 
and attributing the cause of an accident to external factors. 
• In a regression model, external causal attribution was significantly, positively related to 
external responsibility; however, internal causal attribution, and viewing the challenging 
environmental as a factor of a hypothetical visitor incident did not significantly predict 
external responsibility. 
RQ6: How do 
perceptions of 
controllability, 
voluntariness, and 
desirability of park risks 
relate to attributions of 
responsibility for 
preventing accidents?  
 
Controllability  
• A small, significant, positive correlation was found between agreeing that, “If visitors will not 
accept responsibility for their own safety, they should not visit the park” and controllability of 
risk.  
• A medium-sized, negative correlation existed between controllability of risk and external 
attribution of responsibility.  
 
Desirability  
• A small, significant negative correlation was found between desirability of risk and support for 
external responsibility 
• A small, significant, positive correlation was found between agreeing that, “If visitors will not 
accept responsibility for their own safety, they should not visit the park” and desirability of 
risk. 
• When predicting internal responsibility in a regression model, desirability of risk was 
positively related to the outcome variable, as was controllability of risk; perceived danger was 
not a significant predictor (see Model 7).  
 
Perceived Danger 
• A medium-sized, positive correlation between perceived danger as a deterrent to visiting the 
park and external responsibility. 
• In a regression model, perception of danger as a deterrent to visiting the park was strongly, 
positively related to support for external responsibility, and controllability of risk was strongly 
negatively related to the outcome variable; however, desirability of risk was not a significant 
predictor.  
RQ7: How does 
exposure to 
formal/informal and 
official/unofficial risk 
communication relate to 
attributions of 
responsibility for 
preventing accidents? 
 
Official Information 
• A small, significant, positive correlation was found between support for external responsibility 
and reliance on official information sources 
• A small, significant, positive correlation was found between support for external responsibility 
and reliance on official, formal information sources.  
 
Amount of Safety Information  
• A small, significant, positive correlation was found between agreeing that the visitor is 
responsible for his/her own safety and the amount of safety information received.  
• A small, significant, negative correlation was found between external attribution of 
responsibility and amount of safety information received.  
• None of the information-related variables reached significance in the regression models. 
 
 When considering all the variables of interest explored in this chapter, in an overall 
regression model (visitors only) predicting external prevention attribution (see Table 5.18), 
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variables related to perceived risk (controllability: β = -.38, p < .001; perceived danger as park 
deterrent: β = .23, p < .001), sense of place (“blended” place meaning: β =.11, p < .05); place 
attachment: β = -.17, p < .01), and causal attribution (external causal attribution: β = .31, p < 
.001) emerged as the strongest predictors. While a few demographic variables, such as age, sex, 
and identifying as Asian, emerged as significant in earlier models, interestingly they failed to 
reach significance in the final iteration. As was true for the regression models predicting causal 
attribution, the risk-related variables (with the exception of perceived desirability of risk) seemed 
to bring the most explanatory value to the prevention attribution models. When considering 
employees (see Table 5.19), the risk-related (controllability of risk: β = -.34, p < .001; perceived 
danger as deterrent to park visit: β = .25, p < .001) and causal attribution (external causal 
attribution: β = .17, p < .05) variables were likewise important predictors of prevention 
attribution; however, the sense of place variables failed to reach significance in these models. As 
discussed earlier in this chapter (and directly relevant to H7), employees’ park division appeared 
to matter in judgments of responsibility, as being in Administration (β = -.22, p < .01) or Natural 
and Cultural Resources (β = -.20, p < .05) emerged as significant, negative predictors of support 
for external (i.e., NPS) responsibility for preventing visitor injury.    
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Table 5.18. Overall Regression Predicting Support for External Responsibility: Visitors 
only  
 Model 
1 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Block 1: Demographics 
Age .09 .14* .09 .09 .11* .10 
Education -.03 -.04 -.06 -.07 -.08 -.08 
Sex (Female=1) .18** .18** .08 .09 .04 .04 
Native English (Native 
speaker = 1)  
-.09 -.09 -.06 -.08 -.08 -.07 
Asian .19** .15* .07 .06 -.01 -.00 
Hispanic/Latino .07 .02 .00 .00 -.04 -.04 
Other -.03 -.03 -.02 -.03 -.01 -.02 
Inc. R2 (%) 9.4      
Block 2: Group 
Characteristics 
     
Large group .08 .07 .06 .07 .06 
Children 
(1= child under 18 in group) 
.06 .03 .03 .01 .01 
DEWA .04 -.05 -.06 -.06 -.02 
OLYM 
 
.02 -.01 -.01 .01 .01 
Experience in park context  -.12 -.06 -.04 -.01 -.02 
Preparedness (1= 
“completely prepared”) 
 -.10 -.09 -.08 -.06 -.06 
Inc. R2 (%)  4.2     
Block 3: Risk Perception     
Controllability -.43*** -.42*** -.38*** -.38*** 
Desirability  
  
.04 .05 .02 .01 
Danger would deter visit   .29*** .27*** .23*** .23*** 
Inc. R2 (%)   22.6    
Block 4: Sense of Place       
Place Meaning    .11* .12* .11* 
Place Attachment    -.15* -.16** -.17** 
Inc. R2 (%)    2.0   
Block 5: Causal Attribution 
External (NPS) Causal 
Attribution 
    .31*** .31*** 
Inc. R2 (%)     7.5  
Block 6: Information       
Official Formal Info      -.01 
Total Safety Info      .10 
Inc. R2 (%)      .7 
Total R2 (%)      .46 
ANOVA      F 21, 228= 
9.28*** 
Notes. *p< .05;**p<.01; ***p<.001 
n = 250 
Cell entries for all models are standardized regression coefficients. 
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Table 5.19. Overall Regression Predicting Support for External Responsibility: Employees 
only  
 
Notes. *p< .05;**p<.01; ***p<.001 
n =  184 
Cell entries for all models are standardized regression coefficients. 	  
 Model 
1 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Block 1: Demographics 
Age .07 .17 .14 .15 .15 
Education -.02 .01 -.04 -.05 -.04 
Gender  
(Female=1) 
.11 .15 .11 .12 .11 
Native English 
(Native English 
speaker= 1)  
-.07 -.09 .01 .00 .01 
Asian .03 .03 .07 .06 .03 
Hispanic/Latino -.08 -.02 -.00 -.00 .00 
Other .09 .08 .02 .03 .03 
Inc. R2 (%) 3.4     
Block 2: Park 
context 
    
DEWA .13 .09 .07 .05 
OLYM 
 
-.06 -.05 -.06 -.06 
Experience in park 
context 
 -.14 -.15 -.18* -.16 
Park division: 
(Admin= 1) 
 -.19* -.18* -.18* -.22** 
Park Division:  
(N&C Resources =1) 
 -.24** -.19* -.20* -.20* 
Park Division: 
(Maint. & Trails= 1) 
 .03 .01 -.00 -.02 
Park Division:  
(Interp= 1) 
 .01 -.00 .00 .00 
Inc. R2 (%)  11.4    
Block 3: Risk 
Perception 
   
Controllability -.36*** -.36*** -.34*** 
Desirability  
  
-.02 -.02 -.01 
Danger would deter 
visit 
  .26*** .27*** .25*** 
Inc. R2 (%)   16.8   
Block 4: Sense of 
Place 
  
Place Meaning -.08 -.05 
Place Attachment 
   
.09 .08 
Inc. R2 (%)    .7  
Block 5: Causal 
Attribution 
External (NPS) 
    .17* 
Inc. R2 (%)     2.2 
Total R2 (%)     .35 
ANOVA     F 20, 163= 
4.31*** 
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CHAPTER 6.  
 
RISK MANAGEMENT AND CULTURAL THEORIES OF RISK 
 
 In this chapter, I turn to qualitative data from in-depth interviews with employees and 
volunteers to explore research questions 8 and 9 (and sub-questions).  Under the broad purview 
of risk management and cultural theories of risk, these questions asked how employees 
understand risk management in relation to the “mission” of the NPS, and what risk(s) they may 
consider to be acceptable or unacceptable in park settings. Instead of answering each of these 
questions sequentially, as was done in previous chapters, I instead present the results 
thematically. More aligned with a grounded theory approach (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), 
presenting the findings as such highlights the emergent quality of the themes, and also allows 
more flexibility for demonstrating their relationships and interconnections.  
Risk as a Value: The Multidimensionality of Risk in National Parks 
 
There are certain risks that are intrinsic to the sort of, what makes the place a national park, so attractive. 
Like windy roads with cliffs. What attracts people to those places is that ruggedness of the landscape. 
And so, you just can’t smooth all of those hazards out of it (MORA7). 
 
As individuals who live in work these unique environments, interviewees were quick to 
recognize the sources of risk inherent in the landscapes around them. From falling trees to falling 
water, risks to human health and safety abound in the diverse physical ecosystems encompassing 
DEWA, MORA, and OLYM. Instead of focusing solely on risks as threats, however, 
interviewees also recognized risks as attractions—valuable attributes of “wild” places that 
imbued places with the potential to teach people about themselves and their surroundings.    
Risk as inherent 
 When prompted to speak about managing risk in national parks, interviewees emphasized 
that the sources of risk encountered in these places were both inherent, and in some cases, 
unmanageable. Referring to Mount Rainier, one interpretive ranger summed up this belief by 
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stating, “You can’t take a volcano and make it safe!” (MORA4). At the same time, interviewees 
were quick to recognize the uniqueness of each park as an environment hosting hazards both 
“natural” and “manufactured” by people, and in varying quantities. One MORA interpretive 
ranger who had worked at President Lyndon B. Johnson’s ranch, a historical park consisting 
primarily of Texas grassland and pasture, contrasted the inherent risks of these two NPS park 
units, including their recreational offerings, as such:   
Every park is different… If you’re going to go to LBJ’s ranch, you’re really not 
expecting a whole lot of risk. You’re going to get on a bus, you’re going to drive around, 
and [the ranger is] going to tell you the cows are behind the fence… But if you’re coming 
to a mountain [and] you’re planning to climb it, there is some inherent risk (MORA16).  
 
But exposure to inherent risk was not understood as limited to those visitors choosing to embark 
in “adventure recreation,” (e.g., Ewer & Hollenhurst, 1989) such as climbing Mount Rainier. 
Because many national parks, including DEWA, MORA, and OLYM, preserve areas free of 
development, simply visiting these places means accepting the effects of ecological processes 
that may be uncontrollable. Describing how many visitors choose to remain in their vehicles to 
take in the park scenery, a MORA ranger explained that they are nonetheless exposed to the 
hazards around them, such as an eroding hillside adjacent to a road:    
There’s just some things you can’t do anything about. I mean, those people driving up 
the road and having rocks come off the hill and hit their car… There’s going to be some 
inherent risk being out in the middle of 230,000 acres of wilderness on the side of this 
active volcano (MORA3).   
 
In the words of a DEWA Natural & Cultural Resources Division employee, when entering a 
national park, no matter the distance from a paved road, humans are no longer “at the top of the 
food chain” (DEWA4). 
 From eroding hillsides to hungry carnivores, interviewees pointed out that sources of risk in 
national park settings were both innate and omnipresent. Perhaps less obvious, however, was 
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their observation that the dynamic quality of these risks distinguishes them from those most often 
encountered outside of the park. Temperature, wind speed, precipitation, snowmelt, and seismic 
activity, among other factors, change daily and even hourly within the alpine, forest, and coastal 
ecosystems of MORA, OLYM, and DEWA. These shifting park conditions could make the 
relative safety of participating in even the most popular activities unpredictable. In the case of 
the Delaware River, for instance, an interpretive ranger described how swimming conditions, 
even in high-use areas, could vary daily depending on a variety of physical processes:      
…[The river] changes. It’s not just static; this is a great hole to jump in today, but it doesn’t 
mean that a couple days ago, a log didn’t snarl up in there… a bunch of silt come in and fill 
it (DEWA2).  
 
As this ranger explained, visitors more accustomed to swimming in a pool or lake may not 
expect such dynamic change, especially when aspects of the physical environment—restrooms, a 
lifeguard, a beach area—seem suggestive of a more developed tourist area. MORA and OLYM 
interviewees routinely spoke of changing weather conditions transforming high-altitude, alpine 
environments in the course of hours or less; a sunny, clear morning on top of a ridge might turn 
dark and hailing by afternoon. The fog, rain, ice, snow, or reduced visibility could catch any 
traveler off-guard and “socked in” (MORA20)—even the most experienced outdoorsperson or, at 
times, an NPS employee or volunteer. Dynamic risks can also be unpredictable, as interviewees 
emphasized in their descriptions of conditions at their parks. While weather forecasts, avalanche 
reports, and precipitation records, among other information, assist employees and volunteers in 
assessing their own and visitors’ potential exposure to risk, many interviewees suggested that 
this expertise had its limits; as a DEWA Natural & Cultural Resources employee put it, “I mean, 
it’s nature. You don’t know, you can’t predict it” (DEWA14).            
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Risk as desirable  
 While some park-related risk may, by its nature, resist attempts to manage or minimize it, 
some interviews felt that some risk should not be managed in the first place. For many 
interviewees, risk was seen as an integral part of a national park experience: something to be 
desired, rather than to be avoided (Machlis & Rosa, 1990). Importantly, though, the perceived 
acceptability, as well as the desirability of risk depended at least in part on its origin and the 
circumstances with which it was encountered. National park land, including portions of DEWA, 
OLYM, and MORA, conserve over half of the nation’s wilderness areas: parcels designated by 
the 1964 Wilderness Act as areas where “earth and its community of life are untrammeled by 
man, where man himself is a visitor who does not remain” (16 U.S. C. 1131-1136). Meant to 
preserve “primeval character” and “without permanent improvements or human habitation,” such 
as roads, commercial businesses, or the use of motorized equipment, wilderness areas are 
deliberately primitive. Indeed, one of the stated goals of preserving such areas is to allow 
“outstanding areas for solitude” and an “unconfined type of recreation.” Though such a 
connection is not stated explicitly in the legislation itself, many interviewees viewed 
“wilderness” as synonymous with desirable risk. When individuals chose to visit wilderness 
areas, interviewees saw risk-taking as both expected and advantageous, as opposed to in 
developed or frontcountry areas. As one MORA law enforcement ranger explained:  
I don’t think it’s desirable that we have risk on a road because that’s not really the point. 
As a place for people to take risks, and challenge themselves and have an adventure, 
climb the mountain, where there are certain objective hazards—absolutely totally 
appropriate for the national parks (MORA7).  
 
Discussing encountering risk in backcountry wilderness areas within the park, a DEWA law 
enforcement ranger echoed:  
… My personal expectation is, if I’m going hiking and I’m leaving the trailhead and I’m 
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not going to a visitor center boardwalk hike… that there would be an opportunity to get 
too close to a cliff face, even near a trail, and that that should be reasonable (DEWA17).  
 
The following sections explore the notion of risk as a value; as interviewees explained, voluntary 
exposure to risk in places like wilderness areas can achieve the kind of learning, challenge, and 
elevated experience rarely found in everyday life.   
Tolerance and voluntariness. Whether on the job, or during their leisure time, some 
interviewees described risk-taking as part and parcel of life. Yet, whether crossing a glacier, 
using a chainsaw, or fording a river, they realized that the assessment and acceptance of such 
risks likely differed between themselves and other individuals, depending on personal biography 
and preferences. As a MORA law enforcement ranger stated:  
…Risk assessment can be a very individual thing and I think how you live your life and 
what risk that’s acceptable to you… does not necessarily hold true for everybody. The 
risk you choose to take is not necessarily a risk that this person should be taking, or even 
wants to take (MORA5).  
 
Interestingly, though risks in national parks may be perceived as inherent and unavoidable, as 
this quotations suggests, interviewees also seemed to describe a clear voluntariness in the way 
that they—and some visitors—tend to seek out certain sources of risk. That recreational goals of 
visitors and employees in a single national park can vary considerably can be understood as 
reflecting both personal tolerance of risk as well as individual experience and skill level. 
Illustrating this point, an OLYM law enforcement ranger referred to the highly publicized story 
of Aron Ralston, a solo hiker forced to amputate his arm to free himself from underneath a 
boulder in a Utah canyon in 2003. (Ralston’s case has since been popularized further in the 2010 
film 127 Hours). He explained:         
The guy who got his arm caught and cut it off? Some people would say what he was 
doing was stupid. He was on a cross-country backcountry hike by himself. He didn’t tell 
anyone where he was going, etc. But, many people, myself included, I’ve hiked slot 
canyons by myself. And I tend to be careful when I do that, to think more about it, but I 
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guess my take on that is what he was doing in some people’s world was perfectly 
reasonable… (OLYM3).  
 
Because they play a critical role in managing the park experience, interviewees did recognize 
their responsibility to acknowledge the variability of risk tolerance. As an OLYM Visitor & 
Resource protection employee put it, “…Not everyone wants risk… There’s just a… wide 
spectrum of people’s interests and desires when it comes to going into a wilderness area 
(OLYM2)”; however, managing such areas according to the wishes of a diverse visiting public, 
and for the sustainability of the physical landscape, becomes understandably complex: a juggling 
act of competing values. As a DEWA Natural & Cultural Resources employee explained, in the 
case of the Delaware River:      
If we took the rapids out, it wouldn’t be as fun … A certain element of the population 
likes that thrill … Our mission says that we’ll provide these opportunities, but who are 
we to judge what one person’s recreation is compared to another’s [?] (DEWA11).  
 
Paradoxically, parks must allow opportunities for visitors to engage with risk, just as they 
provide interventions to protect them from it. (Forms of risk management will be discussed in 
further depth below).   
 Challenge and elevated experience. Part of the desirability of risk may be that it affords 
individuals the type of physical and psychological challenges that intensify an out-of-doors 
experience. In addition to preserving and protecting land from human development, the 
Wilderness Act may simultaneously support this end, as some interviewees, such as an OLYM 
Natural & Cultural Resources employee, pointed out:    
The Wilderness Act talks about opportunities for solitude and unconfined recreation. And 
that’s really where the whole risk and challenge idea comes from… Being able to go out 
and experience this naturalness, like crossing a stream versus on a bridge. Not having a 
bridge there—that would make it more natural, so your experience as a result would have 
higher risk and challenge… (OLYM13).  
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As this individual’s comment suggests, exposure to “natural” conditions—crossing a stream on 
foot versus on a bridge—contribute to more risk, but also to an authenticity that elevates the 
experience to a higher level of importance. These experiences, some interviewees argued, 
subsequently become highly valuable endeavors, rather than run-of-the-mill occurrences. 
Recounting of a group of young adults and their parents whom he led on a hike in the park, a 
MORA administrator described how traveling through an unmanaged environment challenged a 
middle-aged woman beyond her comfort zone. He recalled:      
… [I] had a mother… came up with her daughter and this group. She was trying to be 
strong. She had never been in a national park. She was scared to death. And I said, ‘Well, 
I planned a little adventure for the 16 year-olds. We’re going to cross a stream.’… It was 
the most adventure she’d ever had… She had to suck it up and not cry because she 
wanted to be strong for her kid… For her it was just a profound experience (MORA8).  
 
Anecdotes such as this led to this individual’s belief that risk exposure contributes to all visitors’ 
experiences, regardless of their activity or skill level. Consequently, “… the less mitigation and 
the more risk and the more uniqueness there is to that experience… that’s what I think fulfills 
[visitors] in the end” (MORA8). Whether falling in a river or in a crevasse, part of the worth of 
such wilderness experiences, interviewees suggested, was making individuals even more aware 
of the (very real) possibility of their own mortality. Comparing backcountry, wilderness settings 
in national parks to more managed amusement parks or zoos, a MORA law enforcement ranger 
suggested that:  
…Some of the risk is good, in that there aren’t many places left in this country or even in 
this world, where you can be out hiking and you’ll see a mountain lion or a bear, which 
could hurt you… I think that raises that experience to a level that you can’t get when you 
go to a zoo… And, in an amusement park-type setting, things have been so engineered 
that, unless you try to get hurt or try to do something really risky, you’re not going to 
suffer consequences… (MORA5).  
 
While interviewees in no way wished injury or illness upon visitors, they did suggest that 
“suffering consequences” could come with the territory; accompanying the breathtaking scenery 
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on a wilderness hike, for instance, could be a pair of skinned knees. Given that visitors 
understood the potential consequences of their recreational choices, from skinned knees to severe 
hypothermia, some interviewees felt comfortable leaving visitors to their own devices, with 
potential injury a reasonable consequence of the “unconfined recreation” promised by a 
wilderness area. As a MORA interpretive ranger summed up, “…let [visitors] go for it. Let them 
go suffer a bit, because that challenge, that experience, that potential risk—it’s part of the 
experience (MORA3).  
 Learning and self-development. With challenge and intensified experience, interviewees 
argued, could emerge the type of learning that fosters skill-building and personal development. 
Some interviewees spoke of their experiences in wilderness settings as enabling them to build the 
type of skills necessary for future engagement in their recreational activity of choice, such as 
hiking or skiing. Though highly trained and experienced in outdoor pursuits, two OLYM 
employees suggested that their experiences in park wilderness settings allowed them further 
learning:    
I’m glad there are places that challenge my skill level. And I’m glad, as are a lot of users, 
those hardcore people out there who are like, ‘I’m going to do a 50 day hike!’ …There’s 
not too many places you can do that (OLYM6).  
 
…So you get to this river and you have to ford it. I mean, that’s a whole other skill set 
that I’d never, ever had to use in the past. So, [risk] is desirable--you kind of push 
yourself a little bit (OLYM9).  
 
While honing skills for future recreational or on-the-job experiences is one benefit to 
maintaining wilderness areas, interviewees suggested that being in these places also helps one 
develop as a person. Being exposed to risk, interviewees suggested, could confer less concrete 
benefits, such as developing an individual’s self-reliance, or their sense of personal 
responsibility. In making this argument, interviewees echoed Joseph Sax’s (1980) 
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“preservationist” perspective: the idea that national parks can play a role in providing visitors 
with a “moral education,” such as through teaching the self-reliance necessary to travel in 
inherently risky environments.  By providing opportunities for “reflective recreation,” Sax 
argued, national parks should serve as locales where visitors are encouraged, regardless of past 
experience or skill level, “to try more challenging and demanding recreation” (Sax, 1980, p. 61). 
Here, an OLYM Natural & Cultural Resources employee explains how Sax’s argument still 
remains relevant to his thinking about risk management in national parks, even 30 years after the 
publication of Mountains without Handrails:   
… I’m with Sax on this and thinking that the park experience can be a learning 
experience that makes us closer to nature, and at the cost of some comfort, perhaps, but to 
the benefit that it makes us better citizens and better humans… By not having a handrail 
on the mountain, you realize that you are responsible and you must not go near the edge, 
or if you are carefully trained and you’re thinking logically, yes, you can approach the 
edge and here’s how you do it, and here’s how you do it safely, and so on. And then 
there’s certain risks that are not worth taking (OLYM7).  
 
Likewise, a MORA Natural & Cultural Resources employee suggested that the risk-taking 
opportunities available in national parks, such as hiking the famous 93-mile trail skirting the base 
of Mount Rainier, could help foster a sense of individual responsibility:    
You’ve got to push yourself a little bit from time to time, and you’ve got to experience 
things… So if you’re out on the Wonderland Trail overnight, camping somewhere and 
get rained on—that’s a real experience… When you’re taking that responsibility, that, if I 
fall, I might die, no one might be able to help and I’ll have to get myself out of here, that 
makes you—I feel like that’s life right there (MORA21).  
 
Like Sax, these and other employees saw part of the value of national parks as their ability to 
“confront the visitor with the less familiar setting of an unmanaged natural landscape” (Sax, 
1980, p. 86). In such places, people can, following the vision of famed landscape designer 
Frederick Law Olmsted, free themselves of the “impediments” and “distractions” of urbanized 
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life. In so doing, the risk they encounter may become, in part, a platform for contemplating 
loftier ideas: their individual freedom, a sense of personal responsibility, and their own mortality.  
Understanding the NPS Responsibility 
 
I think it’s a shared responsibility and I think our responsibility is to highlight hazards that do exist here, 
understanding that a lot of people really don’t understand those (MORA19).  
 
Shared responsibility  
 When asked to explain the responsibility to ensure the safety of park visitors, most 
interviewees described this responsibility as shared between visitors and the representatives of 
the NPS, including employees, managers, and volunteers. For many interviewees, demarcating 
the exact line between one group’s responsibility and the other’s was somewhat difficult; many 
preferred to speak in vague terms about a “cooperative effort” (OLYM3), a “split” (OLYM8), or 
a “combination” (MORA18), and expressed the general belief that, “…both parties have a part in 
[visitor] safety” (DEWA15). According to one MORA employee in the Maintenance & Trails 
Division:  
It’s sort of a group participation, as far as who’s responsible for it. We can do as much as 
we can, but we can’t do everything, so [visitors] have the responsibility to make sure that 
they’re conscious of what’s going on around them (MORA6).  
 
While interviewees appeared to agree on ensuring visitor safety as a shared commitment, they 
differed somewhat in how they allocated accountability for achieving this reality. As will be 
described below, though some viewed the responsibility as evenly split between visitors and the 
park, others preferred to hold visitors more accountable for their own safety.    
Fifty-fifty. Though not asked to give a specific number or percentage, some interviewees 
described ensuring visitor safety as a responsibility allocated equally between NPS 
employees/volunteers and the visitors themselves. Recognizing their role in providing 
information, enforcing rules, and maintaining infrastructure (which will be explored in depth in 
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the sections below), these interviewees saw an equivalent onus on the visitor to seek information, 
be prepared for his or her activities, and remain alert to and aware of the potential risks in the 
park. The following quotations, from a law enforcement ranger at DEWA, exemplifies this 
interviewee’s conception of the idealized balance between their job responsibilities, and the 
visitor’s own personal responsibility:     
…I think it’s kind of a 50-50 split. I mean, I think it’s our job… Everything that we do 
from speed enforcement to just visitor contacts—it’s all safety-related. But I think that… 
there needs to be some ownership placed on the visitor of understanding what they’re 
getting into (DEWA6).  
 
Seventy-thirty. Whether stated explicitly or suggested through their comments, other 
interviewees saw the balance as tipped in favor of the visitor. Though acknowledging the NPS 
role in visitor safety, these interviewees awarded visitors’ individual (i.e., internal—see Chapter 
5) responsibility primary importance. A MORA administrator commented: “…To have a safe 
experience, well, I’d say 70-80% of that responsibility, at least in my mind, is really on the 
person” (MORA8), and a DEWA Natural & Cultural Resources employee echoed: “I think the 
majority of the responsibility is due on the visitor” (DEWA14). Likewise, a DEWA 
administrator described individual responsibility as paramount to the experience of visiting a 
national park:   
… I think [visitors] need to know that the safety is their responsibility, above all, and that 
they can’t assume that the risks they’re taking are somehow going to be ameliorated by 
the Park Service or anybody else. When you enter a park, a natural area, you assume 
certain liability for what happens to you (DEWA9).  
 
In describing visitors as primarily responsible for their own safety, some interviewees 
believed that acting as a “babysitter” or “parent” for unprepared and/or incompetent visitors was 
neither feasible nor appropriate, given the mission of the NPS and the resources available to the 
park. While envisioning clientele akin to children may appear patronizing, interviewees’ 
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explanations demonstrated that they tended to use this metaphor as a way to describe the park’s 
risk management goals, rather than as an opportunity to derogate their user base. In general, 
these interviewees believed an emphasis on individual responsibility to be both appropriate and 
necessary for visitors, a point-of-view that made some disagree with management practices they 
perceived as visitor “hand-holding.” One MORA fee collector noted that, “…if you do hand hold 
too much…[visitors] won’t take accountability” (MORA17). Similarly, a MORA interpretive 
ranger explained how excessive park management can limit the learning necessary for behaving 
safely in a national park: “It’s sort of like children. You have to let them learn by burning 
themselves” (MORA16). Interviewees noted that park managers-as-parents might also impose 
controls that might limit the type of experiences that draw some visitors to the park (as explained 
in the previous section). As one MORA volunteer commented, the “self-sufficiency” required to 
recreate in wilderness areas draws some visitors to national parks; therefore:  
If the park has to act like a babysitter and make sure everything is taken care of and 
[visitors] never get close to the hazardous places, I don’t think you can do that 
(MORA11).  
 
Taking a macro perspective, other interviewees objected to a “parental” role on the basis that it 
violates basic democratic principles, as expressed in one OLYM interpretive ranger’s comment:    
…Do we really expect an entity like the Park Service to take full responsibility for 
babysitting all of our visitors? And that seems kind of absurd and impractical and almost 
seems to fly against the American ideal of freedom… People should take on some level 
of responsibility. And it seems like that’s what being a citizen of the United States should 
be (OLYM4).  
 
While interviewees may have generally agreed that they are not (and cannot be) visitors’ 
parents, interestingly, some park policies seemed to nonetheless reinforce this role. For instance, 
while one MORA interpretive ranger emphasized that visitors “have to take some 
responsibility,” she also described how her staff manages weekly ranger-led snowshoe walks to 
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guarantee the safety of all participants, who often have a range of abilities. She explained,  
“…We usually have a volunteer that comes with us, so if someone does have problems and 
needs to go back, then the volunteer can go back with them (MORA4).”  This tension between 
expecting visitors to be competent and prepared park users, while at the same time anticipating 
that they will not be, appeared throughout employees’ comments and is likewise reflected in 
many of the NPS’ strategies to manage visitor risk, which will be explained below. 
3 Es. As will be explored in more detail in the following sections, interviewees identified 
unique responsibilities that they attributed to the NPS, that can be classified into three categories, 
pertaining to:  (1) education and communication, (2) engineering, (3) legislation and 
enforcement. Classifying risk management strategies by this tripartite typology is not a new 
approach, and understanding its origins serves to further illuminate the discussion. In the context 
of injury control, Baker (1973) argued that preventing injury is akin to preventing an illness, 
disease, or infection. Her discussion of “countermeasures” (i.e., injury reduction strategies) 
included, among others, educational approaches to inform consumers about home safety, 
regulations to upgrade and maintain medical emergency systems, and improving safety standards 
on vehicles. 
Around the same time, Heberlein (1974) wrote about “three fixes” to water management 
issues as “technological,” “cognitive,” and “structural.” While referring to preventing negative 
environmental impact, rather than unintentional injury, Heberlein’s concepts mirror those of 
Baker (1973). First, “technological fixes” (broadly equivalent to Baker’s “ergonomics”) include 
strategies like dams and irrigation projects—strategies that are “appealing,” Heberlein (1974, p. 
280) notes, because “it is much easier to simply build a dam or seed clouds than to change land 
use or other behavior patterns.” Since technological fixes tend to “[make] only the simplest 
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assumptions about human behavior” (Heberlein, 1974, p. 281), the two additional fixes attempt 
to account for these shortfalls. The “cognitive fix” posits that supplying people with more 
information will lead them to “modify beliefs, attitudes, values or motivation” (Heberlein, 1974, 
p. 282), most similar to Baker’s “education.” Finally, the “structural fix” focuses attention on 
modifying individual behavior; though not framed in terms of enforcing rules, this “fix” 
nonetheless may employ management rules, such as removing access to an area or lobbying for a 
new law. More than a decade after Baker and Heberlein’s publications, the National Committee 
for Injury Prevention and Control, in 1989, adopted a similar three-part paradigm, labeling it 
“education,” “engineering,” and “enforcement” (Dr. Sara Newman, pers. communication, 
February 1, 2012); I apply these categories in the following sections.        
Education 
 For most interviewees, educating park visitors was understood as a central part of the NPS 
responsibility. As will be discussed below, the majority of the interviewees described a 
responsibility to provide information to public audiences, yet the ways in which such information 
should be delivered resulted in less of a consensus. Moreover, interviewees saw clear challenges 
to developing and disseminating messages appropriate to diverse park audiences, as well as 
limitations, both logistical and philosophical, to providing information at all.    
Responsibility to provide information. When interviewees discussed the Park Service’s 
responsibility to ensure visitor safety, they routinely mentioned that park managers must provide 
information to visitors. Not all visitors are accomplished mountain climbers, or even aware of the 
climatic conditions of an alpine summit; recognizing that “ignorance” can exist on a spectrum 
from, for instance, “knowing what you don’t know” to “not knowing what you don’t know,” for 
many employees was a crucial distinction. According to one OLYM law enforcement ranger:  
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…I have no problem with visitors being ignorant when they walk in the door… Actually, 
the more descriptive is they’re ignorant, they’re not stupid. They just don’t necessarily 
know the… proper way to go at it… (OLYM3).    
 
In this spirit, most employees were less interested in castigating ignorant visitors than in 
understanding the source of this ignorance, and using it to better understand the information 
necessary to meet their clientele’s needs. Most importantly, interviewees noted that the 
information they disseminate must encompass the “known” risks in the park, such as inclement 
weather, wild animals, or poisonous plants.  Because many park employees recognized visitors’ 
“ignorance” of the physical conditions of a national park, including the above risks, they also 
acknowledged the importance of providing information that, in the words of a MORA fee 
collector, “might not be apparent to an average person” (MORA17); stated differently by a 
MORA law enforcement ranger, and emphasizing the recreational context in which tourists visit 
the park: “…the park is absolutely responsible for making the public aware of hazards that exist 
and the whole range of potential outcomes for the trips that people go on” (MORA7). As a case 
in point, several DEWA employees described needing to inform visitors about the dangerousness 
of river conditions, especially given the massive Delaware River’s misleadingly placid façade. 
According to one park interpretive ranger:   
We definitely try to tell people that the current’s much faster than it appears. I mean, 
sometimes you could be down at Kittatinny Point or one of the visitor centers and people 
think it’s a lake because of the way the wind’s blowing… And then also we talk about all 
the other unknown factors out there—some of the steep drop-offs of the banks of the 
river can be pretty deep… A lot of people are surprised by that (DEWA15).  
 
Other “known” safety-related information that interviewees felt that NPS should share with 
visitors included the following topics:  
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• Trip planning and general preparedness, including proper food storage while camping, 
route finding in the backcountry, carrying the “ten essentials,” how to file a camping 
permit, etc. 
• Interactions with wildlife (e.g., discouraging approaching and feeding wildlife). 
• Weather and park conditions, such as trail conditions, road conditions and closures, river 
levels, and natural hazards (e.g., avalanches, lahars).   
• Issues not necessarily unique to national parks, such as driving safety (e.g., adhering to 
the speed limit, not driving while intoxicated).   
Examples of how and when park personnel in all three parks approached these topics for their 
respective visitor audiences include the following:  
• …At every campfire program there are certain safety messages that we include…. If 
you’re leaving your camp, your campsite, your fire must be out... Take the ten essentials 
with you when you hike kind of thing. You have kind of a captive audience, so it’s a 
good way to get a number of quick messages out to them (MORA4). 
 
• …The people that we’re dealing with are residents, not visitors. So that adds a whole 
different perspective to this park, so that [when] we’re performing drunk driving 
campaigns—a lot of it isn’t the visitors that we’re getting there, it’s the locals that we’re 
educating… (DEWA5). 
 
• …In general we talk with visitors about making sure they have enough gear for whatever 
they’re doing. The ten essentials kind of stuff. And just general traffic safety, about 
slowing down driving around here (OLYM3).  
 
By providing information to their clientele, many interviewees thought that visitors, in turn, 
would be empowered to make “informed decisions” about how to behave in the park. For 
instance, a DEWA administrator described NPS brochures and canoe livery safety talks as, 
“giving [visitors] that personal freedom to make their own choice” (DEWA16)—hopefully, to 
avoid injurious consequences. (Informed decision-making will be explored in more depth 
below). Whether the information provided does, in fact, lead visitors to comply with park rules 
	   232	  
and make the types of decisions that park managers would support, remains an empirical 
question. The link between the park’s safety-related communication and its rate of visitor injuries 
and fatalities is likewise hypothesized, though not necessarily supported, as is illustrated by a 
DEWA law enforcement ranger’s comment:  
…If we have one drowning this year, does that mean that our communication was so 
much better that year? Or was it just luck? The next year could be the same exact 
communication and have ten (DEWA6).  
 
 Meaning and connection. In addition to providing topical information about the risks 
visitors might encounter in the park, some interviewees also described their responsibility to 
inspire visitors to make connections with the park. Across the NPS, interpretive rangers routinely 
refer to the former action as providing “orientation,” and the latter as “interpretation.” A goal of 
interpretation, then, is helping visitors to understand the park at a deeper level. In the case of 
OLYM, for instance, one interpretive ranger suggested that helping visitors appreciate the 
meaning of wilderness extended beyond simply informing them of the park’s legal designation. 
As he explained:  
… Our job as educators, interpreters is: what does that mean?... Some of the stories we 
tell that are associated with wilderness, that maybe people can really experience and take 
home with them… It’s a place where, the din of humanity—it’s not here. You hear the 
wind, you hear the rivers, you hear the birds… And so letting folks know that this is a 
wilderness park and helping them hopefully to have a connection, and a bit of an 
understanding of what that might mean (OLYM 4). 
 
Similarly, as one of his colleagues put it, interpretation becomes “not just saying ‘this is a daisy, 
this is a lupine,’ but so what? Why does it matter that it’s a daisy or a lupine?” (OLYM6). When 
employees and volunteers assist visitors in developing a sense of place, many rely on their own 
meanings of and attachment (e.g., Farnum et al., 2005, Low & Altman, 1992) to the national 
park settings in which they work and live. One OLYM law enforcement ranger described being 
on a routine boat patrol on Lake Crescent, a large glacial lake in the northern part of the park, 
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and stopping to appreciate the beauty of his surroundings. Upon contacting visitors, he tried to 
impart this sense of inspiration that he experiences daily in the park: “… I try to translate that 
into what people are seeing, and how they’re sort of in awe of where they are” (OLYM8). 
Encouraging visitors to form connections to a park can also be strategic. As interviewees 
explained, when visitors understand and feel connected to a park, they may also be motivated to 
behave in ways that help to protect and preserve it. In this way, visitors become stewards and 
invaluable partners to park employees and volunteers in supporting the Park Service mission, as 
the following quotations suggest:    
• … I think it’s important for people to come to these areas even though they may be from 
clear across the country and still feel a kinship with this area that they’re visiting and 
that’s really the whole goal of interpretation… (MORA4).  
 
• …You want people to know what the point of the park is and what it has to offer them, 
what they don’t have in their life… If they appreciate all the things that are going on, the 
types of trees, the beauty, the largest concentration of bears on the East Coast, that way 
they’ll value the park and want to take care of it, especially when they’re here 
(DEWA14).  
 
• My hope is that people will care enough about the place [that] they’ll want to be a good 
steward of it… Hopefully we can impart something—an ideal or something that will help 
them recognize that, ‘Gosh, this is a really awesome place and what can we do to change 
our behavior to help other people take care of it?’ (OLYM2).  
 
Empirical work conducted in sociology and environmental psychology (among other disciplines) 
has demonstrated similar linkages between sense of place and participation in pro-environmental 
behaviors (e.g., Brehm, Eisenhauer, & Krannich, 2006; Stedman, 2002). While an explicit part of 
an interpretive ranger’s job, encouraging visitors to take positive action on behalf of the park, 
such as following park rules or donating time or money to the NPS, did not seem limited to this 
employee group’s domain. Though other employees or volunteers may encounter fewer 
opportunities to engage in the type of persuasive “storytelling” about the park described above, 
they nonetheless saw the value in doing so.   
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“The agency of the ranger.” When describing the sources from which park visitors could 
obtain information (including, but not limited to, risk- and safety-related information) about the 
park, interviewees mentioned the usual suspects, including brochures, pamphlets, maps, bulletin 
boards, and the NPS website. For many interviewees, however, their and their colleagues’ role in 
providing face-to-face contact with visitors was granted particular importance. For one, 
interviewees noted how in-person, employee-visitor contact enables the type of “visitor 
proficiency profiling” (Rickard, McComas, & Newman, 2011) that may dissuade visitors from 
participating in activities for which they are unprepared; though not always stated explicitly, 
interviewees seemed to view this form of risk communication as more effectual than a posted 
sign or brochure. By focusing on spoken and unspoken cues, such as visitors’ dress, equipment, 
or the types of questions they ask, employees can often “size up” these individuals, and then 
tailor their risk communication accordingly. While Rickard et al. (2011) initially observed 
proficiency profiling during a summer season at MORA, comments from interviewees in all 
three parks in this study lend increased support to the idea that this strategic communication 
process may be enacted more widely throughout the Park System and in all seasons. Examples of 
proficiency profiling as a dynamic, two-way interchange between the employee and the visitor 
included the following:      
• …[Visitors] just say, ‘Oh, I need a permit.’ And so we’ll say, ‘Well, where are you 
heading?’… If we know that there’s 10 or 20 feet of snow there, then we kind of start 
asking some questions, like, ‘Do you have really good map and compass skills? Do you 
know about the avalanche danger today? …Do you have avalanche transceivers, probes, 
and shovels?’ And then, depending on their answers to those questions, and we get more 
into detail, and you just kind of learn to read people a little bit, just the way they present 
themselves… (OLYM2).  
 
• …You get an initial impression just based on the way they’re dressed and what they have 
with them… And talking to them. There’s different jargon and lingo that people can use. 
And they’ll tell you, ‘Oh yeah, I brought my map and compass. What is the declination?’ 
So when someone starts talking about declination, I know they’re pretty comfortable with 
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their map and compass… Through conversation you can kind of get an idea of what their 
skill level is… (MORA3).   
 
• If the visitor services people sort of size up their abilities and say, ‘Well, yeah, you can 
go up this rough trail over here, ‘cause you guys look like you would enjoy that’ or, 
‘Maybe you would want to enjoy Dingman’s Falls where you have a boardwalk and you 
can see a nice waterfall there’ (DEWA4).  
 
When profiling visitors, as in Rickard et al. (2011), the present study found evidence that 
employees struggle with what they describe as a tension between wanting to warn visitors of 
potentially hazardous park conditions, while not wanting to “scare them away” from the park. 
Describing the difficulty of informing visitors of the dangers of swimming in the Delaware River 
while not dissuading them from being at the park, a DEWA interpretive ranger explained:  
…A lot of times when I’m talking to somebody, what I want to say is, ‘You are the 
picture of our demographic’… We try not to scare them. But we do let people know that 
people have drowned in this river. And here are the number one causes (DEWA12).  
 
Likewise, a MORA volunteer observed that NPS managers do not necessarily try to “publicize” 
park hazards as it may “discourage people from going out and experiencing the park” 
(MORA13). These and other interviewees’ concerns about the use of “scare tactics” as a form of 
risk communication is relevant to research on fear appeals, which has described the possibility of 
inducing defensive avoidance or reactance given inadequate self-efficacy information (e.g., 
Witte & Allen, 2000); in the case of the park, this unintended consequence of a message might 
mean scaring people away, rather than encouraging them to visit the park (e.g., Byrne & Hart, 
2009; Cho & Salmon, 2007). 
 In addition to seeing park personnel as essential for proficiency profiling, some interviewees 
viewed the ranger as the Park Service’s historic—and popular—resource for informing public 
audiences. For some individuals, staff clad in “flat hats” and the NPS “grey and green” provide a 
kind of nostalgia for generations past, as well as an encouraging reminder of the stewardship that 
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the Park Service has provided of federal lands for nearly 100 years. As a DEWA administrator 
and an OLYM interpretive ranger, respectively, commented:  
National parks have always been the agency of the ranger. This is what we wear, this is 
the badge. We’ve always been the face-to-face person. We need more face time with the 
visitor (DEWA16).  
 
…I think tradition is important… I think when people come to a national park, what 
[visitors] want is something different than they get in everyday life. Like they want 
something that they saw fifty years ago that hasn’t changed, they want a polite person in 
a uniform… (OLYM5).   
 
For some, pride in the job runs deep, as does commitment to the agency, the job, and the general 
public. In a book documenting the history of the national park ranger, former ranger Charles 
“Butch” Farabee (2003, p. vii) sums up this mix of dedication, skill, and historical significance 
by characterizing park rangers as “an amalgam of Jedi Knight, favorite teacher, and Smokey 
Bear.” Continuing, he notes:  
As stewards of our nation’s treasures, they are heir to five thousand years of tradition: 
they celebrate this legacy with pride, reflect it with humility. It is a privilege to be called 
a ranger; but the title must be earned, gained through credibility, confidence, and ardor. 
… It is an attitude and choice; a fervor for the resource and dedication to public service.   
 
Other interviewees, however, saw providing face-to-face contacts as visitors important less 
for the sake of preserving tradition than for ensuring effectiveness. In an agency committed to 
engaging the public, many employees consider speaking directly with their clientele to be the 
gold standard of communication. Research in leisure studies further substantiates these 
comments, as park visitor studies have shown rangers to be both highly used and effective 
information sources, from the perspective of park visitors (e.g., Doucette & Cole, 1993; 
Manning, 2003; Manning, Cole, Stewart, Taylor, & Lee, 2000; Rickard et al., 2011). 
Interviewees noted that one-on-one, face-to-face contacts between NPS staff and visitors enable 
the type of tailored information not always available from other park information sources, 
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whether posted signs or podcasts; in the words of a MORA fee collector: “that is where you can 
get the most up-to-date, most accessible, anything you need kind of thing, is from anybody in 
uniform” (MORA17). According to some employees, engaging visitors in two-way conversation, 
moreover, can be more persuasive than some of the newer forms of information technology, 
especially in cases where human health and safety may be on the line. According to an OLYM 
Natural & Cultural Resources employee:   
… We try to substitute all these media things—podcasts, and electronic, virtual tours… I 
think the personal contact is really important and can be very helpful because a ranger 
would explain to somebody… ‘Are you going out there in that meadow? Do you see 
those elk out there?... Well, they can move about 60 mph when they want to, and they 
don’t want people getting near them.’ (OLYM7).  
 
Importantly, some noted that these face-to-face intercepts could be critical in instances where 
visitors may need safety information, such as about weather or trail conditions, yet may not seek 
out this information on their own. For instance, many parks, including Grand Canyon and 
Yosemite, have instituted “preventive search and rescue” (PSAR) programs in which park staff 
and volunteers rove popular trails in order to intercept individuals who may be ill-equipped to 
participate in the activity. Explaining the merits of a PSAR program, a DEWA law enforcement 
ranger noted:      
…You can have all this information available, you can put it out, you can do public 
service announcements, you can have it available in dozens of languages… But… I think 
with some people you really need that actual visitor contact (DEWA17).  
 
Limited research in national park contexts has substantiated this claim, with the exception of Yee 
and Iserson (2008), whose retrospective quantitative analysis of Grand Canyon search and rescue 
(SAR) data between 1998 and 2005 suggests that PSAR has contributed to a reduction in overall 
SAR incidents. Other studies have demonstrated the effectiveness of park staff (over posted signs 
and barriers) in guiding visitors’ behavior, such as deterring them from hiking off trail in 
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environmentally sensitive areas (Swearingen & Johnson, 1988). Even as they extolled the virtues 
of face-to-face communication, interviewees noted the difficulty of providing adequate levels of 
park staffing to ensure that these contacts took place; no one seemed to believe that hiring more 
people was a foreseeable prospect, given ever-dwindling federal funds for national parks. (For a 
further discussion of funding, see below).  
“Shift from wood signs.” Rather than praise tradition, some interviewees described what 
they viewed as real problems in the antiquated communication channels in place within most 
parks. When asked to evaluate the park’s efforts to disseminate risk- and safety-related messages 
to visitors, one DEWA interpretive ranger voiced frustration with the status quo—
communication strategies she saw as poorly suited for a new generation of tech-savvy 
consumers:       
 Our website’s not that easy to navigate and find information easily …Our brochures are 
not graphically pleasing enough to really make people interested in reading them. We just 
don’t have a lot of media that’s in the right format…That doesn’t work for a generation, 
or people who are coming to the park now. They want it quick. They want it free. And so, 
we’re not meeting their needs (DEWA2).  
 
The sense that parks have been unable to keep up with changing expectations that their clientele 
may have for acquiring information seemed most salient to interviewees’ discussions of social 
media and the park website. Until very recently, most parks were unable to access online 
platforms like Twitter, Facebook, or YouTube through federal government Internet servers. 
Unsurprisingly, the new availability of these services has resulted in widespread adoption, 
including all three parks in this study. Moreover, at the time of this research, both DEWA and 
MORA had recently hired a full-time employee responsible for managing the park’s social media 
presence.  
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Referring most directly to Twitter and Facebook, many interviewees seemed to suggest that 
by adopting forms of social media, the park could improve the park’s communication structure; 
however, interviewees were not always clear in explaining just how social media would 
transform the park’s communication, or why these forms of communication should be considered 
an improvement over more traditional forms of communication, such as signs, bulletin boards, 
and brochures. Most centrally, interviewees seemed to make the argument that, when it comes to 
communication technology, newer is better, especially in, as a DEWA law enforcement ranger 
put it, “keeping up with the times” (DEWA13) and communicating with younger park audiences. 
In the words of a MORA administrator, “[Twitter] is a tool… So we’ve got to shift from signs 
that are painted brown” (MORA8). Likewise, a DEWA Natural & Cultural Resources employee 
agreed:     
I think we probably haven’t explored nearly enough other means of communication that 
us old guys don’t really partake in too much that seems to be more the norm. Facebook 
and Twitter … video chats and YouTube videos and stuff like that, people are gonna look 
at and pass around (DEWA4).   
 
Of the interviewees who offered more of an argument for how social media could transform park 
communication, a handful mentioned using these platforms to disseminate simple, yet urgent, 
risk messages. In the case of MORA and OLYM, for example, park employees described using 
tweets to inform park visitors about weather or driving conditions —information that might not 
be instantaneously updated on the park’s website or telephone information line, and would not 
appear in written materials like brochures. As one MORA employee explains:   
…For Twitter… ‘heavy avalanche danger, we’re not opening the road,’ or, if the road is 
open there’s heavy avalanche danger, be careful in the backcountry’ (MORA16).  
 
Questioning the role of these platforms as a panacea for the park’s communication challenges, a 
few interviewees challenged this utopian view. Referring back to one of the central missions of 
	   240	  
the Park Service, to attract visitors to recreate in national parks, a DEWA administrator noted, 
somewhat tongue-in-cheek, “…simply having the Secretary of the Interior tweet about 
something isn’t going to draw those [younger generation of visitors] in” (DEWA9). Similarly, a 
DEWA law enforcement ranger explained how simply creating a Facebook page does not 
necessarily result in connecting with park visitors:     
…They just opened up a Facebook site like yesterday… But you’ve got to get people to 
know to join them! …This isn’t an easy—you’re supposed to solve all problems after 
this! Because we have smart people that have been trying (DEWA8).  
 
Like the use of social media, park websites received both praise and criticism. On the 
positive side, many interviewees remarked that park websites contained copious information and 
resources for planning a visit, such as trail reports, road closures, and locations and operating 
hours of visitor centers and museums. Accordingly, they viewed the website as an essential 
resource: something every visitor should (and, conceivably, could) refer to prior to arriving at the 
park. Yet, as other interviewees explained, such as the MORA interpretive ranger quoted below, 
the wealth of information contained in the website is not always easily accessible, due in part to 
its federally-mandated format, which is similar across all park units:   
There’s a lot of information on our website. It’s not always easy to find… Things get 
buried. But it’s that overall template and you’re trying to shove things into things… What 
it does is it kind of prevents some of the flexibility for us to use (MORA4).  
 
In the same vein, others called park websites “awful,” “terrible,” and “a mess,” noting that they 
routinely received complaints about them, or, like the employee quoted above, spent time 
assisting visitors to locate information “buried” deep within the sites. According to some 
interviewees, in addition to being non-“user-friendly,” park websites can also jeopardize park 
managers’ goals of helping visitors develop relationships with the park. According to a MORA 
Natural & Cultural Resources employee:  
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Coming from an interpretation method… you can’t really navigate [park websites] in any 
sense of anything. It takes a long time to find anything and the information, like the ways 
to connect people to resources, aren’t there, I don’t think (MORA21).  
 
As this section has illustrated, in the area of visitor communication, some park employees saw 
real issues to be addressed moving forward. Whether the NPS has “appropriately” adapted to an 
evolving information climate, and if using new technological innovations might benefit its 
employees and visitors, remains an empirical question, as employees are left to evaluate their 
communication efforts based on their impressions of what has worked.   
Involving the community. Whether posting signs or tweets, the types of information 
described in the previous sections rely on top-down dissemination by the NPS. In contrast to this 
format, interviewees also discussed instances in which the Park Service partnered—or could 
partner—with outside agencies or businesses in order to provide information to park visitors (or 
potential visitors). In general, interviewees suggested that these partnerships served (or could 
serve) two main purposes: first, to introduce and orient public audiences to national parks, 
including raising awareness and appreciation of undeveloped areas, and second, to target and 
educate park user groups who have been historically involved in safety incidents. In service of 
the first goal, interviewees mentioned efforts to partner with schools, universities, private 
businesses, and nonprofit groups. NPS employees have taught classes, talked to local radio DJs, 
and manned booths at local fairs. Describing how several of his staff members, permanent 
residents of the surrounding communities, have begun volunteering with local public schools, a 
DEWA law enforcement ranger explained, “…if you get the kids involved, you’ll get the parents 
involved” (DEWA7); as potential park visitors, these parents would learn from their children, 
and be better informed of safety and environmental issues in the park. Also working with local 
schools, an OLYM interpretive ranger described taking teenagers from the surrounding 
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communities on hikes in the park as a transformative experience able of combating the “nature 
deficit disorder” (Louv, 2005) he viewed as widespread in this population. Recounting a recent 
trip, he remarked: 
…We’ll talk about sword ferns and Douglas firs and Western red cedars and start to try to 
reconnect… At the end of my workday, that’s probably gonna be the most possibly 
rewarding thing and ultimately—hopefully—the most beneficial thing that we might be 
able to do (OLYM4).  
 
Partnerships can also occur even when park employees are not directly involved. Several 
interviewees from the Washington parks described how businesses and nonprofit groups offer 
information and training designed to orient public audiences to safe outdoor recreation—an 
outcome that, in turn, helps park managers. For instance, a MORA Natural & Cultural Resources 
employee described how local branches of REI, a popular outdoor clothing and gear outfitter in 
the Pacific Northwest, offer “everything from kayak classes to navigation courses, whether it’s 
GPS or map and compass, how to snowshoe, or ski” (MORA20), and others noted that similar 
courses were offered by the Seattle-based nonprofit group The Mountaineers.  
 While the aforementioned partnerships are aimed at the visiting public, writ large, other 
partnerships that interviewees described would target particular user groups. A handful of 
interviewees suggested that partnerships with groups like the Boy Scouts would assist the park in 
preventing the types of rule violations, injuries, and accidents attributed to these groups. As an 
OLYM interpretive ranger explained:  
We could do more outreach to like Scout groups... They certainly have been a resource 
protection problem. But being proactive with them and their leaders and trying to train in 
Leave No Trace…could probably help us in the long run (OLYM6).  
 
Similarly, an OLYM administrator suggested that, following numerous safety incidents and 
infractions among Navy personnel unaccustomed to recreating in the park or the climate of the 
Pacific Northwest, the park reached out to the base’s administrators: “forming relationships with 
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whoever the leaders were, and that way, they would know to post notices or press releases or 
whatever on the bulletin board [at the base]” (OLYM1). According to this individual, these 
efforts resulted in fewer problems among this target group.  
 Tailoring messages. Because many interviewees discriminated between different visitor 
“types” they also believed that communication with visitors could not (and should not) be “one 
size fits all.” Indeed, employees from all three parks described ways in which they struggle to 
manage park experiences for a range of visitors based on assumptions of these groups’ levels of 
awareness and preparedness, as well as previous exposure to park-related information. Some of 
these assumptions are likely borne out, as in one MORA law enforcement ranger’s example of 
comparing a mountaineer to a sightseer:     
…Someone obviously climbing the mountain is going to have to do a lot more research 
on being up to speed with avalanche conditions and going through the process of getting 
a permit, versus someone who’s just going up to the visitor center to watch the movie and 
maybe go to a program (MORA14). 
 
While not asked specifically in the interview to distinguish between park visitors, interviewees 
nonetheless described multiple ways in which they classified the “types” of visitors they 
encounter on a daily basis. These classifications, it seemed, helped interviewees to better 
contextualize the discussion of risk management, including the role played by risk and safety-
based communication. I describe several of these visitor “types” below.  
“The Paradise crowd.” For employees and volunteers at all three parks, classifying visitors 
by the recreational activities they took part in (or avoided) was an easily employable strategy. 
MORA, OLYM, and DEWA each feature a diverse set of activities suitable for a range of 
abilities and skill levels, from visiting indoor exhibits, to canoeing rivers, to scaling glaciers; 
however, when characterizing visitor “types” interviewees tended toward a more dichotomous 
description: those who leave their cars, and those who do not. As several interviewees noted, 
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while some visitors seek the developed park areas, such as picnic areas, museums, and visitor 
centers, others visit parks to experience untrammeled places. Referring to the vehicle-accessible 
base of Mount Rainier, equipped with snack bar, restrooms, and a museum, one MORA ranger 
described some visitors as “the Paradise crowd”: individuals who expect that “everything’s close 
to their car…and they’re wearing their penny loafers and those kind of things” (MORA12). 
Likewise, a DEWA law enforcement ranger explained that, while the park’s developed 
recreational sites, such as lifeguarded beaches, attract “a certain type of visitor,” “thousands and 
thousands of visitors to the park, they don’t want anything to do with that; they want to come and 
be out in nature” (DEWA6). In addition to providing space for sightseers and nature enthusiasts, 
parks can also attract highly competent, experienced, or even professional-level athletes to their 
mountains, rivers, and forests. As one DEWA administrator described, these individuals often 
differ markedly in skill-level from the majority of visitors, which can pose a different kind of 
risk management challenge:  
[Professional kayakers] like to come up when the water’s high in spring and challenge the 
waterfalls and things like that. Some of those activities may be OK for those folks, in 
terms of not getting hurt, because they are so expert at it, but they’re also setting an 
example for other people that… [are] not going to be able to follow it without getting hurt 
(DEWA9).  
 
As these and other comments suggested, in categorizing visitors by their recreational choices, 
interviewees also implied that visitors differ in both their levels of voluntary risk-taking and their 
acceptance—or seeking—of (un)developed landscapes. Interestingly, a MORA administrator 
expressed uncertainty with the park’s traditional emphasis on informing and regulating visitors 
participating in high-risk recreational activities, such as mountaineering. Using a banking 
metaphor, he explained the careful strategy involved in the decision to tailor safety-related 
messages to visitor types:    
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…We’re not going to have enough money to do everything so what…group of visitor do 
you get the most for the investment in safety information [?]… Yeah, we spend a lot of 
time in the high-risk activity, but they’re probably the most prepared… People who, 
driving in the winter for their first [view] of snow… that’s probably a different risk 
(MORA8). 
 
First time visitors. Interviewees also categorized visitors based on whether or not they had 
previously visited the park. Specifically, they differentiated between first-time visitors, and those 
who may have been to the park several times already. Suggesting that familiarity with park rules 
and safety may develop over time, several employees noted that the first-time visitor could lack 
understanding of the conditions at the park. Describing his staff’s struggle to educate visitors 
about park-related safety, one MORA administrator noted, “…Over time people become 
educated. If they’re coming in for one trip… we’re limited about how much impact we can have 
on them” (MORA8). In the same vein, a MORA law enforcement ranger described his staff as 
flummoxed by their futile attempts to:  
…[Deal] with the more typical vacationer coming out from Ohio or whatever, that’s a 
transient population that you can go and hit hard and two weeks later, none of those 
people that saw all of that [safety-related] activity are around, so that’s just a problem 
inherent in parks (MORA9).  
 
As these individuals’ comments describe, having an audience consisting of many first-time—or 
even one-time—visitors poses perennial challenges. Ideally, risk managers provide risk and 
safety-based information that visitors can acquire and assimilate over time; in reality, however, 
park personnel must struggle to decide, as the MORA administrator quoted above put it, 
“…what’s the minimum that the one-time visitors has to have in order not to get hurt [?]” 
(MORA8).      
Locals. Related to the previous category, interviewees also distinguished between visitors 
from the local area and those visiting from out-of-town. As might be expected, some employees 
noted that local visitors are often repeat visitors, as they take advantage of the recreational 
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opportunities offered in close proximity to their home. Describing the type of winter visitors who 
frequent Hurricane Ridge at OLYM, a location with designated sledding, cross-country skiing, 
and downhill skiing areas, one OLYM law enforcement ranger called them, “…a lot of locals 
who pretty much know all the rules and follow them fairly well” (OLYM11). Knowing the 
park’s regulations, however, does not always mean leaving behind the habits of home. 
Employees at DEWA, in particular, described how visitors from nearby metropolitan areas 
seemed to bring with them the customs of city life; specifically, in the words of one employee, 
“they’re always trying to go fast” (DEWA11). Whether or not visitors intend to appreciate 
DEWA’s scenery, or to drive the park roads as a turnpike to New York City, employees 
suggested that they seemed to, consciously or not, bring city culture with them; for most 
employees, these habits were not viewed favorably. Comparing DEWA to a few Western 
national parks in which he had worked, one DEWA law enforcement ranger described:  
…I think just the lifestyle is different here. It’s like the hustle, the bustle, everybody’s 
riding up your tail…  But I mean they’re used to… the city and the horns and riding each 
other and trying to get somewhere and cutting people off…it’s not like they’re gonna do 
that in the city and then come here and not do it (DEWA13).  
 
Interviewees also noted that local visitors are more apt to visit the park spur-of-the-moment, 
rather than as part of a pre-planned trip. For instance, many employees described a sunny day in 
the Puget Sound metropolitan area, one in which Mount Rainier looms large above Seattle, as a 
“billboard” for park visitation. As one MORA law enforcement ranger described:      
…The main thing that we run into is the last-minute visitors at this park, particularly… 
Here, it’s more of the person that’s coming out, oh you can see the mountain out, let’s go 
out for the day (MORA18).  
 
Ironically, employees noted that, in some cases, out-of-town visitors were more prepared for 
their park visit than local visitors, as the non-locals had taken the time to research the park’s 
conditions, as well as to plan an itinerary. (See below for a discussion of visitor preparedness). 
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As employees indicated, determining how to reach all visitor types, and with what information, 
is often less than straightforward, especially given limited budgets. One DEWA law enforcement 
ranger described the park’s ongoing struggle to disseminate park-related press releases to a 
widespread visitor base as “[figuring] out how to reach into the city and get our message out to 
the people that are visiting from those areas” (DEWA6).  
 English as a second language. While all three parks receive foreign visitors, DEWA 
interviewees in particular described how hosting many non-English speakers poses particular 
challenges. With a large Hispanic/Latino visitor base, park managers have attempted to reach 
their users by posting bilingual signs throughout the park, and by ensuring that at least a handful 
of their staff can communicate in Spanish. Yet, despite these interventions, the on-the-ground 
interactions between park employees and non-English speaking visitors can be cumbersome at 
best. A fee collector at DEWA explained the challenges of communicating simple payment 
instructions at a popular beach area:  
None of my [staff] speak Spanish now… I’ve had people on park staff who are Spanish-
speaking help us make up signs and stuff to put in our windows, as far as putting the 
receipt on your dashboard. And there’s no Spanish word for ‘dashboard’…And I actually 
point, ‘Up here, put it here!’ And I’ll watch them do it. ‘No, don’t put it in your wallet. 
Put it up here!’ It’s difficult (DEWA3).  
 
While bilingual signs and staff play a basic role in ensuring that information is disseminated to 
all audiences, tailoring messages may be about more than getting the language right. On a 
summer afternoon, as extended families converge on the park to barbeque and kick a soccer ball, 
a DEWA swimming beach can be transformed into a melting pot of Central and South American 
cultures: Guatemalan, Ecuadoran, Mexican, and Salvadoran, among others. Given this 
atmosphere, a DEWA administrator observed, “I look at my lifeguards. All of them are White, 
Anglo-Saxon kids… So what we’ve got is… having to deal with a different culture” (DEWA16). 
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Cultural differences between visitors and employees can also manifest in reactions to the 
physical park environment. A MORA administrator described how park managers assembled a 
focus group of diverse members of the public to discuss the park’s communication strategies, 
only to find that many believed the photographs of wild animals displayed on park brochures to 
be unwelcoming and scary. As he recalled:  
I still remember—don’t put wild animals and scary bears and cougars and stuff on the 
front page. But at the same time we’ve always used that [approach] as thinking that’s 
effective (MORA8).   
 
Similarly, the DEWA fee collector quoted above was surprised to find that visitors accustomed 
to more urban settings may fear the dense canopy of hardwood trees shading the park’s narrow 
roads, an aspect of the park she and other employees find appealing. As these examples 
demonstrate, whether differences in language or values (or both), employees encounter 
substantial barriers to disseminating park information.   
“Can’t put a sign everywhere.”  Though most NPS employees saw themselves as 
responsible for providing information, they were quick to clarify the limits of their role. 
Referring to the idea of “common sense” (which will be discussed at length below), employees 
noted that their responsibility to provide information must work in tandem with visitors’ own 
knowledge of safety—the information employees tend to expect all visitors to have, regardless of 
their background. Discussing the park’s responsibility to provide safety messages in its 
publications (e.g., pamphlets, maps, signs), an OLYM employee in the Interpretation & 
Education division described what she saw as an appropriate and essential boundary demarcating 
the park’s and the visitor’s responsibility:     
We can provide general safety information… like hypothermia, or if you see a cougar, do 
this, or don’t drive up to the ridge today… But we can’t say like, ‘When you’re hiking on 
a mountain trail, don’t climb up a tree ‘cause you might fall out.’… A lot of it has to be 
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their own common sense. We can give them as many safety warnings as we can, but we 
can’t go with them (OLYM5).  
 
Like the individual quoted above, many employees viewed the NPS responsibility to provide 
information as extending only so far. Limited in personnel and other resources, parks are often 
forced to make do; in the context of providing information, this can mean producing pamphlets, 
podcasts, and signs, placing them in the park, and then hoping for the best, as illustrated in these 
employee comments:    
…All you can do is make as much high quality information available as you can and 
hope people internalize it (OLYM1).  
 
… I guess a lot of that still kind of gets back to educate, and hopefully somebody makes 
an informed decision… and I guess at that point let the cards fall where they will 
(MORA20).  
 
 That the responsibility of information dissemination has necessary limits was expressed most 
directly in interviewees’ belief that park managers “can’t put a sign everywhere.” Some 
interviewees used this expression to emphasize the sheer impossibility of labeling, through signs 
or park literature, each potential hazard throughout the park; as a DEWA administrator put it, 
“you can’t put a sign everywhere in the river where there’s a rock” (DEWA1). Similarly, other 
interviewees noted that signs and brochures are not necessarily useful in disseminating 
information that should be obvious to park visitors; as indicated by an OLYM Natural & Cultural 
Resources division employee: “Would you have a big sign that says, ‘you must use common 
sense in here?’ Would that help in any way? I don’t think so” (OLYM7). Likewise, a MORA law 
enforcement ranger noted:  
…As law enforcement we can say, ‘it is your responsibility to know the rules and 
regulations of the park.’ So you should know that you’re not supposed to cut down trees 
or feed the wildlife. Like there doesn’t necessarily have to be a sign everyplace to dictate 
that (MORA14).  
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Other interviewees seemed to suggest that signs and brochures could become crutches: risk 
management resources that park managers relied upon too heavily, despite limited evidence of 
their effectiveness in guiding visitors towards prescribed behaviors. According to an OLYM 
interpretive ranger:  
…A lot of people in other divisions think, ‘We need a handout, we need a sign, we need 
another handout, we need another sign.’ …Well, people… walk out into the meadow and 
they sit on the signs that say ‘please don’t walk on the meadow.’… And so signs aren’t 
the answer everywhere, but it seems like we need to make at least some effort to give 
people the information (OLYM6).  
 
An over-reliance on signs, moreover, was also seen as decreasing visitors’ receptiveness to park 
messages, including those related to safety. A MORA volunteer (and risk management 
professional by training), noted that park managers should,  “…pick and choose what they want 
to highlight at the moment because otherwise…then there’s the risk of de-sensitizing” 
(MORA13).  
 “People don’t read signs.” Even as interviewees noted the utility of having some (limited) 
signage, they also expressed the strong belief that park visitors, as a group, “don’t read signs”—a 
contention that applied not just to signs and bulletin boards, but to park-related communication 
in general. As interviewees were quick to explain, the reasons for not paying attention to NPS 
communication varied. First, employees acknowledged that visitors might never receive the 
information in the first place. In this sense, visitors can be, unwittingly, “defiant” by default. 
While park managers can (and do) make certain information available to visitors, they can 
neither guarantee that individuals are aware of its existence, nor that they know how to find it. A 
MORA law enforcement ranger summed up this perennial dilemma as such, “…The 
information’s provided to them; it’s there if they go looking for it. But how do you get them to 
actually see it?” (MORA15). Describing a kind of information impasse, a second MORA law 
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enforcement ranger suggested that individuals who most need information about the park could 
also be those least likely to seek it out:  
People who read the trailhead sign and recognize the cues that we’re putting out there 
don’t need the trailhead sign, for the most part, because they know what they’re getting 
into. And the people who don’t [know what they’re getting into] don’t read the sign… 
(MORA7).  
 
While not stated explicitly, this ranger’s comment also implies that the inexperienced visitor may 
“ignore” signs because of his or her unfamiliarity with the physical context or the recreational 
activity. Though an unwarranted sense of self-confidence may persuade visitors that seeking 
information is unnecessary, at the same time, these visitors may have little idea of what 
information they do not know, and what they might need to know to recreate safely in the park. 
Complicating matters, in some parks, such as OLYM, regulations vary by location, such that 
visitors familiar with camping in alpine regions, for instance, might be unaware of the rules of 
camping on the coast. As one OLYM law enforcement ranger who supervises a popular 
backcountry hiking area saw it, “…There isn’t a huge group of people who’s intentionally trying 
to break the rules. There’s just a lot of people who, in good faith, didn’t get it” (OLYM9). 
Likewise, rules for appropriate visitor behavior can also vary by park, leading to potential 
confusion for visitors traveling to more than one national park. A MORA Natural & Cultural 
Resources employee, for instance, gave the example of the need to secure one’s food items while 
traveling in bear habitats, a procedure meant to keep wildlife from becoming sick from, and 
accustomed to, human food:   
…You go to Yosemite, and they say don’t leave your food in the car. And if you’re in 
Yellowstone or even here or Olympic, we say leave your food in the car… People who 
are hitting all of the different parks… and they’ve kept their food in the car, and all of a 
sudden they get to Yosemite and it’s kind of like, ‘Why do I have to take it out of the 
car?’ (MORA20).  
 
	   252	  
As this employee’s anecdote illustrates, managing parks for localized ecological and biological 
conditions, while central to the NPS mission, can result in inconsistent risk messaging and, 
perhaps, uninformed (and unintentional) defiance of park rules.   
 Employees also noted that some visitors inadvertently miss signs and other park-related 
information due to their familiarity with the park and surrounding areas. Even the most striking 
warning sign, employees noted, fades into the background for those most accustomed to seeing 
it, such as repeat park visitors. Moreover, as seminal research in risk communication has shown, 
both familiarity with a risk as well as an optimistic bias, can serve to limit the associated 
perception of risk, which may likewise affect some repeat visitors (e.g., Weinstein, 1987). 
Interestingly, employees acknowledged that they, too, can “ignore” signage for just these 
reasons. A DEWA Natural & Cultural Resources employee used the example of a prominent 
park traffic signal at a highly traveled intersection in the park to demonstrate how signs can be 
rendered invisible for those most exposed to them:  
…There’s a sign that has a traffic light… And it has two blinking yellow lights there 
everyday. It flashes all the time. I’ve asked people, ‘Do you know where that sign is?’… I 
mean, people that drive by everyday. ‘There’s a sign that flashes?’ (DEWA11).  
 
One DEWA interpretive ranger explained how, as a long-time smoker, she, too, has come to 
ignore the safety warnings on cigarette packaging. This reaction, by extension, has convinced her 
of the importance of rules and enforcement (as opposed to just risk communication) to 
preventing drowning fatalities in the park:    
…People say, ‘Why don’t people see the signs? Why don’t they read the signs?’ And I’m 
like, ‘I do it all the time!’ Rip [the Surgeon General’s warning label] off, throw it 
away…. So if we…. close Kittatinny, well then people won’t drown there anymore. 
Because they won’t be able to go there, and they won’t be able to go in the water here, 
just like I can’t smoke anymore [in buildings, due to state law] (DEWA12).  
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In addition to the “types” of defiance described above, it is possible that some visitors who “do 
not read” signs or disobey park rules simply do not comprehend the messages contained therein, 
such as due to a language barrier, as was discussed above. Lacking empirical evidence gathered 
from the visitors themselves, we cannot determine with certainty which of the possibilities 
described above is more often the case when visitors appear defiant.  
 As this section as shown, educational approaches were perceived by interviewees as the 
central pillar of NPS’ visitor risk management strategy. When compared to engineering and 
enforcement approaches, which will be discussed below, educational interventions can be both 
lower in cost and higher in acceptability; even as some interviewees voiced their distaste for 
“signs everywhere,” such approaches are (arguably) less invasive than constructing barriers or 
limiting access, and thus continue to be adopted. Yet the advantages of educational programming 
may be tempered, in part, by their expected effectiveness, something interviewees seemed to 
indicate in their common refrain that visitors “don’t read signs.” Rather than magic bullets, 
educational approaches are mercurial, their effectiveness relying on factors that may be beyond 
the control of NPS managers, such as the past experiences and motivations of their visitor base. 
Describing the necessary shortfalls of the “cognitive approach,” Heberlein (1974, p. 288) 
concluded that:    
The mainstay of the cognitive fix is to transmit information. This information is likely to 
be effective when it helps the person realize the goals he is already motivated to achieve, 
rather than to change old motivations or create new ones.  
 
The extent to which interviewees appreciate Heberlein’s (1974) comment—and the nuances of 
the “educational approach” more broadly—remains in question, though at least one individual, 
an interpretive ranger at DEWA, was forthright in her recognition of the potential shortcomings 
of simply providing education:  
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…While I know that what I love the most, and brought me into this career is the 
education side of things, and I want to feel like that is the most important because that’s 
what I do… I know that it’s the least effective. And so, going in everyday to do a job that 
you feel really is really important but you know is the least effective way of doing that 
job—that can start to wear on you and get frustrating after a while, too (DEWA12).  
 
Engineering 
 Engineering solutions to reduce park risks represent the second area of NPS responsibility 
that interviewees discussed. In describing the park’s responsibility to engineer handrails, 
walkways, and railings, interviewees broached larger issues, such as liability and the legal and 
philosophical concept of wilderness.    
“Can’t put a handrail everywhere.” Like the limits to informing park visitors, interviewees 
also suggested that the park’s ability, or inclination, to reduce park risks through engineering can 
only extend so far. Just as park staff cannot place signs at every corner, or provide brochures at 
each trail junction, a DEWA law enforcement ranger explained, “There comes a certain point 
where we can’t put fences up…we can’t put walkways up, we can’t make every path even and 
balanced so you don’t trip and fall” (DEWA7). For one, the unknown or unpredictable nature of 
some park risks, such as weather or wildlife, make reducing or eliminating these risks near 
impossible. As a DEWA law enforcement ranger remarked, with respect to engineering park 
risks, “…it would be impossible to mark every place that a snake could be or something like 
that” (DEWA17). Second, most parks lack the personnel and funding to engineer the type of 
extensive handrails, walkways, and bridges that a “safe” park would conceivably require; a 
MORA law enforcement ranger noted, “we just don’t have the manpower or money to do that” 
(MORA18). Finally, and perhaps most crucially, interviewees explained that limiting risk in 
parks by altering the landscape might run counter to part of the NPS mandate to conserve and 
protect natural resources; according to the same MORA ranger quoted above:   
	   255	  
This is a national park and part of the mission statement is to conserve the wildlife and 
the scenery. And that doesn’t always necessitate having to put boundaries up everywhere 
(MORA18).   
  
Stated simply, by a MORA Natural & Cultural Resources employee: “You can’t have just 
hundreds of miles of yellow ribbon, or steel tubes, or chain-link fence in the wilderness settings” 
(MORA20).  
 Complicating matters, interviewees pointed out that some visitors purposefully break park 
rules, such as by entering an area that has been cordoned off, even after receiving information 
about the potential risks and the consequences that could ensue.  A DEWA member of the 
Natural & Cultural Resources Division characterized these individuals as risk-takers, describing 
a common scenario in a popular park location:   
At Childs Park… we have overlooks… There’s a set of three waterfalls there. It’s posted 
‘no swimming’… People still go over the railings and jump off the waterfalls… Unless 
we had a ranger posted there 24 hours a day, we wouldn’t be able to stop it. And even 
then we might not be able to stop it. So there’s that risk that people are choosing to 
take… (DEWA11).  
 
Likewise, an OLYM law enforcement ranger agreed, expressing an almost fatalistic attitude 
towards the inevitability of visitor defiance, despite park managers’ best efforts:  
We can set up as much info and guidelines and sort of protections as we can, which will 
work really well for visitors if they choose to avail themselves of it; however, there are 
some people we’re never going to get to and will do silly things despite all of the 
information that is out there to the contrary (OLYM3). 
 
As these examples suggest, park employees often perceive at least a portion of their clientele as 
willingly and consciously putting themselves in unadvisable situations, despite the employees’ 
best efforts to deter them. 
 “Known hazards.” Some forms of engineering, however, may be a requisite part of the 
park’s responsibility to ensure the safety of visitors. When describing the park’s role in 
managing visitor safety, many interviewees mentioned the park’s responsibility to mitigate 
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“known hazards.” Based on interviewees’ descriptions, these hazards were particularly egregious 
and located in well-traveled areas to which visitors are “invited” by the park. An OLYM 
maintenance worker, for instance, described how his staff is replacing a cedar plank boardwalk 
with a gravel path because the wooden walkway becomes particularly slippery in the damp 
coastal area (OLYM12). At DEWA, park personnel constantly assess the hundreds of man-made 
structures on the park’s property—some historic farmhouses and homesteads, some dilapidated 
sheds or abandoned wells— to determine which need to be removed for the safety of park 
visitors. Though most of these structures are clearly posted off-limits to the public, they must 
nonetheless be considered as potential hazards, as a DEWA Natural & Cultural Resources 
employee explained:     
…Some [structures] are really falling down. Others, the floors are about rotted out and 
there’s holes in them and if somebody does break in…if they go through the floor, that’s 
something that we feel can be prevented if we remove the structures (DEWA11).  
 
In these and other examples, interviewees explained how, in accessible, high-visitation areas 
such as campgrounds, park hotels, short trails, and picnic areas, they felt a responsibility, as one 
DEWA Natural & Cultural Resources employee explained, “not to entice [visitors] into dangers 
that they’re not aware of” (DEWA4). Recounting a visitor rescue in which he was involved 
several years ago at a popular sightseeing area called Marymere Falls, one OLYM law 
enforcement ranger explained his disapproval of the agency’s upkeep of its infrastructure: 
We had a woman who, last year… slipped and broke, I think an ankle, but then as she 
fell, she broke a wrist. … If I was that person… I’d file a tort claim and say, ‘Come on, 
this is ridiculous!’ ‘Cause if you look at it, the stairs they have there, they’re just not 
right…So if you’re gonna provide any kind of trail like that… I think they need to do a 
better job (OLYM8).  
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In a similar case, a DEWA Visitor & Resource Protection Division employee explained how the 
conditions at a campground were unfit for visitors, and her dissatisfaction with park management 
for failing to ameliorate the situation. As she explained:  
Our campground in NJ, the dirt driveway has had the hugest potholes for years. I’ve been 
asking them for at least five years to go in and grade it… And we’re charging people 
thirty dollars a night to stay here… It’s so rutted and pot-holed and muddy and disgusting 
that people are now driving over the field to get around it… (DEWA3).  
 
Somewhat differently, in some cases, engineering safety in these parks means balancing 
historical character, as two MORA Natural & Cultural Resources employees explained in 
reference to historic architectural features in prominent national park locations:  
I remember in Yellowstone we had a situation where… the Mission ’66 railing was pretty 
much a rail that probably had an 18-inch gap… We actually had a little girl who fell. She 
was sitting on the bench, but the rail was wide enough that… she fell, and she wound up 
dying (MORA20).  
 
[At Yosemite’s Awanhee Hotel] they had these big, beefy log railings that were really 
low. And the fact that they were so big actually made them even more dangerous because 
the tendency was you want to sit on it. But if you were to lean back you could be in 
serious trouble (MORA22).  
 
Apart from built structures, several interviewees referred to the park’s responsibility to 
remove “hazard trees”: dying or dead specimens that pose a larger risk of falling. In a “natural” 
setting, a fallen tree benefits the park ecosystem by providing rich organic matter to nurture 
young seedlings; however, in populated areas, falling trees pose formidable risks and negative 
consequences for people and property. As an OLYM interpreter explained:  
…If we invite people to sit and have like a target, whether it’s a picnic table or a tent pad, 
then we are responsible for assessing the health of the trees around that. If there’s one 
leaning over and about to fall on them, we need to cut that tree down… (OLYM6).  
 
A DEWA Natural & Cultural Resources employee agreed, remarking, “The rotting dead tree 
hanging over the picnic table is something we probably should fix” (DEWA4). While seeing the 
value in removing a potentially hazardous obstacle, some interviewees reflected on the idea that 
	   258	  
a decision to benefit its visitors might be detrimental to the park itself. In this way, managing 
hazard trees can be understood as a small example of a much larger tension in the NPS mission: 
the call to facilitate visitor recreation while protecting the health of the park flora and fauna; 
unfortunately, for some interviewees, this balance is rarely achieved in an equitable way. In the 
words of a DEWA interpretive ranger:  
 Being in a park, sometimes you can mitigate the hazard easily. Sometimes it’s more 
difficult and we’re supposed to preserve and protect and hang on and take care of these 
trees and all of that. And I know there’s that balancing issue sometimes where the 
protection of the resource and the protection of the visitors can sometimes be at odds 
(DEWA12).  
 
 Negligence or wilderness. As the examples in the previous section illustrate, the park’s 
responsibility to provide engineering solutions to limit the risk in an area likely differ based on 
the location of these risks. This analysis does not attempt to decipher—or critique—the letter of 
the law in the context of national parks; however, it does recognize the importance of park 
employees’ own interpretations of “negligence” and “wilderness,” two legally defined concepts, 
as contributing to their attributions of responsibility. Interviewees’ descriptions would suggest 
that the park’s responsibility to provide engineering solutions is not necessarily static, but rather 
varies geographically, depending on the character of the environment and the volume of visitor 
use. Many interviewees seemed to distinguish between “backcountry” and “frontcountry” or 
“developed” or “undeveloped” areas in order to explain how this responsibility could fluctuate in 
a single park, as described by one MORA law enforcement ranger:     
People sleeping in a building and we don’t have proper fire protection in place and we 
have a bad incident and people are killed, obviously our liability is way up and should 
be… We can talk about people getting out into the backcountry… I think that’s a bit 
different. People go out and step off the edge of a wash or something, or a cliff. We 
didn’t invent gravity. We didn’t make the wash (MORA9).  
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Making a similar point, a DEWA law enforcement ranger expanded this conception of 
backcountry hazards as existing outside of the Park Service’s general control, stating: “… You 
may not be able to put a fence along the entire ridgeline. But yet at a developed waterfall area, I 
think we would generally” (DEWA17). Running through these and other comments is the sense 
that interviewees see parks as multiple units in one: highly developed areas providing the 
amenities available in many metropolitan areas, as well as primitive wilderness settings, where 
the flora and fauna are largely untouched by human intervention. While instances of negligence 
may be more straightforward in developed areas, such as inadequate fire protection in a visitor 
center or park hotel, the issue becomes less black-and-white in the hundreds of miles of trails 
surrounding these buildings. As an OLYM Natural & Cultural Resources employee noted, while 
trails into the park’s wilderness areas may be “undeveloped” in comparison to a paved highway, 
they are nonetheless fabricated with steps, bridges, primitive campsites, and signs (among other 
interventions), thus raising questions about the park’s responsibility to ensure the safety of hikers 
and campers:      
…If the agency is directing people into certain areas, if there’s a designated campsite or 
permit system where you’re assigning people where to camp…then you get into a gray 
area because there’s designated campsites all over the wilderness and to what extent do 
those need to be made more safe? Handrails put in? (OLYM14). 
 
 As this section as shown, engineering approaches are perceived as important, yet in limited 
situations; their acceptability seems to be contingent on the existence of “known risks” that park 
managers feel compelled to address, in areas to which members of the public are “invited.” In 
many cases, engineering solutions become acceptable based on their geographical location, with 
developed, frontcountry locations, such as visitor centers and campgrounds, more obvious 
choices than wilderness settings. That park employees may see clear—or less than clear—
distinctions in their responsibility based on location in the park begs the question: do visitors 
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perceive these distinctions similarly? Stated differently, do visitors and park employees agree on 
the point at which “wilderness” end, and “frontcountry” begin?  
Enforcement 
 Across all three parks, interviewees described situations in which their responsibility 
included enforcing park rules and regulations. Interviewees noted that their ability to maintain 
visitor safety could be challenged by a lack of a law to enforce, or the failure of visitors to 
recognize the laws that were in place.     
Allowing access. At MORA and OLYM, the two parks I visited in the winter, discussion 
often focused on the issue of park access. Because severe storms and avalanches are perennial 
issues, interviewees explained how they devoted countless hours to enforcing tire chain 
restrictions and ensuring that park roads were passable. At MORA, a decision model including 
several factors, such as weather, avalanche risk, and the number of personnel on duty, allowed 
law enforcement rangers to determine whether to open the single road allowing vehicle access to 
the mountain’s 5,400 ft. base at Paradise. Unlike the Washington Department of Transportation, 
the MORA and OLYM road crew use neither salt nor chemical de-icing agents on the road, nor 
do they employ explosives to clear avalanche chutes. Deciding to close the road, in essence, 
involves weighing multiple risks with allowing visitors access to the park. As an OLYM law 
enforcement ranger noted: 
…It’s not just ‘oh, avalanche danger is high, we should close the road.’ It’s ‘avalanche 
danger is high, there is a big storm with big winds, and it’s snowing and you can’t see the 
road.’ There’s a whole bunch of different factors that go into the decision-making process 
(OLYM11).  
 
Given these complex circumstances, as a MORA law enforcement ranger explained, “…we 
make that decision for [visitors] by closing the road if we feel it’s too dangerous for most people 
to pass” (MORA5). Interestingly, maintaining vehicle access is not limited to high alpine parks. 
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Responsible for over 200 miles of road, including 22 miles of Route 209, a major state highway 
and commuter access road, DEWA officials face similar challenges to keep park roads open 
during snowy winters. Indicating the centrality of the park’s role to the livelihood of the 
surrounding communities, a DEWA administrator remarked: “I always joke that if we don’t plow 
the road when it snows, nobody here is going to work” (DEWA9).    
Whether kayaking the Delaware or summiting Mount Rainier, visitors can make many 
recreational choices largely without tremendous oversight. Though recreational permits issued 
by the park are required for some activities, such as ascending above 10,000 ft. at Rainier or 
camping in the backcountry at any of the three parks, employees are often powerless to stop 
visitors from embarking on misguided itineraries. As Rickard et al. (2011) point out, this 
inability to prevent park visitors from engaging in non-illegal, though arguably unsafe, activities 
forces many employees to rely principally on persuasive communication. Unfortunately, talk 
alone is sometimes inadequate in convincing visitors to change their plans, as one OLYM 
interpretive ranger explained:  
…We had some guys come in here…  They were going to go for a day hike from the Sol 
Duc to the Hoh.. It was in the late winter, early spring, I think, and the woman that ran 
the visitor center at the time said, ‘Well, that’s, I don’t think you probably should do 
that.’ And they started and one guy has never been found… But she gave them all the 
right warnings, but people can still choose to do silly things (OLYM6).     
  
A MORA law enforcement ranger echoed this sentiment, explaining how managers’ decisions to 
allow access depend largely upon calibrating the level of risk they deem “acceptable” for the 
general public; however, as previous discussion has noted, different visitor “types” mean that 
acceptance—and tolerance—of risk can vary greatly throughout the visiting population, leaving 
managers to approach risk conservatively (see also Rickard et al., 2011):     
…We’ll close off sections of hiking trails, like if there’s a bridge out. And there may be a 
number of people that can do that river crossing absolutely safely. But, if our feeling is 
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that it’s too high a risk for the general public to try to cross that, then we’ll close it 
down… But in most cases, I think the park… pretty much allows people to make their 
own judgments about what activity they’re going to do. And we may encourage them not 
to do it, but we’ll stop short of saying ‘you can’t’ (MORA5).  
 
At DEWA, interviewees described how they may close the river to swimming given high water 
levels, such as after a storm event. Interestingly, at this park, rather than simply punishing rule 
violators, managers have embarked on an alternative path. As a DEWA interpretive ranger 
explained, park of the park’s water safety program involves using face-to-face contacts on the 
river to reward individuals who comply with the park’s recommendations:       
…We bought a lot of positive reinforcement promotional items, floating keychains in the 
shape of a PFD, safety whistles, water bottles… to positively reinforce safe behavior 
when we saw it on the river… And it was a nice entry because then you could just say, 
‘Well, you just wear your life jacket and let me show you how to put it on properly. You, 
too, can have a water bottle’ (DEWA12).  
 
Finally, and somewhat differently, allowing visitors the authority to decide for themselves 
whether or not to engage in an activity—to ski an avalanche-prone slope, or to cross a large 
river, for instance— might constitute part of the “visitor experience” that the NPS mission hopes 
to achieve, the type of “challenge” and “elevated experience” discussed above. As an OLYM 
Visitor & Resource Protection employee suggested, the visitor’s prerogative, in this regard, may 
be just as critical as his or her safety:   
…It’s good that we don’t restrict as much as we could restrict.…. We don’t tell them that 
they can’t go in to the backcountry when they’re not maybe totally prepared to go into the 
backcountry… We could be much more controlling in that respect, but… that’s part of 
the experience of going to a national park (OLYM10).  
 
Since allowing access to recreate in federal protected land constitutes part of the NPS mission, 
enforcing restrictions of this access can, understandably, make some employees uncomfortable; 
as a MORA law enforcement ranger reflected on his staff’s decision to close the road to Paradise 
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during the winter, he noted: “…there are times when we feel we have to do that and we feel we 
can justify it. But we get conflicted a little bit” (MORA5).  
Questions of identity. Even when park personnel can enforce rules, however, their ability to 
do so can be compromised by inaccurate public perceptions of national parks and the role of the 
people who work there. Of the law enforcement rangers interviewed, several expressed 
frustration with the public’s lack of recognition of the park as federal land, and of their role as 
commissioned federal officers who uphold the laws therein. According to one MORA law 
enforcement ranger:  
That’s one of the biggest challenges in my entire career: the public perception of what a 
park ranger does…They think kind of like the Smokey the Bear-type thing whereas they 
see us and we’ve got our defensive equipment on and they’re like, ‘Whoa! We didn’t 
know park rangers carried guns!’…They didn’t realize that they’re in an exclusive federal 
jurisdiction. Most of them don’t realize until they do something wrong and they end up 
getting a violation notice from us explaining that they have to show up in Federal District 
Court…(MORA15).  
 
As a second MORA law enforcement ranger described, visitors’ misconceptions about his job 
could also, ironically, threaten the safety of the very visitors he is tasked with protecting. For 
instance, he preferred not to wear the iconic NPS “flat hat,” a staple of the park ranger uniform, 
because, in his experience, visitors will “see it and think, ‘Oh, Yogi Bear!’…People don’t look at 
me and see trooper when they see that on” (MORA9). In addition, this individual discussed how 
visitors oblivious to his role or the circumstances have, in some cases, interrupted an arrest or a 
crime scene investigation to inquire about the location of a trail, or a type of tree. Explaining the 
challenges he faces in navigating his role in the park, he noted:    
…When I see the family collecting pinecones or whatever, I’m fine with explaining why 
we don’t do that. But, when a knucklehead needs to be dealt with, you need to deal with 
them. And, I think sometimes we do a disservice when we are the ‘Oh hi, just friendly 
park ranger’… and spend five minutes telling them to get out of the road or whatever 
when sometimes I’ll just yell an expletive and tell them to move… quite honestly, when 
I’ve done that, I’ve gotten an immediate result (MORA9).  
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In addition to misunderstanding the personnel, not knowing about the nature of a place could 
translate into not knowing how to behave appropriately. For instance, several interviewees 
discussed visitors’ tendency to conflate national parks and state parks, as well as the U.S. Forest 
Service (USFS) and the National Park Service. As one OLYM law enforcement ranger observed, 
“So many people come in and they’re like, ‘Oh yeah, Olympic National Forest is so nice’” 
(OLYM11). Similarly, a MORA Natural & Cultural Resources employee suggested that visitors 
might confuse federal land designations in the same way they might fail to discriminate between 
consumer brand names:    
…It’s like Goodyear or Goodrich on tires. [Visitors] mix the Park Service with the Forest 
Service. And in some cases they get it, and in other cases, it’s just the Great Outdoors 
(MORA20).  
 
Semantics aside, this belief can be particularly troublesome because USFS land is subject to 
different regulations than NPS land, such as those relating to logging, hunting, the presence of 
domesticated animals, and operating motorized equipment. Moreover, many parks, such as 
OLYM and MORA, are surrounded by USFS land, including trails and campsites, confusing the 
issue further. One MORA interpretive ranger described how he explained to discontented visitors 
the benefits and drawbacks of NPS regulations, such as road closures and hiking permits:      
… I tell them, ‘Look, there’s a lot of things that we have rules [for] in the Park Service, 
but there’s a trade-off. These things that you want to do here, you could go right outside 
in the Forest Service just next to the park and do it. But they’re not going to be plowing 
the roads, or come patch you up if something happens’ (MORA3).  
 
Likewise, a MORA law enforcement ranger suggested that the NPS commitment to visitor 
safety, as stated in its official legislation and practiced “in the field,” means that, “…the 
consequences of screwing up in the national park [are] a lot less severe, for the most part, than 
screwing up somewhere else on your own” (MORA7).  
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Interestingly, at DEWA, questions of park identity were central to many interviewees’ 
comments. Unlike MORA and OLYM, DEWA has no central entrance where vehicles must stop, 
make contact with a park employee, and pay a fee; instead, entrances to the park abound (i.e., 70 
access points from adjoining rural roads and state highways), but signage indicating the park’s 
boundaries is scarce. As a result, several employees spoke of local residents being unaware of 
the park’s federal designation, or even its existence. As a park administrator noted:  “We get 
more visitors than the Grand Canyon. Twice as many as Yellowstone and Yosemite… Not all of 
them are leaving here with the knowledge that they visited this park” (DEWA9). Visitors will 
often become confused by the location of the park that, though named after the river, is situated 
in the states of Pennsylvania and New Jersey. The administrator quoted above spoke of his 
staff’s longtime struggle to “[create] an identity so that when you’re in the park, you know that 
this is the park” and that “It’s not in Delaware” (DEWA9). Like most of the law enforcement 
rangers I spoke with, another DEWA employee saw the park’s lack of identity as endangering 
her ability to perform her job:   
I find the most frustrating is that people have never even heard of this park… and they 
have no idea of the scope and the size… Even people that live right outside the park and 
drive through everyday. And that does add to a lot of the confusion and complications 
and the people not understanding what’s going on and why am I stopping them and can I 
give you a ticket ‘cause you’re just a ranger… (DEWA8).  
 
Clarifying this point, a DEWA interpretive ranger noted, “[Visitors] might not know that they 
can’t remove plants or wildlife or things like that because they might not know that they’re in a 
national park” (DEWA15). In the coming months and years, DEWA officials plan to continue 
addressing their “identity problem” through more extensive, up-to-date, and prominent signage, 
especially at each park entrance.   
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Three Es in practice: Additional considerations 
 In practice, the approaches to education, engineering, and enforcement reviewed above face 
real challenges in the form of limited funding, as well as the threat of legal action. Because of 
these limitations, many interviewees were quick to mention that their plans to disseminate 
information, engineer a safety fix, or enforce a park rule, were more often “pie in the sky” than 
proven on the ground. In this sense, there existed potential for disconnect between interviewees’ 
idealized notions of their responsibility to ensure safety, and the reality of these interventions. 
 Resource limitations. Despite park employees’ perceived responsibility to manage the 
“three Es” of risk management, they also recognized that limited resources imposed significant 
roadblocks to meeting this responsibility, as the examples below describe.   
Education. With a limited staff, fewer rangers are available to make the face-to-face contacts 
many of them deem imperative for informing park visitors about potential safety risks. Limited 
funding also means an inability to hire new personnel who could spearhead efforts to introduce 
new communication technology into parks, to evaluate and upgrade the communication sources 
currently in use (e.g., videos, brochures, exhibits, etc.), or to establish partnerships with local 
organizations or businesses to educate public audiences. According to interviewees:  
I think the Web is certainly a place where people are getting more and more information, 
but we don’t have a lot of dynamic information on our website mostly because we don’t 
have a position dedicated to trying to keep that stuff dynamic (OLYM6).  
 
Unfortunately, we don’t have the staffing to be out there and to contact people as much as 
we’d like to. I know even our interpretation folks, even though they have seasonals, 
they’re trying to staff visitor centers and handle the programs that they have and still do 
some roving things, but we have 70,000 acres. It’s not easy to be everywhere! 
(DEWA11).  
 
Engineering. With less funding, park employees cannot repair the known risks they routinely 
encounter around parks, such as deteriorating pavement, hazard trees, or splintered wood on 
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picnic tables. Moreover, limited funds make budgets small (or non-existent) for the emergency 
medical and fire prevention resources that visitors may expect, should they get into trouble. In 
the words of interviewees:   	  
[Visitors] shouldn’t come here and have grass be this high with the little clover flowers 
and bees and snakes and poison ivy all over the place. The bathroom should be working, 
clean. I don’t think it’s right (DEWA3).  
 
…In the picnic area we have a lot of paved walkways where all the edges are crumbled 
off because people walk across, so there’s really tripping hazards…  So, in a sense, we’re 
creating hazards for the visitors because we don’t have the money to eliminate these 
hazards (MORA6).  
 
…I worked at some park, we had an ambulance, I mean it was horrible… It shot sparks 
 and flames out the exhaust… We couldn’t afford to maintain it. We couldn’t afford to 
 replace it…. This is a life safety thing… You’d be better off putting the person in a 
 wheelbarrow… (DEWA17).  
 
Enforcement. Few law enforcement rangers in general, and even fewer on duty on a given 
shift, means the need to prioritize certain tasks (e.g., digging out signs from under snow) over 
others (e.g., patrolling park roads); however, all of these tasks are arguably necessary to ensure 
safety for park visitors, as these comments describe:    
Some of those [visitors] maybe wouldn’t have [jumped off a waterfall] if they knew that 
there was a good chance that they would see a ranger and they would get in trouble and 
would get a ticket or a fine… (DEWA8).  
 
…We are professionals, and that means that, first and foremost, we deal with law 
enforcement and emergency services… You have to be out there to enforce the laws and 
to see where you’re going to be picking someone up potentially for search and rescue or 
medical situation (MORA18).   
 
…Where there used to be thirty or forty uniformed rangers patrolling in working parks, 
there’s 15 now… And it’ll never go back the other way… We do what we can do and we 
prioritize… Take care of what’s most critical, which is protection of visitors and staff. 
And you kind of prioritize everything underneath that (DEWA7).  
 
“Society’s love of litigation.” Along with having limited resources to enact the 3 Es, park 
employees and volunteers described being hamstrung by the legal issues surrounding these 
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practices. For one, many interviewees spoke of visitors as being quick to litigate in an attempt to 
find fault with an action (or inaction) of the NPS and/or to abdicate their own personal 
responsibility. Two MORA employees explained the situation as indicative as a more general 
societal climate, rather than exclusive to park visitors:      
Everyone in this sue-happy world doesn’t want to take responsibility for anything they do 
and so they don’t and so they want to blame it on the highest level of authority there so 
they can see what they can get out of it. It’s like that lady who bought the coffee at 
McDonald’s and then sued because it was too hot! (MORA23).  
 
…Part of it I think might be our society’s love of litigation… People are so used to… 
something is going to tell me or keep me away from something dangerous, where out 
here you can walk right up to the edge sometimes, or, there’s not going to be anything 
saying, ‘Hey, the rocks are wet’ (MORA3).  
  
In light of this litigiousness, from putting up signs to contacting visitors, park employees 
explained needing to navigate risk management strategies carefully and deliberately. Risk 
messages about the park, for instance, might be interpreted in ways that would implicate the park 
in an instance of injury or death, as a DEWA law enforcement ranger explained, based on a 
conversation with an NPS solicitor:  
…We never really deemed the river ‘closed’ because then if we called the river ‘open’ 
then we would actually assume more of the risk ‘cause you could say, ‘Well, you’re 
saying it’s open and we can go in there, so you’re saying it’s safe to go in there’ 
(DEWA13).  
	  
In situations where an action may become a precedent, park managers must tread carefully. A 
MORA law enforcement ranger explained this in the context of a park’s interaction with private 
property owners while he was working at OLYM:   
…Actually their land, it was private property, but it fell under the exclusive federal 
jurisdiction of the park. So people would say, ‘Well, this tree’s dangerous.’ And we’d go 
up and look at it, and if it was… yeah, we’d address it. But we still didn’t go up and do 
hazard tree mitigation and evaluate all the trees along the whole road just for that reason. 
Because if we did it for that mile of road, we’d have to do it for all of the miles of road. 
Just from a tort, liability standpoint (MORA15).  
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As these examples have illustrated, interviewees described a critical awareness of how even 
seemingly small actions—removing a hazard tree, for instance—could have monumental 
repercussions from a legal perspective. For some interviewees, the Park Service’s role in 
enacting the three Es, while also advocating for visitors to take personal responsibility, 
represents a tension not easily resolved in tort claims. As a MORA Natural & Cultural Resources 
employee remarked:  
…When is the time to just say… ‘You’re putting your family or your kid or somebody 
else in jeopardy.’ And our society places so much emphasis on personal freedom and not 
taking away access or denying them that, but … we’re real happy with suing people, and 
looking for deep pockets (MORA20).   
 
The Visitor’s Responsibility: Prepared and Aware 
 
…The public doesn’t take enough responsibility to educate themselves enough before they come 
here… The only ones that ever seem well prepared are the ones they—the only activity they will do 
here in the park is picnic (DEWA19). 
 
When interviewees described their view of visitors’ responsibility to ensure their own safety, 
a temporal “checklist” of duties and requirements seemed to emerge. The responsibility to ensure 
one’s safety, according to interviewees, begins not just at the park gates, but also in the days and 
weeks leading up to one’s visit, as an individual must prepare for the experience. Once at the 
park, a separate—but related—set of responsibilities must then be engaged.     
Before the visit 
 According to interviewees, prior to coming to a national park, visitors must take 
responsibility to adequately prepare themselves for their trip. Importantly, employees and 
volunteers emphasized that visitors must seek out information, which, ideally, would be available 
from NPS and other sources. Emphasizing this point, a DEWA Maintenance Division employee 
distinguished between unprepared and inexperienced, viewing the former as unacceptable for 
park visitors, given available information resources about the park:   
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 Inexperienced is one thing. Unprepared is something else. Obviously, if it’s your first 
time here, you’re going to be inexperienced. OK, but you can research. I mean 
everything’s available out there…(DEWA19). 
 
Stated differently, as one of his colleagues put it: …You’re going to another place. It’s up to you 
to either find out the information or make the contacts…” (DEWA14). On more than one 
occasion, an interviewee explained this responsibility to seek information as what he or she 
would expect to do as a visitor to an unfamiliar location, national park or otherwise. A MORA 
Natural & Cultural Resources employee, for instance equated the experience of visiting a 
national park to visiting a different country, suggesting:  
You’re not just going to travel to that foreign country. You’re going to research it a little 
bit, you’re going to learn what you need to take, what do you need to not take…what is 
there to do, what are the things that you need to know about doing that thing (MORA21).  
 
For a DEWA law enforcement ranger, visiting Death Valley National Park for the first time 
meant scouring multiple sources for information about the park’s conditions, with the intent of 
keeping himself and his family safe. As he explained:    
…You get the brochures, you get the pamphlets, you talk to the people at the visitor 
center, you try to educate yourself as much about, OK, ‘Where should we not be going 
this time of year? What is a better area to go? What are the dangers we face?’ (DEWA7) 
 
Making the same point, this ranger’s colleague also mentioned that, despite his familiarity 
working in national parks, if he visits an NPS site unfamiliar to him, he will adopt the 
perspective of a park visitor: “[doing] some research before I get there…[finding] out the areas 
that I shouldn’t go to… And not just [relying] on someone else to keep me safe” (DEWA6). In 
particular, interviewees suggested that, before driving through the park gates, visitors were 
responsible for knowing the following:  
• Potential park hazards, such as challenging terrain, wildlife, and inclement weather. 
 
o …When you’re driving up into the mountains in winter, expect ice (MORA9).  
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• Park rules and regulations, including speed limits and other safety requirements. 
 
o For people coming to the park, it would be nice if they were able to give a call 
first, and they were familiar with the campsites, where they needed to park, what 
were some of the rules and regulations. Life vests required, all of those kinds of 
things (DEWA 5).  
 
• Current weather conditions and area closures, including the awareness that these 
conditions might change. 
 
o …Realize that it’s May but there are still ten feet of snow on the mountains… so 
you’re not going to be doing the Seven Lakes Basin hike without ice axes, 
crampons, maps, and compasses (OLYM4).  
 
• Recommended equipment, provisions, and clothing for the recreational activity (or 
activities). 
o There’s people that’ll show up and say, ‘Where can I find water? Where can I find 
gloves?’ And would you not bring water or gloves in the middle of the winter? 
(MORA3). 
 
• His/her physical fitness level, physical abilities, potential health issues, recreational 
goals, and risk tolerance.  
 
o …I think they need to know their capabilities and limitations (DEWA4).  
 
o …Not being under the influence of mid-altering substances, alcohol, things like 
that. Not being influenced by peers to do things that you’re not physically capable 
of (DEWA9).  
 
During the visit 
 According to interviewees, while within park boundaries, visitors must also take 
responsibility to behave appropriately. In many ways, this discussion mirrored the ways in which 
interviewees discussed “ignorant” or “deficient” visitors (discussed above), since “responsible” 
visitors, by comparison, are aware of their surroundings, and able to make informed decisions.    
 Situational awareness. Interviewees felt that being a visitor in a national park required the 
type of “situational awareness,” a term often used among military and law enforcement 
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professionals to describe the need to know, as one MORA Natural & Cultural Resources 
employee put it, “everything that’s going on around you all the time” (MORA21). Instead of 
being distracted by their recreational goals, responsible park visitors attend to how their actions 
in a complex, dynamic environment might affect their own wellbeing. Exercising situational 
awareness as a visitor could be as simple as, in the words of one Natural & Cultural Resources 
employee, “[paying] attention to where they are and how to get back” (DEWA4). Though 
employees strive to maintain many park areas, weather conditions can make conditions variable; 
a rotted sign or a flooded trail is not an uncommon sight. In addition to following posted signs 
and learning current conditions, as one OLYM Visitor & Resource Protection employee noted 
that visitors have a responsibility to:      
…Pay attention to what [they’re] doing. That’s difficult in a national park because you 
came to the national park to look at things, and to enjoy the great outdoors and 
everything… you’re not on a  sidewalk walking downtown, you’re on a trail (OLYM10).  
 
While recognizing their role to remove certain known hazards, or provide appropriate warnings 
(see above), interviewees likewise saw a role for visitors to: first, heed their instructions, and 
second, to remain vigilant during their park visit. One DEWA interpreter, who devotes a large 
part of his job to developing water safety interventions at the park, emphasized that visitors, 
“need to be receptive to our messages…and willing to understand why we’re doing what we’re 
doing in trying to make sure that they’re safe” (DEWA15). At MORA, although park employees 
spend a considerable amount of time addressing and removing hazard trees in popular park 
locations, a Natural & Cultural Resources employee suggested that this risk management 
operation might be a responsibility shared with visitors. In the case of hazard trees, visitors could 
assist park managers by being mindful of the conditions that make such trees particularly 
dangerous to be around:  
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…In some areas, campgrounds, maybe even though we try to treat hazard trees, if people 
took some responsibility themselves and said, ‘This doesn’t look right,’ or if the weather 
is changing, or if it’s just getting really blustery… (MORA20).  
 
Informed decision-making. Just as employees saw visitors as responsible for being 
“receptive” to their risk- and safety-related information and recommendations, they also felt that 
their clientele needed to take responsibility to use this information as the basis for making 
informed choices. Having sought information prior to the park visit, and collected additional 
expertise from park personnel, visitors will ideally be well equipped to make decisions about 
how to recreate safely in the park; as a MORA interpretive ranger put it, “…There’s a time when 
it’s the visitor’s responsibility to decide whether they’re going to heed that advice or not” 
(MORA10). According to some interviewees, this responsibility to make decisions about, for 
instance, where to recreate in the park, or what to bring with them, made up a critical part of the 
visitor experience; a second, and equally important, part of this responsibility was accepting 
responsibility for the consequences of these decisions, whether positive or negative. A MORA 
administrator described this interplay between informing visitors, and also allowing them the 
space to make their own choices—a responsibility he saw as landmark of the national park 
experience: 
…You have to accept the responsibility for your decisions. I mean but it’s not that you 
throw people to the wolves… I think our job is to not let them learn the hard way… I 
think we have to highlight the obvious risk and try to communicate those as best we can. 
But people have to make their choices (MORA19).  
 
As is apparent in this quotation, and has been described above, this tension between informing 
and enforcing (or preparing and proscribing) appeared often throughout employees’ comments. 
In some sense, this tension may be representative of park employees’ challenge to manage risk 
while also allowing visitors the freedom to experience the park on their own terms—an 
interpretation of the organizational mission of the NPS and part of the appeal of wilderness areas. 
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Unsurprisingly, in instances where interviewees perceived visitors as knowingly breaking rules 
(i.e., “informed defiance”, see above), they had limited patience for violations. A DEWA Visitor 
& Resource Protection employee remarked that areas that are, “…clearly marked that you 
shouldn’t be parking, hiking, leaving the trail, no access beyond this point, [visitors] need to take 
some responsibility…because the signs are there for a reason” (DEWA5).        
Challenges to visitor responsibility 
 While interviewees had no trouble identifying the actions they saw as comprising the 
visitor’s responsibility, they also discussed what could be considered challenges to achieving 
these goals. Interviewees recognized that new sights, sounds, and activities could distract park 
visitors from being vigilant about their own safety. At the same time, they expressed the belief 
that visitors’ actions and decision-making often seemed to indicate a lack of “common sense.” 
When interrogated further, however, lacking common sense seemed more a reflection of a 
visitor’s unfamiliarity with a park setting, including expectations regarding how to behave in 
these places, and their inherent risks.   
 Tourist mentality.  For some employees, visitors’ ignorance emerged from their “tourist 
mentality.” Excited to be on vacation, distracted by unique or unfamiliar landscapes, visitors may 
attend to the scenery at the expense of their own safety. Having witnessed countless visitors 
taking part in unadvisable behaviors, park personnel often comment that such visitors have “left 
their brains at home” (see Rickard et al., 2011). One MORA administrator suggested how the 
thrill of being in the park could negate one’s usual attention to traffic conventions—a reaction 
that might appear, to an outsider, as ignorance:  
…There is a lot of that… the rules don’t apply because I just saw a bear. Or, I can get out 
here and leave my door open and take a picture of that mountain and get back in. The fact 
that I’m on a highway doesn’t sink in to them (MORA8).  
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In this sense, visitors’ goals of seeing the mountain or photographing the bear, become 
prioritized, sometimes at the expense of the more mundane requirements of “situational 
awareness,” such as paying attention to traffic. At the same time, these goals must often be 
achieved within a limited vacation schedule, increasing the pressure to focus on the scenery even 
more. As one MORA interpretive ranger described it, “…[Visitors] look through their viewfinder 
and they forget” (MORA4). In addition to eschewing laws and customs, visitors may also appear 
to ask “dumb” questions, a type of ignorance that employees also attributed to operating within 
the tourist mentality. Just as the OLYM law enforcement ranger quoted above distinguished 
“ignorance” from “stupidity,” employees noted that visitors may appear “dumb,” when, in fact, 
they are simply unable to articulate their needs. An OLYM interpretive ranger described what 
she saw as the necessity of not taking visitors’ comments at face value, and of giving visitors the 
benefit of the doubt:    
…It might sound really stupid to you ‘cause you’re coming from a different… 
foundation, but try to read between the lines. What is it that they’re asking? They’re 
probably asking a legitimate question, but they just haven’t figured out how to say it … If 
you probe a bit you can often get to what the real question is (OLYM6).  
 
In some cases, employees described experiences in which they, too, have asked “dumb 
questions” while playing the tourist role, such as in a foreign country; however, whether this sort 
of self-reflection is practiced by all employees—or unique to a select few—is unclear.  
Common sense. Whether they are stopping their car in the middle of the road, or asking a 
seemingly obvious question, visitors often appear to park employees to lack “common sense”—
an opinion that NPS employees expressed both frequently and vehemently. Describing her 
explanation for what she often witnesses while on patrol in MORA, one law enforcement ranger 
noted:   
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…People are on vacation and they want to relax and they tend to forget just the common 
sense things of driving, the general preparedness, just the typical things that I think folks 
would normally listen to or adhere to… They want to get the best picture, they want to 
have the best experience possible (MORA18).  
 
That tourists often “lack common sense” has also been used by scholars as part of a sociological 
explanation for the proliferation of crimes aimed at unassuming vacationers. As Tarlow (2006, p. 
97) writes:  
Travelers often leave their commonsense at home… The word ‘vacation’ gives us an 
insight into this phenomenon. We derive the word vacation from the French word 
vacances meaning ‘vacant.’ A vacation then is a time of mind-vacancy, a period when we 
relax and tend not to think… Any police officer who has worked a beat in which there are 
a large number of tourists will report on how bags are left unattended or cameras left on 
benches. 
 
In a similar sense, Tarlow (2006) points out that tourists may be operating within “in a state of 
anomie” (p. 97)—confused by local customs or currency, among other factors—as well as liable 
to be stressed by common frustrations of traveling, such as flight delays or cramped car rides. 
These factors, Tarlow argues, combine to make tourists more likely to lower their inhibitions, 
making them easy targets for pickpockets and con artists.   
In the context of recreating in a national park, where the risk of crime may be less of a central 
concern, interviewees expanded on Tarlow’s (2006) reasoning, indicating that the concept of 
“common sense” itself might require further examination.  On its face, describing their clientele 
as lacking common sense can appear insulting; however, when prompted to explain further what 
they meant by “common sense,” employees were quick to acknowledge the inadequacy of this 
simplistic concept in explaining a complex phenomenon. Rather than a universal “truth,” they 
saw common sense as variable, differing from person to person depending on one’s biography. 
In the words of a DEWA law enforcement ranger, “Common sense… is not the same for 
everybody, based upon your education, based upon your environment” (DEWA7), echoed by one 
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of his colleagues: “…what’s common sense for me would not be common sense for other 
people” (DEWA8), and a third OLYM law enforcement ranger: “…part of common sense is 
your life experiences” (OLYM8). As these three rangers’ comments imply, many employees 
recognize that what they refer to as common sense is less unanimous than their everyday 
parlance would suggest. Indeed, the knowledge, awareness, and behavior that an NPS law 
enforcement ranger attributes to common sense would not necessarily be equivalent for each and 
every park visitor. More specifically, the common sense that visitors lack may be contingent 
upon their familiarity with the park setting and the expectations associated with behaving in 
these areas, two themes explored in more depth below. 
Familiarity. Employees may perceive a national park in a similar way, not only because they 
work for NPS, but also because they experience the setting daily. As an OLYM law enforcement 
ranger put it: “most people, unlike the rangers, don’t live in the parks and don’t know the day-to-
day in and out of stuff” (OLYM3), or, in the words of an OLYM Natural & Cultural Resources 
employee: “…people who are maybe on the trail crew here who pretty much live in the 
backcountry are just really aware of what all those hazards are” (OLYM14). As year-round 
residents of the park or the surrounding area, employees often develop an intimate familiarity 
with what can be challenging, unique physical landscapes; NPS employees learn to endure the 
heat of Death Valley and the snow of Mount Rainier, as well as the hazards that can accompany 
living in undeveloped areas. In comparing themselves to visitors, many employees, for instance, 
contrasted their familiarity with wilderness settings to many visitors’ familiarity with cities. As 
many employees explained, their comfort traveling on backcountry trails, might be equivalent to 
a visitor’s ease in navigating the streets of an urban center. A DEWA interpretive ranger 
described this phenomenon as such:              
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…People from New York—well, they’re used to buildings and things like that. [DEWA] 
is… something totally different than what they’re used to, and so it appears wild. It’s the 
unexpected around the corner. There could be a bear, there could be a rattlesnake, there 
could be that hidden waterfall around the corner… It’s that unexpected and out-of-the-
norm. Their norm, that is (DEWA2).   
 
Contrasting the OLYM wilderness and downtown Seattle, an OLYM interpretive ranger 
provided a similar explanation:  
…People come to this park and they’re more afraid of things here than they are risks that 
they deal with in their everyday lives. But because they deal with them day in and day 
out, they’re used to it. They know. They lock their doors. They lock their car…. I’m more 
afraid of the city than I am of going backpacking alone in the Olympics. Because that’s 
my comfort level. I’m familiar with it (OLYM6).  
 
The realization that bugs and snakes could be scarier than urban streets—an unfamiliar 
perception for many park employees—thus allowed some interviewees to begin to see the park 
from a visitor’s point-of-view.  
As the above quotations suggest, in addition to making the urban-rural comparison, 
employees also suggested that some visitors lack familiarity with “nature” writ large, which 
could explain their “non-commonsensical” beliefs and behaviors. A Natural & Cultural 
Resources employee noted that, “…the farther insulated from nature they are, the more likely 
they are not to have common sense when dealing with nature. Because they’re not familiar with 
nature” (OLYM7). Describing a highly used area in the northeast corner of the park, another 
MORA park volunteer described how a common visitor injury, a leg fracture from falling debris, 
may be a result of the lack of common sense about natural systems:  
…One of the popular places for people to sit in the spring on the Carbon Glacier trail is 
an area that’s out of the trees and just has low brush and big sunny hillside behind you... 
The reason there are no big trees is one thing I tell them: if you’re in a place in 
Washington with no big trees, there’s a reason. And it’s an avalanche chute… So that’s 
not park-unique, that’s…the way mountains work (MORA10).  
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While “obvious,” perhaps, to a seasoned hiker in the Pacific Northwest or an NPS employee at 
MORA or OLYM, understanding “the way mountains work” may not be knowledge common to 
the general public, especially the first-time park visitor. Though the intentions of employees like 
the one quoted above are likely beneficent—to inform, so as to affect positive behavior change—
the way in which such information is delivered deserves scrutiny; is discussing “the way 
mountains work” a neutral act of providing information, for instance, or could it also function as 
a more subtle attempt to prove one’s own superiority?  
While familiarity with nature might entail awareness of ecological processes, it could also 
encompass knowing how to manage one’s exposure to environmental hazards that may be 
widespread in the park. A MORA administrator described how visitors who live in the greater 
Puget Sound metropolitan area, a short drive from MORA, can be overwhelmed by, and 
unprepared for, the park’s high altitude micro-climate: “…they’re sitting there playing with their 
crocuses and…the next day they’re in white-out conditions and they’re clueless” (MORA8). 
Across the country, a DEWA Natural & Cultural Resources employee suggested that DEWA 
visitors are often not accustomed to avoiding deer in the road, noting, “I don’t think a lot of 
people learn to drive that way when they’re growing up in a more urban environment” 
(DEWA11). Time and again, interviewees described how visitors failed to recognize hazards 
associated with popular recreational activities. One MORA volunteer spoke of roving a high-
altitude area popular for winter camping in snow caves:  
The scariest times for me are in the winter up at Paradise… People hike up in there and 
they don’t understand that there’s running water down underneath the snow and if they 
go in, they’re dead and it’s happened many times up here at this park (MORA11).  
 
Similarly, at DEWA, one employee worried that visitors’ ignorance of the most deadly, and 
perhaps, unlikely, wildlife at the park could endanger their safety:     
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I think people are aware if a raccoon is acting funny or something, that they know, get 
out of the way. But the tick thing—they’re so little… they’re very hard to see… 
(DEWA14).  
 
As this employee indicates, for visitors unaccustomed to the East Coast, ticks can be, in both a 
physical and psychological sense, an “invisible” risk: a risk not ignored, but rather not even seen.   
Expectations. As described above, because visitors are often more familiar with urban areas, 
their notions of how to behave in a park—i.e., “common sense”—may be founded on the 
expectation that they will receive the amenities and services provided in a more developed 
setting. Many employees expressed frustration with what they perceived as visitors’ inaccurate 
assumptions that park services would mimic urban services—for instance, that their cell phones 
and GPS units would function without a hitch, or that an ambulance could arrive at the drop of a 
hat. To some park employees, such expectations seemed far-fetched. Explaining how some 
visitors will assume they can access avalanche-prone areas without sufficient gear or knowledge, 
one MORA interpretive ranger noted:  
I find a lot of people don’t really quite make that connection of—that it’s not safe, it’s not 
like if you turn around the corner and you forget your food, there’s a Subway 
[restaurant]. And if you don’t decide to gas your vehicle up, there’s going to be one 
around the next corner. There’s all that stuff that in our normal, civilized lives that there’s 
a lot of safety and back-ups built in (MORA3).  
 
Interestingly, some employees hypothesized that these unrealistic expectations may develop 
based on physical markers built into the park landscape. The paved roads, restrooms, gift shops, 
and snack bars dotting many national parks may contribute to visitors’ expectations of being in a 
setting no different from a suburban shopping center. Traveling to the park from an urbanized 
area, many visitors, in the words of one MORA Visitor & Resource Protection employee, 
“…come in here off the modern road; they see it’s black and it’s asphalt. And they drive it like 
they can drive modern roads” (MORA1), thus paying limited attention to the road’s narrowness, 
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curves, or the often treacherous weather. Just as the expectation of “routine” driving conditions 
may discourage visitors’ vigilance, ubiquitous signage throughout the park may likewise 
encourage distraction. Referring to the wording of the park’s numerous interpretive displays, 
illustrated signs placed around the park to alert visitors to natural or cultural points of interest, 
one MORA law enforcement ranger argued:   
…We definitely put up cues that take people out of … the immediacy of their 
surroundings… It’s like, ‘imagine this, picture this,’ and we have all these viewpoints 
and overlooks and places that we—we bring people to. And whenever people are told to 
go somewhere, they sort of abdicate the responsibility for their decision-making. So I 
think the cues are definitely there to be distracted (MORA7).  
 
Paradoxically, as this employee suggests, attempts to engage and inspire visitors to think about 
the larger natural and cultural issues surrounding parks may interfere with managers’ 
expectations that visitors remain alert and aware of their surroundings.    
Still other employees, without referring to a particular attribute of the built landscape, argued 
that national parks, for some people, connote “safety,” and even encourage a degree of optimistic 
bias—an idealistic notion that, as one DEWA administrator put it, “I’m in a park and I can’t get 
hurt” (DEWA1). According to some employees, this perception of safety stemmed from visitors’ 
expectation that a national park was a different kind of park, one with a different set of 
appropriate behaviors. Frustrated by some visitors’ inability to distinguish DEWA from the 
tourist trappings of the surrounding Pocono Mountain resorts, one Visitor & Resource Protection 
employee explained:  
…I want the visitor to understand, this is a national park. It’s not an amusement park. 
They come in, they ask you where the rides are, do you have a playground, where’s the 
pool?... They complain that we don’t have sand on our beaches, and it’s like, ‘It’s a 
natural river beach. We don’t enhance it. It’s gravel, rocks, grass, soil…!’ (DEWA3).  
 
Interestingly, physical landscapes deliberately modified to manage risk can also be mistaken for 
“natural” attributes of the park, as one DEWA law enforcement ranger noted: “…there’s a fair 
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number of people who see trail steps and stuff and think that that stuff’s natural” (DEWA17). 
Whereas the fast food restaurants, golf courses, and outlet malls surrounding Delaware Water 
Gap may confuse the uninitiated DEWA visitor, employees noted that even the parks bounded 
by national forests could mislead visitors. Explaining that many MORA visitors drive to the park 
for the day from the surrounding Puget Sound metropolitan area, one MORA law enforcement 
ranger noted that they bring with them the expectations of an urban recreation experience:       
…There are those folks that think that they’re just going to go on a hike in a city park, 
where you’re just going to go on this short trail, and don’t realize that some of those trails 
are a lot longer than they anticipate. And potentially a lot more strenuous with not the 
paved trails with the railings at every single location (MORA18).  
 
Perceptions of Visitor Accidents 
 
Anything that’s unplanned that has some sort of … negative consequence. An accident could be I stubbed 
my toe, or an accident could be I chopped my toe off (DEWA2). 
 
 Characterizing interviewees’ perceptions of their own and visitors’ responsibility to prevent 
visitor accidents (i.e., ensure visitor safety) also involved asking them to share their 
understanding of an “accident.” In addition to defining accident writ large, such as was asked of 
Kouabenan’s (1998) respondents, interviewees also described how they understood accidents in 
the context of national parks. After presenting a typology of accident types, I explain two ways 
in which interviewees attributed causal responsibility for two kinds of hypothetical visitor 
accidents: “user errors” and “acts of God.”    
Defining an accident 
 Just some of Kouabenan’s (1998) respondents preferred to define accidents through a 
“characterization” of a hypothetical event, when prompted for a definition, many interviewees 
chose to describe an accident through its general attributes. First, several respondents described 
accidents as involving negative consequences, including bodily injury and property damage. 
Most simply, in the words of a DEWA employee, an accident is, “Anything that they did not 
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want to happen to them that had a negative effect” (DEWA2). As one OLYM employee noted, 
such effects need not be drastic in order to “qualify”:  
I suppose it involves injury to a person or property. But I think injury could heal. So it’s 
not debilitating … It doesn’t have to be big. Just some level of injury or property damage 
would be an accident (OLYM13).  
 
Nonetheless, many respondents saw accidents as “reportable”: events worthy of bringing to the 
attention of park officials or other medical personnel. Second, respondents also saw accidents as 
unintentional occurrences. For instance, using the context of a motor vehicle collision, one 
DEWA employee explained an accident as, “…something you didn’t do on purpose… I don’t 
think there’s very many people that purposefully crash into other cars” (DEWA9). Similarly, and 
constituting the third attribute of an accident, interviewees saw accidents as unscheduled; 
according to a MORA employee, an accident is:  
…Something that’s unplanned, that happens, and whether you get hit by a tree, or you 
fall, or it’s a car wreck… I guess when I think of an accident I usually just think of 
something that is—just happens that you did not expect at the time  (MORA20).  
 
  While most respondents agreed upon the aforementioned accident characteristics (i.e., 
involving injury/damage, unintentional, and unplanned), some disagreement surrounded the 
extent to which accidents were seen as preventable, avoidable, and/or controllable. On the one 
hand, one faction of respondents viewed accidents as inherently preventable, a point of view 
often expressed in the context of personal biography, as evidenced by the following comments: 
• …My father… worked in a place where they made bombs and explosives and stuff 
and his specific focus was on safety reviews. So I grew up hearing like the refrain 
accidents can be prevented or like this whole concept that nothing is really an accident 
because if you use your head and you take time to think things through, 
accidents…can be prevented (OLYM1).  
 
• An accident, first off, is preventable. You learn that being on the Fire Department… 
(MORA 23).  
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• …When I first had driver’s ed, the guy was like, ‘There’s no such thing as an 
accident. It’s all preventable.’ I agree with that mostly (MORA3).  
 
In emphasizing accidents as preventable, these interviewees echo the contemporary perspective 
of many public health professionals, for whom unintentional injuries, like viruses and bacterial 
infections, can be understood, tracked, and ultimately averted (e.g., Girasek, 1999; Loimer & 
Guarnieri, 1996). Baker’s (1974) perspective also resonates, as she describes progress in injury 
control as “retarded by the ‘accident’ folklore, including the notion of reckless, selfish, careless, 
and intoxicated people, ‘getting what they deserve’” (p. 987). Yet not all interviewees subscribed 
to the public health, “injury control” point of view. For these individuals, the uniqueness of the 
national park setting, as well as the varied responsibilities of a national park employee, made 
accidents both unpredictable and unpreventable. As these employees noted:  
• …You could be on the ladder not over-extending and the ladder could collapse for 
whatever reason. You can take preventive measures but sometimes things still happen. 
…So I don’t believe that all accidents are preventable. I think we can do a lot to 
minimize accidents, but I also believe that that’s why we call them accidents 
(DEWA1). 
 
• Well, it seems like we’re always going to have rangers walking on snowy surfaces. 
We’re going to have rangers in tidepools on slippery surfaces. Are we gonna be able to 
prevent every accident? … I don’t know how you can do that (OLYM4).  
 
• If you’re driving down the road and Bambi jumps out in front of you in a split second, 
I mean I would consider that an accident just because, I mean you didn’t… really have 
any control over that (DEWA13).  
 
Whether or not accidents were viewed as preventable also relates directly to the schema 
participants used to attribute causal responsibility, which will be explored further below.   
Accidents in national parks 
When asked to describe a “visitor accident,” respondents described outcomes and 
contributing factors that exemplified actual visitor injuries that have occurred in each park. In 
general, these descriptions align with two of Kouabenan’s (1998) categories: (1) defining an 
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accident by describing the “circumstances of an accident” and (2) by describing “the nature of 
the accident/an example of an accident.” Since many of the interviewees play central or 
supporting roles in visitor safety, such as by providing emergency medical care, patrolling park 
roads, or volunteering in SAR missions, this apparent overlap is unsurprising; indeed, most 
interviewees spent (or had spent, at another point in their career) significant time in the field 
interacting with park visitors and seeing, first-hand, the types of scenarios they proceeded to 
describe. In general, definitions of visitor accident fell into four categories: (1) motor vehicle 
accident; (2) minor traumatic injury; (3) serious traumatic injury; (4) medical injury due to 
interaction with wildlife/environment.  
 Motor vehicle accident. For many respondents, a typical visitor accident in the park 
involved driving, a scenario that could easily occur outside of park boundaries; unlike most 
modern thoroughfares, however, park roads can be narrow and winding (a product of their 
historic designation), and often remain open in inclement weather conditions, such as high 
winds, low visibility, ice, and snow. As respondents noted:       
• If I’m thinking visitor accident, most of the time I’m thinking it’s automotive… The 
roads are narrow, they’re not pitched (MORA1).  
 
• … In my experience, it’s usually motor vehicle accidents is the first thing that usually 
comes to mind. Since that’s one of the most frequent things we respond to (MORA15).  
 
• I guess on the road, a vehicle accident. This winter we’ve had several cars driving on the 
Hurricane Ridge Road in winter, icy conditions, and they’ve gone off the road into the 
ditch, sometimes turned their car on the side, so, it’s fairly common, I suppose, for this 
time of year and that road (OLYM11).  
 
Minor traumatic injury. Another common definition of a visitor accident revolved around a 
minor traumatic injury, such as a sprained, strained, or fractured ankle, and was often described 
as precipitated by a slip, trip, or fall. As with automobile accidents, sprains, strains, and fractures 
are not unique to park settings; however, the uneven terrain of trails and other “natural” 
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walkways, as well as the number of individuals choosing to walk in these areas, make such 
injuries even more likely. In the words of the respondents:  
• Someone who’s walking and then happens to slip on the root and then turn an ankle 
(MORA2).  
 
• We had a gentleman trip over one of the curbs where you park your car… He tripped 
over that last week and smashed his face all up (DEWA3). 
  
• The quintessential visitor accident is, I would say, a broken ankle (MORA7).  
 
Serious traumatic injury. Other employees chose to define visitor accident in terms of 
serious traumatic injuries and fatalities. In these instances, the examples given were often park-
specific, and were precipitated by high-risk recreational activities, such as mountaineering at 
OLYM and MORA. In general, these are activities pursued by a small percentage of park 
visitors. As the respondents described:  
• …A fall, climbing accident on Mount Deception. Someone glissading and they’re un-
roped and they glissade right into a crevasse. That’s happened on Mount Olympus. I 
think he’s still there (OLYM6).  
 
• Well, for here I think of climbing accidents (MORA16).  
 
• …Like if you were climbing and you fall in a crevasse (MORA20).  
 
Medical injury. The final category of exemplary visitor accidents involved medical injuries, 
such as allergic reactions, secondary to interactions with wildlife or the physical park 
environment. While poisonous plants and insects (e.g., poison ivy, ticks), as well as wildlife 
(e.g., snakes), exist outside of national parks, the park environment can offer a particularly 
amenable habitat for certain species. As one DEWA employee suggested:    
We have designated beaches, we have lifeguards, we’re trying to maximize [visitors’] 
safety in the river. And yet [visitors will] park along the road, they’ll walk through the 
poison ivy to get into the river. Well, they’re gonna go home with poison ivy! That’s an 
accident (DEWA1).  
 
	   287	  
Again, the examples interviewees chose to discuss seem to suggest that they are aware of—if not 
also involved in—the day-to-day incidents unfolding in the park around them. Unpublished data 
gathered at MORA between 2001-2010 (see Appendix A) suggest that fractures, sprains/strains, 
and medical emergencies, such as allergic reactions or heart attacks, were some of the most 
prevalent visitor emergency medical issues.  
Accidents and causal attribution 
As indicated above, respondents disagreed on the extent to which they perceived accidents as 
unavoidable maladies or preventable events. For some respondents, however, the circumstances 
surrounding the accident rendered it one or the other, leading to attributions of causal 
responsibility. Generally speaking, two categories of generalized accidents emerged, “ideal 
types” I refer to as “user error” and “Act of God”; each was associated with a distinct pattern of 
causal attribution.  
 User error. Accidents in this category were referred to by respondents as occurring due to an 
individual’s bad decision, with the implication (stated or not) that the individual should have 
known better, and that a different person in the same circumstance would have chosen 
differently. Referring to factors such as poor judgment, a lapse in attention to the physical 
setting, unpreparedness, and exceeding one’s skill level for a recreational activity, respondents 
appeared to place causal responsibility for this type of accident squarely with the individual. 
Implicit in many respondents’ explanations was the idea that the individual consciously chose 
this unadvisable position, whether through unfortunate ignorance, or willful risk-taking, as the 
following quotations exemplify:   
• So someone wears cheap flip-flops hiking on a rocky trail where it just rained. They may 
slip and cut themselves on their ankle, they may sprain their ankle… they’re just 
unprepared for what they’re doing. So… that was a bad decision to actually hike that area 
(DEWA14). 
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• I would say that an accident occurs when somebody has exceeded their skill level or their 
acceptable level of risk. And it may be that they didn’t know what their acceptable level 
of risk is, but that in and of itself, going into an activity not knowing what level of risk 
you’re going to accept, I mean that’s a risk in and of itself (MORA5).  
 
• …Like someone jumping off of a waterfall that’s already signed, ‘no swimming, no 
jumping’ and it’s got handrails. That’s not an accident. That’s someone chose to take a 
risk and they got injured in the process (DEWA11).  
 
As the above examples illustrate, by perceiving visitors’ behaviors as informed defiance—
they chose to do something when they knew better—when these individuals are injured, some 
employees seemed to “blame the victim” for the unfortunate outcomes. As is described by the 
Just World Hypothesis (Lerner & Miller, 1978), some interviewees seemed to indicate that 
visitors they perceive as choosing to defy regulations (or their own “common sense”) “get what 
they deserve” or “deserve what they get.” A DEWA law enforcement ranger described this 
perspective as widespread among her colleagues, especially with respect to driving-related 
incidents in the park:   
Like we’ve had construction zones and we were having all kinds of motorcycle accidents 
because of the way that the detour was. And the response from many of the law 
enforcement rangers was … there were speed limit signs that said to slow down. And if 
they chose not to, then if the result of that is that they wreck and get hurt, then they 
deserve it (DEWA8).  
 
Similarly, a MORA volunteer suggested that part of the “culture” of the NPS consisted of, in 
part, “…saying, hey, you get what you pay for. It goes with the territory. You come out here, 
you’d better know what’s going on, otherwise you’re going to get in trouble” (MORA13). In a 
“just world,” defiant visitors may be, to use a biological metaphor, “selected” for their fate, as 
their poor choices result in unsavory outcomes. Referring to a widely visited abandoned railroad 
track above the Delaware River, a DEWA administrator provided a sardonic explanation for the 
recurrent unintentional visitor injuries occurring there:  
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…National parks are the last great place for natural selection. You can’t fix stupid. You 
can’t tell 18 year-old boys, ‘Don’t jump off the Karamac Bridge abutment.’ ‘Cause 
they’re going to (DEWA16).  
 
Likewise, a MORA Natural & Cultural Resources employee expressed a resigned frustration that 
park policies cannot always prevent certain visitor behaviors. Referring to what he saw as a 
certain “type” of visitor, he noted:  
…You have to put up some sort of obstruction to [an unsafe area], but if [visitors] still 
want to go over it, they’re still gonna go over it… They’re the Darwin Award winners, 
basically. They go over these places, they slip on a slippery rock, and fall down and die. 
And it happens. It’s too bad but they’re the ones that went over it (MORA21).  
 
Despite the park’s best efforts, in the end, defiant visitors will be defiant visitors, and their 
injuries, while unfortunate, to many employees are not unexpected. By assuming (consciously or 
not) that these individuals understand both the rules of the park and the ramifications of their 
actions, however, many employees may preemptively assign causal responsibility to park 
visitors. In turn, an overemphasis on internal responsibility, as Baker (1974) suggests, may 
actually hinder progress on determining causal factors outside of the individual himself that 
might be able to be changed. (This point will be explored further in Chapter 7).   
Act of God. Other accidents were described as being the outcome of chance: a fluke, bad 
luck, or an unfortunate constellation of circumstances, such as being hit in the head by falling 
rocks. While respondents acknowledged some degree of preventability might be possible in these 
instances, such as choosing to hike earlier in the day when rock fall is less likely, for the most 
part, these accidents were perceived as considerably less preventable, avoidable, or controllable 
than the “user error” accidents described above.  
• Hazard tree falls on the New Jersey side, lands on a car, crushes two people, kills them 
dead. There was nothing they could have done… Is it the hand of God, what is it? Those 
things happen (DEWA12).  
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• … I call it a fluke thing because it’s—in my mind, it’s somebody that is completely 
prepared, and just, the nature of the beast, things change, or something happens, you 
can’t prevent a rock rolling down a hillside and crashing into a car…You can’t prevent 
someone who’s got the full hiking boots on, well prepared, physically fit, and just 
happens to roll their ankle. That happens. That’s what I would consider an accident 
(MORA18).  
 
• An accident is more like you’re driving and a deer jumps right out in front of you and 
there’s no way you can even react to it. That’s something that is very hard to prevent. 
There’s just no reaction time… (DEWA11).  
 
• …Sometimes a person is sitting at the bottom of a cliff and somebody above knocks off a 
rock and that rock just falls down… The guy sitting on the ground did nothing wrong. He 
was just sitting there, and, so far as the guy on the ground was concerned, it was an act of 
God… So I’d call that an accident (OLYM7).  
 
 
In general, during the interviews, employees and volunteers appeared to make external causal 
attributions when talking about this “type” of accident, referring to characteristics such as 
challenging environmental conditions or the risk inherent in park settings, especially wilderness 
areas. Instead of attributing responsibility to park personnel or infrastructure, however, most 
respondents saw the issue of blame as non-applicable, or even irrelevant, a point of view that 
may differ from that held by certain injured (and litigious) park visitors. As these employees 
explained: 
• …Some things that happen are just like an act of God. Windstorm comes up, a heavy 
rain, the ground’s soaked, trees start blowing over. If you’re driving on a road, a tree 
falls and you hit it, whose fault is that? Well, it’s nobody’s fault, it’s just what you call 
an act of God… And people have tried to sue us for that, but it’s like, we have no 
control over that! That’s just the way it is (DEWA14). 
 
• …If someone slips on…like the black tar at the beach that we tell people is slippery … 
it’s not really their fault. It’s not the park’s fault. It’s just an accident… You walk 
down a gravelly trail and your leg goes out from under you and you slip and fall. It’s 
not the person’s fault… It just is. It’s just how it is (OLYM5).  
  
While shying away from assigning responsibility, many respondents preferred to lean on the 
adage “accidents happen” when explaining the cause of accidents perceived as “acts of God.” 
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Suggesting that prevention can only do so much, and that accidents are not only probable but 
also likely, some respondents acknowledged that they, too, could fall victim to the circumstances 
described; in other words, accidents do not (necessarily) discriminate. Summarizing this point of 
view, an OLYM employee noted, “…I could do it just as easy as anybody else. And pre-planning 
is not always going to help you” (OLYM8). Likewise, a MORA employee described:  
We don’t work in an office, where things are pretty regulated. We work in a wild place 
where things can happen, and no matter what you can do, there’s always going to be 
something that happens (MORA21).  
 
Though associated with different cultural norms, these employees’ reactions, like those of 
Kouabenan’s (1998) West African respondents, seem motivated, at least in part, by a fatalistic 
perspective. Whether car collisions, or slips on pavement, the perspective that accidents will 
happen seems to offer respondents a way to avoiding assigning blame altogether.  
Understanding NPS Safety Culture 
 
…If you’re thinking about employee safety, then you should be thinking about visitor safety, too, and a 
lot of stuff sort of carries over (OLYM3).  
 
 While parks are places to recreate, they are also places to work: sites hosting a particular 
“safety culture” (e.g., Cooper, 2000). Understanding how employees view their responsibility to 
keep visitors safe may, in part, relate to how they view their own safety on the job. The 
following section discusses the ways in which interviewees defined a “positive” safety culture in 
a park context, including the communication mechanisms involved in creating and re-creating 
this culture, and the challenges to maintaining it. Finally, I discuss how interviewees see 
employee safety as related (or not related) to visitor safety, including their opinions of what this 
relationship should be.     
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Defining “positive” safety culture 
Just as employees viewed managing visitor safety as enacting a balance between their own 
and visitors’ responsibilities, when discussing employee safety, interviewees described a 
partnership between managers and on-the-ground workers. For a “positive” safety culture to 
perpetuate, as scholars have noted (e.g., Cooper, 2000), managers must supply the conditions for 
safe work (e.g., safety equipment, trainings), just as workers must pledge a certain degree of 
personal responsibility for following these conditions. Describing this interplay between 
management and workers’ responsibilities, one OLYM administrator noted:  
…I know I’m supposed to wear chaps if I use a chain saw. Most employees know that. 
It’s also incumbent on us to make sure that there are chaps. And that they work right. And 
to make sure that we have a protocol that talks about using chaps, so that there’s no 
question about that (OLYM3).  
 
But while administrators, like the individual quoted above, can do much to ensure the conditions 
for safety, they also look to their colleagues on the ground to sound the alarm when these 
circumstances do not exist. During the winter season at MORA, a law enforcement ranger 
responsible for patrolling the popular area around Paradise recognized that she must rely on her 
employees, seasonal hires paid to oversee the “snowplay” (i.e., sledding) operation at the base of 
the mountain, to assist her efforts. As she noted, “… I’ve had to teach [my staff], like, ‘Hey, 
anytime you guys see a safety hazard deficiency, correct it, or let me know, and I’ll try to do 
something about it’” (MORA14). Several interviewees noted that granting lower-level 
employees the authority to report concerns to higher-level management, and to take ownership of 
their own and their colleagues’ safety, resulted in gains for all: employees, volunteers, and 
visitors alike. In this sense, an employee directly involved with employee safety at OLYM 
described how ground-up workplace safety efforts, those in which staff are entrusted with 
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developing their own safety initiatives, tend to be more sustainable than more traditional top-
down, command-and-control efforts:    
The most effective programs that I’ve seen have been developed by employees… 
Because if they develop it, they’ve got ownership in it, and they’re going to participate in 
it. If I come down and say, ‘You have to do this now.’ Well, a week later when I’m not 
there, they’re not interested (OLYM10).  
 
Empowering lower lever employees in this way, interviewees noted, also makes them more 
likely to notice, voice, and avoid risks that could influence the safe performance of their jobs (see 
Edmondson, 1996). A MORA Natural & Cultural Resources employee discussed how his 
personal tolerance of on-the-job risk did not compromise his boss’ evaluation of his 
performance; instead, as he described:  
When I’m out in the field with [my supervisor] and he crosses a log and it’s wet and it’s a 
narrow log and I hate crossing logs above water, and I don’t feel comfortable doing it, I 
don’t do it… He doesn’t judge me. I wouldn’t judge anyone that says the same thing to 
me. So, we have that opinion, and we’re very safe that way (MORA21).   
 
As this and other interviewees recognized, in the long run, any productivity compromised by 
recognizing safety concerns would be made up by a decrease in employee injuries, as well as 
time spent steering through the tortuous bureaucracy surrounding them.  
Creating safety culture 
As safety science scholars have noted (e.g., DeJoy et al., 2004), safety culture emerges, in 
part, from the communication processes occurring daily in the organization. Interviewees 
described both formal and informal examples of official communication enacted daily, and in 
response to particular safety-related events.   
Formal communication. Within the three parks, interviewees discussed a litany of official, 
formal forms of routine communication enacted both within divisions and at the all-park level, 
including:   
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• Safety “tailgate” sessions, i.e., staff-wide discussion of safety concerns related to a 
particular job, usually conducted directly before doing the job 
• Trainings, including how to use personal protective equipment (PPE) correctly 
• Safety Committee meetings, i.e., groups of park employees who meet regularly to discuss 
and correct employee and visitor safety concerns 
• Operational Leadership training  
 
Whereas the first three items listed above might be enacted with respect to particular safety 
concerns at a park, such as removing asbestos from a building, or repairing a road, the last 
describes a more general philosophy toward approaching safety. Developed by the U.S. Coast 
Guard, Operational Leadership (OL) is a set of trainings aimed at employees in all levels of the 
NPS to teach risk assessment. As its core, OL relies on the “GAR” model: training employees to 
assess job-related situations as “green” (i.e., safe), “amber” (i.e., use caution), or “red” (i.e., 
danger/risk imminent before they take action that may, ultimately, put them and/or park 
volunteers or visitors at risk). While OL had been adopted in all three parks at the time of this 
study, one DEWA law enforcement ranger suggested that uptake by park administrations 
nationwide varied considerably, with East Coast parks less likely to offer OL trainings to its 
seasonal and year-round employees. As a result, he noted, not all NPS employees may familiar 
with how the program works:     
… If you ask National Park employees what’s the safety program in the Park Service, 
maybe 95% of them, they don’t know. Or they have it on a mug, NPSafe, or they have it 
on a lanyard, but they don’t know what the program does. It’s on the InsideNPS website 
but over in the corner down on the right. But I don’t think that many people actually 
know anything about the program… So we haven’t done a good job (DEWA6).  
 
Though OL ostensibly reinforces the “positive” safety culture norm that, “it’s not just the 
supervisor’s responsibility for safety; it’s the seasonal [employees’] responsibility to speak up” 
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(DEWA6), this message may have a shorter reach than intended by NPS officials.  
 In the situation that visitor injuries do occur, park managers engage a number of formal 
communication mechanisms, each creating and re-creating the park’s safety culture. These forms 
of communication included:  
• Safety “stand-downs”, i.e., abstaining from performing an activity until further review of 
an injury/accident. 
• Reporting an injury to a supervisor. 
• Performing a root cause analysis to determine the contributing factors to a particular 
injury/accident. 
• Assembling a Board of Review investigation (involving NPS employees from outside of 
the park) to determine the cause of an injury/accident, how it might have been prevented, 
and how to prevent a similar situation in the future.   
• Issuing fines to employees whose injuries/accidents, and resulting damage to park 
property, are deemed the cause of their actions.  
Together, these forms of communication emphasize a culture of transparency, and appear, on 
their face, to encourage acknowledging an unfortunate incident rather than sweeping it under the 
rug (e.g., see DeJoy et al., 2004; Edmondson, 1996). As some administrators discussed, in some 
cases encouraging timely reporting can create the illusion of an injury “epidemic”; for instance, 
cases of poison ivy, while both serious and ubiquitous, are probably less concerning to managers 
than an amputated digit. Nonetheless, as a DEWA administrator remarked, “…mostly we like to 
encourage people to report their accidents because something that seems minor today might 
result in medical problems down the road” (DEWA9). 
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Informal communication. In addition to these formal communication mechanisms, 
interviewees also mentioned informal communication as a way to convey safety messages 
between managers and employees.  After conducting a more formal safety “tailgate” session, 
managers and employees may continue the conversation throughout the workday. A DEWA 
Interpretation & Education employee explained how, when directing park volunteers on 
maintenance or construction projects:         
We all meet at the tailgate of the truck or wherever we’re working and we talk about 
safety, make sure it’s signed off on, and then, prior to, after any breaks, we also have an 
additional safety talk (DEWA10).  
 
At OLYM, where a large staff of rangers is responsible for patrolling a vast expanse of 
wilderness, one law enforcement ranger discussed how taking her employees on an “orientation 
patrol,” a group overnight hiking trip in the wilderness area, provided an opportunity to assess 
their skills and ability to travel safely in an undeveloped environment:   
…It’s a good opportunity for me to see how the new people that I have never worked 
with before handle being in the backcountry. I make everyone light the stoves and light 
the lanterns just so that I’m comfortable with, like, if I send them back there by 
themselves, I know they’re not going to eat cold food… So, it makes me sleep better at 
night (OLYM9).   
 
Finally, employees discussed ways in which informal communication allowed them to look out 
for one another, such as to remind a colleague of a safe(r) way to perform a routine task. As a 
DEWA law enforcement ranger explained, self-policing can be an effective way to remind 
employees to take responsibility for their own safety:  
We keep track of each other if we’re on a motor vehicle accident, then, if one’s wearing 
their vest and the other one’s not, then, ‘Hey, grab your traffic vest.’ That way you’re 
high visibility and people can see you when you’re out there. ‘Cause if you were to get 
hit, if the simple solution was, why didn’t you just tell him to wear his vest, it’s just kind 
of us policing ourselves out there… (DEWA13).  
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Challenges to “positive” safety culture 
Achieving the kind of positive safety culture described above is not as easy as scheduling a 
few trainings or talking to one’s co-workers. Interviewees described several factors that they 
believed made it difficult to create workplaces in which injuries are minimized, accidents are 
reported, and employees play a pivotal role in improving safety conditions.  
Characteristics of employees. Some of these challenges are perceived as stemming from the 
characteristics of NPS employees and the nature of their jobs. First, as some interviewees 
described, many parks support a dynamic workforce that changes yearly and seasonally, given 
patterns of visitation and the movement of non year-round employees between parks. This lack 
of continuity, as one MORA Maintenance Division worker noted, can be a barrier to they type of 
acculturation necessary to make achievements in safety culture:    
You look at the industry, and they may have the same employees for year after year after 
year, so you can develop a real culture with them. Here, we tried to take half our seasonal 
staff this year for three months or four months and it’s really hard to instill that culture 
into them at that time, in that time frame… (MORA6).  
 
Second, achieving “positive” safety culture may be complicated by goals of the individuals who 
are often drawn to work in the Park Service. For many NPS employees, parks represent not just a 
workplace, but also a recreation site, as they spend their leisure hours hiking, biking, skiing, and 
climbing in these places. In some cases, the sources of risk that may be avoided during the work 
week become desirable on the weekend, as some employees seek “[getting] a thrill” or “being on 
the edge” (MORA5). As a MORA law enforcement ranger further explained:     
They could be on a trail working on Friday and we expect them to do things in a certain 
way so that ultimately they’re safe as they’re working. But if they choose to go out on 
Saturday on their day off on that same trail and do something more risky, well, that’s 
their right as an American (MORA5).  
 
As this individual’s comment suggests, some employees must learn to manage a personal risk 
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tolerance that may be misaligned with that of management; an action or decision suitable for a 
Saturday, for example, may be inappropriate on Monday. 
Characteristics of the job. Just as employees must juggle work- week and weekend risk-
taking behavior, they are also challenged by the multifaceted nature of their jobs, which can pose 
another barrier to creating positive safety culture. As several interviewees noted, NPS employees 
are often expected to be “jacks-of-all-trades,” able to complete tasks in a variety of domains, 
from handling wildlife, to writing traffic tickets; having the necessary, up-to-date certifications to 
complete these tasks, however, is daunting, and sometimes impossible. A DEWA Visitor & 
Resource Protection employee explained that NPS employees:     
… Do such a hodgepodge of things all the time [so] it’s hard to stay on top of all the 
safety-related stuff that they need to do. Whereas you might have guys putting on roofs, 
that’s primarily what they do… Where our guys might just do it once in a blue moon, but 
they’re out there doing it… and the concern is they may not be as prepared as they should 
be when they go out because they’re doing so many things, they’re kind of like a jack-of-
all-trades… (DEWA18).   
 
Law enforcement rangers in particular face considerable challenges, as they must balance the 
inherently dangerous nature of their job with, like other employees, collateral duties that require 
them to maintain varied certifications and up-to-date expertise. According to a DEWA law 
enforcement ranger, he and his colleagues must come to work each day:   
…On our A game. … We’re not coming to sit behind a desk…. Our known risks are a lot 
different than someone who’s driving to work and then coming to work at Headquarters 
or something. And I mean, their safety issues are going to be a lot different than our 
safety issues, as far as their chair and their posture and lifting boxes … compared to ours 
where, I mean, just earlier today I was going like 90 mph to get to a call (DEWA13).  
 
Moreover, the tasks required of them often require training and practice, which they may not 
routinely receive, given the diverse nature of their daily assignments. Comparing himself to a 
state patrol officer, whose daily job is limited to making traffic stops, one OLYM law 
enforcement ranger noted:    
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They’re good at it. That’s what they do. And I’d like to say I’m decent at doing traffic, 
too, but it’s a challenge because I have to get back into it whenever I can after doing boat 
patrol or doing work out in the woods, or whatever it might be. So there’s that tug and 
pull, I mean, it’s definitely a challenge (OLYM8).  
 
Demands on employees to fulfill multiple tasks—and different types of tasks—can also lead 
them to perceive that they must rush through their duties, a situation compounded by short-
staffing. As a handful of management-level interviewees noted, including two individuals at 
DEWA, working too quickly can result in injuries that could have been avoided:  
There’s a perception that management demands, and management demands that it be 
done today and it doesn’t matter, do it today. [We] have never demanded anything ever 
get done today. What we’re basically saying is we have an operation, let’s do what we 
have to support that operation, but let’s do it safely (DEWA1).  
 
I’m constantly lecturing people about not speeding in government vehicles. Somehow 
people get the impression that, because they have a lot of tasks, they have to speed. But 
I’m always telling them, ‘Don’t speed. Don’t take chances with a motor vehicle’ 
(DEWA9).  
 
Unfortunately, when taken together, the circumstances described above can combine to create a 
culture in which employee safety may be idealized and promoted, and yet in practice, not 
achieved. Despite the best intentions of managers, safety can be compromised by the simple 
reality of too much work for too little staff.  
 Management role. Interviewees also suggested that barriers to achieving a positive safety 
culture could emanate from the management level. For one, because individual park units have 
considerable authority to determine their own operational rules and norms, the focus on safety 
can be variable. Based on her experience as an employee in several parks, an interpretive ranger 
at DEWA noted that park superintendents could vary in how they perceive the responsibility of 
the park to ensure visitor safety, such as in the case of preventing hiking-related injuries and 
accidents:    
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Some superintendents are just hyper sensitive. They go maybe over or above and then 
some that I don’t think are sensitive enough that… we have such and such number of 
people on this trail, and this is a hazard. We need to do something about it. And they see 
it as, ‘Well, the visitor’s going off the pavement; they need to take on that risk 
themselves.’ I’ve seen the extremes (DEWA2). 
 
In this and other instances, interviewees described how higher level management played a 
significant role in making decisions that influenced the development of a park’s safety culture. 
With respect to Operational Leadership, for example, a DEWA law enforcement ranger 
suggested that whether or not park employees received these trainings rested principally with the 
Superintendent: “…Each park is its own little fiefdom, and if the Superintendent there really 
thinks it’s important, they could get the [OL] class… (DEWA6). In other cases, management 
decisions dealing with a park’s safety program could have the effect of disenfranchising 
employees who might not agree with a program’s direction. One DEWA lower-level 
administrator, for instance, expressed disgust with the park’s past attempts at supporting 
employee safety, viewing it as little more than expensive, bureaucratic, and procedural:   
We have spent hundreds of thousands of dollars on safety programs, safety initiatives. 
We had one program… we had to do little checklists, where we’d observe each other. So 
if you walked into my office and you saw that my drawers were all shut and it wasn’t a 
tripping hazard, you’d do a little checklist… All right, come on! We did things like that. 
And we paid big money for it (DEWA16).  
 
Other employees disagreed with management’s strategies to promote their own (purported) 
success. A MORA Natural & Cultural Resources employee described these self-congratulatory 
efforts as potentially alienating and ultimately detrimental. As he explained:     
…Like you get the emails from the safety people that say… ‘Oh, our injury claims were 
down to three worker injuries per year!’ Well, what happens if the next year, you’re one 
of those people? You’re not gonna want to report it. There’s gonna be some 
embarrassment about it… There could be some, ‘I don’t want to report this because I’m 
gonna make the park look bad.’ And I think that’s a really, really, really bad thing… 
(MORA21).  
 
 
	   301	  
 
Relating visitor safety and employee safety  
 Understanding interviewees’ perceptions of safety culture also meant disentangling their 
views about employee safety and visitor safety—two goals that, for some, are not pursued 
equally by the NPS. Whether or not management tends to emphasize the safety of one population 
over the other, however, many interviewees seemed to suggest that parks with safe employees 
would, by extension, host safe visitors.   
Visitors over employees? When asked to discuss the relationship between employee and 
visitor safety, some interviewees spoke of the NPS emphasis on each, both what it was, and what 
it should be. Interestingly, at DEWA in particular, employees seemed to hold conflicting 
opinions as to whether the park—and the agency, broadly speaking—attends more to issues of 
visitor or employee safety. On the one hand, a DEWA employee in the Natural & Cultural 
Resources division maintained that he and his colleagues “…put more thought into visitor safety 
as we’re looking at a facility or as a project or whether we’re maintaining something… Whereas 
employee safety probably comes in second, behind that…” (DEWA4). As he further explained, 
this emphasis on the visitor above the employee was justified by the expectation that visitors 
may be “ignorant” of some of the safety concerns around them (see above). As he argued:  
…We expect more out of our employees, though, than we expect out of the visitors, as 
far as safety awareness and we know what they’ve been trained to do and we know that 
they’re supposed to watch out for stuff and not get themselves into bad situations 
(DEWA4).  
 
As this individual’s comment indicates, NPS’ attention to the “3Es” make sense, given visitors 
who may be unaccustomed to such settings, and employees who may be—even upon hiring—
expected to “know better.” On the other hand, some interviewee saw the situation differently, 
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such as another DEWA employee, who suggested that management decisions have tended to 
prioritize the employee:    
… Park Service has always had a pretty good push for safety. But what I’m seeing lately, 
it’s the safety of the employee only. We’ll talk to like our Safety Officer about water 
safety and he says, ‘That’s not my concern.’ And I think it’s more than just the employee. 
The biggest thing is to keep our visitors safe if we can. And I think we need to have more 
of that attitude from the top down… (DEWA16).  
 
As these examples suggest, whether (or the extent to which) a particular park, or the entire 
agency, emphasizes visitor safety over employee safety may be difficult to quantify. As this 
chapter has shown, efforts to address the needs of both are—and have been—in place in all three 
parks.  
 “Trickle down hypothesis.” With regard to whether one group should be emphasized over 
the other, however, interviewees expressed a bit more agreement. As has been mentioned 
elsewhere in this chapter, many visitors come to the park just once—and for a short timeframe—
allowing limited opportunity for park staff to share information with them. According to some 
interviewees, this limitation provided a clear argument for focusing safety initiatives on 
employees. In the words of one DEWA Visitor & Resource Protection employee:  
…With visitors, people come to your park to do things…and so you might have a brief 
contact with them. They may or may not read any of your signs, or any of your things, 
and there’s nothing you can do about that…. Employees, on the other hand, I mean you 
can make that a condition of the employment. So you have more opportunity and plus, 
you have policies, procedures, safety plans, and job safety analysis and all that stuff that 
is supposed to be followed… (DEWA18).  
 
As this individual’s comment suggests, a “visitor safety culture” may be impossible to create, let 
alone change. Focusing management efforts on the employee may also be not only practical, but 
also strategic. A popular sentiment among interviewees was the notion that “safe” employees 
promote “safe visitors,” what I call the “trickle down hypothesis.” Stated simply, safety-
consciousness breeds safety-consciousness, as employees not only model safe behaviors, but also 
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are alert to potential visitor concerns. The DEWA employee quoted above described, “… If 
[employees] have a good safety culture or a good safety background, they could take that and, 
kind of… recognize issues that might affect visitors (DEWA18). As models for visitors, 
employees can capitalize on opportunities to communicate spoken and unspoken messages about 
what constitutes “appropriate” behavior in a park setting, as these two employees describe:   
…Our employees interact with the visitor all the time. And if they’re…carrying that 
message, then even by the way they do their jobs, it’s going to be obvious to a visitor that 
this is important to us, and this is the way we do business here (OLYM10).  
 
… If our patrol rangers are out on the river, like they have all their safety stuff, they have 
all their PFDs, they have their safety ropes…. So if they’re rolling up to a boat, and 
they’re contacting somebody without their PFDs on it’s real easy to say, ‘Well, where’s 
your PFD?’ …  I guess that’s kind of like leading by example…(DEWA13).  
 
That safety consciousness spills over from one population to the next is an appealing hypothesis. 
Yet whether employees who adhere to appropriate precautionary behaviors influence visitors to 
make similar decisions is unsubstantiated, rather than given. According to at least some 
interviewees, however, by this logic, a focus on employee safety ensures, by extension, that 
visitors will likewise receive the message. As a DEWA law enforcement ranger put it:    
… Whenever you change that mindset with your employees, you will get your employees 
to start looking at visitors in the same mindset and spreading that same type of 
knowledge onto them… We’re always trying to push that in the face of employees, just 
slow down and think ahead and are you wearing the proper PPE, are you looking at this 
right. I think with that mindset, when that starts being even more instilled in the 
employees… it definitely will spill over to the visitors (DEWA7).  
 
Chapter Summary 
 
Drawing on qualitative in-depth interview data, this chapter examined employees’ and 
volunteers’ perceptions of risk and risk management in national park settings. Responding 
broadly to research questions (and sub-questions) 8 and 9, emergent themes were discussed in 
five main substantive areas: (1) the multidimensionality of risk in national parks, (2) the 
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responsibility of the NPS to ensure visitor safety, (3) the park visitor’s responsibility to keep 
him/herself safe, (4) perceptions of visitor “accidents”, and (5) the NPS safety culture (or 
cultures). Table 6.1 provides an overview of the major themes and sub-themes discussed in each 
of these areas.  
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Table 6.1. Overview of Major Themes and Sub-Themes: Chapter 6 
Substantive Area Emergent Themes 
Multidimensionality of 
Risk in National Parks 
• Risk as inherent 
• Risk as desirable 
o Tolerance and voluntariness 
o Challenge and elevated experience 
o Learning and self-development 
Understanding the NPS 
Responsibility 
• Shared responsibility 
o 50-50 
o 70-30 
o 3Es 
• Education 
o Responsibility to provide information 
o Meaning and connection 
o “The agency of the ranger” 
o Shift from wood signs” 
o Involving the community 
o Tailoring messages 
 “The Paradise crowd” 
 First-time visitors 
 Locals 
 English as a second language 
o “Can’t put a sign everywhere 
 “People don’t read signs” 
• Engineering 
o “Can’t put a handrail everywhere 
o “Known hazards” 
o Negligence or wilderness 
• Enforcement 
o Allowing access 
o Questions of identity 
• The 3Es in Practice: Additional considerations 
o Resource limitations 
o “Society’s love of litigation” 
The Visitor’s 
Responsibility  
• Before the Visit 
• During the Visit 
o Situational awareness 
o Informed decision-making 
• Challenges to visitor responsibility 
o Tourist mentality 
o Common sense 
 Familiarity 
 Expectations 
Perceptions of Visitor 
Accidents 
• Defining an accident 
• Accidents in national parks 
o Motor vehicle accidents 
o Minor traumatic injury 
o Serious traumatic injury 
o Medical injury 
• Accidents and causal attribution 
o “User error” 
o “Act of God” 
Understanding NPS 
Safety Culture(s) 
• Defining “positive” safety culture 
• Creating safety culture 
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Understanding NPS 
Safety Culture(s) 
(continued) 
o Formal communication 
o Informal communication 
• Challenges to “positive” safety culture 
o Characteristics of employees 
o Characteristics of the job 
o Management role 
• Relating visitor safety and employee safety 
o Visitors over employees? 
o “Trickle down hypothesis” 
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CHAPTER 7. 
 
 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Introduction 
 Attribution theory has been a mainstay of the social science research repertoire for over half 
a century. Experimentalists and qualitative researchers alike have contributed to our 
understanding of how individuals attribute the causes of—and responsibility for—events both 
common and extraordinary, from failing a test to surviving a car crash. Historically, whereas 
much of the social psychological research has adopted a dualism of attributing responsibility to 
“internal” traits of individuals or to “external” characteristics of the environment (e.g., Heider, 
1958; Kelley, 1963), researchers in anthropology, science & technology studies, public policy 
and sociology (among other disciplines) have envisioned attribution of responsibility more 
broadly in cultural, moral, and ethical terms (e.g., Crittenden, 1989; Douglas, 1990; Green, 
1997a). Though much of the multi-disciplinary research incorporating aspects of attribution 
theory attends to the more expansive issue of risk management, no apparent research has 
attempted to integrate these studies.     
In response to this gap, this dissertation has envisioned the concepts of responsibility and risk 
more holistically. As stated in the introduction (Chapter 1), this dissertation applied attribution 
theory on an individual level (i.e., how individuals explain the causes of accidents and 
unintentional injury) and envisioned attribution as occurring within a social context (i.e., how 
individuals perceive their responsibility in the promotion of safety in public spaces). In so doing, 
it drew from two previously segregated approaches to attribution theory, both applicable to 
understanding risk management. The research also worked towards a more thorough integration 
of risk perception concepts into attribution theory, examining how the perceived nature of risks 
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(e.g., controllability, desirability) and the context in which they are encountered may affect 
attributions of responsibility. Finally, the dissertation examined how sociocultural variables (e.g., 
past experiences, group memberships) and exposure to both “official” (i.e., institutionally-
scripted) and “unofficial” (i.e., unscripted) park risk and safety-related communication relate to 
attributions of responsibility. The study pursued the above goals in the applied context of three 
U.S. national parks, where I conducted in-depth interviews with park employees and volunteers, 
and surveyed park staff and visitors.    
The following chapter is an attempt to draw together previous chapters in order to provide 
preliminary answers to the larger questions driving this research: Considering multiple 
audiences, who (or what) is perceived as responsible for ensuring that accidents do not occur, 
and why? And, what do these attributions mean in the context of envisioning institutional risk 
management strategies? In so doing, I also reflect on how this study might inform future research 
integrating attribution theory and risk communication.  The chapter is organized as follows. First, 
I review the major findings, along with the theoretical and management implications of the five 
major conceptual areas considered in this dissertation: (1) causal attribution, (2) prevention 
attribution, (3) sense of place, (4) risk perception, evaluation, and communication, and (5) safety 
culture (see Table 7.1). The chapter concludes with a discussion of avenues for future research, 
which builds upon the findings and implications.     
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Table 7.1. Major Findings, Theoretical Implications, and Management Implications 
	   310	  
 
 Major Finding Theoretical Implication Management 
Implication 
Differences in causal 
attribution were found 
between employees and 
visitors.  
Extends the notion that 
causal attributions can vary 
by occupational or 
hierarchical role (e.g., 
Kouabenan et al., 2001).  
“External” causes loaded 
onto three separate factors: 
(1) NPS-related; (2) 
related to the biophysical 
environment; (3) related to 
fate, bad luck, chance, etc.  
Extends the dualistic causal 
schema typically used to 
classify unintentional 
actions, including 
accidents. Suggests some 
support for the idea of 
“superphysical causality” 
(Shaver, 1985).  
 
The NPS should consider 
co-orientation or attribution 
“re-training” in order to 
counteract “misalignment” 
of attributions between park 
staff and visitors. 
 
 
There was a dualistic 
interpretation of accidents, 
as “user errors” or “acts of 
God,” with corresponding 
attributional processes. 
 
 
Suggests support for extant 
social psychological theory, 
e.g., “Just World 
Hypothesis” (Lerner & 
Miller, 1978). 
How visitor accidents are 
framed can play a significant 
role in how both visitors and 
employees attribute causal 
responsibility; suggests need 
for balance between 
“blaming the victim” and 
invoking bad luck.  
 
 
Causal attribution differed 
by level of experience in a 
setting, and involvement 
in a similar accident. 
 
 
Supports empirical research 
connecting attribution 
theory to applied contexts 
(e.g., Kouabenan, 2002). 
Visitors with less experience 
in parks may be the least 
likely to see the visitor as 
responsible; suggests a 
potential “misalignment” 
between new visitors and 
park staff in expectations for 
responding to visitor 
accidents.  
Causal 
Attribution 
   
Prevention 
Attribution 
Differences in attributing 
responsibility for 
preventing accidents were 
observed on the basis of 
individual characteristics, 
including activity choice.   
Supports Rickard et al. 
(2011) as well as research 
on “adventure recreation” 
(Ewert & Hollenhurst, 
1989) and “edgework” 
(Lyng, 1990). 
Recreation activity choice, 
in many cases, can be a 
proxy for voluntary risk-
taking) Therefore, tailoring 
messages based on activities 
may be a useful and efficient 
strategy. 
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Table 7.1. (Continued) 	  
Differences in attributing 
responsibility for 
preventing accidents were 
observed on the basis of 
demographic 
characteristics, including 
age, sex, race/ethnicity, 
education level, and native 
language.  
 
 
Supports the findings of 
Espiner (2000) and, less 
directly, research in cultural 
psychology (e.g., Menon et 
al., 1999).  
Park managers should 
collect demographic 
information about visitors to 
help them better anticipate 
potential differences in 
responsibility beliefs 
between visitors and park 
staff, and to craft 
communication accordingly.  
 
 
Differences in attributing 
responsibility for 
preventing accidents were 
observed on the basis of 
employee “type.” 
 
 
Supports Espiner (2000).  
Promote discussion of 
expectations for visitor 
injury prevention at all 
levels/divisions of parks. 
Consider attribution “re-
training” in order to 
counteract “misalignment” 
of attributions. 
 
The “shared” 
responsibility for 
preventing visitor 
accidents seems to be 
understood by 
employees/volunteers as 
temporal, distributed, and 
spatial.  
Suggests that national parks 
may be “liminal” spaces 
(Shields, 1991; Van 
Gennep, 1960); also 
reflects a “deficit model” 
approach to distributing 
risk information (e.g., 
Durant et al., 1989).  
The NPS should consider 
if—and how—they 
communicate a “shared” 
responsibility, as well as 
how, in practice, a “shared” 
responsibility is applied. A 
“framework for shared 
responsibility” may be 
necessary to streamline 
communication of this 
concept across the Park 
System.   
    
Parks appear to support 
not one, but many safety 
cultures, including those 
related to employees and 
(possibly) to visitors.  
Safety Culture 
A “positive” safety culture 
is created and re-created, 
in part, through formal and 
informal communication. 
 
 
 
 
 
Supports and extends 
findings in the safety 
science literature (e.g., 
Findley et al., 2007; Harvey 
et al., 1999) to apply to a 
new occupational setting. 
 
Suggests the need for more 
attention to how particular 
park divisions and/or levels 
of the agency understand 
their responsibility to 
prevent both visitor and 
employee accidents, given 
the unique characteristics of 
employees and their job 
requirements. How these 
cultures may interact and/or 
mutually reinforce one 
another remains an empirical 
question.  
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Table 7.1. (Continued) 	  
Safety Culture There are numerous 
threats to maintaining a 
“positive” safety culture, 
such as characteristics of 
employees (e.g., risk 
tolerant) and of the job 
(e.g., competence required 
in several areas).  
  
   
Perceived desirability and 
acceptability of risk 
depend at least in part on 
its origin and the 
circumstances under 
which it is encountered, as 
well as a person’s risk 
tolerance.   
 
Some sources of risk in 
national parks are 
perceived by 
employees/volunteers as 
inherent and dynamic and, 
in some cases, 
unmanageable.  
 
Builds on Machlis and 
Rosa’s (1990) “desirable” 
risk concept as well as on 
the “voluntariness” of risk 
(Tulloch & Lupton, 2002). 
Also lends credence to the 
basis of cultural theory 
approaches to risk—that 
one’s experiences, 
affiliations, etc. influence 
perceptions and evaluations 
of risk (e.g., Tansey & 
O’Riordan, 1999).  
 
Park managers should be 
aware of potential 
differences in assumed risk 
tolerance and familiarity of 
park staff versus visitors. 
While central to the park 
experience for some, risk 
may not be “sought out” by 
all visitors, and 
opportunities should exist to 
cater to both groups.  
 
Differences in causal 
attributions were observed 
on the basis of perception 
of the controllability of 
park-related risk.  
 
Extends the concept of 
controllability of the cause 
(e.g., Weiner, 1996).  
How visitors perceive the 
controllability of park risks 
matters in their development 
of causal attributions. 
Message strategies could 
aim to achieve a balance 
between inspiring an 
“exaggerated” sense of 
control (optimistic bias) and 
inspiring fatalism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk 
Perception,  
Evaluation, & 
Communication  
 
Those who perceived risk 
as desirable were more 
likely to view a visitor 
accident as caused by 
challenging environmental 
conditions and/or bad 
luck.  
 
Builds on Machlis and 
Rosa’s (1990) concept of 
risk as desirable. 
 
Suggests that managers may 
need to tailor messages 
based on recreational 
choices (see above).   
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Table 7.1. (Continued) 	  
Those who perceive risks 
as desirable are less likely 
to see the NPS as 
responsible for preventing 
visitor accidents. 
 
Supports Rickard et al. 
(2011) 
 
Visitors’ reliance on and 
exposure to official park 
information was positively 
related to internal causal 
attributions.  
 
 
 
 
 
Risk 
Perception,  
Evaluation, & 
Communication  
  
The amount of safety-
related information 
visitors received was 
related to perception of 
individual responsibility to 
prevent park accidents.   
 
Suggests some support for 
the idea that reliance on 
particular information 
sources may predict 
particular attributions of 
responsibility (e.g., Doria et 
al., 2006).  
 
Points to a need to review 
the content of agency-wide 
and park-level 
communication: how is 
attribution for causing and 
preventing accidents 
represented? New safety-
related messages should be 
designed strategically, in 
order to garner support for 
how the NPS would like to 
represent responsibility, i.e., 
as “shared” between visitors 
and staff. 
   
There was evidence for 
the presence of a 
“blended” place meaning 
that incorporates both 
human and nature-based 
ideas about parks.  
Supports the concept of the 
“hybridity” of natural and 
cultural meanings in 
“special places” (e.g., 
Cantrill, 1998) 
Agreement with blended 
place meaning and higher 
place attachment was 
positively related to 
internal causal 
attributions.  
Sense of Place 
Those who were more 
attached to the park were 
less likely to view the NPS 
as responsible for 
preventing visitor 
accidents.  
 
Extends the sense of place 
literature to consider 
attribution of responsibility 
(causal and prevention). 
 
Those less aligned with the 
natural/cultural meaning of 
the park, and less attached to 
it (i.e., presumably, first-
time visitors) would be more 
likely to see the NPS as 
responsible in the case of a 
visitor injury/accident. 
Suggests that park managers 
might target new park users 
as an audience for 
“attribution re-training” (see 
above).   
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Causal Attribution 
Using two hypothetical scenarios (“Hellroaring Creek” and “Mammoth Hot Springs”) 
describing visitor injuries, the survey measured visitors,’ employees,’ and volunteers’ beliefs 
about the cause of these accidents, including factors internal to the victim (e.g., his 
unpreparedness for hiking), and those external to the victim (e.g., environmental conditions, lack 
of park safety infrastructure). In addition to further explaining the classification of external 
causes, this section also describes differences in causal attributions between employees and 
visitors, how respondents tended to interpret “accidents” more generally, and the relationship 
between experience in parks (and in actual visitor safety incidents) and causal attributions.      
Understanding “external” causes  
 As described in Chapter 4, results of a factor analysis (varimax rotation) indicated that 
external accident causes (i.e., factors outside of the scenario’s hypothetical victim, Roger 
Ellison) did not load onto a single factor. Instead, three items related to the NPS (e.g., the NPS’ 
attention to park safety infrastructure) loaded together, leaving two separate items: (1) 
challenging environmental conditions, and (2) bad luck, fate, chance. From a theoretical 
perspective, it is interesting to note that the typical “dualistic” locus of the cause schema used to 
classify unintentional actions (see Malle, 1999) did not capture what appeared to be a more 
nuanced interpretation of the scenario. Indeed, that “fate, bad luck, and chance” was a separate 
construct, together with the tendency of some individuals to explain the hypothetical accident as 
an “act of God” in free responses lends some support to Shaver’s (1985) notion of 
“superphysical causality”; however, it is unclear the extent to which this reasoning may have 
been a product of the religiosity of the respondent, a demographic variable not measured in this 
study, but often important to making such attributions (Shaver, 1985).  
	   315	  
 This expansion of the external causes category also poses interesting implications for the idea 
of the controllability of the cause, a second property utilized to attribute causal responsibility 
(Weiner, 1996, 2006). As Weiner (1996, 2006) reminds us, we can think of controllability of a 
cause as either controllable by the actor himself (i.e., in the case of the scenario, Roger Ellison), 
or by an outside agent (i.e., the National Park Service). Following this logic, the actions of the 
NPS in the scenario may be viewed as external to Roger Ellison as well as controllable; that is, 
the NPS (hypothetically speaking) had control over whether to maintain its safety infrastructure, 
enforce its safety policies more rigorously, and so on. The concepts of bad luck and challenging 
environmental conditions are also external to Ellison, yet the perception of controllability in this 
case may be less straightforward. While most would agree that, by definition, one lacks control 
over what is perceived as “bad luck” or “fate,” environmental conditions such as terrain or 
weather may not foster the same agreement between individuals. As will be discussed below, the 
extent to which respondents saw themselves as able to control their exposure to park-related risk, 
such as inclement weather or rough terrain, varied among the sample. As Weiner (2006) 
explains, and as this dissertation has begun to show, the extent to which we perceive a cause as 
controllable matters in terms of how we attribute responsibility to external actors (e.g., the NPS), 
develop emotional reactions (e.g., anger vs. sympathy), and support or act on behalf of a person 
or a social policy.  
Differences between employees and visitors 
As described in Chapter 4, comparing employees and park visitors’ causal attributions with 
respect to the visitor accident scenario revealed significant differences. Employees were more 
likely to view internal causal factors (i.e., those related to the victim, such as his lack of 
preparedness) and challenging environmental conditions as important causal factors than visitors 
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were. On the other hand, visitors were more likely to view bad luck as an important causal factor. 
As hypothesized, the “misalignment” between employees and visitors in their causal attributions 
appears to parallel that which has been documented in the safety science literature as occurring 
between upper-level managers and lower-level employees (e.g., Lacroix & Dejoy, 1989; Lehane 
& Stubbs, 2001). As distinct populations with varied experiences in park settings and 
responsibilities (i.e., recreating in the park vs. managing risk in the park), these differences are 
not necessarily unexpected; however, as Lehane and Stubbs’ (2001) findings suggest, such 
perceptual differences indicate that the direction of future risk management decisions may not 
align with park visitors’ expectations or needs. For instance, if park managers are more likely to 
hold visitors responsible in the case of an accident, they may be less motivated to investigate 
potential park actions that may have contributed to the event, such as a lack of communication or 
the (non) enforcement of a park rule, and to work towards changing these conditions in the 
future. Lacroix and Dejoy (1989) echo this point, arguing that managers’ “chronic belief that 
most accidents can be prevented by heightened worker effort” (p. 106) may result in “little or no 
attempt to reconstruct accident sequences or to identify basic causes” and in potential 
organizational conflict. To extrapolate, visitors could interpret park managers’ inaction as a lack 
of interest in their safety and wellbeing, or even a failure to meet their expected 
responsibilities—Freudenburg’s (1993) notion of “recreancy” —leading to negative attitudes 
toward and a lack of trust in the NPS. Following the logic of the occupational safety literature, 
achieving congruence between causal perceptions of park visitors and employees/volunteers 
would thus “foster a better environment for the effective implementation of preventative 
strategies in a mutually supportive way” (Lehane & Stubbs, 2001, p. 125).  
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The idea of achieving “congruence” between visitors and employees/volunteers is 
reminiscent of co-orientation, a concept steeped in public relations and mass communication 
research, and applied in deliberative contexts involving multiple audiences. Weaving together 
diverse research traditions in sociology and psychotherapy with the symmetry model, mass 
communication researchers introduced co-orientation as a concept describing the “relationships 
between the cognitions of two or more people” (McLeod & Chaffee, 1973, p. 470). By 
comparing the beliefs of two separate groups, co-orientation operates under the assumption that:  
…A person’s behavior is not based simply upon his private cognitive construction of the 
world; it is also a function of his perception of the orientations held by others around him 
and of his orientation to them (McLeod & Chaffee, 1973, p. 470; emphasis theirs).  
 
As a management approach, co-orientation can provide insight into the relationship between the 
public’s (and other key stakeholders’) subjective judgments, and those of managers, thus 
providing a basis on which to construct more successful policy-based interventions. Researchers 
have used the co-orientation approach to compare the perspectives of two groups or stakeholders, 
for instance, those of decision-makers with those of the public, in order to gauge common 
ground and disagreement on both topical subjects and perceptions of each other (e.g., Broom & 
Dozier, 1990; Grunig & Stamm, 1973; Leong, McComas, & Decker, 2007, 2008; Tichenor & 
Wackman, 1973). With respect to causal attribution, adopting a co-orientation perspective would 
require a survey of park staff and visitors in order to determine: (1) park staff’s causal attribution 
of a particular event, such as a visitor accident; (2) park visitors’ views of the same event; and 
(3) each group’s estimate of the other group’s views. Once each group’s beliefs about the event, 
and about the other group’s beliefs have been tabulated, steps can be taken to reach common 
ground. As communication and public relations scholars have argued, documenting the 
dimensions of belief correspondence can be critical to formative research on key audiences (such 
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as park visitors), leading to later shaping of appropriate and effective strategic communication 
(e.g., Broom & Dozier, 1990).  
 While co-orientation approaches often employ a series of deliberative forums over an 
extended time period to achieve shared understanding within and between groups (e.g., see 
Leong et al., 2008), targeted interventions meant to “train” (or “re-train”) certain audiences’ 
causal attributions may be another promising approach (Cushner & Brislin, 1995; Haynes, Perry, 
Stupnisky, & Daniels, 2009; Sarkisian, Prohaska, Davis, & Weiner, 2007; Williams-Piehota et 
al., 2004). In a public health context, researchers have begun to pilot communication-based 
interventions that aim to influence responsibility beliefs and target individual behaviors. 
Recognizing that health messages emphasizing an individual’s behavior could unintentionally 
inspire feelings of anger, guilt, or fatalism, Williams-Piehota et al. (2004) designed a study to 
investigate whether messages emphasizing the role of social groups (e.g., friends, families, 
religious groups) could influence health-based decision-making. To do so, the authors randomly 
assigned subjects to receive a telephone message emphasizing either individual (i.e., internal) 
responsibility for consuming the appropriate amount of fruits and vegetables, or social (i.e., 
external) responsibility. While both types of messages increased fruit and vegetable 
consumption, Williams-Piehota et al. (2004) found that the social responsibility message 
appeared to motivate increased intake over time, as compared to the individual responsibility 
message. Also in the health context, Sarkisian et al. (2007) designed an “attribution re-training 
curriculum” consisting of both educational trainings and exercise sessions for older adults in 
order to influence their causal beliefs about becoming sedentary; more specifically, “participants 
were taught that becoming sedentary is not inevitable with aging and that older adults should 
attribute being sedentary to modifiable attributes rather than to old age” (Sarkisian et al., 2007, p. 
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1842). Sarkisian et al.’s (2007) apparent success—intervention participants both exercised more 
and reported more positive beliefs about their own mental and physical health—suggests support 
for the use of strategic communication in order to influence attributional beliefs.  
Management implications. Sarakisian et al.’s (2007) attribution re-training is founded on 
the idea that individuals can be persuaded to “reject stable and uncontrollable attributions and 
instead adopt unstable and controllable explanations for failure” (p. 1843). Put simply, how a 
person attributes responsibility is less a belief set in stone, and more a judgment open to change.  
In the context of a national park, one can imagine designing a communication campaign or 
multiple campaigns, (e.g., one specifically for visitors, one for employees, etc.) meant to 
influence that group’s beliefs about the causes of, or responsibility for the prevention of, visitor 
injuries. Based on the results of this dissertation, for instance, messages might emphasize that 
visitor accidents are not solely the result of “bad luck,” but that individuals have considerable 
control over certain aspects of their park visit, such as seeking information about the park and 
carrying certain supplies with them. (Further discussion on the potential content of these 
messages, as well as a research agenda related to messaging strategies, will be provided below).  
Interpretation of “accidents” 
How study participants attributed causal responsibility for visitor accidents may also be a 
product of their understanding of accidents more generally, which was explored among 
employees and volunteers in Chapter 6. Interviews highlighted employees’ and volunteers’ 
tendency to describe visitor accidents using a dualism that seemed to follow the traditional social 
psychological attribution model: as “user errors” (i.e., stemming from internal causes, usually 
under an individual’s control) or as “acts of God” (i.e., stemming from external causes, often 
perceived as not under an individual’s control). Whereas employees described many park 
	   320	  
accidents as falling into the first category, they likewise described ways in which visitor 
accidents may be uncontrollable, unpreventable, and even unpredictable. In the context of Mount 
Rainier, for instance, one can imagine a hiker injuring his leg while wearing inadequate footwear 
versus injuring his leg while escaping a volcanic debris flow; the hiker’s ability to select 
appropriate footwear—his control over a potential cause of his injury—may be important to his 
safety in both scenarios, but could be overshadowed given other, more immediate sources of 
risk. When reading the Hellroaring Creek scenario, it is possible that employees interpreted 
details of the scenario as “cues” for viewing the scenario as a case of “user error”; in free-
response answers describing the cause of the accident, survey respondents tended to highlight the 
fact that the individual chose to hike alone, and also to extrapolate that he purposefully veered 
from the established trail to take a photograph, despite no explicit information in the scenario 
that he did so. This interpretation of the hypothetical accident—one in which a visitor retains the 
ability to make rational choices about his experience—may have led employees to hold the 
visitor as primarily accountable for his fate. In this sense, respondents’ interpretations of the 
scenario seemed to follow Green’s (1997a) description of how, in a contemporary “risk society” 
(Beck, 1992) concerned with statistical probability, accidents tend to be constructed as 
occurrences that are under the control of the individual: 
Accidents, even in such high-risk recreations such as rock-climbing or long-distance 
hiking should not happen. They only do so if the public fail to take due care to calculate 
known or knowable risks (p. 126).  
 
As the interviews illustrated, this interpretation of visitor accidents may not be limited to the 
hypothetical, as employees and volunteers described “victim blaming” as a common response to 
accidents precipitated by situations in which they perceived visitors as “choosing” to defy park 
rules or “common sense,” including engaging in high-risk recreation or in more mundane 
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activities, such as driving; as the Just World Hypothesis mantra goes, these individuals “got what 
they deserved” (Lerner & Miller, 1978).  
Management implications. That the propensity to “blame the victim” may be preceded by 
the way in which a particular visitor incident is framed suggests implications for how park 
managers, as well as news media outlets, choose to communicate about such incidents with 
public audiences. As the expansive literature in message framing suggests (e.g., Entman, 1993; 
Iyengar, 1991, 1996), whether park-based communication places particular emphasis on an 
accident as being caused by internal factors or external factors may influence how audiences 
come to attribute responsibility for the cause of such accidents. The final section of this chapter 
posits a research agenda for investigating how particular message strategies, such as framing, 
might be invoked to influence attributions of responsibility.       
Importance of experience 
 Chapter 4 also provided evidence that an individual’s level of experience in a given setting 
may influence his or her causal attributional judgment (Kouabenan, 2002; Kumagai et al., 2004a; 
Kumagai et al., 2004b; Winter & Fried, 2000). Employees who had never been involved in an 
actual visitor safety incident (e.g., participating in a park search & rescue effort), as well as those 
who had never experienced an incident similar to that described in the scenario, were more likely 
to report above median internal causal attributions. Following Kouabenan (2002), we may 
interpret these attributional judgments as self-defensive, in that employees appeared to prefer to 
attribute responsibility to characteristics of the visitor, rather than to circumstances that may have 
been more under their managerial auspices, such as the physical infrastructure at the park, or the 
enforcement of park rules. As suggested above, the “default” attributional response of NPS 
employees, especially for those without first-hand knowledge of responding to visitor safety 
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incidents, may be to blame the visitor; given the ubiquitous refrain among Park Service 
employees and volunteers that visitors “leave their brains at home” (as described in Chapter 6), 
this response may be somewhat understandable. Likewise, we might hypothesize that those 
employees or volunteers who have been involved in visitor safety incidents, whether as a patient  
or as a medical provider, may develop a more nuanced understanding of the causes of such 
accidents, including both internal and external factors.    
For visitors, experience seemed to play a parallel role. Experience in a national park setting, 
measured through number of visits at the park, length of the most recent visit, and number of 
national parks visited overall, was negatively correlated with viewing NPS-related causes of the 
hypothetical accident as important. The more time visitors spent recreating in national park units, 
in other words, the more their causal attributions approached those of the employees and 
volunteers in the sample. We can interpret this finding in several ways. First, it is possible that 
those more accustomed to national park settings have also, to some degree, internalized the 
“culture” of personal responsibility perpetuated by the NPS (see below), leading them, like 
employees and volunteers, to view visitors as blameworthy in such situations. A second 
possibility relates to the operation of an optimistic bias (Weinstein, 1980, 1987) that may 
persuade more “experienced” visitors to assign greater importance to “human factors” in the case 
of visitor accidents. Extrapolating from DeJoy’s (1989) work on (in)experienced drivers and 
causal attributions of responsibility for car crashes, we can expect that a visitor who has spent a 
lifetime hiking or paddling in national parks might perceive other visitors as similarly “in 
control” of their personal exposure to risk and overall safety in a park, and thus blameworthy in 
the case of an accident (see also Green, 1997a). 
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Management implications. From a management perspective, the finding that visitors with 
less experience in park settings may be the least likely to view the visitor as responsible in the 
case of an accident deserves further attention. As federal efforts such as “Healthy Parks, Healthy 
People” and the “America’s Great Outdoors Initiative” aim to attract more diverse populations to 
national, state, and local parks, critical questions emerge. Will these new visitors, individuals 
who may be unfamiliar with the biophysical environment, as well as with the rules and 
regulations of the park, tend to attribute more responsibility to the NPS in the case of a visitor 
accident? How might these attributions of responsibility influence intentions to take legal action, 
such as the filing of tort claims in the case of visitor injury or death in a national park? These and 
related questions call for further empirical scrutiny.     
Prevention Attribution 
 In addition to understanding how respondents attribute responsibility for a visitor accident 
that (hypothetically) took place, this dissertation also attempted to explain how respondents 
understood the responsibility to prevent such events from taking place: the responsibility to 
ensure safety, or what I have chosen to call “prevention attribution.” I measured prevention 
attribution with both survey items and with in-depth interview questions. The following section 
describes differences in attributing responsibility for preventing visitor injury/accidents by visitor 
demographics, such as race/ethnicity, and also by recreational activity choice. Next, I take a 
closer look at the meaning of a “shared responsibility” for preventing visitor injury/accidents, 
including the underlying assumptions. The remainder of the section examines the relationship 
between causal and prevention attribution.   
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Differences by visitor “type” and demographic characteristics  
Recreational activity. As described in Chapter 5, how visitors attributed responsibility for 
preventing accidents (i.e., ensuring their own safety in the park) seemed to vary by individual 
characteristics. For instance, participation in high-risk recreational activities, such as skiing or 
mountaineering, was negatively associated with expressing support for NPS responsibility to 
prevent visitor injury. Following Rickard et al. (2011), this relationship seems to make intuitive 
sense, as it suggests that skiers or mountaineers, among other “high risk” or “adventure” 
recreationists (Ewert & Hollenhurt, 1989), would prefer not to see their participation limited by 
NPS oversight, such as through enforcing rules or restricting access. As considerable 
sociological research has indicated, for some individuals, climbing or skiing is not simply a 
pastime, but rather an activity fundamental to one’s self-concept (e.g., Lipscombe, 2005; Lyng, 
1990). Taking part in these activities, therefore, may be felt as an expression of larger personal 
and societal issues, whether self-actualization, or freedom of expression. That visitors 
participating in different recreational activities tend to hold distinct judgments about their—and 
the NPS’—responsibility for ensuring safety also indicates that employees’ natural tendency to 
group visitors by activity, as noted in Chapter 6, has potential merit.  
 Demographic characteristics. Chapter 5 also illustrated how attributions of responsibility 
for preventing accidents may vary across common demographic characteristics, such as age, sex, 
education level, race/ethnicity, and native language, confirming the findings of Espiner (2000) in 
the context of New Zealand national park tourists. In particular, women, older individuals, more 
educated individuals, those who were non-native English speakers, and those identifying as 
Asian tended to express more support for NPS responsibility; those identifying as 
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Hispanic/Latino, on the other hand, expressed less support, and, correspondingly, more support 
for individual (internal) responsibility.   
While explaining the reasoning behind these tendencies is difficult without more information 
about the visitor sample, the fact that the variation exists suggests that judgments of 
responsibility for preventing visitor injury may not be universally held. Moreover, these 
differences support considerable research in social psychology and communication that has 
demonstrated differences in attributional judgment by cultural background, with implications for 
developing effective, culturally-sensitive communication strategies (e.g., Cushner & Brislin, 
1996; Menon, Morris, Chiu, & Hong, 1999; Oetzel, DeVargas, Ginossar, & Sanchez, 2007). 
While this research attends most centrally to causal attribution, it may be nonetheless pertinent 
to prevention attribution, and thus applicable to understanding attributions of responsibility for 
ensuring safety. For instance, in making causal attributions, individuals from a Western (i.e., 
U.S., European) background tend to look towards characteristics of the individual (i.e., internal 
causes) whereas those from an Eastern (i.e., Asian), traditionally “collectivist” cultural 
background gravitate more towards external attributions (e.g., Krull, 1993; Menon et al., 1999).  
In the context of the parks studied, the differences observed provide some evidence that visitors 
may arrive at a park with certain pre-defined assumptions about their role in ensuring their own 
personal safety, as well as tendencies towards making causal attributions—beliefs that may 
render them more or less receptive to park communication encouraging them to prevent 
accidents and injuries. While most employees and volunteers seem to recognize the potential for 
difference among their clientele, fewer have found solutions to address these differences while 
providing necessary park information.  
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While no known NPS-initiated research has examined attributions of responsibility for visitor 
safety by visitor race or ethnicity, recent agency-funded studies do shed light on differences in 
perceptions of the overall safety of national parks by racial/ethnic group. Concerned with how 
such demographic characteristics might influence a visitor’s park experience, in the last decade, 
the NPS has conducted nationally representative telephone surveys of randomly selected park 
visitors and non-visitors across the U.S. (Solop, Hagen, & Ostergren, 2003; Taylor, Grandjean, 
& Gramann, 2011). Unsurprisingly, results of these and other studies indicate that visitors to 
national parks are disproportionately non-Hispanic White, with Hispanic Americans and 
African-Americans tending to be under-represented, as compared to the general U.S. population. 
For the purposes of this dissertation, however, the more interesting contribution of such research 
is the attention to perceptual variations by cultural group. For instance, Taylor et al. (2011) found 
differences in perceptions of whether national parks are “safe places to visit” by race and 
ethnicity; whereas 10% of the overall sample agreed that NPS units are not safe, 5% of Whites, 
24% of Hispanics, 16% of African-Americans, and 5% of Asians answered this way; these 
differences were statistically significant by a chi-square test (p < .05). Familiarity with national 
park units also differed significantly by race/ethnicity; whereas 30% of the overall sample agreed 
that, “I just don’t know that much about NPS units”, the same was true of 26% of Whites, 34% 
of Hispanics, 56% of African-Americans, and 34% of Asians. Interestingly, the authors posit that 
differences associated with varying knowledge and perceptions of parks may exist at a more 
fine-grained level than racial or ethnic group. Most tellingly, Taylor and colleagues found 
significant differences in response between Hispanics who were interviewed in Spanish and 
those who were interviewed in English, even after taking several steps to account for differences 
in connotation and language. They interpret these differences as:  
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… Most plausibly due to social, economic, and/or cultural variation between the two 
groups of Hispanic respondents. Those who speak only Spanish may include more recent 
immigrants with lower levels of acculturation and less awareness of the National Park 
System’s status in U.S. society. It also may be that less acculturated Hispanic Americans 
are less comfortable around uniformed government employees, including park rangers, as 
was conjectured in the focus group (p. 15).   
 
The idea of “two groups” of Hispanic respondents aligns, in many ways, with both my 
experiences with and employees’ interpretations of the visitor base at DEWA. From witnessing 
multigenerational family barbeques at the park’s beaches, to speaking with visitors in Spanish, I 
interacted with park visitors who appeared to be recently immigrated to those who appeared to 
be fully acculturated; in some cases, upon contacting a visitor group, I was directed to speak with 
a younger child—the member of the family most comfortable communicating in English. 
Moreover, while many DEWA visitors are Spanish-speaking, this sharing of a native language 
masks wide differences in country and culture of origin. Though anecdotal, these experiences 
confirm to some extent that identification by race/ethnic group or by native language on its own 
may be an inadequate measure on which to group park visitors for management purposes.     
Management implications. As a basis for tailoring park communication, classifying visitors 
by recreational activity may be a relatively low cost, straightforward method of distinguishing 
between audiences who may hold distinct beliefs about their own responsibility, and thus might 
require different messages from the park. At the same time, while DEWA (and presumably, 
other park units) have taken steps towards acknowledging the diversity of its visitor base, 
bilingual signs and brochures may address only the surface of what may be deeper beliefs, 
attitudes, and perceptions, including attributions of responsibility for ensuring safety. 
Researchers’ appeals to the NPS and other federal land management agencies (e.g., U.S. Forest 
Service) to examine and respond to the communication needs of multicultural user groups are not 
new (e.g., Simcox & Hodgson, 1993; Dahl, 1993; Chavez, Winter, & Absher, 2008); however, 
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such calls to action may be insufficient to enact change without the contribution of other factors, 
such as adequate research funding and field personnel. But as Simcox and Hodgson (1993, pp. 
131-132) argue, “While implementing such programs will be costly, the trade-off may be 
increased resource degradation and user conflicts as a result of an inability to diffuse information 
effectively.” Results from this dissertation, combined with the findings of cultural psychology 
and communication, suggest that a systematic understanding of the general demographics of a 
park’s visitor base, including race/ethnicity, native language, and sex at minimum, should be a 
necessity for park managers. Recognizing that there are likely hurdles, both political and 
monetary, to collecting this information, efforts should be made towards gathering and analyzing 
these data in a systematic fashion, and on an annual basis. This information, in turn, will provide 
the baseline for constructing more complex approaches that account for fine-grained differences 
within groups that, on the surface, may have many similarities.          
Shared responsibility   
As reported in Chapter 5, the majority of all respondents (visitors, employees, and 
volunteers) perceived that responsibility for preventing visitor injury rested almost entirely with 
the individual, with very few respondents perceiving this responsibility as “shared” between park 
visitors and staff. By comparison, interviewees (employees and volunteers) were much more 
likely to describe the responsibility to ensure visitor safety as “shared,” and even in some cases 
as an equal responsibility. To some extent, we might explain this apparent mismatch as due to 
the fact that, for employees (as was true for visitors), attributions of responsibility seemed to 
vary by employee “type,” following the findings of Espiner (2000). As such, the job titles and 
responsibilities of the individuals interviewed may have mattered considerably in the types of 
responses I received. As Chapter 5 illustrated, employees in the Administration and Natural & 
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Cultural Resources Divisions were less supportive of NPS’ responsibility to prevent visitor 
injuries/accidents, as compared to those in the Visitor & Resource Protection Division; as was 
discussed in Chapter 5, we can speculate that such differences in belief may be related to each 
group’s distinct job descriptions, including the amount of direct involvement with visitors and 
obligation to participate in search & rescue procedures. 
While the perceived division of overall responsibility due to the NPS and the park visitor 
may not be universal, employees did seem to share a common perspective on how they 
envisioned their duty to manage park risk. As Chapter 6 described, following the “3E” approach 
(e.g., Baker, 1973), employees and volunteers described their “educational” responsibility as:        
• Providing information about “known” risks. 
• Helping to develop meanings of and connections with the park. 
• Providing face-to-face contacts with visitors, both to disseminate information, and to 
sustain the historical and cultural significance of the ranger to the agency. 
• Adapting to and keeping abreast of changing forms of information technology that may 
be useful and appropriate in park settings. 
•  Partnering with, and/or relying on other agencies and organizations to educate their 
visitor base (e.g., on how to recreate safely in the park). 
• Tailoring messages to meet the needs of various visitor “types,” including those who are 
oriented towards “risky” recreation, and those who do not speak English as a first 
language.  
• Reacting to a visitor base that may or may not attend to “official” forms of 
communication. 
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At the same time, interviewees noted their responsibility to (1) provide solutions for  “known 
hazards” in areas to which park personnel “invite” visitors and (2) balance the value of 
undeveloped wilderness with the possibility of negligence (“engineering”). Finally, employees 
and volunteers described the need to allow access or enforce closures in park areas, despite 
experiencing threats to their own authority and self-identity (“enforcement”). While 
acknowledging their own responsibilities, employees also recognized that visitors, too, should be 
held responsible for preparing themselves for a park visit (e.g., seeking out information, 
gathering the appropriate equipment), as well as exercising “situational awareness” and making 
informed decisions while in the park.   
The tendency to “individualize” responsibility (Beck, 1992; Bickerstaff, Simmons, & 
Pidgeon, 2008) for avoiding park-related risks appears to be engrained in the larger occupational 
community of the NPS (see Van Maanen & Barley, 1984), one that upholds the (sometimes 
unstated) belief that “brainless” tourists should be held responsible for their unfortunate fates 
(see also Green, 1997a); however, when encouraged to think more broadly about issues of 
responsibility for visitor safety, most employees and volunteers conveyed that safety, like many 
environmental risks and public health concerns, may be more “collective” than individual 
(Bickerstaff et al., 2008), with responsibilities due to multiple parties (see Chapter 6). 
Interestingly, the inclination to see safety as primarily a personal responsibility also emerged 
strongly among visitor survey respondents. Whereas research on public audiences’ attributions of 
responsibility for protecting against environmental risks, such as air pollution or climate change, 
has demonstrated citizens’ propensities to pass on the responsibility to other institutional actors, 
such as lawmakers or industry affiliates (e.g., Bickerstaff & Walker, 2002; Eden, 1993; Petts, 
2005), overall, visitor respondents were less inclined to pass the buck to the NPS for ensuring 
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their safety (see Chapter 5). While visitors’ attributions of responsibility for preventing 
injuries/accidents seemed to vary by demographic characteristics (as described above), in 
general, most seem to view the maintenance of one’s health and safety as under personal control 
(e.g., Bickerstaff et al., 2011; Kirkwood & Brown, 1995; Lupton, 1993, 1994).  
Returning to NPS Director’s Order 50C, in which visitor injury prevention is described as a 
“shared responsibility between the park staff, park partners, and park visitors” (U.S. DOI, 2010, 
p. 60), how have the results of this dissertation helped to illuminate how this “shared” 
responsibility is perceived by park staff and what, in practice, it may entail? Is a “shared 
responsibility” one in which multiple parties take on equal, but different responsibilities in 
pursuit of the common goal of reducing visitor injuries/accidents? Unlike the context of a theme 
park or a zoo, where one’s safety can be all but guaranteed through the use of engineering and 
enforcement, in a national park, responsibility to prevent visitor injury, as described by 
interviewees, was seen as temporal, distributed, and spatial (see Figure 7.1). Responsibility to 
prevent injury begins before the park visit, as visitors are expected to gather information, prepare 
themselves physically, and gather necessary equipment; as interviewees explained, in this stage, 
responsibility rests, for the most part, on the shoulders of the visitor. Once beyond the park gates, 
however, responsibility appears to shift. While visitors remain responsible to maintain situational 
awareness, as well as to select activities that are within their physical abilities, park managers 
now take on a certain degree of responsibility, such as to mitigate known risks and to provide 
park-related information. At this point, while responsibility can be viewed as shared or 
collective, importantly, the onus of responsibility on visitor or park manager seems to shift based 
on the physical landscape. Following the observation of Tuler and Golding (2002), in more 
“frontcountry” settings, such as campgrounds or visitor centers, interviewees seemed to attribute 
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responsibility for preventing visitor injury to their own actions (e.g., upkeep of infrastructure), 
whereas in “backcountry” or wilderness settings, they placed more of this burden on the visitor 
him or herself.           
 Assumptions underlying “shared” responsibility. In thinking about interviewees’ 
conception of the temporal, distributed, and spatial attributes of a shared responsibility to prevent 
visitor injury, two assumptions held by interviewees deserve mention. First, while many 
employees and volunteers seemed to recognize the limitations of the “education” approach, such 
as the difficulty in reaching visitors who are not “motivated” to seek out information about the 
park (Heberlein, 1974), they nonetheless depend on these methods as a central approach to their 
risk management efforts. Moreover, while interviewees articulated their desire to tailor 
messages, they also described the more likely scenario of pushing out information— blanketing 
the visitor base with standardized information and hoping for the best. This “deficit model” 
(Durant, Evans, & Thomas, 1989; Rennie & Stocklmayer, 2003; Wynne, 1993) default seemed 
to reflect the working assumption that providing visitors with “adequate” information will ensure 
that they follow rules, act appropriately, and avoid injury. A top-down, deficit model approach 
seemed likewise present in interviewees’ descriptions of using new technology, such as social 
media, to communicate with visitors. In their ability to disseminate one-way messages, from the 
NPS to an (undifferentiated) audience base, an electronic Tweet and a wooden sign may be 
largely equivalent, despite utopian discourse to the contrary; in their current application by the 
NPS, neither allows the audience to talk back.  The idea that “experts” (or in this case, NPS 
managers) and the lay public (park visitors) can—and should—listen to and learn from one 
another in regard to localized, current, and often controversial socioscientific issues instead 
epitomizes the Public Engagement with Science (PES) model (e.g., Burns, O’Connor, & 
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Stocklymayer, 2003; Kerr, Cunningham-Burley, & Tutton, 2007; Lazinger, 2007; Leshner, 
2003). From a PES perspective, all citizens hold values with respect to socioscientific issues 
deserving of legitimization and expression. Participation in deliberative processes, whether 
citizen science projects or citizen juries, in turn, can also foster public trust in “official” decision-
making bodies, such as government agencies (Irwin & Michael, 2003). By this logic, NPS 
communication that limits the public’s ability to participate or “talk back” may, unintentionally, 
limit visitors’ trust in the agency’s ability to manage risk in national parks.    
A second assumption present in employees’ comments relates to the geography of the park 
itself. When describing their risk management efforts, interviewees seemed to delineate their 
responsibility by location: more developed areas required more of their attention (in terms of the 
3Es) than backcountry trails or designated wilderness. Yet whether visitors perceive similar 
gradations in the park’s—and their own—responsibility remains an empirical question. When 
frontcountry areas can include short trails, and wilderness areas can be dotted with primitive 
structures, the designation between “park-maintained” and “visitor on his own” may be less than 
black-and-white. Instead, we might characterize a national park as “liminal” space (Shields, 
1991; Van Gennep, 1960): a less differentiated, transition zone of responsibility, straddling the 
developed and the undeveloped. First introduced in anthropology, the concept of liminality 
describes the idea of being in transition from one developmental state to another, such as during 
a “rite of passage” (Van Gennep, 1960; Turner, 1974). For sociologists and cultural geographers, 
however, liminality offers a way to conceptualize people’s experiences in places, both familiar 
and foreign (e.g., Bevan, 2011; Currie, 1997; Freidus & Romero-Daza, 2009; Phipps, 1999; 
Shields, 1991). Tracing historical changes in the meanings of popular tourist locations, Shields 
(1991, p. 118), for instance, wrote of Brighton Beach, as “ ‘betwixt and between’ the sublime 
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chaos of the sea and the ordered landscape of England.” Indeed, scholars in leisure studies have 
used the concept of liminality to describe the experiences of traveling and being a tourist, 
including engaging in activities one might avoid at home (e.g., Currie, 1997; Phipps, 1999). 
  In a national park, we can apply the concept of liminality on at least two levels: First (and as 
explored in Chapter 6), visitors, as tourists, may be “in between” their accustomed habits and 
activities of home and the varied new opportunities and experiences that a national park 
represents. As Currie (1997, p. 894) writes, upon entering a “liminoidal” state separate from their 
home environments, tourists: 
…are liberated from the normal mode of societal action and interaction. The rules of 
society no longer apply to tourists; they are temporarily allowed to create their own rules 
within which to operate.  
 
Likewise, Freidus and Romero-Daza (2009, p. 686) explain tourists’ existence as liminal when 
they “‘vacate’ their lives but do not fully integrate into the tourist spaces since their time there is 
clearly marked and they are expected to eventually return home.” At the same time, attributes of 
the physical environment into which tourists enter may construct the appearance of a place 
straddling the boundary of managed and unmanaged, civilized and wild. This second application 
of liminality suggests that attributions of responsibility may vary geographically, based on 
physical cues in the landscape, such as picnic tables, handrails, paved roads, or outhouses. Future 
research should attempt to determine how best to develop communication strategies that convey 
this sense of transition from one “zone” to another, where expected responsibilities might differ.  
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Figure 7.1. A Proposed Framework for “Shared Responsibility” for Preventing Visitor 
Injury 
TEMPORAL 
During Park Visit 
(SPATIAL) 
Developed Areas Undeveloped 
Areas 
 
 
 
DISTRIBUTED 
Before Park 
Visit 
**Visitors and park staff may not share a 
common understanding of “developed” and 
“undeveloped” (e.g., frontcountry/backcountry); 
for visitors, may be influenced by physical cues 
in the landscape** 
After Park Visit 
• Maintain situational 
awareness 
• Attend to and 
respect physical 
capabilities and 
limits 
• Make informed 
decisions 
• Seek information 
 
  
• Maintain 
situational 
awareness 
• Attend to and 
respect physical 
capabilities and 
limits 
• Recognize and 
accept inherent 
park risks 
Visitors • Seek 
information 
• Gather clothing, 
gear, supplies 
• Know rules of 
the park 
• Consider goals 
of park visit 
(e.g., risk-
seeking, type of 
activity, etc.) 
**Visitors may change their expectations and/or 
behaviors based on the “limnoidal” experience 
of being in a park** 
• Incorporate 
lessons learned 
from present 
visit to 
influence future 
experiences 
• Attend to and reduce 
“known” risks, 
especially in popular 
areas 
• Provide information 
• (If possible) Enforce 
park rules 
• (As appropriate) 
Encourage or 
discourage certain 
activities (i.e., 
“visitor proficiency 
profiling”).  
• (As 
appropriate) 
Provide 
information  
(e.g., signs). 
• (If possible) 
Enforce park 
rules 
 
Employees 
and 
Volunteers 
(NPS) 
• Promote public 
awareness and 
understanding 
of the park, 
including its 
rules and 
inherent sources 
of risk 
• Consider 
differences 
based on: 
activity choices, 
demographics, 
and familiarity 
with parks (i.e., 
first-time vs. 
repeat visitors) 
in designing 
communication. 
**Information made available to park visitors 
may not directly, and without complication, lead 
to knowledge acquisition and behavior change. 
** 
**Visitors and park staff may neither anticipate 
nor value park-related risk in the same way.**  
• In the case of a 
visitor accident, 
conduct 
investigation; 
consider the 
complexity of 
attribution of 
responsibility 
• Attend to the 
ways in which 
the news media 
covers the 
event; consider 
developing and 
maintaining 
partnerships in 
order to 
influence 
coverage.    
 
 
Management implications. Though stated in an agency directive, what is meant by a 
“shared” responsibility to prevent visitor injury may require more explicit attention to ensure a 
mutually agreed-upon translation on the ground. Further attention is needed to investigate 
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whether parks should—and if they presently do—communicate about visitor safety as a “shared” 
responsibility in information available to both visitors and employees (e.g., website, signs, 
employment policies, etc.). NPS officials should consider creating and disseminating a 
“framework for shared responsibility,” such as outlined in Figure 7.1, that clarifies how 
responsibility for preventing visitor injury is temporal, distributed, and spatial in order to: (1) 
foster common understanding of this risk management directive across the Park System and its 
diverse park units, (2) illuminate potential assumptions implicit in risk management decisions, 
and (3) establish a basis for creating safety-related messages targeted at visitors.    
Relating prevention and causal attribution  
 
 In this chapter, as in this dissertation, the concepts of causal and prevention attribution have 
been considered separately as distinct outcome variables, with the former informed primarily by 
the social psychological literature, and the latter by more sociological approaches; however, it is 
worth re-examining whether these two variables, indeed, measure separate constructs. Would we 
expect an individual who perceives a visitor accident to be caused principally by the 
characteristics of the victim to also view park visitors as primarily responsible for preventing 
such accidents? As described in Chapter 5, I did observe significant correlations between these 
attributional beliefs in the expected direction—that is, internal causal attributions were correlated 
with beliefs about internal responsibility for preventing visitor accidents, and external causal 
attributions were correlated with beliefs about external (i.e., NPS) responsibility for preventing 
visitor accidents; however, these correlations were small to moderate in size, rather than large, 
lending some evidence that these variables measured separate constructs. Closer attention to the 
temporal nature of the attributional belief may be warranted: whereas causal attribution refers to 
past events (i.e., the visitor who fell and injured himself last month), prevention attribution, as I 
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have defined it, refers to present or future events (i.e., avoiding being involved in an accident on 
this park visit or future visits). In a reflective review of the history of social psychological 
approaches to attribution theory, Weiner (2008) suggests that the theoretical approach has been 
used both to examine causes of past events as well as those that may occur in the future, which 
has led to some confusion:  
Should beliefs about the future (e.g., “if I try hard then I will succeed”; “I can control my 
weight, and, thus, will improve my health”; “I have the strength to take charge of my life 
and, thus, will be accepted in the program I want”) be considered under the rubric of 
attribution theory? Or rather, does attribution theory instead look backward: “I 
succeeded; it is because I tried hard”; “I improved my health; it was caused by losing 
weight”; “I was accepted for the program of my choice; it was because I took charge of 
my life.” The former hypotheses embrace the future, teleology, and reasons; the latter 
relations concern the past outcomes, mechanism, and causes. Heider did not disentangle 
the two groupings, embracing them both within the large framework of causal thinking. I 
suspect this has left the field with some enduring problems and confounds, but also many 
possibilities and avenues for study (Weiner, 2008, p. 155).  
 
One approach to understanding the potential differences between causal and prevention 
attributional beliefs, also an avenue for future study, may lie with Construal Level Theory (CLT) 
(e.g., Liberman, Sagistrano, & Trope, 2002; Liberman & Trope, 1998; Trope & Liberman, 
2010), which, at its core, suggests that “temporal distance systematically changes the way events 
are represented” (Trope & Liberman, 2003, p. 407). As the theory explains, we can expect that 
psychological distance will differ based on spatial, temporal, social, and authenticity (i.e., real vs. 
hypothetical) factors; this distance, in turn, can influence how we make attributions of 
responsibility. For instance, events presented as hypothetical, in the future (i.e., temporally 
distant), spatially distant (e.g., in another country), or involving distant others are referred to as 
being at a higher construal level and will tend to elicit simplified, internal causal attributions: the 
propensity to see the individual as blameworthy, rather than other external factors. On the other 
hand, events presented as “closer” in spatial, temporal, and social terms (e.g., a “real” event, 
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occurring nearby, in the present, involving family or friends) represent a lower construal level 
and would be more likely to elicit more complex causal attributions: seeing both internal and 
external factors/circumstances as causal factors. Therefore, when asked to think about distant 
future events, individuals tend to under-weight external factors (Trope & Liberman, 2003). CLT 
thus provides another lens through which to examine the potential framing of safety-related 
messages to park visitors. For instance, messages could be framed to prime lower construal 
levels (e.g., presented in the present, in the context of the park, etc.), so as to encourage visitors 
to think about a visitor accident as not just caused by an individual’s actions, but also by various 
other external factors (e.g., weather, park infrastructure, etc.) (See below for further discussion 
on message development).  
Sense of Place 
This dissertation also explored how variables central to sense of place (i.e., place attachment 
and place meaning) related to causal and prevention attribution in the context of a national park. 
In addition to illuminating how place meanings in national parks may be both human- and 
“nature”-based, the results also suggest that one’s agreement with such meanings, as well as 
level of attachment, may matter in making attributions of responsibility for ensuring safety.  
“Blended” place meaning 
As outlined in Chapter 4, results of a factor analysis (varimax rotation) suggested that five of 
the eight place meaning survey items loaded highly on a single factor. These items appeared to 
describe both “nature” and human-based place meanings, including seeing the park as a wildlife 
habitat, a historical place, somewhere to be preserved for future enjoyment, a community of 
visitors and staff, and an unpredictable landscape. Though I had expected items related to place 
meaning to load onto two separate factors, one representing more nature-based place meanings, 
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and a second to represent more human-based place meanings, I instead found a single-factor 
solution. While contrary to my expectation, these “blended” place meanings might in fact be a 
more realistic reflection of how publics interpret special places: what Cantrill (1998, p. 312) 
referred to as a “continuum between environmentally- versus socially-salient features.” 
Exploring SOP among residents of the Lake Superior region of Michigan, Cantrill (1998, pp. 
312-313, emphasis in original) described how respondents generally agreed that natural and 
social meanings of the place were mutually contingent:  
To some, Munising is perceived as being situated in a peopled place that just happens to 
be found amid a variety of pleasing physical characteristics… Others view their “home” 
as located within a natural environment that includes people, some of who may share a 
preference for acting in the best interests of and being in the out-of-doors.   
 
Many scholars have rejected the nature-culture dualism, preferring instead to speak of 
“socionatures” or “naturecultures” (e.g., Davison, 2008; White, 2006). Environmental 
communication scholars, too, have recognized the “hybridity” of the material and discursive, 
suggesting that this tension underlies much of the study encompassed by this sub-discipline (e.g., 
Marafiote & Plec, 2006; Milstein, 2009; Rogers, 1998). Though some have criticized 
communication about national parks, and wilderness more generally, for perpetuating a false 
separation of “nature” from humankind (e.g., Cronon, 1996; DeLuca, 2010; Ross-Bryant, 2010), 
survey results suggest that this dualistic interpretation was not operative for respondents. It is 
possible that this nature/culture “hybridity” follows NPS efforts to communicate about these 
issues jointly, as is evident in the text of its websites and through the comments of interviewees. 
Though the use of cross-sectional survey research does not allow us to draw causal 
conclusions—i.e., exposure to communication leads to the development of place meanings, 
rather than the reverse— study results nonetheless provide evidence that conceptualizing 
meanings as a dynamic negotiation of the material (i.e., biophysical) and the social (i.e., 
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“peopled”) may be applicable to how user groups encounter national parks (see also Byrne, in 
press).  
SOP and attribution theory 
In regard to causal attribution, these blended place meanings, as well as place attachment, 
appeared to be positively related to judging internal causes of the hypothetical accident as 
important, as well as environmental conditions (Chapter 4). Given the dual roles of humans and 
the physical landscape in contributing to the meaning of parks, these attributional judgments 
appear logical. Similarly, as Chapter 5 illustrated, there was a negative relationship between 
place meaning (as well as place attachment) and support for external (i.e., NPS) responsibility 
for preventing visitor injury. One interpretation of these findings is that, as individuals come to 
understand the park in the park in this blended way, as well as believe the park to be central to 
their life, they also tend to view their responsibility (both in causing and preventing accidents) in 
ways that are more likely “sanctioned” by park personnel. As has been described above, seeing 
visitors as at least equally responsible—and usually more responsible—than park staff appears to 
be the default belief among most park personnel. 
Management implications. As was true for experience in national parks (see above), a 
visitor’s level of attachment to and understanding of a national park also appears to matter in 
how he or she comes to make attributions about the cause or prevention of visitor 
injuries/accidents. Based on anecdotal evidence and on empirical research in the sense of place 
and community sociology literature (see, e.g., Moore & Graefe, 1994; Relph, 1976; Stedman, 
2002; Theodori & Luloff, 2000; Tuan, 1977), first-time visitors may be less attached to the park 
as well as less in agreement with the “standard” meaning of the park. In turn, managers should 
anticipate that this user group might be less likely to align with more experienced visitors, as 
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well as employees or volunteers, in terms of attributing responsibility for safety. While in some 
ways an expected or “obvious” finding, no other known research has linked sense of place with 
attribution theory. Moreover, empirical evidence that establishes probable differences in beliefs 
between first-time and repeat park visitors lends much needed support to park managers’ 
decisions to target particular “types” of visitors.  
Perception, Evaluation, and Communication of Risk 
Results from this dissertation also make several beginning steps towards linking risk 
perception and attribution theory. Importantly, they suggest that the nature of the risk, the 
perceived context in which it is encountered, as well as the sources used to communicate about 
it, matter in judgments of causal and prevention attribution.  
Perceived controllability of risk 
As described in Chapter 4, survey measures meant to capture voluntariness and 
controllability of risk ended up loading on a single factor, which I chose to label “controllability 
of risk.” While the internal reliability was acceptable (Cronbach’s alpha = .67), it is possible that 
items pertaining to this concept should be revised in future work. Ideally, separate, reliable scales 
should be found to represent voluntariness and controllability of risk, and it may be necessary to 
pattern these more closely on those used by Slovic (1987). Nonetheless, the negative correlations 
found between controllability of risk and external (i.e., NPS) causal attribution, as well as 
between controllability of risk and attribution of responsibility for ensuring safety, support 
attention to the importance of controllability in influencing attributions (Weiner, 1996; see 
Chapters 4 and 5). Where Weiner (1996) approached controllability in a cognitive sense—e.g., 
one has control over the decision to study for a test, but not over one’s IQ— this dissertation 
drew on Slovic’s (1987) related notion of control as related to exposure: whether or not one 
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perceives that he has control over his exposure to a given risk, such as inclement weather. 
Results indicated that using controllability in the Slovic (1987) sense produced attributions that 
mirror Weiner’s (1996) predictions: that is, the more control an individual perceived he had over 
his exposure to a given risk, the less he held others (i.e., NPS) as responsible for either ensuring 
his safety or for causing his accident (see also above).     
Perceived desirability of risk 
 
The idea of risk as desirable (Machlis & Rosa, 1990) played a central role in both 
individuals’ attributions of responsibility for causing and preventing injuries/accidents, and in 
their valuation of risk in national parks more generally. As Chapter 6 described, many 
interviewees viewed risk in national parks as desirable and valuable, though these perceptions 
also seemed contingent upon the circumstances in which risk was encountered. Interviewees 
spoke of experiencing park-related risks, as well as voluntary risk-taking, for instance, as a 
pathway to self-development, self-reliance, and citizenship, a perspective echoing that of Sax 
(1980). Following this pattern, survey respondents who viewed risk as desirable were less likely 
to support external (i.e., NPS) responsibility for preventing visitor injury/accidents (Chapter 5). 
Somewhat differently, survey respondents who viewed risk as desirable were also more likely to 
see challenging environmental conditions and bad luck as important causal factors in the 
hypothetical visitor accident (Chapter 4). We can speculate that individuals more willing to seek 
out risk in outdoor settings, such as through recreation, may be at the same time, more familiar 
with its potential to contribute to negative outcomes; moreover, they appear more willing to 
accept these misfortunes as “acts of God” rather than “user errors” predicated on their own 
decisions. The idea that park-related risks and risk-taking may be sought out by some while 
shunned by others broadly follows past research in cultural theory. For instance, ethnographic 
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work has led researchers to conclude that, even within a single organization, acceptability of risk 
and risk exposure can vary by such attributes as occupational role and hierarchical status 
(Rayner, 1986).  
Management implications. Since perceived controllability of park-related risks matters in 
the development of causal attributions, more attention is needed to how this variable can be 
represented in park communication. In order to achieve “shared” attributions of responsibility for 
causing and/or preventing visitor accidents, message strategies might aim to strike a balance 
between inspiring an “exaggerated” sense of control over one’s exposure to risk in a national 
park (i.e., similar to an optimistic bias), and inspiring feelings of no control over one’s risk 
exposure (i.e., similar to fatalism).    
While the idea of risk as desirable emerged in both survey and interview data, and was 
expressed by visitors, employees, and volunteers, some caution is necessary in extending these 
results to management decisions. As discussed in Chapter 6, self-reflective employees and 
volunteers acknowledged that their personal tolerance for risk, as well as their comfort level in 
undeveloped settings such as wilderness areas, was likely not shared with all visitors who may 
enter the park gates. Therefore, the utopian promise of parks as places to take risks in order to 
develop self-reliance and personal responsibility—Sax’s (1980) “moral education”—may not be 
a commonly shared vision. Is viewing a park visit as a chance to have a picnic, rather than to 
scale a cliff, somehow a “lesser” use of a national park?  Park managers should attend to the 
ways in which employees and volunteers may, based on their own preferences, personal 
biographies, and tolerances for risk, tend to value certain park uses over others, and how this 
valuation may be, intentionally or not, passed on to park visitors. With growing attention to 
attracting traditionally under-represented, first-time visitors to parks, Sax’s (1980) vision may be 
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an inadequate—or even inappropriate—management goal. Greater discussion is warranted to 
explore if, and/or how, the goals of initiatives such as “Healthy Parks, Healthy People” may 
unintentionally conflict with pre-existing, normative beliefs among park staff, such as that 
mountains should exist “without handrails.”            
Exposure to/reliance on park-related communication  
 
 As Chapters 4 and 5 described, this dissertation also explored the influence of risk 
communication, including information reliance and exposure, on attribution of responsibility. 
Interestingly, the more a visitor reported relying on official information sources, the more likely 
he was to make internal causal attributions in the case of a hypothetical visitor accident. On the 
other hand, reliance on official information sources was also positively related to support for 
external (i.e., NPS) responsibility for ensuring visitor safety. In terms of safety information (i.e., 
information specifically covering potential risks in the park, such as driving conditions) the more 
an individual received, the more likely he was to view challenging environmental conditions as 
causal factors in an accident; since the survey item included specific attention to “park hazards 
(e.g., wildlife, drowning, earthquakes, rock slides, etc.)” and “weather conditions,” this result is 
largely unsurprising. At the same time, receiving more safety information also made a visitor 
more likely to see himself as responsible for ensuring his own safety at the park.  
 Management implications. Because this dissertation did not include a formal investigation 
of the content of the information sources referenced, we can only speculate as to whether 
visitors’ attributions tended to follow those represented in park communication (e.g., see Kahlor 
et al., 2002; Viswanath & Finnegan, 1996). In future research, a content analysis of the official, 
formal sources listed on the survey, including park signs, pamphlets, and museum exhibits, 
would help determine whether visitors may be forming their attributions, in part, from their 
exposure to certain types of park communication. For instance, do the messages that do exist 
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emphasize personal responsibility over external (i.e., NPS) responsibility for ensuring safety? 
(How) might messages about the same topic, such as interactions with wildlife, differ by park 
unit? At the least, however, the results appear to indicate some difference in attributions 
depending on the source of the information, official or unofficial, which seems to support 
existing research in the area of health information-seeking (e.g., Doria et al., 2006; Ford & 
Kaphingst, 2009).   
Safety Culture 
This dissertation also operated under the premise that understanding how employees make 
causal attributions, as well as attributions of responsibility for preventing visitor accidents, may 
relate, in part, to how they view their own safety on the job (Chapter 6). Interviewees described 
how a “positive” safety culture came to be enacted in the workplace, as well as how this culture 
might influence visitor safety.   
“Positive” safety culture 
Echoing the findings of the extant literature in this area (e.g., Cooper & Phillips, 2004; 
Nielsen et al., 2008; Wilson-Donnelly et al., 2005), interviewees seemed to understand a 
“positive” safety culture as one in which a balance exists between managers’ and on-the-ground 
workers’ responsibilities to create the conditions for safe working practices. Based on 
interviewees’ comments, these cultures were formed (and re-formed) through communication 
practices, both formal (e.g., trainings) and informal (e.g., conversations among employees). 
While concluding that NPS employees are no different than the factory workers, oil rig workers, 
and utility workers investigated in the safety culture literature is appealing, doing so would 
overlook the complexity of park employees’ occupational setting. Qualities unique to park 
employees (e.g., the high rate of turnover, their propensity for risk-taking), park jobs (e.g., the 
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need to be proficient in multiple skills and trades), and park managers (e.g., variable attention to 
safety as a management goal) create apparent challenges to achieving the kind of positive safety 
culture of which interviewees spoke.  
Multiple safety cultures 
Results from the interviews also provided insight into the fact that parks, by virtue of their 
amalgam of employees and visitors, seem to support not one, but many safety cultures. As 
interviewees pointed out, a “visitor safety culture”—to the extent that one can or should exist—
is, by definition and necessity, different than an “employee safety culture.” In explaining the 
relationship between these cultures, interviewees described a hypothesized “trickle down effect,” 
whereby the attention to safety among employees leads to improvements in visitor safety. As 
employees described, part of the trickling down of safety culture may be via the modeling of 
various “safe” or “unsafe” actions, similar to what Rickard (2011) described as commonplace 
instances in which an occupational workers’ nonverbal communication—the construction worker 
without a helmet, the exterminator without a mask, for instance—functions as risk 
communication to onlookers. Such modeling can be normative, and can validate or invalidate the 
official safety rules that employees uphold and visitors are asked to follow; as DEWA 
interviewees mentioned, a law enforcement ranger without a life vest can hardly demand that a 
visitor to wear one and expect to maintain his authority and credibility.  
The extent to which multiple safety cultures may exist in a single location, by virtue of job 
title or responsibility level, has received considerable attention in the safety science literature 
(e.g., Findley, Smith, Gorski, & O’Neill, 2007; Harvey, Bolam, & Gregory, 1999; Mearns, Flin, 
Gordon, & Fleming, 1998; McDonald, Corrigan, Daly, & Cromie, 2000; Pidgeon, 1998). Such 
research refers to organizational “subcultures,” wherein “desirable” attention to safety may be 
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more or less pronounced.  In a survey of both managers and lower level employees at two 
nuclear power plants, each operated by the same company, Harvey et al. (1999) found 
differences in expressions of safety culture not only between managers and all employees, but 
also between employees at the two plants. Arguing that safety culture cannot “be viewed as a 
single entity” (Harvey et al., 1999, p. 11), the authors concluded that:     
…Most, if not all, organizations have at least two safety cultures. It is inherent in 
organizational hierarchies that those at the top determine policy and those lower down 
implement it; there are also differences in the way employees see things when they are 
based in different functional areas (Harvey et al., 1999, p. 12).  
 
Less clear from existing research, however, are the ways in which such cultures might interact 
with or mutually reinforce one another. Moreover, if multiple safety cultures can exist among an 
organization’s employees and managers, how might such cultures impact the attitudes, 
perceptions, and behaviors of its paying clientele? Given, as this dissertation has shown, a 
diverse visitor base—some seeking risk, some avoiding it, some new visitors, some returning 
year after year, etc.—is the development of a shared “visitor safety culture” even possible? 
Clearly, more research is needed to examine the extent to which attention to safety among an 
organization may influence the safety of its clientele, as well as to identify the mechanisms by 
which such influence may occur.  
 Management implication. Interview findings suggest the need for more attention to how 
employees and volunteers in particular park divisions and/or administrative levels of a given 
park understand their responsibility to prevent both visitor and employee injuries/accidents. 
Differences of opinion as to whether a park, or the entire NPS, places more emphasis on visitor 
or employee safety—as well as the amount of emphasis these institutions should place on 
either— were apparent in the interviews, and, in some cases, hinted at feelings of frustration or 
even contempt towards management. Moreover, interviewees’ widespread belief that efforts to 
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improve employee safety directly influence visitor safety may be likewise problematic: could the 
assumption that engaging in employee safety efforts leads to improved visitor safety compromise 
necessary attention to efforts targeted more directly to visitors? These and other questions will 
require further inquiry, as well as deliberate consideration.   
Summary 
The expansive list of findings and recommendations just discussed (also presented in Table 
7.1), while instructive, run the risk of distracting the reader from the larger conclusions of this 
dissertation. In thinking about responsibility for public safety in places like national parks and 
the role of communication, what does this dissertation research contribute to the scholarly 
literature and the wider public policy conversation? I see the broader conclusions and 
contributions of this research as running along two axes, the theoretical and the pragmatic. From 
a pragmatic perspective, this dissertation has provided a snapshot of how one institution, the 
National Park Service, manages risk for a diverse set of employees and audience of public users. 
By integrating research in risk perception, tourism/leisure studies, and environmental psychology 
to existing work in attribution theory, this dissertation provides new evidence of how previously 
unconsidered variables tend to predict differences in how individuals attribute the causes of, and 
responsibility for preventing, unintentional injury. Some of these variables, such as the extent to 
which one views park-related risks as controllable, tend to predict expected, rather than 
groundbreaking, results; those who perceive risks as controllable are more likely to hold the 
victim responsible for her unfortunate fate, a finding aligning with traditional social 
psychological attribution research. Yet, for a government agency like the NPS, such results are 
instructive in that they reinforce the adage (among communication scholars) that public 
communication should not be envisioned as “one size fits all,” especially in locations where 
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encountering risk may be a goal of the visitor experience. As will be discussed below, 
understanding how individuals attribute responsibility for safety can be used by an agency like 
the NPS as a platform for designing messages about safety, as well as for influencing prescribed 
and proscribed visitor behavior.   
From a theoretical perspective, a larger stated goal of this research was to link two different 
ontological and epistemological approaches to considering attribution of responsibility. How 
successful was the pairing of the concepts of causal and prevention attribution in this 
dissertation? Like most scholarly work, the present study seemed to raise just as many questions 
as it answered.  Moving forward, CLT may be a viable approach to differentiating and 
explaining differences in how individuals attribute responsibility for causing versus preventing 
accidents, using the temporal context of an already past or to-be-determined future event. Yet, 
with its roots deeply in psychological theory, does CLT provide ample (or any) attention to the 
societal-level factors that scholars such as anthropologist Mary Douglas view as critical to 
understanding the interplay between risk and responsibility? More concretely, does the 
operationalization of “prevention attribution” via standardized survey questions, such as were 
used in this dissertation, maintain loyalty to its original conceptualization by Douglas and others? 
While this dissertation drew inspiration from two relatively disparate literatures, it stops short of 
integrating the concepts of both literatures into a single predictive model; this project—neither a 
small nor uncontroversial task—remains a future goal.  
Future Research 
 After presenting several alternative methodological strategies to conducting future research 
in this realm, such as using a “mixed mode” survey or visitor focus groups, I explore two main 
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directions for future research: one based on messages and messaging strategies and a second 
based on more sociocultural approaches to risk and risk management.   
Survey methodology 
Future research with park visitor and employee audiences might be improved by an attention 
to alternative methodologies. First, as suggested in Chapter 3, researchers have noted that the 
response rate of online surveys may be improved by offering respondents both a mail (i.e., paper) 
and an Internet option. More recently, researchers have argued that this so-called “mixed mode” 
approach—for instance, using a sampling frame of mailing addresses and providing all 
respondents with a printed pre-survey invitation listing a website as an optional method of 
completing the survey—allows for the greatest possible sample validity (e.g., see Dillman, 
Reips, & Matzat, 2010; Graefe et al., 2011; Lesser et al., 2011; Sexton et al., 2011; Smyth et al., 
2010). While employees can be reached via mail at a park headquarters address, identifying a 
sampling frame for park visitors would not be as straightforward. A potential option, and one 
that has been practiced by the NPS in past social science research, is to sample the general public 
more broadly, thus capturing both park visitors and non-visitors, which simultaneously provides 
the option of comparing these groups (see Taylor et al., 2011).  Second, future research might 
also benefit from employing methods beyond interviews and surveys, such as group interviews 
or focus groups. Given that most visitors come to parks in groups of family and friends, speaking 
with these individuals together, rather than separately, might better capture the social dynamics 
at play, such as how decisions about group-based behavior (e.g., where to hike or camp, how to 
locate needed information) might be made. In order to address potential issues of recall, a 
researcher might approach visitor groups while they are at the park, such as directly after an 
interpretive program at a visitor center or a campground. Alternatively, researchers might use a 
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random sampling strategy, such as selecting the first 30 cars through the entrance gate at a 
randomly selected day and time, and then inviting these groups (or a representative of the group) 
to participate in a group interview or focus group at some time during their park visit; incentives, 
such as a free meal, payment, or a gift certificate might increase participation rate.  
 Future research involving park visitors and employees/volunteers should also account for 
seasonal variation in these audiences. Due to time and resource limitations, the current study 
sampled MORA and OLYM respondents during the winter/early spring, and DEWA respondents 
during the summer months. Anecdotal evidence based on conversations with park personnel, as 
well as my own first-hand experience, leads me to expect that visitor populations at the 
Washington parks likely differ substantially by season; for instance, the summer months tend to 
draw more visitors from out-of-state (or country) who visit MORA or OLYM as part of a multi-
day vacation “destination” rather than (as may be true for more local, repeat visitors), a weekend 
excursion. Moreover, the proportion of non-permanent staff increases during the summer, 
creating a distinct population of employees who may have worked in several parks over the years 
or, alternatively, may be just beginning their careers with the NPS. Sampling strategies should 
better reflect these potential differences.  
Accident scenario 
In future studies, one might also pay closer attention to the design of the accident scenario (or 
scenarios). While they were not intended to be controlled experimental manipulations, it is 
possible that certain elements of each of the scenarios influenced survey respondents in 
unintended ways. As discussed above, and evidenced by many of the free response answers, 
individuals tended to assume that the solo hiker described in the “Hellroaring Creek” scenario 
had purposefully ventured off-trail, even though the scenario did not explicitly state this. In the 
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future, pre-testing scenarios with a group of park employees and visitors (rather than just 
undergraduate students) may identify potential interpretive issues such as these. Meant to mimic 
a press release, and modeled after actual incidents in national parks, the length, complexity, and 
purposive “ambiguity” of the scenarios distinguished them from previous examples used in other 
experimental studies based on defensive attribution (e.g., Walster, 1966). While the face validity 
of these scenarios appeared to be high—comments from visitor, volunteer, and employee 
respondents suggested that they found the accidents to be highly plausible in a park setting—it is 
possible that a shorter, simpler form might be employed in future research in order to better 
separate and measure individual variables.   
Future studies  
 
In each of the sections of this chapter, I have discussed several avenues for pursuing 
questions raised by this dissertation. In a broad sense, these can be parsed into two main areas: 
(1) on the message level; and (2) on the sociocultural level. While the former category is perhaps 
more well suited to quantitative methods and influenced by a social psychological approach to 
research, the latter will likely rely on qualitative methods and a more sociological approach to 
risk and risk management (see Figure 7.2.). For the sake of continuity, the examples presented 
below suggest research in the context of national parks; however, it is important to note that such 
research is meant to be theoretically grounded, and thus able to span a larger substantive realm.  
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 Message-level research. In terms of message-level research, two potential areas deserve 
mention. First, future research could investigate existing official and unofficial park risk- and 
safety-related communication, including pamphlets, signs, websites, radio announcements, and 
movies at a park unit or group of park units. Using a content analysis methodology, one could 
investigate how the NPS, as well as other information sources, currently represent responsibility 
for ensuring visitor safety. Critical-cultural communication studies investigating the 
“individualization” of certain health afflictions in public health campaigns (e.g., Becker, 1993; 
Brownell, 1991; Wang, 1992) might be utilized as examples, and to develop a coding scheme 
(see also Kirkwood & Brown, 1995). Results would help establish a baseline for the kinds of 
messages that visitors might currently receive from the NPS and other partnering agencies, and 
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help us better understand the contribution of information to the development of attributions of 
responsibility.  
A second research goal, based on the results of this study, would be to explore the 
appropriateness of various risk- and safety- message content and design (e.g., relevant “frames” 
used) in national park settings and in other contexts in which encountered risks may be novel or 
unfamiliar to certain individuals or groups of individuals. Knowing how audiences such as park 
visitors attribute responsibility for causing and preventing park accidents can inform future 
studies that aim to influence public support for various risk management strategies in national 
parks and other public recreational contexts, such as city and state parks (e.g., Iyengar, 1989; 
Weiner, 2006). In such places, messages might be constructed such that visitors are more likely 
to think about responsibility for their own safety in institutionally supported ways—i.e., in the 
case of the NPS, to envision responsibility for preventing injuries/accidents as “shared” between 
visitors and park employees. Within the context of public health, Niederdeppe, Bu, Borah, 
Kindig, and Robert (2008) have proposed a research framework for using various message 
strategies, including framing, narrative, and visual images, to influence perceptions of obesity as 
a condition caused not just by personal decisions (e.g., caloric intake, inadequate exercise), but 
also by social determinants (e.g., affordability of healthy food, access to places to exercise).  
Extrapolating to the context of visitor safety, we can envision developing messages to be 
displayed in parks that emphasize both the complexity of causal factors that potentially 
contribute to visitor accidents (e.g., decisions/characteristics of the visitor, as well as conditions 
of the park and actions of park managers), as well as the collective or “shared” nature of the 
responsibility to prevent such instances. Given that interviewees tended to see the NPS’ 
responsibility to ensure visitor safety as temporal, distributive, and spatial, messages can 
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manipulate these variables accordingly. Using the research agenda described by Niederdeppe et 
al. (2008) as a starting point, as well as the literature on Construal Level Theory and “attribution 
re-training,” Table 7.2 provides an overview of research questions related to potential messaging 
strategies, and Figure 7.3 lists example messages to be used in park settings; clearly, future 
empirical research is necessary to determine their scope and effectiveness.      
Table 7.2. Sample Research Questions by Message Design Strategy1  
Message Strategy Research Question 
1. Do messages that emphasize aspects of both internal and external (i.e., NPS) 
responsibility result in “shared” attributions of responsibility for causing/preventing 
visitor accidents? In what context(s) would such messages be effective and/or 
appropriate?  
2. Do messages that frame visitor safety in terms of past events (e.g., “ten visitors died 
last year at the park”) result in greater “shared” attributions of responsibility than those 
that are framed in terms of present or future events (e.g., “this year, 10 visitors will die in 
the park”)?  In what context(s) would such messages be effective and/or appropriate?  
3. Do messages that employ “thematic frames” lead to more “shared” attributions of 
responsibility for causing/preventing visitor accidents than messages that employ 
“episodic frames” (Iyengar, 1991)?  
4. Do physical cues in the park environment (e.g., buildings, roads, handrails, etc.) 
influence the effectiveness of messages that emphasize aspects of individual and/or 
external responsibility?  
 
 
 
Framing 
 
 
 
  
5. Can message campaigns (and/or other interventions) that target employees/volunteers 
and visitors “re-align” each group’s causal/prevention attributions to be more similar to 
one another?   
6. Can messages that use narratives about the contributions of external causes to visitor 
safety (e.g., the role of the NPS in providing safety infrastructure, the role of 
environmental conditions, etc.) offset the finding that both visitors and employees tend to 
attribute the cause of visitor accidents solely to characteristics/actions of the visitor 
him/herself (i.e., “victim blaming”)?  
 
 
Narrative 7. Can messages that use narratives about visitor safety convey the complexity of causes 
(e.g., individual decisions, built environment, biophysical environment, etc.) that 
contribute to visitor accidents, or are multiple narratives necessary to emphasize the 
contribution of each of these potential causes?  
8. What type of visual images might be most effective in conveying a “shared” 
responsibility for visitor safety? What type of visual images might limit “victim 
blaming”?    
 
Visual Images 9. What type of visual images might convey the (non)controllability of park-related risk? 
How might such images affect attributions of responsibility for causing/preventing park 
accidents?  
Note. 1Table format, message strategy categories, and some of the research questions based broadly on Niederdeppe 
et al. (2008) 
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Figure 7.3. Sample Safety Messages1 
 
Message 1: Past event framing 
The employees and volunteers of Zion National Park are committed to maintaining the Angel’s 
Landing Trail for your safety and enjoyment; however, loose sand or pebbles on stone are very 
slippery. Last year, five visitors died after falling on this trail. 
We ask that you:  
• Wear shoes with sturdy soles  
• Stay on the trail 
• Stay back from cliff edges 
• Pay attention to posted warnings 
• Keep children in your sight 
 
 
Message 2: Present/future event framing 
The employees and volunteers of Zion National Park are committed to maintaining the Angel’s 
Landing Trail for your safety and enjoyment; however, loose sand or pebbles on stone are very 
slippery. This year, five visitors will die after falling on this trail. 
 
We ask that you:  
• Wear shoes with sturdy soles  
• Stay on the trail 
• Stay back from cliff edges 
• Pay attention to posted warnings 
• Keep children in your sight 
 
Note. 1Messages adapted from the Zion National Park website; see http://www.nps.gov/zion/planyourvisit/your-
safety.htm  
 
Cultural research. Future research that I have deemed sociocultural would attend more 
directly to the concepts of safety culture and liminality (Van Gennep, 1960) with respect to 
unique organizational and geographical contexts like national parks. As discussed in this chapter, 
the idea that national parks may be experienced as liminal places “betwixt and between” the 
developed and the undeveloped deserves further scrutiny. Do material “cues” (e.g., restrooms, 
sidewalks) imply certain understandings about the attribution of responsibility for safety in a 
given area of a park? How might official communication in these areas support (or challenge) 
these notions? Understanding the ways in which attributions of responsibility might vary within 
a geographical landscape would likely pose logistical challenges; however, one could envision 
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presenting visitors with journals or interactive mobile devices upon entering the park and asking 
them to respond to various prompts about their experience as they visited several locations or 
landmarks. Alternatively, or in addition, researchers might approach visitors recently returned 
from park visits, and ask them (via in-depth interview or a journaling activity) to reflect on their 
recent trip; using the context of the day-to-day might provide a useful comparison: for instance, 
who (or what) is responsible for your safety in your workplace, vs. when you were in the 
national park?  
A second research focus would further investigate the potential interplay of safety “cultures” 
within a client-oriented organization. (How) does the safety culture—or cultures—of an 
organization affect its clientele? Can a safety culture take hold among transient clientele: a 
population where only a portion of the individuals may be “regulars”: those accustomed (and/or 
“attached”) to the place? What is the role of communication in this negotiation of worker, 
manager, and “customer” safety culture? These and other questions present interesting 
opportunities to merge theoretical and empirical findings from the management, communication, 
and safety science disciplines.     
Concluding Thoughts 
Stories about accidents are vehicles for reaching a consensus about proper responsibilities and the 
apportioning of blame (Green, 1997a, p. 186). 
 
 
 From the fatally wounded ranger, to the escaped shooter, to the four lost hikers, the 
prevalence of “accidents” in national parks encourage us to consider larger questions of risk and 
responsibility in federal protected areas. That serious injuries and fatalities occur (and continue 
to occur) may be reason enough, from a public health perspective, to direct increased attention 
and resources to promoting visitor safety in national parks; however, as a communication 
scholar, I find justification as well in the fact that such injuries and deaths are often 
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sensationalized, leading to amplification of risk perceptions and (from some park managers’ 
perspective) unwanted media and public scrutiny. In considering the future of U.S. parks and 
open spaces, determining how diverse audiences of visitors and managers envision their 
responsibilities for causing and preventing accidents will be critical. As this dissertation has 
shown, such attributions of responsibility are associated with normative judgments about how we 
value, manage, and communicate about such special places—judgments that cannot be taken 
lightly.     
	   359	  
 
APPENDIX A 
 
ANALYSIS OF VISITOR INJURIES AT MOUNT RAINIER NATIONAL PARK, 2001-2010 
(ABRIDGED VERSION) 
 
Laura N. Rickard 
Mount Rainier National Park SCA Public Risk Management Intern, Spring 2011 
May 2011 
 
Introduction & Methods 
Overview 
 As part of their ongoing effort to address visitor safety, the Mount Rainier National Park 
(MORA) management team sought to learn more about the nature of visitor injuries in the last 
ten years at the park. By compiling and analyzing these data, they hoped to better design and 
implement the park’s emergency services programs, as well as to determine how to allocate park 
resources to enhance prevention efforts in the park. Allowing a Student Conservation 
Association (SCA) Public Safety Intern—a  “third party” unaffiliated with park management—to 
review the data might also help provide feedback on the park’s injury reporting system to date. 
To guide the project, Chief Ranger Chuck Young provided the following list of questions to be 
answered:  
• What are the most common injuries park visitors are experiencing?  
• What have been the most prevalent causes of these injuries?  
• Where in the park have the injuries been occurring?  
• What recreational activities were the injured visitors participating in when they got hurt?  
• Are there any trends that can be teased out of these data?  
Data sources 
I collected MORA visitor injury data from 2001-2010 from several sources: 
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1. EMS Run Reports: The most prevalent source of visitor injury data at the park, EMS run 
reports are completed by NPS medical caregivers (i.e., first responders, EMTs) after an incident 
and then filed each year. These reports vary in the degree of detail, but usually include:  
• Patient sex, age, and address (e.g., city, state, country) 
• Location of the incident (or where the patient received treatment) 
• Events leading up to the injury 
• Description of the injury (and probable diagnosis) 
• Description of treatment and next steps (e.g., ambulance transfer to a local hospital) 
These reports were hand-written, but some included attached, typed pages to further clarify the 
incident and its management. While most EMS reports were filed together by year, in some cases 
these reports were kept in other places, such as with motor vehicle accident files (if the injury 
resulted from the MVA). Importantly, while many of these reports contained suspected 
diagnoses (e.g., sprained ankle, stroke, etc.), in most cases they were not confirmed by other 
responding medical personnel, such as the emergency room nurses, physicians, and other 
personnel who may have cared for the patient after his/her treatment by NPS employees. In 
addition, cases of fatal injuries are limited to those in which the park visitor died within the 
boundaries of MORA; for example, if a patient in cardiac arrest died in an ambulance or 
helicopter while en route to a hospital in Seattle, this incident would not be recorded as a park 
fatality. (Also, for most cases, the park does not have this information). Given these limitations, 
the fatal and non-fatal injury data should be viewed as best estimates.          
2. Search and Rescue (SAR) Reports: More complex incidents, such as those involving a 
technical rescue or an extended search for a lost party, are assigned a name and case incident 
number and are filed each year. These reports usually involve a more extensive narrative 
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outlining the circumstances of the incident, and some were accompanied by EMS run reports. In 
addition, a SAR report might include: 
• Media coverage of the incident 
• Maps of search areas in the parks or templates of “missing person” posters 
• Maps or photographs of the incident scene 
• Notes on interviews with the injured party’s friends/relatives 
• (In the case of a fatality) A coroner’s report 
3. Case Incident Log: Each year, all incidents that take place in the park, whether law 
enforcement stops, personnel training, medical responses, or other events, are assigned a unique 
case incident number and filed in the log. Therefore, any report of a visitor injury should have 
been recorded, and the log functioned as a guide for me to locate EMS and SAR reports. In some 
cases, especially in the earlier years investigated (e.g., 2001-2003), some references to injuries 
listed in the Case Incident Log could not be located in report form. The absence of these reports 
can be attributed to several possibilities, such as: 
• A NPS employee requested a case incident number for a reported visitor injury, only to 
find that the situation was already resolved. 
• The NPS employee responding to the incident failed to file a report. 
• The NPS employee responding to the incident could not locate the injured party (a “false 
alarm”), and thus did not offer medical care. 
When no report existed, it was impossible to determine which of these possibilities had 
occurred, and also whether the injury had affected a park visitor, NPS employee, or park 
concession employee. For the purposes of inclusion, all entries listed in the Case Incident Log 
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between 2001 and 2010 that made reference to a medical incident/emergency went into the 
dataset. 
Data input 
After locating each year’s EMS run sheets and SAR reports, I then transferred relevant 
information to an Excel spreadsheet. This spreadsheet, designed by epidemiologists Dr. Sara 
Newman and Jennifer Cheng at the NPS Division of Risk Management, included the following 
fields of information:  
• Case incident number  
• Date of incident (day, month, year) 
• Time of day the incident occurred, using a 24-hr clock 
• Age and date of birth of patient 
• Sex of patient 
• Residence (city, state, country) of patient 
• Recreational activity that the patient was participating in 
• Cause of injury, including all causes if multiple factors existed (e.g., exposure to cold, 
avalanche, fall, etc.) 
• A narrative description of the incident, paraphrased from the report(s) 
• Location of the incident, both general (e.g., “Paradise frontcountry”) and more specific 
(e.g., Jackson Visitor Center) 
• Traumatic injury (e.g., sprain, fracture) and body area(s) (e.g., torso, lower extremities) 
• Medical injury (e.g., cardiac condition, hypothermia)  
• Environment type (e.g., glacier, trail) 
• Outcome (i.e., fatal or non-fatal injury) 
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• Suicide (yes/no) 
Data analysis 
After compiling the above data in Excel, I then imported the data into PASW Statistics 
(version 18.0) for further analysis. I used this software to calculate descriptive statistics (e.g., 
frequencies, means, etc.), to run Pearson Chi-Square and T-tests, and to create graphs and charts. 
(I also used Excel to create graphs). Chief Ranger Chuck Young, Sara Newman and Jennifer 
Cheng assisted throughout the process of analyzing and presenting these data. 
Results 
 
Q1. What was the prevalence of visitor injuries, fatal and non-fatal, at MORA between 
2001 and 2010?  
Table 1: Number of Visitor Injuries, Fatal and Non-Fatal, 2001-2010 
 
Between 2001 and 2010, the 
prevalence of fatal visitor injuries 
ranged between a low of zero 
people fatally injured per million 
recreational visitors in 2006 to a 
high of 7.39 people fatally injured 
per million recreational visitors in 2004 (see Tables 1 and 2). As seen in Figure 1, despite some 
variation, the prevalence of fatal visitor injury remained quite stable between 2001-2010. The 
prevalence of non-fatal visitor injuries, however, appeared to vary more, ranging from a low of 
44.86 people non-fatally injured in 2007, to a high of 120.7 people non-fatally injured in 2009 
(see Table 2). It is important to note that the this calculation lends equal weight to non-fatal 
injuries, regardless of their relative “severity”; in other words, a non-fatal injury entailing 
 
 
 Number of Visitor Injuries 
Year Non-fatal Fatal Total 
2001 90 5 95 
2002 104 9 113 
2003 115 2 117 
2004 87 9 96 
2005 103 5 108 
2006 98 0 98 
2007 47 5 52 
2008 81 3 84 
2009 139 2 141 
2010 135 5 140 
	   364	  
Table 2: Visitor Non-fatal and Fatal Injury Prevalence, 2001-2010 
 
multiple trauma and a hospital 
stay was classified the same as a 
minor sprained ankle. Also, the 
relatively low number of 
reported non-fatal injuries in 
2007 may be attributed to the 
fact that several popular areas of 
park were closed to the public for several months of the early part of the year due to significant 
flooding damage.  
Between 2007 and 2009, while the number of recreational visitors appeared to be relatively 
stable, the injury prevalence increased; however, we can't necessarily conclude that the burden of 
injury has increased in the park for a number of reasons. First, we may have limitations in the 
“numerator” of our injury data over the past ten years. That is, we cannot rule out the possibility 
that an increasing prevalence of non-fatal injuries may be a result of better reporting on the park 
of MORA personnel. If this were true, 2008 and 2009 might be more accurate representations of 
the actual non-fatal injury rate at the park, whereas earlier years might underestimate this 
number.  
Second, we lack data on the number of visitors participating yearly in some of the more 
popular recreational activities at the park, such as day hiking; without this information, we lack 
an “accurate denominator” that would allow for more valid analysis across the years. Perhaps, 
for instance, twice as many park visitors took day hikes to Camp Muir in 2008, as compared to 
2009. At present, our prevalence calculations only capture visitation in general, as opposed to 
  Injuries per million 
visitors 
Year Recreational Visitors  Non-fatal Fatal  
2001 1, 301, 103 69.17 3.84 
2002 1, 310, 390 79.37 6.87 
2003 1, 262, 351 91.10 1.58 
2004 1, 217, 750 71.44 7.39 
2005 1, 173, 897 87.74 4.26 
2006 1, 113, 601 88.00 0 
2007 1, 047, 685 44.86 4.77 
2008 1, 163, 227 69.63 2.58 
2009 1, 151, 654 120.70 1.74 
2010 1, 191, 754 113.28 4.20 
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visitation by recreational activity type or location in the park. (Since visitation was measured the 
same way over the ten-year period, we can, however, still compare across years). In addition, we 
cannot know for sure whether an increasing prevalence of non-fatal injuries may be related to 
efforts to attract new visitors to the park. That is, have visitors unfamiliar with the park increased 
in recent years? Are these individuals more likely to be injured? Unfortunately, while our data 
included some limited demographic information, such as the home address of the patient, we 
lack information such as the individual’s familiarity with the park and/or with the activity s/he 
was participating in at the time of the injury. Despite these limitations to the numerator and 
denominator of our data, the prevalence numbers reported still provide valuable information 
about the burden of visitor injury at the park.        
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Figure 1 
 
 
 
Q2. What are the most common injuries park visitors are experiencing?  
 
Traumatic injury 
Based on how the park EMS run sheets report data, as well as the classification established 
by NEMSIS and in the sports and recreation literature, injuries were defined as either traumatic 
or medical. Traumatic injuries were physical conditions resulting from interaction with 
something outside of a person’s body, such as a hand crushed by a sled, or an ankle rolled after 
an individual slips on a log. As shown in Table 3, the five most common non-fatal traumatic 
visitor injuries were (1) superficial/contusions, (2) fractures, (3) sprains/strains, (4) open wounds, 
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and (5) dislocations (see also Table 4). Table 3 also provides example narratives taken from 
EMS run sheets in the data to illustrate each of the common traumatic visitor injuries. The most 
common traumatic injuries associated with visitor fatalities included (1) open wounds, (2) 
fractures, and (3) injuries to internal organs (see Table 5 and Figure 2). Of both non-fatal and 
fatal visitor injuries, a significant percentage was classified as “unspecified” (22.5% and 36.4%, 
respectively)—that is, the traumatic injury was not described in an EMS or SAR report. In these 
cases, information about the nature of the injury was unavailable, either due to an omission of the 
reporting, or because, in some cases, the reporting party did not have the information.  
Table 3: Top Five Non-fatal Traumatic Visitor Injuries, 2001-2010 
Traumatic Injury Definition Example Narrative 
1. Superficial/contusions Injuries involving relatively 
minor soft tissue damage (e.g., 
surface abrasions) or bruises. 
Patient was involved in a 
rollover MVA; sustained 
minor abrasions and 
lacerations to left knee and 
hands.  
2. Fracture Any broken bone throughout the 
body. 
 
Patient fell while stepping off 
the footbridge; complained of 
swelling in both ankles. 
Possible fracture of both 
ankles. 
3. Sprains/strains Injuries involving ligament 
sprains or muscle strains. 
 
Patient fell while hiking, 
rolling her right ankle. 
Complained of pain in right 
ankle, minor swelling, and 
deformity.   
4. Open wound Injuries involving more 
significant soft tissue damage 
(e.g., large laceration, near 
amputation). 
 
Patient was practicing a self-
arrest when she fell on the 
adze of her ice axe, cutting 
her hand. She sustained a 
deep laceration with possible 
ligament damage to hand 
(between left thumb and 
forefinger). 
5. Dislocation Injuries occurring when bones in 
a joint become displaced or 
misaligned. 
Patient slid on trail, causing 
her knee to “bend the wrong 
way.”  Possible dislocation.  
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Figure 2  
 
 
Table 4: Traumatic Non-fatal Visitor Injuries, 2001-2010 
Responses  
N Percent 
Superficial/contusions 208 27.4% 
Fracture 168 22.1% 
Sprains/strains 107 14.1% 
Open wound 66 8.7% 
Dislocation 25 3.3% 
Burns 8 1.1% 
Crushing 2 .3% 
Blood vessels* 2 .3% 
Amputations 1 .1% 
Internal Organs 1 .1% 
 
Unspecified 171 22.5% 
 Total 759 100.0% 
 
*Injuries associated with blood vessels, such as bloody noses. 
  
4 
1 
0 
5 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
25 
66 
107 
168 
208 
0 50 100 150 200 250 
Unspecified 
Internal Organs 
Dislocation 
Open wound 
Sprains/strains 
Fracture 
Superficial/contusions 
Number of Injuries (n) 
Ty
pe
 o
f I
nj
ur
y 
Top Visitor Traumatic Injuries, Non-fatal and Fatal, 2001-2010 
Non-fatal 
Fatal 
	   369	  
Table 5: Trauma Associated with Fatal Visitor Injuries, 2001-2010 
Responses  
N Percent 
Open wound 5 45.5% 
Fracture 1 9.1% 
Internal Organs 1 9.1% 
 
Unspecified 4 36.4% 
Total 11 100.0% 
 
Medical injury  
Based on the criteria explained above, medical injuries were classified as those that develop 
within the body, such as chest pains from a heart attack or dehydration from a depletion of the 
body’s fluids. As shown in Table 6, the five most common non-fatal medical visitor injuries 
were cardiac-related, allergic reactions, syncopal episodes, dizziness, and dehydration (see also 
Table 7). The most common medical injuries associated with visitor fatalities included cardiac-
related, hypothermia, and asthma (see Table 8 and Figure 2). When information about the 
medical injury was limited or unavailable, injuries were classified as “unspecified.” These cases 
made up only a small proportion of all reported medical injuries, non-fatal and fatal (4.2% and 
0%, respectively). When viewing this list of injuries, it is important to recognize that many of 
could be related to one another, and/or symptomatic of a more significant medical injury. For 
instance, syncopal episodes and dizziness could be related to the onset of AMS or dehydration. 
Unfortunately, I lacked detailed information on many of the cases, as well as a “definitive” 
diagnosis of the injury. 
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Table 6: Top Five Non-fatal Medical Visitor Injuries, 2001-2010 
Common Medical Injury Definition Example Narrative 
1. Cardiac-related Injuries related to heart/circulatory 
system, e.g., chest pains, heart 
palpitations, etc. 
 
Patient was hiking when she 
started feeling dizzy, short of 
breath, and experienced a rapid 
pulse. She also complained of 
"crushing" substernal chest 
pain. 
2. Allergic reaction Injuries related to hypersensitivity to 
allergens, such as insects, 
environmental pollutants, or animals. 
Patient was hiking when her 
eyes began to swell and she had 
difficulty breathing. She 
appeared to be having an 
anaphylactic reaction to a bee 
sting. 
3. Syncopal episode Sudden loss of consciousness, 
general caused by insufficient 
oxygen to the brain (i.e., fainting). 
 
Patient passed out while 
standing in line at the snack 
bar. Had been hiking and had 
not eaten much during the day. 
Reaction may have been due to 
over-exertion from hiking and 
lack of food/water, plus 
elevation. 
4. Dizziness Impaired spatial perception/stability, 
sometimes occurring prior to a 
syncopal episode. 
 
Patient woke up and "the room 
was spinning." Had a history of 
dizzy spells. Patient vomited.  
5. Dehydration Insufficient fluids, resulting in a 
variety of symptoms (e.g., thirst, 
reduced urine output, rapid heart 
rate, disorientation, etc.)  
 
Patient had been hiking since 
earlier in the day and had not 
had anything to eat or drink. He 
stated that he had a tendency to 
have low blood sugar. 
Complained of weakness. 
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Figure 3 
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Table 7: Medical Non-fatal Visitor Injuries, 2001-2010 
Responses  
N Percent 
 Cardiac-related 49 14.5% 
Allergic reaction 43 12.8% 
Syncopal episode 30 8.9% 
Dizziness 28 8.3% 
Dehydration 26 7.7% 
AMS 25 7.4% 
Gastrointestinal problem 22 6.5% 
Asthma 14 4.2% 
Hypothermia 11 3.3% 
Seizure 11 3.3% 
Abdominal pain 9 2.7% 
Diabetic 8 2.4% 
HAPE/HACE 6 1.8% 
Eye Injury 5 1.5% 
Stroke 5 1.5% 
Swelling 4 1.2% 
Excessive alcohol/drugs 3 .9% 
Exhaustion 3 .9% 
Migraine 3 .9% 
Nonspecific fever 3 .9% 
Emotional/psychological 2 .6% 
Frostbite 2 .6% 
Hyperthermia 2 .6% 
Near-drowning or immersion 2 .6% 
Pneumonia 2 .6% 
Airway obstruction 1 .3% 
Diverticulitis 1 .3% 
Nausea 1 .3% 
Sinus headache 1 .3% 
Skin infection 1 .3% 
 
Unspecified 14 4.2% 
Total 337 100.0% 
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Table 8: Medical Injuries Associated with Fatal Visitor Injuries, 2001-2010 
Responses  
N Percent 
Cardiac-related 6 46.2%  
Hypothermia 6 46.2% 
 Asthma 1 7.7% 
Total 13 100.0% 
 
I next considered the top non-fatal traumatic and medical injuries together. Figure 4 provides 
a visual depiction of the top 11 non-fatal traumatic and medical injuries, considered jointly, as 
experienced by MORA visitors between 2001 and 2010. While traumatic and medical injuries 
were about evenly divided in the list, traumatic injuries clearly dominated in frequency, with 
superficial/contusions, fractures, sprains/strains, and open wounds filling the top four places. As 
Figure 4 illustrates, apart from dislocations, non-fatal traumatic injuries far outweigh the number 
of top non-fatal medical injuries.  
  
Figure 4 
 
 
25 
26 
28 
30 
43 
49 
25 
66 
107 
168 
208 
0	   50	   100	   150	   200	   250	  AMS 
Dislocation 
Dehydration 
Dizziness 
Syncopal episode 
Allergic reaction 
Cardiac-related 
Open wound 
Sprains/strains 
Fracture 
Superficial/contusions 
Number of Injures (n) 
Ty
pe
 o
f I
nj
ur
y 
Top Non-fatal Traumatic and Medical Injuries, 2001-2010 
Traumatic 
Medical 
	   374	  
Q3. What is the relationship between age and visitor injuries/fatalities?  
 
Of the injury records that included the age of the patient (N=894), ages ranged from 1 to 95 
years old, with a mean of 41.71 years and a median of 42 years (SD = 21.31). As seen in the 
histogram below (see Figure 5), the age data appear almost normally distributed. Interestingly, 
though, it would seem that the data are somewhat bimodal, in that there are two “peaks” in the 
data: one around 30 years old and another around 50 years old. As will be described below, I 
took these age ranges into account when devising a grouping strategy for further analysis of the 
data.    
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Figure 5 
 
Q4. What are the most prevalent non-fatal visitor injuries by age group?  
 
In order to better understand the nature of visitor injuries by age, I decided to split all visitors 
into seven age categories, determined, in part, by past research on visitor use in national parks. 
These groups were:  
• Group 1: Visitors under 6 
• Group 2: Visitors ages 6-12 
• Group 3: Visitors ages 13-18 
• Group 4: Visitors ages 19-30 
• Group 5: Visitors ages 31-45 
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• Group 6: Visitors ages 46-55 
• Group 7: Visitors above 55 
As seen in Figure 6, visitors ages 56 and above experienced the greatest number of reported 
injuries, whereas visitors ages 5 and under suffered the least. The two “peaks” mentioned above, 
with respect to incidence of reported visitor injuries, appears to correspond roughly to group 5 
(“peak 1”) and groups 6 and 7 (“peak 2”). (The analyses below explore this idea further). In 
analyzing these data, it is important to bear in mind that we lack corresponding data on visitation 
in each of the visitor “groups”; that is, we do not know whether more visitors over age 55 may, 
in fact, be visiting MORA as compared to other age groups.   
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Figure 6 
 
I next analyzed the most prevalent types of non-fatal injuries, both traumatic and medical, by 
each of the seven age groups. As illustrated in Table 9, across all groups, superficial/contusions 
emerged as the most common reported non-fatal injury, though the percentage of this injury of 
all reported injuries in the age group varied from a low of 23.8% (ages 56 and above) to a high of 
46.2% (ages 5 and under). For each of the top non-fatal visitor injuries at MORA, Table 9 shows 
how the prevalence of each varied by age group. The cells highlighted in yellow convey which 
age group experienced the given injury type most frequently as a percentage of the occurrence of 
the 11 injuries considered below (i.e., superficial/contusions, fractures, sprains/strains, open 
wound, cardiac-related, allergic reactions, syncopal episodes, dizziness, dehydration, 
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dislocations, and AMS) in the age group. For example:  
• Superficial/contusions accounted for 46.2% of the injuries listed below for visitors 
under 6 years old. 
•  Fractures accounted for 26.6% of the considered injuries listed below for visitors 
ages 46-55. 
• Sprains/strains accounted for 17.1% of the considered injuries listed below for 
visitors 31-45. 
• Open wounds accounted for 19.2% of the considered injuries listed below for visitors 
6 and under. 
• Cardiac-related injuries accounted for 16.7% of the considered injuries listed below 
for visitors older than 55. 
• Allergic reactions accounted for 20% of the considered injuries listed below for 
visitors ages 6-12. 
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Table 9: Common Non-fatal Traumatic and Medical Visitor Injuries by Age Group, 2001-
2010 
Number of non-fatal injuries per age group (n) Type of Injury 
<6  6-12  13-18  19-30  31-45  46-55  >55 TOTAL 
Superficial/contusion 12 
(46.2%) 
10 
(33.3%) 
11 
(25.0%) 
34 
(25.6%) 
41 
(25.9%) 
41 
(28.7%) 
50 
(23.8%) 
199  
Fracture 3 
(11.5%) 
3 
(10.0%) 
7 
(15.9%) 
32 
(24.1%) 
37 
(23.4%) 
38 
(26.6%) 
35 
(16.7%) 
155  
Sprains/strains 1 (3.8%) 4 
(13.3%) 
6 
(13.6%) 
22 
(16.5%) 
27 
(17.1%) 
15 
(10.5%) 
21 
(10.0%) 
96  
Open wound 5 
(19.2%) 
3 
(10.0%) 
8 
(18.2%) 
13 
(9.8%) 
14 
(8.9%) 
18 
(12.6%) 
14 
(6.7%) 
75  
Cardiac-related 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (2.3%) 1 (.75%) 6 (3.8%) 9 (6.3%) 35 
(16.7%) 
52  
Allergic reaction 4 
(15.4%) 
6 
(20.0%) 
4 (9.1%) 6 (4.5%) 4 (2.5%) 4 (2.8%) 9 (4.3%) 37  
Syncopal episode 0 (0%) 1 (3.3%) 3 (6.8%) 2 (1.5%) 4 (2.5%) 4 (2.8%) 16 
(7.6%) 
30  
Dizziness 0 (0%) 2 (6.7%) 1 (2.3%) 3 (2.3%) 5 (3.2%) 2 (1.4%) 15 
(7.1%) 
28  
Dehydration 0 (0%) 1 (3.3%) 2 (4.5%) 6 (4.5%) 7 (4.4%) 3 (2.1%) 7 (3.3%) 26  
Dislocation 1 (3.8%) 0 (0%) 1 (2.3%) 7 (5.3%) 7 (4.4%) 5 
(3.5%) 
3 (1.4%) 24  
AMS 0 (0%) 1 (3.3%) 0 (0%) 7 (5.3%) 6 (3.8%) 4 (2.8%) 5 (2.4%) 23  
TOTAL 26 
(100%) 
30 
(100%) 
44 
(100%) 
133 
(100%) 
158 
(100%) 
143 
(100%) 
210 
(100%) 
745 
 
 
 
Figure 7 provides a graphic depiction of the top five most common non-fatal visitors injuries 
(traumatic and medical) by age group. 
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Figure 7 
 
 
Q5. What are the sex and age differences in visitors injured at MORA? 
 
Female visitors who were injured or killed were, on average, slightly older than the male 
visitors who were injured or killed. For non-fatal injuries, the mean age of female visitors was 
42.4 (SD=21.43), while the mean age of male visitors was 41.3 (SD=21.61). For fatal injuries, 
the mean age of females was 41.5 (SD=17.89) years old, and for males, 38.6 years old 
(SD=15.63) (see Table 10). The mean age difference of male vs. female visitors for both non-
fatal and fatal injuries was not statistically significant. (For non-fatal injuries, t(854) = -.72, p= 
.47 and for fatal injuries, t(36) = -.41, p =.68). That is, female visitors who were injured and 
killed between 2001-2010 at MORA were not statistically more likely to be older than the male 
visitors who were injured or killed.  
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Table 10: Mean Age of Non-fatal and Fatal Injured Visitors by Sex, 2001-2010 
Outcome Sex 
N Mean Age Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
M 459 41.34 21.606 1.009 Non-fatal injury Age 
F 397 42.40 21.425 1.075 
M 32 38.56 15.629 2.763 Fatal injury Age 
F 6 41.50 17.886 7.302 
 
Q6. Are male visitors more likely than female visitors to be injured/killed in the park?  
 
Using the cases in which sex was known (N= 895 non-fatal injuries and N= 42 fatal injuries), 
men were more likely than women to be fatally injured in the park; this difference was 
statistically significant, as shown through a Pearson Chi-Square analysis (χ2 (1, N = 937) = 
14.10, p =.000) (see Table 11).  
Table 11: Cross-tabulation of Injury Type by Sex 
Sex  
F M Total 
Count 413 482 895 Non-fatal injury 
% within Outcome 46.1% 53.9% 100.0% 
Count 7 35 42 
Outcome 
Fatal injury 
% within Outcome 16.7% 83.3% 100.0% 
Count 420 517 937 Total 
% within Outcome 44.8% 55.2% 100.0% 
 
 
Q7. What have been the most prevalent causes of injuries and fatalities?  
 
Each incident could have multiple contributing factors (i.e., injury causes). For instance, a 
visitor might slip and fall on a trail (fall), then roll his ankle (overexertion of ligament), and also 
strike his head on a boulder in the process (struck by/against or crushed). Therefore, when I 
analyzed each incident, I included all possible causes based on the information available, 
including the following:  
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• Falls: An injury received when a person descends abruptly due to the force of gravity and 
strikes a surface at the same or lower level (i.e., including both ground-level falls, and falls 
from greater height)   
• Preexisting medical condition: The patient was suffering from a preexisting medical 
condition at the time of the incident, such as high blood pressure or diabetes. This category 
was also used to denote individuals who had a history of previous, related injury, such as an 
individual who had sprained his ankle twice in the last year or an individual who had 
suffered a stroke six months prior to her park visit.  
• Transportation-related cause: Injury involving modes of transportation, such as cars, 
motorcycles, bicycles, or airplanes. 
• Overexertion: Working the body or body part too hard, causing damage to muscle, tendon, 
ligament, cartilage, joint, or peripheral nerve (e.g., common cause of strains, sprains, and 
twisted ankles).  
• Struck by/Against or Crushed: Injury resulting from being struck by (hit) or crushed by a 
human, animal, or inanimate object or force other than a vehicle or machinery; injury caused 
by striking (hitting) against a human, animal, or inanimate object or force other than a 
vehicle or machinery.  
• Natural/Environmental: Injury resulting from exposure to adverse natural and 
environmental conditions (such as severe heat, severe cold, lightning, sunstroke, large 
storms, and natural disasters) as well as lack of food and water.  
• Inhalation/Ingestion/Suffocation: Inhalation, aspiration, or ingestion of food or other 
object that blocks the airway or causes suffocation. (Note that suffocation can result from 
being buried in an avalanche).  
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“Unknown” was used to denote instances in which no information was provided on the EMS run 
sheet or in the SAR report, and/or the NPS caregiver did not know the cause. The category 
“other specified causes” was used to refer to injury associated with any other causes that do not 
fit another category. Figure 8 illustrates the top causes of visitor injuries, both non-fatal and fatal, 
between 2001 and 2010. 
Figure 8 
 
 
Note. In the category Natural/Environmental, 22 were classified as dehydration, 6 were classified as avalanche, 6 
were classified as cold exposure, and 48 were classified as altitude. Cases in which the cause of injury was unknown 
were not considered in this analysis.    
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varied substantially in terms of the amount of detail devoted to the location of injuries and 
fatalities, with some reporting simply a general park region (e.g., “Longmire”) and others more 
specific locales (e.g., “1.5 miles up the Rampart Ridge Trail”). Moreover, while some reports 
noted where the injury itself occurred, others noted only where the patient received care, such as 
at a ranger station or visitor center. In these cases, it was often difficult to discern where the 
injury itself took place. (In some cases, in fact, the injury had occurred a day or two prior, and in 
a different region of the park).  
With these limitations in mind, the five most common areas of the park for reported non-fatal 
visitor injuries were: (1) Paradise frontcountry (e.g., picnic areas, Jackson Visitor Center, etc.), 
(2) Paradise area trails, (3) Upper mountain (i.e., any location above 10,000 ft on Mount Rainier, 
including Camp Muir), (4) Longmire area trails, and (5) Paradise-Longmire Road. (Despite the 
name of the last category, I included in this designation all incidents that occurred anywhere 
between the Nisqually entrance and Paradise on the main road). The five most common areas of 
the park for reported visitor fatal injuries were: (1) Upper mountain, (2) Highway 410, (3) 
Sunrise area trails, (4) Paradise frontcountry, and (5) Longmire area trails. Figure 9 provides a 
visual depiction of these and other park areas that account for the top ten most common general 
park areas where both non-fatal and fatal visitor injuries occurred.    
Using the general areas described above, I created two meta-categories: frontcountry and 
backcountry locations (see Appendix I for a synopsis of this classification). I then analyzed the 
frequency of injuries and fatalities in frontcountry versus backcountry settings. Results indicated 
the following (see Table 12 and Figures 10 and 11):  
• 40.54% of non-fatal visitor injuries occurred in the frontcountry, as compared to 20.51% 
of fatal injuries. 
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• 59.46% of non-fatal injuries occurred in the backcountry, as compared to 79.49% of fatal 
injuries.  
A Pearson Chi-Square analysis suggests that fatal injuries were more likely to occur in 
backcountry settings (χ2(1, N = 747)= 6.202, p =.013)(see Table 12).  
Figure 9 
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Figure 10: Non-fatal Visitor Injuries by Backcountry/Frontcountry, 2001-2010 
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Figure 11: Visitor Fatalities by Back/Frontcountry, 2001-2010  
 
 
Table 12: Cross-tabulation of Injury Type by Location, 2001-2010 
Type of Location 
 Frontcountry 
location 
Backcountry 
location Total 
Count 287 421 708 Non-fatal injury 
% within Type of 
Location 
97.3% 93.1% 94.8% 
Count 8 31 39 
Outcome 
Fatal injury 
% within Type of 
Location 
2.7% 6.9% 5.2% 
Count 295 452 747 Total 
% Type of Location 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Q9. What recreational activities were the visitors participating in when they got hurt?  
 
According to the data, visitors were engaged in the following recreational activities when 
they were non-fatally injured: (1) hiking or walking, (2) mountaineering (i.e., using specialized 
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equipment, such as ice axes and crampons, and usually traveling above 10,000 ft on the upper 
mountain, (3) driving a car (this category included both drivers and passengers of vehicles), (4) 
driving a motorcycle, and (5) snowplay (i.e., sledding or sliding on the snow, often—but not 
exclusively—in the park’s designated “snowplay area” at Paradise). For fatal injuries, the top 
recreational activities included: (1) mountaineering, (2) hiking/walking, (3) river crossing, (4) 
driving a car, and (tied for 5th place), boating, skiing, and snowshoeing (see Figure 12).  
Many reported activities associated with visitor injuries, such as whittling a walking stick or 
playing Frisbee at a campground, did not fit in any of the pre-determined categories. Such 
activities accounted for the “other” category, which made up 9.6% of all cases. Another large 
proportion of all reported injuries did not include sufficient information to determine an activity 
at the time of the injury, and these were classified as “unknown” (21.2% of all cases).  
  I also analyzed the relationship between age group and recreational activity associated with 
injury (non-fatal and fatal). By looking at the row percentages in Table 13, we can better 
understand the proportion of injuries that occurred in each which age group(s), as associated with 
the top ten most common recreational activities. As shown in Table 13, the prevalence of injury 
associated with these activities ranged by age group. For example, as illustrated by the yellow 
highlighted cells in Table 13:  
• Visitors over 55 accounted for 38.6% of all reported injuries associated with 
hiking/walking.   
• Visitors ages 31-45 accounted for 37.9% of all mountaineering-related injuries. 
• Visitors ages 31-45 accounted for 29.4% of all automobile-related injuries. 
• Visitors ages 46-55 accounted for 31% of all motorcycle-related injuries. 
• Visitors ages 6-12 accounted for 40% of all snowplay-related injuries 
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Figure 12 
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Table 13: Cross tabulation of Number of Non-fatal and Fatal Injuries per Age Group by 
Activity, 2001-2010 
Number of non-fatal and fatal injuries per age group (n) Activity 
<6  6-12  13-18  19-30  31-45  46-55  >55 TOTAL 
Hiking/walking 8 
(2.3%) 
10 
(2.8%) 
14 
(4.0%) 
53 
(15.1%) 
59 
(16.8%) 
72 
(20.5%) 
136 
(38.6%) 
352 
(100%) 
Mountaineering 0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
30 
(31.6%) 
36 
(37.9%) 
22 
(23.2%) 
7 
(7.4%) 
95 
(100%) 
Driving a car 2 
(2.9%) 
3 
(4.4%) 
2 
(2.9%) 
13 
(19.1%) 
20 
(29.4%) 
11 
(16.2%) 
17 
(25.0%) 
68 
(100%) 
Driving a 
motorcycle 
0 (0%) 1 
(1.7%) 
0 
(0%) 
10 
(17.2%) 
16 
(27.6%) 
18 
(31.0%) 
13 
(22.4%) 
58 
(100%) 
Snowplay 5 
(11.1%) 
18 
(40%) 
6 
(13.3%) 
7 
(15.6%) 
8 
(17.8%) 
1 (2.2%) 0 (0%) 45 
(100%) 
Skiing 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 
(6.3%) 
5 
(31.3%) 
4 
(25.0%) 
2 (12.5%) 4 
(25.0%) 
16 
(100%) 
Biking 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 
(8.3%) 
3 (25%) 1 
(8.3%) 
5 (41.7%) 2 
(16.7%) 
12 
(100%) 
Snowshoeing 0 (0%) 1 
(12.5%) 
0 (0%) 1 
(12.5%) 
5 
(62.5%) 
0 (0%) 1 
(12.5%) 
8 
(100%) 
Running 2 
(33.3%) 
0 (0%) 3 (50%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 
(16.7%) 
6 
(100%) 
Snowboarding 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (20%) 2 (40%) 2 (40%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 5 
(100%) 
River Crossing 0 (0%) 1 
(33.3%) 
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 
(33.3%) 
1 (33.3%) 0 (0%) 3 
(100%) 
TOTAL 17 34 28 124 152 132 181  
 
 
Q10. What is the relationship between injury causes and recreational activities?  
 
Excluding the categories of “other” and “unknown,” I looked at the relationship between the 
top five causes of non-fatal and fatal injuries and the recreational activity that the visitor was 
participating in at the time. To do so, I performed a cross-tabulation of activity by cause, which 
results in a matrix (see Table 14) with counts and percentages in each cell. Based on this 
analysis, we see that: 
• Natural/Environmental most commonly co-occurred with: (1) hiking/walking, (2) 
mountaineering, and (3) snowshoeing. 
• Falls co-occurred with: (1) hiking/walking, (2) mountaineering, and (3) snowplay.  
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• Overexertion co-occurred with: (1) hiking/walking, (2) mountaineering, and (3) skiing.  
• Struck by/against or crushed co-occurred with: (1) snowplay, (2) mountaineering, and 
(3) hiking/walking.  
• Pre-existing medical conditions co-occurred with: (1) hiking/walking, (2) 
mountaineering, and (3) driving a car. 
• Transportation-related causes co-occurred with: (1) driving a car, (2) driving a 
motorcycle, and (3) riding a bicycle. 
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Table 14: Cross-tabulation of Non-fatal and Fatal Visitor Injury Cause by Activity 
Cause of Injury  
Activity Natural or 
Environ- 
mental 
Fall 
Over-
exertion 
Struck 
by/ 
Against 
or Crush 
Preexist 
medical 
condition 
Transport 
related cause 
Total 
Hiking or 
Walking 
103 (58.5%) 198 
(73.1
%) 
80 (76.2%) 6 (9.7%) 68 (78.2%) 0 (0%) 455 
Mountain-
eering 
65 (36.9%) 40 
(14.8
%) 
14 (13.3%) 18 
(29.0%) 
9 (10.3%) 0 (0%) 146 
Driving (car) 0 (0%) 0 
(0%) 
0 (0%) 2 (3.2%) 5 (5.7%) 70 (52.6%) 77 
Driving 
(motor-cycle) 
0 (0%) 0 
(0%) 
0 (0%) 1 (1.6%) 1 (1.1%) 57 (42.9%) 59 
Snowplay 0 (0%) 10 
(3.7
%) 
3 (2.9%) 29 
(46.8%) 
2 (2.3%) 0 (0%) 44 
Skiing 3 (1.7%) 9 
(3.3
%) 
4 (3.8%) 3 (4.8%) 1 (1.1%) 0 (0%) 20 
Biking 0 (0%) 4 
(1.5
%) 
2 (1.9%) 2 (3.2%) 0 (0%) 6 (4.5%) 14 
Snowshoeing 5 (2.8%) 4 
(1.5
%) 
2 (1.9%) 0 (0%) 1 (1.1%) 0 (0%) 12 
Running 0 (0%) 5 
(1.8
%) 
0 (0%) 1 (1.6%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 6 
 
River 
Crossing 
0 (0%) 1 
(.37
%) 
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 
 Total 176 (100%) 271 
(100
%) 
105 (100%) 62 
(100%) 
87 (100%) 133 (100%) 834 
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APPENDIX B 
 
ONLINE SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
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APPENDIX C 
 
LETTER TO MORA COMMUNITY15 
 
I’d like to take this opportunity to introduce myself to the Mount Rainier National Park 
community. I am a graduate student at Cornell University working as a Student Conservation 
Association (SCA) intern at MORA this winter/spring; if I haven’t met you already--either in the 
last few days, or when I was here in Summer 2009-- I hope to do so soon. 
 
Because you have worked as employees and volunteers at MORA, I believe you have a unique 
and important perspective to share. Therefore, I’d like to invite you to take part in an online 
survey about visitor safety. There are no “right” or “wrong” answers to these questions, and your 
responses will be kept confidential. Your comments will inform my research at Cornell, as well 
as help to provide NPS with feedback on how to address visitor safety issues in the future. 
 
In the next few weeks, you will be receiving an email invitation to access the survey. You may 
skip questions that you do not wish to answer, or discontinue participation at any time with no 
effect. (You can also fill out some questions, and then return to the survey at a later point). I 
estimate that the survey will take about 20 minutes to complete. Once you finish, you’ll have the 
option of entering into a drawing for a gift certificate to REI.  
 
Two other parts of my research deserve mention. First, I will be contacting some of you in the 
next few weeks to ask you to participate in an interview, also relating to safety in the park. 
Second, you may see me at Paradise or the Carbon River area speaking with visitors, whom I 
will be recruiting to take a similar online survey.   
 
If you have any questions or comments about any of the above, please do not hesitate to contact 
me. I look forward to interacting with you all in the next few months! 
 
Best wishes, 
 
 
Laura Rickard 
(401) 258-7252 
lnr3@cornell.edu  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Sent by email to all MORA employees by Chief Ranger Chuck Young in February 2011; also posted at the same 
time on the MORA volunteer blog by Volunteer Coordinator Kevin Bacher. 
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APPENDIX D  
 
LETTER TO OLYM COMMUNITY16 
 
I’d like to take this opportunity to introduce myself to the Olympic National Park community. I 
am a graduate student at Cornell University working as a Student Conservation Association 
(SCA) intern based at Mount Rainier National Park this winter/spring. I’ll be at Olympic for 
several weeks this season, and I hope to meet many of you then. 
 
Because you have worked as employees and volunteers at OLYM, I believe you have a unique 
and important perspective to share. Therefore, I’d like to invite you to take part in an online 
survey about visitor safety. There are no “right” or “wrong” answers to these questions, and your 
responses will be kept confidential. Your comments will inform my research at Cornell, as well 
as help to provide NPS with feedback on how to address visitor safety issues in the future. 
 
In the next few weeks, you will be receiving an email invitation to access the survey. You may 
skip questions that you do not wish to answer, or discontinue participation at any time with no 
effect. (You can also fill out some questions, and then return to the survey at a later point). I 
estimate that the survey will take about 20 minutes to complete. Once you finish, you’ll have the 
option of entering into a drawing for a gift certificate to REI.  
 
Two other parts of my research deserve mention. First, I will be contacting some of you in the 
next few weeks to ask you to participate in an interview, also relating to safety in the park. I will 
be conducting these interviews in person when I am at Olympic. Second, you may see me at 
various locations in the park, such as Hurricane Ridge, speaking with park visitors, whom I will 
be recruiting to take a similar online survey.   
 
If you have any questions or comments about any of the above, please do not hesitate to contact 
me. (You may also prefer to speak with Chief Ranger Colin Smith, who can provide a bit more 
background on my project). I look forward to interacting with you all in the next few months! 
 
Best wishes, 
 
 
Laura Rickard 
(401) 258-7252 
lnr3@cornell.edu  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Sent by email to all OLYM employees in March 2011 by Chief Ranger Colin Smith. 	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APPENDIX E 
 
LETTER TO DEWA COMMUNITY17 	  
I’d like to take this opportunity to introduce myself to the Delaware Water Gap community. I am 
a graduate student at Cornell University who will be conducting social science research at this 
park. I spent the winter and spring as a Student Conservation Association (SCA) Public Safety 
Intern at Mount Rainier NP, and also spent part of my time at Olympic NP. I’ll be at DEWA for 
several weeks this summer, and I hope to meet many of you then. 
 
Because you have worked as employees and volunteers at DEWA, I believe you have a unique 
and important perspective to share, and I’d like to invite you to take part in an online survey 
about visitor safety. There are no “right” or “wrong” answers to these questions, and your 
responses will be kept confidential. Your comments will inform my Ph.D. research at Cornell, as 
well as help to provide NPS with feedback on how to address visitor safety issues in the future. 
 
In the next few weeks, you will be receiving an email invitation to access the survey. You may 
skip questions that you do not wish to answer, or discontinue participation at any time with no 
effect. (You can also fill out some questions, and then return to the survey at a later point). I 
estimate that the survey will take about 20 minutes to complete. Once you finish, you’ll have the 
option of entering into a drawing for a gift certificate to REI.  
 
Two other parts of my research deserve mention. First, I will be contacting some of you in the 
next few weeks to ask you to participate in an interview, also relating to safety in the park. I will 
be conducting these interviews in person when I am at the park, and I estimate that they will take 
about 40 minutes. Second, throughout the summer you may see me at various locations in the 
park, such as Hialeah Picnic Area, speaking with park visitors, whom I will be recruiting to take 
a similar online survey.   
 
If you have any questions or comments about any of the above, please do not hesitate to contact 
me. (You may also prefer to speak with Chief Ranger Eric Lisnik, who can provide a bit more 
background on my project). I look forward to interacting with you all in the next few months! 
 
Best wishes, 
 
 
Laura Rickard 
(401) 258-7252 
lnr3@cornell.edu  
 	  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Sent by email to all MORA employees by Chief Ranger Eric Lisnik in June 2011.	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APPENDIX F 
 
SAMPLE RECRUITMENT POSTCARD (OLYM) 
 
 
 
	   422	  
APPENDIX G 
 
EMAIL SURVEY INVITATION	  	  
FROM:  Laura Rickard 
SUBJECT: National park visitor survey  
 
Dear [[name]], 
 
I  am contacting you to invite you to take part in a study about visitors in national parks.  
In this survey, I will ask you about your experiences in_____National Park, as well as your 
opinions about safety. Your comments will inform my PhD research at Cornell University, as 
well as help to provide the National Park Service with feedback on how to address visitor safety 
issues in the future. 
 
Please take a moment to answer this survey to help us better understand your experiences 
and opinions. Your participation in this survey is voluntary and please be assured that all the 
information you provide will be kept strictly confidential and will never be used in any way to 
permit identification of you. 
 
To access the survey, please use the following URL: 
http://sri.cornell.edu/XXXXXX 
 
**This is a unique URL only for you; please do not forward this link to anyone else. 
  
If you have any questions about the survey, please do not hesitate to contact staff at the Cornell 
University Survey Research Institute at 607-255-3786 or surveyresearch@cornell.edu. In 
addition, my contact information is listed below. 
 
Thank you very much for your time. 
 
Best wishes, 
Laura Rickard 
 
Graduate Student, Department of Communication, Cornell University 
(401) 258-7252 
lnr3@cornell.edu  
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APPENDIX H 
 
EMAIL SURVEY INVITATION REMINDER	  
	  
FROM:  Laura Rickard 
SUBJECT: National park survey—REMINDER 
 
Dear [[name]], 
 
As you may recall, I have contacted you to ask you to take part in a study about visitors in 
national parks. In this survey, I will ask you about your experiences in_____National Park, as 
well as your opinions about safety. Your input matters to me, and I hope you’ll consider 
participating.  
 
Please take a moment to answer this survey to help us better understand your experiences 
and opinions. Your participation in this survey is voluntary and please be assured that all the 
information you provide will be kept strictly confidential and will never be used in any way to 
permit identification of you. 
 
To access the survey, please use the following URL: 
http://sri.cornell.edu/XXXXXX 
 
**This is a unique URL only for you; please do not forward this link to anyone else. 
  
If you have any questions about the survey, please do not hesitate to contact staff at the Cornell 
University Survey Research Institute at 607-255-3786 or surveyresearch@cornell.edu. In 
addition, my contact information is listed below. 
 
Thank you very much for your time. 
 
Best wishes, 
Laura Rickard 
 
Graduate Student, Department of Communication, Cornell University 
(401) 258-7252 
lnr3@cornell.edu  
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APPENDIX I 
 
SURVEY CONVERSION (DEWA VISITORS) 
 
INVITATION: 
 
FROM:  Laura Rickard 
SUBJECT: First 50 people to complete survey by 8/22 receive a gift certificate!  
 
Dear [[name]], 
 
By now you’ve received an invitation to take a survey about visitors in Delaware Water Gap 
National Recreation Area.  
   
I understand that you are busy and would therefore like to offer you a $10 gift certificate to 
Amazon.com to thank you for participating. The first 50 eligible persons to complete the 
survey by August 22nd will receive this gift certificate.  
 
Your participation in this survey is voluntary and please be assured that all the information you 
provide will be kept strictly confidential and will never be used in any way to permit 
identification of you. 
 
To access the survey, please use the following URL: 
http://sri.cornell.edu/XXXXXX 
 
**This is a unique URL only for you; please do not forward this link to anyone else. 
  
If you have any questions about the survey, please do not hesitate to contact staff at the Cornell 
University Survey Research Institute at 607-255-3786 or surveyresearch@cornell.edu. In 
addition, my contact information is listed below. 
 
Thank you very much for your time, and I look forward to your participation! 
 
Best wishes, 
Laura Rickard 
 
Graduate Student, Department of Communication, Cornell University 
(401) 258-7252 
lnr3@cornell.edu  
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APPENDIX J 
 
INFORMED CONSENT (EMPLOYEE/VOLUNTEER INTERVIEWS) 
 
Exploring visitor safety and risk communication in national parks  
 
You are invited to participate in a research study about visitor safety in national parks. You were 
selected as a possible participant because of your job/position. I ask that you read this form and 
ask any questions you may have before agreeing to be in the study.  
 
Background Information: This project will examine how National Park Service (NPS) staff and 
national park visitors think about human safety in national parks. The goal is to better understand 
the role played by park staff in discussing risk and safety-related issues with the public, as well 
as to understand how and where park visitors may receive and interpret risk and safety-related 
park information.  
 
Procedures: If you agree to be in this study, I will ask you to participate in an interview, 
envisioned to last about 40 minutes, in which I will ask about your views on safety issues in the 
parks and how and what you communicate with the public about these views. If you feel 
comfortable doing so, you may be asked to participate in this interview with one or more of your 
co-workers. With your permission, this interview may be audio-taped. 
 
Risks and Benefits of Being in the Study: I do not anticipate any risks for you participating in 
this study, other than those encountered in day-to-day life. If we correspond via email, there is a 
chance that a third-party could read our correspondence. Indirect benefits of participation are 
greater awareness of the communication challenges faced by NPS employees and volunteers as 
well as their role in influencing public understanding of health and environmental risks. 
 
Payment for Participation: You will not receive any payment for taking part in the study. 
 
Voluntary Nature of Participation: Your decision whether or not to participate will not affect 
your current or future relations with Cornell University, nor with the National Park Service. Your 
participation is voluntary, and you may refuse to participate before the interview begins, 
withdraw or ask questions at any time, and/or skip any questions with no effect. 
 
Confidentiality: The records of this study will be kept private. In any sort of report I might 
publish, I will not include any information that will make it possible to identify you. All data will 
be securely stored in the investigator’s locked office on the investigator’s password-protected 
computer. Hard copies of data will remain in the investigator’s office. All data will be destroyed 
(i.e., shredded or erased) when their use is no longer needed but not before a minimum of five 
years after data collection. 
 
Permission to Use Recording Device: Please sign below if you are willing to have this 
interview audio-taped. You may still participate in this study if you are not willing to have the 
interview recorded. 
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Signature ___________________________________ Date ________________________ 
 
Contacts and Questions: The researchers conducting this study are: 
 
Laura Rickard, Graduate student, Department of Communication, 212 Kennedy Hall, Cornell 
University, Ithaca, New York 14853. Phone: 401-258-7252; Email: lnr3@cornell.edu 
 
Katherine McComas, Associate Professor, Department of Communication, 313 Kennedy Hall, 
Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, 14853. Phone: 607-255-6508   
 
If you have any questions or concerns regarding your rights as a subject in this study, you may 
contact the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at 607-255-5138 or access their website at 
http://www.irb.cornell.edu. You may also report your concerns or complaints anonymously 
through Ethicspoint or by calling toll free at 1-866-293-3077. Ethicspoint is an independent 
organization that serves as a liaison between the University and the person bringing the 
complaint so that anonymity can be ensured. 
 
 You will be given a copy of this form to keep for your records. 
 
Statement of Consent: I have read the above information and have received answers to any 
questions I asked. I consent to participate in the study. 
 
 
Signature ___________________________________ Date ________________________ 
 
Your name (printed)________________________________________________________ 
 
Signature of person obtaining consent    ____Date _______ 
 
Printed name of person obtaining consent    ___Date_____________ 
 
This consent form will be kept by the researcher for at least three years beyond the end of the 
study and was approved by IRB on November 23, 2010. 
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APPENDIX K 
 
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
	  
[Introduce self and project and thank individual for participating. Review the informed 
consent form and seek permission to audiotape interview.] 
 
Introductory information 
1) How did you come to be an employee/volunteer at _______park? 
 
2) Tell me about your experience working/volunteering at the park. 
• How long have you worked/volunteered here? Have you worked/volunteered at other 
national parks?  
• How would you describe your position at the park—for instance, do you see your time 
here as serving the public, a part-time job, a full-time career, etc.?  
 
Attribution of responsibility and safety 
3) In thinking about visitor safety, what do you think counts as an “accident”? Can you think of 
an example?   
• How do you decide who is responsible for accidents occurring? (Or, can you decide?) 
 
4) How does this park address safety issues, both in relation to employees and visitors?  
• To what extent is safety emphasized in this park? Can you think of an example to explain 
what you mean?  
 
5) In your opinion, what is the park’s role in ensuring the safety of its visitors? What about the 
visitor’s role?  
• What should park visitors know about risk/safety issues in the park? 
• Does a visitor’s background influence what he or she should need to know about these 
issues? 
 
6) Is any amount of risk “acceptable” in a national park? Why or why not?  
• (How) can we distinguish between “acceptable” and “unacceptable” levels of risk?  
 
Risk communication 
7) Tell me about the ways in which visitors receive safety/risk information.  
• How effective are these methods for getting across the safety/risk information? 
• Is there a particular topic/issue that you feel is not currently being well publicized in the 
park?  
• Is there an information source/method that doesn’t currently exist, that should exist?   
 
8) To what extent is talking to the public about safety/risk issues a part of your job? 
• Have you discussed these issues? What has “worked”? Not worked?  
• Have you received any training in talking about safety/risk issues with public audiences? 
If not, would you like to have training?  
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• Are there any other individuals at the park that you can think of who play a role in 
disseminating risk/safety information by word-of-mouth?  
 
[Thank the participant, making sure to leave appropriate time for questions, debriefing, 
and/or other comments, i.e., “Is there anything else you would like to add that we didn’t get 
to in this interview?”] 
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